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In recent years, a paradigm shift has occurred in the way companies view risk 
management, and the trend has moved towards a holistic view of risk 
management. As the fundamental paradigm in this trend, enterprise risk 
management (ERM) has attracted much worldwide attention. Construction 
firms have been seen as prime candidates for ERM adoption because their 
businesses are risky ventures, plagued with complex and diverse risks. This 
research aims to provide an understanding of ERM implementation in Chinese 
construction firms (CCFs) based in Singapore, thereby contributing to the 
knowledge relating to ERM implementation in construction firms. 
Specifically, this research proposes an ERM framework, which considers the 
project-based nature of construction firms and presents the functional steps 
toward ERM implementation. In addition, this research develops an ERM 
maturity model. This model adopts the fuzzy set theory (FST) to deal with the 
problems relating to ambiguous, subjective and imprecise judgments that are 
inevitably involved in the ERM maturity assessment exercise. Through a 
literature review and a survey conducted with 89 professionals, a total of 16 
important maturity criteria and 66 applicable ERM best practices as the 
sub-set of the criteria were identified and included in the model. Out of the 89 
respondents, 64 were practitioners from CCFs in the global market and 25 
were academics from universities located in Mainland China. 
A further survey was performed to collect the data relating to the 
implementation levels of the 66 ERM best practices in CCFs based in 
Singapore. By inputting these data into the ERM maturity model, it was found 
that the overall ERM maturity level of these firms was low, and that there was 
significant association between the ERM maturity level and firm size.  
ix 
 
ERM maturity can be influenced by the interactions between the drivers for 
and hindrances to ERM implementation. Thus, using the survey data, the 
research found that 13 drivers and 25 hindrances had significantly positive and 
negative influence on ERM implementation in CCFs based in Singapore, 
respectively. These significant drivers and hindrances were interpreted in 
tandem with the theories of organizational change, organizational learning, 
organizational culture, motivation, as well as leadership. 
Case studies were also conducted to uncover how ERM was implemented in 
three Singapore-based CCFs. The cross-case comparison results substantiated 
the association between ERM maturity and firm size, and implied that the 
ERM implementation in these firms was influenced by their respective parent 
companies.  
Lastly, this research develops a knowledge-based decision support system 
(KBDSS) for ERM in CCFs, which can assess the ERM maturity, visualize the 
assessment results, provide action plans for improving ERM practices, and 
generate a printable ERM maturity assessment report. The KBDSS consists of 
a knowledge base, a graphical user interface, and a decision support engine. 
As few studies have been focused on ERM implementation in construction 
firms, the proposed ERM framework, the development of the fuzzy ERM 
maturity model for CCFs, as well as the investigation of the ERM maturity 
and the factors influencing ERM implementation in Singapore-based CCFs 
significantly contribute to the current literature. In addition, the ERM KBDSS, 
which incorporates the ERM maturity model and a set of action plans, allows 
users to obtain a clear view of the status quo, strengths and weaknesses of 
their ERM implementation and on how to improve their ERM practices, thus 
contributing to practices in the industry. 
x 
 
Future research would develop a set of metrics to measure ERM performance, 
examine the impact of ERM on project performance, set up an ERM 
benchmarking system, as well as identify the appropriate organizational 
learning styles, motivation measures, and leadership styles for ERM 
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1.1 Research motivation 
There are numerous opportunities in the international construction market. 
According to the Engineering News-Record (ENR), the top 250 international 
contractors as a group generated US$511.05 billion from overseas projects in 
2012 (ENR, 2013a). However, construction businesses, especially those 
conducted outside home countries, are risky ventures. Cost and time overruns 
were found to be frequent in international construction projects (Flyvbjerg et 
al., 2003). Contracting in overseas construction markets involves not only the 
typical risks at home, but also the complex and diverse risks peculiar to 
international transactions (Han and Diekmann, 2001). Inadequate overseas 
environmental information and construction experience contribute to a higher 
risk exposure and possibility of losses in the international market than that in 
the domestic market (Zhi, 1995). Furthermore, contractors that fail to conduct 
effective risk management in the overseas market tend to bear the 
consequences such as poor cost and schedule performance, conflicts, and even 
business failures. Hence, risk management is critical for construction firms to 
survive and remain profitable in the international construction market (Ling 
and Hoang, 2009; Zhao et al., 2012). 
The construction industry is a project-based industry. Hence, risks inherent in 
construction projects have been emphasized in the litetrature (Lehtiranta, 2013; 
Shen, 1997; Zhi, 1995; Zou et al., 2007b). However, construction firms are 
also exposed to the risks outside the projects, which tend to impact both 
project objectives and corporate objectives. Overemphasis on project risk 
management (PRM) tends to result in low efficiency in risk management, lack 
of transparency across multiple projects, inappropriate resource allocation 
among projects and difficulties in achieving the corporate strategic objectives 
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(Adibi, 2007; Zhao et al., 2011, 2012). Therefore, risk management in 
construction firms should cover not only project risks, but also the risks 
encountered by being a business enterprise (Schaufelberger, 2009). Sometimes, 
the projects concurrently managed by a firm may fail at the same time, as the 
result of failure in risk management at the firm level (Liu et al., 2013). 
For construction firms venturing into overseas markets, a global view to 
identify systemic risks was recommended to replace project-only risks (Zhi, 
1995). The recent trend is to take a holistic view of risk management (Gordon 
et al., 2009), recognizing risk management as an enterprise-wide process that 
collectively considers the risks that various projects face and links these risks 
to the corporate strategy (Adibi, 2007). Thus, enterprise risk management 
(ERM), which is a holistic and integrated approach to risk management, has 
captured the attention of risk management professionals and researchers 
worldwide (McGeorge and Zou, 2013) and was forecast to grow in the 
construction industry (Deloitte, 2010a). This approach agrees with the modern 
portfolio theory. This theory states that it is possible to build a portfolio that is 
reasonably safe even though it contains a number of uncorrelated or negatively 
correlated high-risk investments (Lam, 2003). 
ERM has been driven by a series of compulsory corporate governance 
requirements, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) corporate governance rules in the US, Corporate 
Governance Code in the UK, and KonTraG in Germany. The three main rating 
agencies, i.e. Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s and Fitch, also regarded 
ERM implementation as an input to the analysis of credit ratings (Beasley et 
al., 2008). In addition, several ERM frameworks and standards have been 
issued for ERM implementation (CAS, 2003; COSO, 2004; ISO, 2009b). 
Hence, ERM has been implemented in a variety of industries. A great number 
of studies on ERM have been conducted, with most of them focusing on the 
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financial, insurance, manufacturing, energy and chemical industries. Some 
surveys on ERM implementation have used the samples from construction 
firms (AON, 2010; Beasley et al., 2010c; CFO/Crowe, 2008; KPMG, 2010), 
indicating that there were ERM practices in construction firms. However, few 
studies have been conducted to provide an understanding of ERM 
implementation in construction firms. Therefore, there exists a knowledge gap 
in ERM implementation in construction firms. This research fills the gap and 
provides an understanding of ERM implementation in construction firms. 
1.2 Research scope 
According to the ENR, Chinese construction firms (CCFs) occupied the top 
three positions among the top 250 global contractors (ENR, 2013b), and 55 
CCFs were ranked within the top 250 international contractors based on their 
overseas contracting revenues in 2012 (ENR, 2013c). Hence, CCFs are 
playing an important role in the international construction market. According 
to the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC), by the end of 2012, 
CCFs had accumulated a turnover of US$652.75 billion from overseas 
projects (NBSC, 2013).  
As one of the four Asian Tigers, Singapore has become an important overseas 
market for CCFs because of its relatively stable political and economic 
environment, liberal rules, and attractive construction demand. According to 
the Building and Construction Authority of Singapore (BCA, 2013b), 
Singapore’s construction demand reached S$28.1 billion (approximately 
US$22.3 billion) in 2012. CCFs have benefited greatly from this high demand. 
According to the NBSC (2013), the turnover of CCFs in Singapore had 
increased from US$0.51 billion in 2001 to US$2.88 billion in 2012, which 
made Singapore become the ninth largest overseas markets of CCFs.  
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This research focuses on ERM implementation in CCFs based in Singapore, 
which are actually the overseas subsidiaries of their parent companies located 
in Mainland China. This research proposes an ERM framework to facilitate 
ERM implementation in construction firms, and examines the ERM 
implementation level and the critical factors affecting the ERM 
implementation in Singapore-based CCFs. In addition, these critical factors 
are analyzed in tandem with five theories of organizational behavior, including 
organizational change, organizational learning, organizational culture, 
motivation, as well as leadership theories. Finally, to enhance the ERM 
implementation level towards the best practices in CCFs, a knowledge-based 
decision support system (KBDSS) for ERM is developed.  
1.3 Research objectives 
As the research question is “How is ERM implemented in CCFs based in 
Singapore?”, this research aims to provide an understanding of the ERM 
implementation in CCFs based in Singapore, thereby filling the knowledge 
gap in ERM implementation in construction firms. The specific objectives of 
this research are to: 
(1) Propose an ERM framework to facilitate the ERM implementation in 
construction firms; 
(2) Develop an ERM maturity model to assess the ERM maturity in CCFs;  
(3) Investigate the ERM maturity level in CCFs based in Singapore; 
(4) Examine the critical factors driving and hindering the implementation of 
ERM in CCFs based in Singapore, and analyze them in tandem with 
theories of organizational behavior; and 
(5) Develop a KBDSS that can assess the ERM maturity level of CCFs and 




1.4 Research hypotheses 
ERM implementation is an on-going and iterative process (Bowling and 
Rieger, 2005; Hallowell et al., 2013) and should proceed in incremental steps 
(IMA, 2007). An effective ERM program requires several years to develop 
(Hallowell et al., 2013). Hence, the implementation level of ERM is often 
described by a maturity continuum. Several ERM maturity models have been 
developed to help organizations in various industries to assess their ERM 
maturity level (AON, 2010; Ciorciari and Blattner, 2008; RIMS, 2008; Santori 
et al., 2007; UC, 2009). These models help organizations to identify the status 
quo, strengths and weaknesses of their ERM practices, from which they can 
derive measures to fill the existing gaps between the status quo and the best 
practices. The construction industry is project-based and has some typical 
characteristics, such as involvement of various parties, product uniqueness, 
on-site production and ad hoc project teams with relatively high turnover rates 
(Burtonshaw-Gunn, 2009; Tserng et al., 2009). These characteristics make the 
construction industry different from financial, insurance, and energy industries, 
where the existing ERM maturity models have been widely used. Also, the 
short-term perspective in the construction indutry hinders innovation and 
technical development (Dubois and Gadde, 2000, 2002), and the industry’s 
specific uncertainties increase the difficulty in using a centralized approach to 
decision-making (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). This research develops an ERM 
maturity model to assess the ERM maturity level in CCFs against several 
criteria. These criteria can reflect the key characteristics of advanced or 
successful ERM practices. The implementation levels of these criteria act as 
the independent variables in the model, while the ERM maturity level is the 
dependent variables. This model involves the formulation of the first 
hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: ERM maturity in CCFs depends on a set of critical criteria. 
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Although the overall revenue of CCFs has been soaring in recent years, CCFs 
were still plagued with several weaknesses, one of which was identified as the 
lack of sufficient management capacities (Lu et al., 2009), including the risk 
management capacity. The low risk awareness caused by an unsupportive 
culture and the lack of expertise and experience was found to hinder the 
implementation of risk management in the Chinese construction industry (Liu 
et al., 2007). Although it is necessary for CCFs to properly analyze and 
understand the cultural, political, economic, institutional, and regulatory 
environment in their target overseas markets before they venture abroad (Zhao 
et al., 2009), a number of CCFs have rushed abroad without a proper market 
analysis (Orr and Scott, 2008).  
CCFs in Singapore also appeared to have a low level of risk awareness. 
External risks, which fall outside a firm’s direct control (Fang et al., 2004; 
Frame, 2003), tend to threaten construction firms in the overseas market. 
However, the lack of external risk management was found in most CCFs 
based in Singapore, where firms had low risk awareness and lacked capable 
people with the specific knowledge (Low et al., 2009). Moreover, CCFs that 
first ventured into Singapore would not spend resources in external risk 
management, but were eager to win a project regardless of the potential risks 
(Low et al., 2008). In addition, some CCFs did not emphasize safety risks, 
with workers risking their lives to achieve early completion (Ling and Lim, 
2010). As ERM should cover all the risks that a firm faces, the lack of external 
risk management and low-level safety management may represent low-level 
ERM. Zou et al. (2010) compared the maturity measurement levels of various 
risk management maturity models and categorized maturity into four levels: 
initial and ad hoc, repeatable, managed, and optimized. Ciorciari and Blattner 
(2008) evaluated ERM maturity along a scale including the very weak, poor, 
middle, good and optimized levels. The levels below the middle can be viewed 
as immature. Hence, the second research hypothesis can be drawn as follows: 
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Hypothesis 2: ERM maturity level in CCFs based in Singapore is low. 
The first two hypotheses are related to ERM maturity and their relationship 
can be depicted as seen in Figure 1.1. The sources of the 16 ERM maturity 
criteria are presented in Section 3.7.2. The weights of the criteria in the model 
were identified using the professional views collected from the first round of 
questionnaire survey. Professionals rated the importance of each criterion 
based on their experience and knowledge about risk management in CCFs. 
Through the one-sample t-test, the criteria with significant importance were 
deemed as critical criteria and retained in the model. Thus, the ERM maturity 
level depends on these critical criteria and Hypothesis 1 can be tested (see 
Section 7.2.2). It should be noted that this ERM maturity model can be used to 
measure ERM maturity level of all the CCFs, including those based in 
Singapore. The data relating to the implementation level of each critical 
criterion were collected from the second round of questionnaire survey 
conducted with CCFs based in Singapore. The data were input into the model, 
and the overall maturity level of CCFs based in Singapore was identified. 












M01. Commitment of the board and senior management
M02. ERM ownership
M03. Risk appetite and tolerance
M04. Risk-aware culture
M05. Resources 
M06. Risk identification, analysis and response 
M07. Iterative and dynamic ERM process steps 
M08. Leveraging risks as opportunities
M09. Risk communication
M10. A common risk language
M11. A risk management information system
M12. Training programs 
M13. Formalized key risk indicators
M14. Integration of ERM into business processes
M15 .Objective setting
M16. Monitoring, review and improvement of ERM 
framework
 
Figure 1.1 Hypotheses 1 and 2 
Sources: Various sources presented in Section 3.7.2 
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The first two hypotheses are important because a review of current risk 
management practices is the foundation of improvements in risk management 
practices and such a review should be started by assessing its risk management 
maturity (Loosemore, 2006). There has not been an ERM maturity model 
specifically for construction firms in the existing literature. The proposed 
ERM maturity model that helps CCFs assess their ERM maturity levels can 
expand the current literature.  
ERM implementation is impacted by the interaction between drivers for and 
hindrances to ERM implementation. In this research, drivers for and 
hindrances to ERM implementation were collected from a literature review on 
ERM implementation in various industries (see Sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.5). As 
these drivers and hindrances were hypothesized to drive and hinder the ERM 
implementation in CCFs based in Singapore, the following two research 
hypotheses can be formulated (see Figure 1.2): 
Hypothesis 3: ERM implementation in CCFs based in Singapore is affected by 
a set of critical drivers. 
Hypothesis 4: ERM implementation in CCFs based in Singapore is affected by 
a set of critical hindrances. 
A total of 17 drivers and 36 hindrances were identified and collated from the 
literature review and to test the Hypotheses 3 and 4. The data relating to the 
significance of drivers and hindrances were collected by the second survey 
conducted with the CCFs in Singapore. In addition, the one-sample t-test was 
used to test the statistical significance of the drivers and hindrances (see 




















 4Drivers for ERM implementation
D01. Legal and regulatory compliance requirements
D02. Non-mandatory reports or standards
D03. Credit rating agencies’ requirements
D04. Reduced earnings volatility
D05. Reduced costs and losses
D06. Increased profitability and earnings 
D07. Improved decision-making
D08. Better risk reporting and communication
D09. Increased management accountability 
D10. Greater management consensus
D11. Competitive advantages
D12. Better resource allocation
D13. Improved clients’ satisfaction
D14. Improved control of an enterprise over its projects
D15. A broader scope of risks
D16. Advances in information technology 
D17. Request from top management
Hindrances to ERM implementation
H01. Low data quality
H02. Lack of data
H03. Insufficient resources (e.g. time, money, people, etc.)
H04. Lack of a formalized ERM process
H05. Lack of risk management techniques and tools
H06. Lack of internal knowledge, skills and expertise
H07. Lack of qualified personnel to implement ERM
H08. Lack of a risk management information system (RMIS)
H09. Unsupportive organizational structure
H10. Unsupportive organizational culture
H11. Lack of a common risk language
H12. Lack of risk awareness in the organization
H13. Confidence in the existing risk management practices
H14. Existence or re-emergence of the silo mentality
H15. Lack of shared understanding and approach to risk management across departments
H16. Lack of understanding relating to an effective ERM process
H17. Perception that ERM adds to bureaucracy
H18. Perception that ERM increases costs and administration
H19. Perception that ERM interferes with business activities
H20. Inadequate training on ERM
H21. Lack of an ERM business case
H22. Lack of perceived value or benefits
H23. Lack of commitment from the board and senior management
H24. Not perceived as priority by senior management
H25. Lack of the board or senior management leadership
H26. The movement of the ERM champion from senior management into other areas without a successor
H27. Lack of consensus on benefits of ERM among the board members and senior management
H28. Other competing priorities
H29. Lack of a clear ERM implementation plan;
H30. Inability to coordinate with other departments;
H31. Lack of a set of metrics for measuring ERM performance
H32. Unclear ownership and responsibility for ERM implementation
H33. Organizational turf
H34. Employees’ reluctance to give up power
H35. People’s reluctance to share risk information 
H36. Recession and business downturn
Drive Hinder
 
Figure 1.2 Hypotheses 3 and 4  
Sources: Various sources presented in Sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.5 
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Hypotheses 3 and 4 are important because the identification of the critical 
drivers and hindrances can help practitioners find the key points for ERM 
implementation. Hence, the management can take measures to strengthen the 
positive influence of drivers and diminish the negative influence of hindrances. 
The critical drivers and hindrances were analyzed in tandem with the 
organizational behavior theories, as well as it can extend the existing 
literatures relating to the linkages between ERM implementation and 
organizational behavior theories.  
Figure 1.3 indicates how the four hypotheses are linked. The portion above, 
including Hypotheses 1 and 2, is for the study of ERM maturity, while the 















Figure 1.3 The link of the four hypotheses 
It should be noted that ERM implementation is different from ERM maturity. 
ERM maturity is a static status while ERM implementation is a dynamic status. 
ERM implementation is a multi-year journey and an on-going process, during 
which there are different ERM maturity levels at different points in time for 
ERM implementation. Hence, ERM maturity can be considered as a “snapshot” 
of ERM implementation (see Figure 1.4). ERM implementation level at a 















Figure 1.4 The “snapshot” view of ERM implementation 
1.5 Research significance 
In recent years, a paradigm shift has occurred in the way companies view risk 
management, and the trend has moved towards a holistic view of risk 
management (Gordon et al., 2009). As the fundamental paradigm in this trend, 
ERM has attracted worldwide attention (McGeorge and Zou, 2013). 
Compared with the traditional approach, ERM enables firms to shift the focus 
of the risk management function from primarily defensive to increasingly 
offensive and strategic (Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003) and provides a new way 
to improve PRM in construction firms (Liu et al., 2013). Given the complexity 
and diversity of the risks, construction firms have been seen as prime 
candidates for ERM adoption (Druml, 2009). Thus, it is important to gain an 
understanding of ERM in construction firms.   
ERM maturity reflects the sophistication of ERM implementation. To 
understand the ERM maturity of a company, a starting point can be the 
assessment of its current risk management practice (Loosemore, 2006). It is 
necessary for a company to assess its ERM maturity because such assessment 
can help the company obtain a clear view of the status quo, strengths and 
weaknesses of its ERM implementation. Based on the assessment results, the 
management staff of this company can take measures and prioritize resources 
to improve the weak areas of the ERM implementation. Thus, an ERM 
maturity model is developed and applied in the CCFs based Singapore. 
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In addition, ERM implementation is impacted by the interaction between 
drivers for and hindrances to ERM implementation. Hence, it is important to 
identify the critical drivers and hindrances, which can help find the key points 
for ERM implementation, thus allowing the management to strengthen the 
positive influence of drivers and diminish the negative influence of hindrances. 
From the perspective of organizational behavior, ERM can be considered as a 
process of organizational change from the traditional, silo-based risk 
management approach to a holistic and integrated risk management approach. 
This organizational change also requires organizational learning as a medium 
(Alas and Sharifi, 2002), change in the organizational culture (Senior and 
Fleming, 2006), appropriate motivation measures, and the leadership of 
change agents. Thus, it is necessary to link ERM with the theories of 
organizational change, organizational learning, organizational culture, 
motivation, and leadership, thus providing the theoretical rationale behind 
ERM implementation in construction firms. 
Furthermore, the ERM maturity assessment involves complicated 
mathematical calculations and the management needs to take measures to 
improve their ERM along the maturity continuum. Thus, it is necessary to 
develop an easy-to-use platform for the users to assess their ERM maturity and 
support their decision-making relating to ERM. The KBDSS developed in this 
research incorporates the ERM maturity model, and thus enables the users to 
assess their maturity and obtain the action plans that help them to improve 
their ERM practices along the maturity continuum. This KBDSS can also 
serve as a learning tool for the users unfamiliar with ERM. When they use the 
KBDSS, they need to read the ERM best practices and think about the current 
practices in their firms. This thinking process contributes to their knowledge 
and practices relating to ERM.  
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1.6 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of 10 chapters. Following this chapter, Chapter 2 provides 
an overview of the Chinese construction industry in terms of the domestic 
market, ownership of firms, workforce, safety, and profitability, and then 
focuses on the CCFs venturing into the international construction market.  
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on risk management and ERM. In this chapter, 
the factors that drive and hinder ERM implementation are identified, an ERM 
framework for construction firms is proposed, and a fuzzy ERM maturity 
model for CCFs is developed.  
ERM implementation also involves issues relating to organizational behaviors. 
Hence, five organizational behavior theories, including organizational change, 
organizational learning, organizational culture, motivation, and leadership 
theories, are reviewed in Chapter 4. Then, ERM implementation is linked to 
the five organizational behavior theories respectively, and a conceptual model 
is generated in Chapter 5.  
Chapter 6 describes the research process, data collection techniques and data 
analysis methods. Two rounds of surveys and three case studies were 
performed, and the data were collected through past document analysis, 
questionnaires, and semi-structured interviews. Multiple statistical analysis 
methods were selected to analyze the data. The data analysis results of the 
two-round questionnaire surveys and relevant discussions are presented in 
Chapter 7, while the findings of the three case studies are described in Chapter 
8.  
Chapter 9 provides the background information of KBDSSs, and presents the 
development of the KBDSS for ERM in CCFs. Also, a hypothetical example 
is used to demonstrate how the KBDSS works, and the KBDSS is validated 
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using the case testing method with the views garnered from five industry 
experts.  
Finally, Chapter 10 provides a summary of research findings and conclusions, 
a discussion of the contributions to the literature and practices, the research 
limitations, and recommendations for further research. 
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2 The Chinese Construction Industry and Firms 
2.1 Introduction 
China, currently the second largest economy in the world, has experienced 
significant economic development in the past 30 years, benefiting from the 
“reform and opening-up” policy. China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has 
jumped from Renminbi (RMB) 364.52 billion (approximately US$60.36 
billion) in 1978 to RMB51,894.2 billion (approximately US$8,262.2 billion) 
in 2012 (NBSC, 2013). As one of the oldest traditional industries, the 
construction industry has kept pace with infrastructural and urban 
development that formed the most essential ingredients of China’s rapid 
economic development, and has been thus regarded as an important pillar 
supporting China’s economy (Cheah et al., 2007; Low and Jiang, 2003).  
The Chinese construction industry was relatively huge in size. Its annual 
output value had dramatically increased from RMB1,249.76 billion 
(approximately US$198.1 billion) in 2000 to RMB13,721.8 billion 
(approximately US$2,251.9 billion) in 2012 (NBSC, 2013). The construction 
industry has contributed to the employment scene in China. At the end of 2012, 
there were 42.6 million people employed by 75,280 construction firms (NBSC, 
2013). A majority of the workforce in the Chinese construction industry were 
peasant-workers with low level of knowledge.  
This chapter provides an overview of the Chinese construction industry in 
terms of the domestic market, ownership of firms, workforce, safety, and 
profitability. Then, this chapter focuses on the CCFs venturing into the 
international construction market. The literature review covers their overseas 
market distributions and output values, SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities and Threats) analysis, and risk management practices. Finally, 
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there appears to be a need for implementing ERM in the CCFs outside of 
China. 
2.2 Overview of the Chinese construction industry 
2.2.1 The Chinese construction market 
The massive output value of the Chinese construction industry was largely 
attributed to the booming domestic construction market. The boom in the 
domestic market was closely related to the national fixed assets investments. 
Specifically, more than 60% of these investments had been in construction and 
installation projects between 2000 and 2012 (NBSC, 2013) (see Figure 2.1).  
 
Figure 2.1 Fixed assets investment in China in 2000-2012 
Source: NBSC (2013) 
The national fixed assets investment decisions were made by the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the State Council of 
China. Recent decisions for huge fixed assets investments relating to the 
construction industry included the following:  
(1) In November 2008, the State Council of China decided to complete a huge 
investment of about RMB4,000 billion (approximately US$657.4 billion) 





















Total fixed assets investments Investments in construction and installation projects
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the national economy, and thus alleviating the negative impacts of the 
global financial crisis. Most of the investments have been used for 
infrastructure construction, urban development, as well as the post-disaster 
reconstruction in the areas destroyed by the devastating Wenchuan 
earthquake in May 2008.  
(2) China’s 12th Five-Year Plan indicated that about RMB7,000 billion 
(approximately US$1,150.6 billion) would be invested into urban 
infrastructure construction from 2011 to 2015 (Xiao, 2010).  
(3) The No. 1 Document of the CPC Central Committee, which was issued in 
January 2011, proposed the development of rural water conservancy 
projects. Hence, the State Council plans to invest around RMB4,000 
billion (approximately US$657.4 billion) in rural water conservancy 
construction projects from 2011 to 2020 (Jin, 2011).  
Besides the investments decided by the CPC Central Committee and the State 
Council, the provincial and municipal governments also invested massive 
sums of money into the infrastructure projects within their jurisdiction. This is 
because these investments could greatly contribute to the increase in local 
GDP, which was considered as one of the most important indicators to 
measure the performance of local officials. Furthermore, the investments in 
residential buildings by corporations (state-owned, private, or joint venture) 
also contributed to the development of the Chinese construction industry. The 
huge demand for housing among the Chinese urban people and the great 
benefits underlying the real estate development drove a number of 
corporations to invest in residential building development.  
These huge investments have enabled the domestic construction market to 
experience continuous booms, thereby providing CCFs with many 
opportunities. Benefiting from the numerous opportunities, leading CCFs have 
got soaring revenues in recent years. ENR indicated that 46 CCFs were ranked 
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within the top 250 global contractors based on their total contracting revenue 
in 2012 (ENR, 2013b). Table 2.1 shows the 2012 total revenue of the leading 
Chinese contractors among the ENR top 250 global contractors. Chinese 
contractors occupied half of the top 10 global contractors. China Railway 
Construction Corp. Ltd. occupied the top position, with a total revenue of 
US$84,642.0 million, followed by China Railway Group Ltd. with a total 
revenue of US$81,805.7 million and China State Construction Engineering 
Corp. with US$81.366.8 million. Domestic revenue made up 97.5%, 95.4% 
and 93.9% of their total revenue in 2012, respectively. Domestic revenue also 
represented over 70% of the total revenue in other CCFs. 
Table 2.1 Leading Chinese global contractors in 2013 ENR ranking 
Rank Firm name 
Total revenue 
(Million US$) 
% of domestic 
revenue 
1 China Railway Construction Corp. Ltd. 84,642.0 97.5% 
2 China Railway Group Ltd. 81,805.7 95.4% 
3 China State Construction Engineering Corp. 81,366.8 93.9% 
5 China Communications Construction Group Ltd. 47,327.3 76.4% 
9 China Metallurgical Group Corp. 31,522.6 92.7% 
13 Shanghai Construction Group  20,822.4 95.8% 
14 Sinohydro Group Ltd. 20,120.1 72.8% 
36 China National Chemical Engineering Group Corp. 8,725.8 86.3% 
41 Shengli Petroleum Administration Bureau, Sinopec 7,537.6 97.5% 
42 China Gezhouba Group Co. Ltd. 7,507.3 73.2% 
Source: ENR (2013b) 
 
It is worth noting that all the top 10 firms and a majority of the 46 CCFs in the 
2012 ENR top 250 global contractors were state-owned enterprises. 
State-owned and collective-owned enterprises were two typical ownership 
forms of Chinese enterprises in China’s planned economy system. There have 
been reforms in the ownership of enterprises since the adoption of “reform and 
opening-up” policy. The next section describes the ownership of the CCFs. 
2.2.2 Ownership forms of CCFs 
Since adopting the “reform and opening-up” policy in late 1978, the traditional 
19 
 
planned economy system has been challenged through reforms in a variety of 
industries. In 1992, the 14
th
 CPC Congress identified the transformation to the 
socialist market economy as the goal of the reforms. Enterprise reforms, which 
stressed the establishment of a modern enterprise system, were critical for 
completing this transformation. As one of the enterprise reforms, ownership 
diversification had encouraged shareholding among entities with various 
ownership forms. Through ownership diversification, the authorities hoped to 
completely cut the direct ties between state-owned enterprises and their 
controlling authorities. Due to ownership diversification, the ownership of 
CCFs had evolved from traditional state and collective ownership towards a 
mixed economy (Wang et al., 2006).  
According to ownership, the CCFs were categorized into state-owned firms, 
collective-owned firms, firms funded from Hong Kong (HK), Macao (MO), 
and Taiwan (TW), foreign funded firms, and other firms, most of which were 
private firms (NBSC, 2013). Table 2.2 highlights the employees and number 
of each category of construction firms in 2000-2012. At the end of 2012, there 
were a total of 75,280 construction firms employing about 42.7 million people, 
creating a total output of about RMB13,721.8 billion. As Table 2.2 shows, in 
2012, state-owned firms accounted for only approximately 6.1% of all the 
firms, but employed 10.7% of all the employees in construction firms and 
generated 16.7% of the industry output value. Others represented about 86.8% 
of all the firms, employed 83.7% of all the employees, and contributed about 
78.9% to the whole output value of the Chinese construction industry. 
Construction firms funded from outside Mainland China represented around 
0.9%, and employed only 0.5% of all the employees.
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Table 2.2 Number, employees and gross output value of CCFs in 2000-2012 
Year Total 









  Others 
No. %   No. %   No. %   No. %   No. % 
Number of CCFs 
2000 47,518  9,030  19.0   24,756  52.1  635 1.3   319 0.7   12,778  26.9  
2001 45,893  8,264  18.0   19,096  41.6  622 1.4   274 0.6   17,637  38.4 
  2002 47,820  7,536  15.8  
 
13,177  27.6  
 
632 1.3  
 
279 0.6  
 
26,196  54.8  
2003 48,688  6,638  13.6  
 
10,425  21.4  
 
535 1.1  
 
287 0.6  
 
30,803  63.3  
2004 59,018  6,513  11.0  
 
8,959  15.2  
 
511 0.9  
 
386 0.7  
 
42,649  72.3  
2005 58,750  6,007  10.2  
 
8,090  13.8  
 
516 0.9  
 
388 0.7  
 
43,749  74.5  
2006 60,166  5,555  9.2  
 
7,051  11.7  
 
479 0.8  
 
370 0.6  
 
46,711  77.6  
2007 62,074  5,319  8.6  
 
6,614  10.7  
 
482 0.8  
 
365 0.6  
 
49,294  79.4  
2008 71,095  5,315  7.5  
 
5,843  8.2  
 
474 0.7  
 
363 0.5  
 
59,100  83.1  
2009 70,817  5,009  7.1  
 
5,352  7.6  
 
444 0.6  
 
351 0.5  
 
59,661  84.2  
2010 71,863  4,810  6.7   5,026  7.0   416 0.6   331 0.5   61,280  85.3  
2011 72,280  4,642  6.4   4,847  6.7   393  0.5   303 0.4   62,095  85.9  
2012 75,280  4,602  6.1   4,640  6.2   385  0.5   295 0.4   65,358  86.8  
Employees of CCFs (1,000) 
2000 19,943  6,356  31.9   8,875  44.5  82  0.4   44  0.2    4,586  23.0  
2001 21,107  5,907  28.0   7,399  35.1  77  0.4   43  0.2    7,681  36.4  
2002 22,452  5,438  24.2  
 
5,792  25.8  
 
74  0.3  
 
45  0.2    11,104  49.5  
2003 24,143  5,243  21.7  
 
5,056  20.9  
 
70  0.3  
 
60  0.3    13,713  56.8  
2004 25,003  4,674  18.7  
 
3,864  15.5  
 
68  0.3  
 
81  0.3    16,316  65.3  
2005 26,999  4,800  17.8  
 
3,616  13.4  
 
86  0.3  
 
108  0.4    18,389  68.1  
2006 28,782  4,676  16.2  
 
3,320  11.5  
 
89  0.3  
 
81  0.3    20,616  71.6  
2007 31,337  4,701  15.0  
 
3,170  10.1  
 
98  0.3  
 
114  0.4    23,254  74.2  
2008 33,150  4,721  14.2  
 
2,668  8.0  
 
105  0.3  
 
92  0.3    25,564  77.1  
2009 36,726  5,189  14.1  
 
2,468  6.7  
 
109  0.3  
 
102  0.3    28,857  78.6  
2010 41,604  5,769  13.9   2,465  5.9   122  0.3   98  0.2   33,151  79.7  
2011 38,525  4,449  11.5   2,204  5.7   113  0.3   99  0.3   31,660  82.2  
2012 42,672  4,578  10.7    2,162  5.1    130  0.3    103  0.2    35,700  83.7  
Gross output value of CCFs (Billion RMB) 
2000 1,249.8  505.4  40.4  
 
403.6  32.3  
 
9.9  0.8  
 
6.7  0.5    324.1  25.9  
2001 1,536.2  536.3  34.9   377.6  24.6  10.3  0.7   7.3  0.5    604.7  39.4  
2002 1,852.7  558.3  30.1  
 
333.9  18.0  
 
11.4  0.6  
 
9.1  0.5    940.1  50.7  
2003 2,308.4  606.0  26.3  
 
327.1  14.2  
 
12.4  0.5  
 
12.9  0.6    1,350.0  58.5  
2004 2,902.1  732.6  25.2  
 
275.6  9.5  
 
13.7  0.5  
 
20.2  0.7    1,860.0  64.1  
2005 3,455.2  843.2  24.4  
 
281.5  8.1  
 
17.3  0.5  
 
24.9  0.7    2,288.3  66.2  
2006 4,155.7  921.9  22.2  
 
290.4  7.0  
 
24.1  0.6  
 
27.5  0.7    2,891.9  69.6  
2007 5,104.4  1,063.1  20.8  
 
315.4  6.2  
 
28.2  0.6  
 
39.6  0.8    3,658.1  71.7  
2008 6,203.7  1,223.2  19.7  
 
321.6  5.2  
 
32.1  0.5  
 
38.7  0.6    4,588.1  74.0  
2009 7,680.8  1,519.0  19.8    328.2  4.3    33.5  0.4    41.5  0.5    5,758.6  75.0  
2010 9,603.1  1,814.9  18.9   365.5  3.8   44.4  0.5   43.9  0.5    7,334.3  76.4  
2011 11,646.3 2,043.68 17.5   430.65 3.7   61.27 0.5   65.82 0.6   9,044.9 77.7 
2012 13,721.8 2,293.02 16.7   491.90 3.6   64.97 0.5   47.70 0.3   10,824.2 78.9 
Source: NBSC (2013) 
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In addition, the number of state-owned and collective-owned construction 
firms had decreased by 49.0% and 81.2% from 2000 to 2012, respectively. 
Employees in state-owned firms had dropped by 28.0%, but their output value 
had quadrupled during this period, which demonstrated the improvement in 
productivity of state-owned firms. By contrast, the number of firms in “others” 
category had jumped from 12,778 to 65,358 during this period, which was 
attributed to the privatization of some state-owned and collective-owned 
construction firms and the establishment of new private firms.  
Furthermore, the number of firms funded from HK/MO/TW had decreased by 
39.3%, while the number of foreign funded firms had reduced by 7.5%. 
Despite the dramatic increase in the output value of both categories of 
construction firms, these firms still contributed less than 1% to the 
construction industry output value. 
2.2.3 Workforce of CCFs 
The huge number of employees in the CCFs suggested that this industry was 
still a labor intensive industry, which was not likely to change drastically in 
the near future because of its potential impact on employment (Low and Jiang, 
2003) and social stability. A majority of the workforce in the construction 
industry were peasant-workers who used to be peasants living on farms in the 
countryside. Under the Residence Management and Registration Ordinance of 
China enacted in 1958, the migration of rural residents to cities or towns was 
strictly forbidden unless they could find a job in a city or town or obtain 
admission by a university or high school. The reforms in the agriculture had 
enabled agricultural productivity to increase dramatically, thereby freeing a 
number of rural workers from their tasks. Simultaneously, the “reform and 
opening-up” policy had accelerated the industrialization process in the coastal 
cities since 1979, and created huge demand for workers. Hence, the 
government allowed peasants to work in the cities or towns without changing 
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their registered residence from peasants to workers (Yung, 2009). Thus, the 
term peasant-worker appeared in the 1980s.  
Peasants were usually gathered by a foreman to work on the construction site. 
Arrears in payment were thorny problems for peasant-workers. If paid on time, 
they would earn more money than farming in the countryside. If the foremen 
or contractors could not pay them on time, attributed to the clients’ delay in 
payments or the dishonesty of the foremen or contractors, the peasant-workers 
would suffer heavy losses. With the increase in legal awareness, 
peasant-workers have been trying to protect their own rights. In addition, 
under the leadership of the State Council, provincial and municipal 
governments have also helped to clear arrears and to take measures to protect 
peasant-workers’ rights since 2003. These measures also contributed to 
China’s social stability.  
These peasant-workers were usually industrious, and eager to earn money to 
improve the living standards of their families in the countryside. However, 
they generally had a low education level, and most of them did not receive any 
tertiary education. They obtained related knowledge and skills only through 
short-term training. Moreover, most of them lacked proper safety training and 
adequate safety awareness, which contributed to China’s poor construction site 
safety record (Liu et al., 2007; Tam et al., 2004).  
2.2.4 Safety 
In terms of international standards, the safety record of the Chinese 
construction industry was poor (Tam et al., 2004). The Chinese construction 
industry was considered as the second most dangerous industry second to the 
coal mining industry (Zou et al., 2007a). To improve construction safety, a 
series of laws, regulations and technical codes have been enacted. The Labor 
Law of China, which came into force on 1 January 1995, stipulated in the sixth 
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chapter that employers should maintain safe and healthy working conditions. 
However, the clauses were not specific enough to ensure adequate inspection 
and enforcement. The Construction Law of China, enacted on 1 March 1998, 
was the basic law regulating the construction industry, and specifically set out 
in the fifth chapter the structure for safety administration in the construction 
industry. The Law of Working Safety of China, which became effective on 1 
November 2002, set out requirements for the proper behavior of all forms of 
enterprises and employees. It was the foundation for the government 
administration in working safety. Moreover, the Ordinance for Construction 
Engineering Safety Management, enacted on 1 February 2004, stipulated the 
safety responsibilities of all stakeholders in construction activities, and 
described the supervision and management system for construction safety. The 
Ordinance also set out the specific punishment for unacceptable behavior, and 
emplaced criminal responsibilities on the owner, designer, construction and 
supervision enterprises according to the Criminal Law of China (Zou et al., 
2007a). In order to handle working safety accidents, the State Council enacted 
the Ordinance for Reporting and Investigating Work Safety Accidents on 1 
June 2007, which developed the requirements for reporting accidents and 
classified safety accidents into four classes, as indicated in Table 2.3.  
Table 2.3 Classification of safety accidents 
Accident class 
Accidents resulting in one of the following conditions 
Fatalities  Serious injuries Direct economic loss (Million RMB) 
Extraordinarily serious ≥ 30 ≥ 100 ≥ 100 
Serious 10-29 50-99 50-100 
Relatively serious 3-10 10-49 10-50 
Ordinary ≤ 2 ≤ 9 < 10 
 
According to the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of China 
(MOHURD, 2013), construction safety in building and municipal works was 
still far from satisfactory. As Table 2.4 indicates, there were 487 safety 
accidents leading to 624 deaths in 2012, which was an improvement compared 
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with that in 2011. The total number of safety accidents and fatalities had 
dropped gradually during these three years. However, in the terms of the 
number and fatalities of relatively and more serious accidents, there was still 
much room for improvement. It merits attention that the data provided by the 
MOHURD only presented the accidents in building and municipal works and 
did not indicate the safety status of the whole Chinese construction industry 
because other works were outside the jurisdiction of the MOHURD. Moreover, 
because some fatalities might be concealed deliberately, safety in building and 
municipal works might be worse than what is indicated in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4 Accidents in building and municipal works in 2010-2012 
Year 
Accidents  Relatively and more serious accidents 
Total number Fatalities   Number Fatalities 
2010 627 772   29 125 
2011 589 738  25 110 
2012 487 624  29 121 
Source: MOHURD (2013) 
Poor safety in the Chinese construction industry could be attributed to a 
number of factors. Cheng et al. (2004) found that the safety knowledge level 
of project managers, safety officers and foremen was very low, and proposed 
six root causes of accidents in China: lack of attention on safety protection by 
workers, lack of attention on safety management by main contractors and 
project managers, insufficient safety training, inadequate setting of minimum 
safety level, tiredness of workers, and poor quality of construction materials 
and equipment. In addition, Tam et al. (2004) claimed that poor safety 
awareness leaders in the firms, lack of training, poor safety awareness of 
project managers, reluctance to input resources for safety, and reckless 
operations were the top five causes for poor construction site safety in China. 
Construction safety management is also a key element of PRM in construction 
firms because accidents can threaten project objectives (Zou et al., 2007b). 
From the perspective of the entire firm, safety risk could ruin the firm’s 
25 
 
reputation, erode its profitability and even threaten its survival because 
accidents can involve criminal charges. Hence, safety risk should also be 
considered as a key element of ERM. A risk-aware culture tends to generate a 
safety culture on the site, thus lowering the accident occurrence rate. 
2.2.5 Profitability of CCFs 
The competitive bidding system was introduced into the Chinese construction 
industry in the early 1980s. In 1999, the National People’s Congress of China 
passed the Tendering and Bidding Law, which stipulated that a project funded 
by the state or by international financial institutions was required to undergo a 
bidding process. Hence, most of the CCFs had to win contracts through 
competitive bidding. However, some large state-owned firms can still secure 
projects through government assignments.  
Wang et al. (2006) found that maximizing profitability was considered as the 
most important objective by most construction firms. As Figure 2.2 illustrates, 
the average profitability of CCFs had steadily increased from 2000 to 2012. 
The 2012 ratio of profit to output value was 3.50%, which was more than 
double that of 2000 (1.54%). The pre-tax profit to gross output value had 
increased by 45.7% during this period.  
 
Figure 2.2 Profitability of CCFs in 2000-2012 
Source: NBSC (2013) 
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Although the average profitability appeared satisfactory, a number of 
construction firms were still plagued with relatively low profitability (Cheah et 
al., 2007) or even deficits in contracting projects. There have been a number of 
plausible explanations for the low profitability of CCFs, including (Cheah et 
al., 2007; Wang et al., 2006):  
(1) Competitive bidding was a common practice for the CCFs to obtain 
contracts. The contractor’s bid price was always very important in 
determining who would be awarded a contract. As a result, cutting price 
has been a common competing method for various categories of 
construction firms. This method might lead to low profitability. 
(2) Clients may force the contract price down through negotiations with the 
contractors. Most contractors would accept the lower price proposed by 
clients, especially so in a prevailing buyers’ market. 
(3) Clients tended to ask contractors to finance the projects during 
construction, largely depleting the contractors’ working capital. Without 
the advance and on-time payment, many contractors had no money to pay 
the subcontractors, and the subcontractors in turn had no money to pay the 
peasant-workers. Consequently, the main contractors’ and subcontractors’ 
profits were squeezed so that the profitability level might drop to nearly 
zero. 
(4) Losses in construction were always related to risks. Construction firms 
with poor risk management skills and low risk awareness would suffer 
losses during the construction process, leading to low profitability.  
As poor risk management skills and low risk awareness contribute to low 
profitability of CCFs (Wang et al., 2006), a high level of risk management 
practice that indicates good risk management skills and appropriate risk 
awareness would improve the profitability. 
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2.3 CCFs in the overseas market 
2.3.1 CCFs’ overseas market 
Despite the booming domestic construction market, an increasing number of 
CCFs have ventured overseas for market expansion, driven by the current 
globalization of construction markets. Encouraged by the Chinese 
government’s “way out” strategy and support through loans, custom duties 
reliefs, improving the efficiency and administrative procedures for approving 
overseas construction works, etc., CCFs had built up their competencies to 
venture into the overseas markets, and expanded their businesses in about 180 
countries by the end of 2012 (NBSC, 2013). In addition, joining the 
international competition has been thought of as a strategy that could 
strengthen the competitiveness of these firms, and afford them the 
opportunities to learn advanced management skills and technologies from their 
overseas competitors.   
 
Figure 2.3 Overseas project contract value and turnover of CCFs in 1989-2012 
Source: NBSC (2013) 
Construction projects awarded have been the main source of overseas turnover 
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had been increasing gradually from 1989 to 2000. From 2000 to 2012, CCFs’ 
overseas project turnover had drastically increased by 14 times, from US$8.38 
billion in 2000 to US$116.6 billion in 2012. In addition, after 17 years of 
gradual rise from 1989 to 2005, CCFs’ overseas project contract value had 
rapidly increased since 2005, from US$29.6 billion in 2005 to US$156.5 
billion in 2012 (NBSC, 2013). Although CCFs had expanded their businesses 
in about 180 countries, over 99% of CCFs’ overseas turnover was based in the 
developing countries in 2012, and about 81.6% came from Asia (46.56%) and 
Africa (35.02%). As Figure 2.4 shows, Angola, India, Venezuela, Nigeria, 
Saudi Arabia were the five largest overseas markets of CCFs (NBSC, 2013).  
 
Figure 2.4 Top 10 largest overseas markets of CCFs in 2012 
Source: NBSC (2013) 
 
Figure 2.5 Overseas project turnover of various markets of CCFs in 2000-2012 
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As Figure 2.5 indicates, the period of 2000-2012 witnessed a steady rise in 
CCFs’ turnover in Asia and Africa, which could be attributed largely to the 
good relationship between China and Asian and African countries. However, 
CCFs’ turnover in Europe and North America was still relatively low, which 
made CCFs weak in terms of the overall international market share.  
The ENR top 250 international contractors generated US$511.05 billion from 
overseas projects in 2012 (ENR, 2013a). A total of 55 CCFs were ranked 
within the top 250 international contractors, sharing about 13.3% (US$67.17 
billion) of the total overseas revenue (ENR, 2013c). By contrast, 58 European 
firms shared 50.3% (US$255.03 billion), and 34 American contractors shared 
14.1% (US$71.52 billion). This demonstrated that there were still weaknesses 
that rendered CCFs uncompetitive with respect to their European and 
American counterparts in the international market, despite a number of other 
strengths and increasing competitiveness. Hence, CCFs should understand 
their strengths and weaknesses, as well as the opportunities and threats while 
competing in the international market.  
2.3.2 CCFs based in Singapore 
Despite being an island country with limited land resources, Singapore has a 
thriving and stable political and economic environment. Singapore’s Building 
and Construction Authority (BCA) has made efforts to create a knowledgeable 
workforce, and enables Singapore to be an ideal location for construction 
firms from various countries (Low et al., 2008). In addition, the Singapore 
construction industry has experienced a continuous increase in demand, driven 
by strong public housing demand and high construction demand for 
institutional developments and major infrastructure projects. In 2013, total 
construction demand reached a historical high of S$35.8 billion 
(approximately US$28.1 billion), increasing by 27.1% from S$28.1 billion in 
2012 (BCA, 2014). The booming Singapore construction market also offers 
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CCFs a number of opportunities. Ling and Lim (2010) indicated that CCFs in 
Singapore usually have strong financial capacity, received strong support from 
the Chinese government, offered low bids through low profit margins, low 
labor costs and satisfactory quality, and achieved satisfactory cost 
performance. 
In 2012, CCFs in Singapore obtained a turnover of US$ 2880.1 million from 
contracted projects (see Figure 2.6), which was more than triple of that in 
2000 (US$ 654.2 million) (NBSC, 2013). Thus, CCFs in Singapore occupied a 
share of about 10% in this market. In addition, in terms of the annual turnover, 
Singapore has become the ninth largest overseas markets for CCFs. CCFs 
began to venture into the Singapore construction market in the early 1990s. At 
the time of this study, there were 46 CCFs based in Singapore, nine of which 
had the A1 grade under the BCA registry, indicating that they enjoyed 
unlimited tendering capability. Most of these CCFs were of medium size and 
small size entities. Also, a majority of these CCFs were registered under the 
general building category and engaged in building projects, while only a few 
were registered under the civil engineering category and served as main 
contractors in the mass rapid transit projects.  
 
Figure 2.6 Project turnover of CCFs in Singapore in 2000-2012 
Source: NBSC (2013) 
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2.3.3 SWOT analysis of CCFs in the overseas market 
A construction firm’s decision to venture overseas should be based on a good 
understanding of the opportunities and threats associated with the international 
business, as well as the development of company strengths relative to 
international activities (Gunhan and Arditi, 2005). Previous studies (Lu et al., 
2009; Zhao and Shen, 2008; Zhao et al., 2009) conducted SWOT analysis of 
CCFs in the international market. The strengths and weaknesses tended to be 
internally controllable factors, while opportunities and threats were external 
factors that could not be directly controlled but could react to their advantages 
(Pearce, 1992). Thus, Zhao and Shen (2008) and Zhao et al. (2009) identified 
CCFs’ strengths and weaknesses in terms of management ability, financial 
ability, technological ability, resource differences and cost differences. They 
also identified opportunities and threats in the light of the social and political 
environment, economic environment, as well as markets and competition.  
 
Figure 2.7Figure 2.7 lists the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of 
CCFs in the overseas market. 
· Lower workforce cost
· Plenty and cheap construction materials 
available
· Hard working
· Experience on large scale and complex 
projects
· Specialty expertise
· Insufficient management capacity
· Lack of R&D
· Weak in professional services 
· Lack of skilled labor
· Low ability to create financial solutions for 
clients
· Limited extent of using information 
communication technologies (ICTs)
· Language disadvantage
· Lack of experience for sophisticated 
project procurement
· Booming domestic market
· Strong government support
· Friendly relationship with developing 
countries
· Booming overseas construction market
· More open global construction market
· Increasing Chinese firms' overseas direct 
investments (ODI)






· High nontariff barriers








Figure 2.7 SWOT analysis of CCFs in the overseas market 
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Sources: Zhao and Shen (2008), Lu et al. (2009) and Zhao et al. (2009) 
The strengths of CCFs have enabled them to make significant progress in 
establishing their competitiveness and expanding into the overseas markets. 
Low cost of workforce, materials and equipment were considered as 
traditional strengths of CCFs (Zhao and Shen, 2008; Zhao et al., 2009). In 
addition, CCFs’ employees usually worked hard due to the profound influence 
of Confucianism. Hard work has been accepted as a code of ethics by CCFs’ 
employees that helped CCFs to expand even into markets with adverse 
conditions (Zhao et al., 2009). Moreover, huge investments in infrastructures 
and urban development in the domestic market involved constructing many 
large and complex projects, such as the Beijing Olympic venues, the Three 
Gorges Dam project, the South-to-North Water Transfer project and the 
Qinghai-Tibet Railway project. These projects provided opportunities for 
CCFs to gain valuable experience and specialty expertise. Such experience 
and expertise allowed the CCFs to transfer these practices into the overseas 
market.  
Despite these strengths, CCFs were still plagued with several weaknesses, 
which hindered their market expansion in developed countries. The biggest 
problem of CCFs was the insufficient management capacity to integrate their 
strengths to penetrate the international market due to the lack of a strong base 
of international entrepreneurs and management professionals (Lu et al., 2009). 
Lack of research and development (R&D) was another weakness of CCFs. 
Few CCFs had R&D departments (Low and Jiang, 2003), which made CCFs 
lagged behind their counterparts in scientific research and construction 
management skills. Lack of skilled labor also contributed to poor performance 
in many CCFs because most of the CCFs’ workforce was made up of 
peasant-workers with inadequate knowledge and skills (Zhao et al., 2009). 
Lack of skilled employees also rendered CCFs weak in professional services 
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in construction, such as design, engineering, consultancy, and information 
technology (IT) services. These professional services could reflect 
competitiveness in the international market and have seen as a necessary 
facilitator for business expansion (Lu et al., 2009). In particular, the lack of 
design capacity has been a common disadvantage of CCFs to bid for projects 
that adopt the design-build (DB) model.  
In addition, despite strong financial capacities in some CCFs, they still lacked 
the experience to package financial solutions for clients, which hampered 
them from achieving a win-win situation both for their clients and themselves 
(Lu et al., 2009). Moreover, the use of information communication 
technologies (ICTs) in CCFs for construction management and 
decision-making was relatively slow compared with their overseas competitors, 
thus constraining them from improving performance in the overseas markets. 
Incompetence in English was also a common weakness of CCFs that affected 
effective communication between CCFs and their overseas clients, which 
might result in a reduction of overseas business opportunities (Zhao and Shen, 
2008). However, this language disadvantage did not seem to be significant for 
CCFs in Singapore, because many Singaporeans can communicate in 
Mandarin (Ling and Lim, 2010). Furthermore, a majority of the CCFs were 
used to the traditional Design-Bid-Build (DBB) model, which hindered their 
bids for large and sophisticated projects that adopted new procurement models, 
such as the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) and Build-Operate-Transfer 
(BOT) projects (Lu et al., 2009). 
There were also several opportunities in the domestic and overseas 
environments for the CCFs. As a result of huge investments in infrastructures 
and urban development, the booming domestic market provided a buffer for 
CCFs that enabled them to be more flexible when competing against their 
counterparts (Lu et al., 2009). Due to the “way out” strategy, the Chinese 
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government has taken measures to help the CCFs compete in the overseas 
markets. These included loans, custom duties reliefs, providing overseas 
market information, and improving the efficiency of approving overseas 
construction work. China’s long-standing and friendly relationships with a 
number of developing countries particularly in Africa and Asia also helped the 
CCFs to achieve high market shares in these countries (Zhao et al., 2009). 
Additionally, despite the negative influence of the 2008 global financial crisis, 
the Asian and African construction markets were still booming from 
infrastructural construction. Hence, opportunities were still available for the 
CCFs in their traditional markets. China’s entry into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) also enabled CCFs to embrace a more open global 
market. As the underlying principle of the WTO, global trade liberalization 
concerning open market access and fair national treatment would provide 
tremendous opportunities for CCFs’ expansion into new overseas markets (Lu 
et al., 2009). Moreover, the overseas direct investments (ODI) had spiraled 
drastically from US$5.5 billion in 2004 to US$87.8 billion in 2012 (NBSC, 
2013). Firms doing ODI tended to select familiar contractors to undertake their 
construction works, thus presenting good opportunities to CCFs in the 
overseas markets. Furthermore, CCFs’ collaboration and partnering with their 
Japanese, American or European counterparts has been a useful strategy when 
bidding for sophisticated projects. This also provided the opportunities to 
expanding into new markets. Partnering or joint ventures between CCFs, 
typically between civil engineering firms and mechanical and electrical 
supply/installation firms, were also very common (Lu et al., 2009). 
Finally, the CCFs should not ignore the threats in the environment when 
venturing abroad. Overseas construction activities involve complex and 
diverse risks peculiar to these international transactions, over and above the 
typical risks at home (Han and Diekmann, 2001). The uncertain political and 
economic environments in developing countries, which were the main 
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overseas markets of CCFs (Deng and Low, 2013), have significantly 
threatened their overseas business performance. The recent examples were the 
turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa arising from the Jasmine 
Revolution, which led to great losses for the CCFs. Increasing costs have been 
another thorny issue threatening CCFs’ performance. The rapid increase in the 
costs of labor, materials and equipment has weakened the CCFs’ traditional 
advantage of low cost, which was worsened by currency fluctuation. The 
strong appreciation of Chinese RMB against the US dollar would reduce the 
CCFs’ revenue in RMB because payments were usually made in US dollars in 
the international market (Zhao and Shen, 2008). In addition, there was fierce 
competition in the international construction market due to globalization. Such 
competition would lead to a “low-bid-price war”, which would lead to 
considerable decrease in profits for the CCFs (Zhao et al., 2009). Moreover, a 
number of new nontariff barriers such as high technical standards or limiting 
visa permits for workforce have been set up by an increasing number of 
countries to protect their construction markets. Hence, the CCFs have been 
prevented from expanding their shares in the American and European markets. 
Furthermore, the increasing trend towards providing integral services would 
threaten the CCFs’ business because most of them were used to the DBB 
model and lacked the experience of procurement in the PPP and BOT models. 
Other weaknesses such as low management capacity, low ability to create 
financial solutions for clients and weak professional services would worsen 
this situation (Lu et al., 2009).  
Opportunities and threats co-exist in the international construction market. It is 
the task of risk management that seeks to maximize the positive impacts of 
opportunities as well as to minimize the negative impacts of threats.  
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2.3.4 Risk management practices of CCFs in the overseas market 
Effective risk management is crucial to the survival, profitability and success 
of the CCFs that have ventured into the international arena where the risk 
exposure is higher. Inadequate information pertaining to the overseas 
environment and construction experience also contributed to a higher risk 
exposure and possibility of losses in the international market than that in the 
domestic market (Zhi, 1995). Hence, it is necessary for the CCFs to properly 
analyze and understand the cultural, political, economic, institutional, and 
regulatory environment in their target overseas markets before they venture 
abroad (Zhao et al., 2009). However, a number of CCFs went abroad without a 
proper market analysis (Orr and Scott, 2008), which demonstrated their low 
risk awareness. 
External risks, falling outside a firm’s direct control (Fang et al., 2004; Frame, 
2003), can threaten construction firms in the overseas market. However, the 
Singapore-based CCFs lacked external risk management (Low et al., 2009) 
and those that first ventured into Singapore would not invest in external risk 
management but were eager to win a project regardless of the potential risks 
(Low et al., 2008). Evidently, not all overseas construction markets were as 
stable as Singapore’s. Lack of effective risk management might lead to huge 
losses for the CCFs that contracted projects in the unstable markets due to the 
political risks. The war in Libya, which was CCFs’ sixth largest overseas 
market in 2010 (NBSC, 2011), has already resulted in tremendous losses for 
the CCFs. The latest conservative estimate of the state-owned CCFs’ losses 
was approximately US$18.8 billion, but only 5.68% of the losses could be 
covered by insurance contracts (Xinhuanet, 2011). In addition, the devastating 
earthquake, tsunami and nuclear meltdown in Japan would increase the 
uncertainty of some raw materials’ prices, and bring about some surprises to 
the international construction market. Furthermore, even if the environment is 
37 
 
relatively stable, CCFs’ ineffective risk management can engender huge 
losses.  
Leading CCFs have already encountered their pitfalls in the overseas market. 
Two recent cases were related to the huge losses of China Railway 
Construction Corp. Ltd. in Saudi Arabia and China Overseas Engineering 
Group in Poland. These were the subsidiaries of the top and second ranked 
firms among the 2012 ENR top 250 global contractors, respectively (ENR, 
2013b). The former was estimated to have suffered a maximum loss of 
RMB4.15 billion (approximately US$681 million) (China, 2011) while the 
latter was claimed about US$271.1 million (Cienski, 2011). These huge losses 
were caused not only by project risks, but also by the risks from the strategic 
decisions. In other words, these were caused not only by low level of PRM, 
but also by low level of ERM.  
However, cases of successful risk management in CCFs still abound. Wu 
(2008) illustrated the effective risk management practice of a subsidiary of 
China Communications Construction Group (Ltd.) through two construction 
projects in Indonesia and Singapore. Despite the complex risks, this firm 
achieved satisfactory performance in both projects. 
2.4 Summary 
The huge investments in infrastructures and urban development have 
contributed greatly to economic development and brought about a continually 
booming domestic construction market in China. In this market, state-owned 
construction firms still played a key role despite their reduced proportion due 
to ownership diversification brought about by the enterprise reforms. The 
“reform and opening-up” policy also contributed to the advent of 
peasant-workers, who made up a majority of the workforce in CCFs. Most of 
them and some managers lacked proper safety training or education, and 
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adequate safety awareness, resulting in China’s poor construction site safety 
records despite the presence of several enacted laws and regulations. This 
demonstrated the low level of risk management in CCFs, which also 
contributed to low profitability in some CCFs. Lack of effective risk 
management was also a thorny problem for CCFs based in Singapore, because 
the risks whose sources were perceptibly far away from Singapore might also 




3 Risk Management and Enterprise Risk Management 
3.1 Introduction 
All organizations, regardless of their size, industry or customer base, have to 
face some degree of risks. Hence, risk management is seen as a management 
response to the volatile environment. Traditionally, risk management has been 
segmented and conducted in separate business units or departments (i.e. silos) 
within a company. However, the silo-based approach to risk management has 
been criticized because it overlooks risk interdependence, inefficient 
coordination and duplication of expenditure. By contrast, ERM treats each risk 
as part of an enterprise’s entire risk portfolio rather than a discrete one, and is 
thus considered as a holistic and integrated risk management approach.  
This chapter first provides an overview of risk management through an 
introduction to the definition of risk and risk management and the generic risk 
management process. Also, it discusses the fundamentals of ERM and the 
relationship between ERM and PRM, and proposes an ERM framework for 
construction firms. This framework can be customized by firms according to 
their stage reached in ERM implementation. Finally, to assess the ERM 
maturity level in construction firms, an assessment model is developed by 
adopting the fuzzy set theory (FST). 
3.2 Overview of risk management 
3.2.1 Definition of risk and risk management 
Risk has different meanings to different people, and the concept of risk varies 
according to viewpoints, attitudes and experiences (Walewski et al., 2003). 
Some scholars emphasized the negative or harmful consequences of risk and 
considered the risk as synonymous with threat (Baloi and Price, 2003; Rescher, 
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1983; Rowe, 1977), while some recognized risk as a double-edged sword, 
encompassing both downside risk (threat) and upside risk (opportunity) 
(Loosemore, 2006; Segal, 2011; Ward and Chapman, 2003).  
In addition, as risk arises from uncertainty (Hillson and Simon, 2007), some 
definitions have linked risk with uncertainty. Knight (1921) argued that risk 
was calculable within reasonable precision while uncertainty was not 
calculable. However, some scholars supported the interchangeable use of risk 
and uncertainty (Del Caño and De la Cruz, 2002; Diekmann et al., 1988; 
Vernon, 1981) because the likelihood of occurrence of uncertainty is usually 
estimated by subjective judgments and it is difficult to draw a clear line 
between a knowable and unknowable belief (Tan, 2007). This argument was 
challenged by Hillson (2006), who argued that uncertainty without impact on 
objectives should not be viewed as risk.  
Also, some of the international and regional risk management standards 
admitted the double-edged nature of risk and linked risk with organization’s 
objectives. For instance, the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) defined risk as “effect of uncertainty on objectives” (p.1) in ISO 
31000:2009, which has been adopted in the British Standard Institution (BSI); 
and Standards Australia/Standards New Zealand (AS/NZS 4630:2004) defined 
risk as “the chance of something happening that will have an impact on 
objectives” (p.4), which was withdrawn in 2009 in favor of ISO 31000. Given 
the double-edged nature of risk and its impact on objectives, this research 
adopts the risk definition provided by ISO 31000:2009, and puts aside the 
difference between risk and uncertainty in terms of availability of the 
likelihood of occurrence.  
Definitions of risk management are also available in risk management 
standards. ISO 31000:2009 briefly defined risk management as “coordinated 
activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk” (p.2) while 
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the Institute of Risk Management (IRM, 2002) defined risk management as 
“the process whereby organizations methodically address the risks attaching to 
their activities with the goal of achieving sustained benefit within each activity 
and across the portfolio of all activities” (p.2). In this research, risk 
management is recognized as the process supported by resources to deal with 
risk by monitoring and controlling the likelihood and/or impact of threats, or 
by seeking the realization of opportunities.  
3.2.2 Risk management process 
A systematic process of risk management is normally divided into risk 
identification, risk analysis, and risk response. Risk response can be further 
divided into four actions, i.e. retention, reduction, transfer and avoidance (Zou 
et al., 2007b). Recent risk management standards, such as BS 31100:2008 and 
ISO 31000:2009, have added some new elements, which render the risk 
management process more comprehensive. Such a risk management process 















































Figure 3.1 A generic risk management process 
Source：ISO 31000:2009 
(1) Communication and consultation 
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This is the continual and iterative processes that an organization conducts 
to provide, share or obtain information, and to engage in dialogue with 
stakeholders regarding the management of risk. Communication and 
consultation with internal and external stakeholders should take place at 
each step of the risk management process.   
(2) Establishing the context 
The organization defines the external, internal and risk management 
process context where the remaining process will take place. The external 
context is anything outside the organization that must be considered in risk 
management, while the internal context is anything within the organization 
that can influence risk management in the organization, such as the 
organizational structure and culture, objectives, strategies, resources and 
knowledge, and decision-making processes (both formal and informal). 
The risk management context is where the risk management process is 
applied, and includes the responsibility for risk management, the scope of 
the risk management process, risk assessment methods to use, the way to 
evaluate the performance and effectiveness of the risk management, the 
relationships between a project and other projects in the organization, and 
the resources available for the risk management process.  
(3) Risk identification 
The organization should identify sources of risk, areas of impacts, events 
(including changes in circumstances) and their causes and potential 
consequences. The risks identified should be placed in a risk register or 
risk log before they can be treated. It should be assumed that not all risks 
will be identified and hence monitoring and review are necessary to add 
risks to the register. Review of historical document, brainstorming, Delphi 
technique, scenario analysis, checklist analysis, SWOT analysis or other 
methods can help people identify risks, particularly infrequent risks, or 
“black swan” situations (Taleb, 2007). 
(4) Risk analysis 
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Risk analysis is to provide the decision maker with sufficient 
understanding of the risk. Risk analysis involves consideration of the 
causes and sources of risk, their positive and negative consequences, and 
the likelihood of the occurrence of consequences. Factors affecting 
consequences and likelihood should be identified. Risk is analyzed by 
determining consequences and their likelihood, and other attributes of the 
risk. Risk analysis methods can vary from quantitative mathematical 
models to qualitative methods. 
(5) Risk evaluation 
Risk evaluation assists in decision-making, based on the outcomes of risk 
analysis, about which risks need treatment and the priority for treatment. 
Risk evaluation involves comparing the level of risk found during the 
analysis process with the risk criteria. Based on this comparison, the need 
for treatment can be considered. 
(6) Risk treatment 
Risk treatment, which is synonymous with risk response, is the process to 
modify the risks. Selecting the most appropriate risk treatment option 
involves balancing the costs and efforts of implementation against the 
benefits derived, with regard to legal, regulatory, and other requirements 
such as social responsibility and the protection of the natural environment. 
Dealing with negative consequences, the risk treatment options include 
avoiding/eliminating risks, reducing risks, retaining/accepting risks, 
transferring risks, as well as sharing risks with others. In contrast, 
exploiting, sharing, accepting or enhancing risks can be employed to treat 
risks with positive consequence, i.e. opportunities. 
(7) Monitoring and review 
Monitoring and review involve regular checking or surveillance, and 
encompass all aspects of a risk management process in order to ensure that 
controls are effective and efficient. Monitoring and review also obtain 
further information to improve risk identification, analysis, and evaluation, 
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learn lessons from the risk management process, detect changes in the 
context, and identify emerging risks. 
The risk management process should also be recorded to enable risk 
management activities to be traceable, thereby providing the foundation for 
continuous improvement in the overall process. Hence, all the risk 
management elements constitute a continuous cycle of review and 
improvement. 
3.3 ERM fundamentals 
3.3.1 Definition of ERM 
Although there have been various definitions of ERM (CAS, 2003; Lam, 2003; 
Miccolis and Shah, 2000), ERM is most frequently defined with reference to 
the 2004 guidance document Enterprise Risk Management—Integrated 
Framework published by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (COSO). The COSO (2004) defined ERM as “a 
process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other 
personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to 
identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be 
within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of entity objectives” (p.4) 
It is noteworthy that the events in this definition can have negative impact, 
positive impact, or both, which is consistent with the double-edged nature of 
risk. Additionally, ERM is a process, ongoing and flowing through an entity, 
and should be practiced by individuals at every level of an organization. This 
process is applied in strategy setting and the enterprise, including taking an 
entity-level portfolio view of risk. Identification of potential events and 
management of risk within corporation also falls within the scope of the ERM 
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process. Moreover, this definition emphasizes reasonable assurance that is 
provided to the board of directors and management concerning the 
achievement of corporate objectives in one or more but overlapping categories, 
rather than complete enumeration and attempted eradication of the risks. 
Finally, ERM helps entities to understand the risks that they face, and helps 
managers to tailor their goals to the firm’s risk appetite. 
Enterprise or enterprise-wide risk management is currently the most widely 
used and generally accepted terminology for this approach to risk management 
(Hopkin, 2010). Besides ERM, other terms have also been used to describe 
this approach, such as corporate risk management, holistic risk management, 
strategic risk management and integrated risk management. The Casualty 
Actuarial Society (CAS, 2003) considered these terms as similar to, even 
synonymous with, ERM, because they all emphasized a comprehensive view 
of risk and risk management, a movement away from the silo-based approach, 
and the view that risk management can be both a value-creating and 
risk-mitigating process. Hence, these terms are used interchangeably in this 
research. 
3.3.2 Differences between ERM and silo-based risk management 
Traditionally, risk management is segmented and conducted in separate 
business units or departments (i.e. silos) within a company. Under silo-based 
risk management, each silo deals with its own risks, and no single group or 
person in the organization has a grasp of the entire exposure that the company 
faces (IMA, 2007). This practice is attributed to the way people think about 
solving problems, the existing organizational structure, the evolution of risk 
management practice (Chapman, 2006), as well as the fact that each silo 
within a company possesses the best expertise to address the risks within its 
area of responsibility (Utter, 2006).  
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However, silo-based risk management fails to consider the interdependence 
and interactions between risks (Cendrowski and Mair, 2009; Chapman, 2006; 
Collier, 2009), creates inefficient coordination between various silos and 
duplication of risk management expenditure (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; 
Meulbroek, 2002), pays little or no attention to strategic risks or financial risks 
(Narvaez, 2011), and may overlook the most significant risks (Collier, 2009) 
due to lack of a holistic view of the risks confronted by the company.  
Risks are, by the very nature, dynamic, fluid and highly interdependent 
(Cendrowski and Mair, 2009; Chapman, 2006; Lam, 2003; Pennock and 
Haimes, 2002), and thus cannot be segmented and managed independently. 
Hence, risk management should be integrated into the business process 
(Hilson, 1998; Jutte, 2010), and exist within all levels of an organization. 
Organizations that operate in the volatile environment need a holistic and 
integrated approach to managing their portfolio of risks (Lam, 2003).  
Since the mid-1990s, ERM has been recognized as a holistic and integrated 
approach to managing an enterprise’s entire risk portfolio, and widely used in 
the financial and energy industries. ERM treats each risk as part of a 
company’s entire risk portfolio rather than a discrete one (Cumming and Hirtle, 
2001; Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Spicer, 2006), and concerns understanding 
the interdependencies among risks and how risk response measures can 
address multiple risks across multiple business areas (Chapman, 2006). It is 
the holistic management of the entire risk profile that distinguishes ERM from 
the silo-based approach to risk management (Pagach and Warr, 2011).  
Additionally, ERM attempts to consolidate the risk management process 
across all the levels within the organization (COSO, 2004), and concerns not 
only an organization’s view of the risks that it faces, but also the degree of 




Furthermore, since enterprise risks are considered as an integral part of 
corporate strategy, the selection of strategy can be one way to control these 
risks. Senior management can change a highly risky strategy to one with an 
acceptable risk profile. In addition, ERM implementation throughout an 
organization also needs the sponsorship of the board and senior management. 
Therefore, ERM can be viewed as a top-down approach to risk management 
(Dickinson, 2001; Olson and Wu, 2008). 
3.3.3 Modern portfolio theory 
Markowitz (1952, 1959) is the father of the modern portfolio theory who 
formulated the portfolio problem as a choice of the mean and variance of a 
portfolio of assets. Markowitz (1952, 1959) proved the fundamental theorems 
of the mean variance portfolio theory. These theorems concern: 
(1) Holding constant variance, maximizing expected return; and  
(2) Holding constant expected return, minimizing variance.  
These two principles have guided investors to select their preferred portfolios, 
according to their risk return preferences. The theory conveyed an important 
message that assets could not be selected only on characteristics that were 
unique to the security. An investor had to consider how each security interacts 
with all other securities, which resulted in an ability to construct a portfolio 
that had the same expected return with less risks than a portfolio constructed 
by ignoring the interactions between securities (Elton and Gruber, 1997). 
Portfolio risk depends not only on the risk of the individual investments on a 
stand-alone basis, but also how they interact with each other. In a sense, the 
risky investments lose their identity when combined into the portfolio. Hence, 
it is possible to construct a reasonably safe portfolio even if it contains a 
number of uncorrelated high-risk investments (SOA, 2006). 
48 
 
The modern portfolio theory can be linked to ERM because ERM holds a 
portfolio view of risks, and considers the interactions between risks. The 
concepts of the modern portfolio theory can be generalized beyond financial 
risks to include risks of all kinds, namely beyond a portfolio of investments to 
the entire collection of risks that an organization faces (CAS, 2003). An 
enterprise can be thought of as a collection of risky activities. Each activity 
has risk and return expectation. Hence, “investments” in the modern portfolio 
theory are considered as equivalent with “risky activities” in an enterprise. 
Lam (2003) argued that enterprise risk managers should think and act like a 
“fund manager” and set portfolio targets and risk limits to ensure appropriate 
diversification and optimal portfolio returns. Thus, these managers can 
combine risky investments into a low-risk portfolio. Lam (2003) also regarded 
portfolio management as one of the seven components in the ERM framework. 
The portfolio management aggregates risk exposure, incorporates 
diversification effects, and monitors risk concentrations against risk limits. 
Some benefits of ERM also derive from the portfolio approach to risk 
management. Improvements in business performance result from a portfolio 
view of all risks, managing the linkages among risk, capital and profitability, 
and rationalizing the company’s risk transfer strategies (Lam, 2003). As 
holding a diverse portfolio of stocks reduces the return volatility, ERM can 
offset risks and result in a total risk level that is lower than the sum of the 
individual risks, which in turn can reduce risk management costs (Kleffner et 
al., 2003). 
3.3.4 Drivers for ERM implementation 
An argument gaining momentum in the literature is that ERM adoption has 
been compelled by a series of legal compliance and corporate governance 
requirements (Acharyya, 2008; Conrad and Yau, 2009; Gates, 2006; Kleffner 
et al., 2003; Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Manab et al., 2010; Miccolis, 2003; 
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PwC, 2008; SOA, 2006; Towers Perrin, 2006; Utter, 2006). Most of these 
requirements are the mandatory laws or regulations, and non-mandatory 
reports or standards that created public pressures and benchmarks for sound 
management practices. Table 3.1 illustrates several sources of compliance and 
corporate governance requirements. Adopting ERM has been viewed as one of 
the best strategies to comply with these new risk-based governance 
requirements (Wu and Olson, 2009). Moreover, because ERM can increase 
firm’s value, the three main rating agencies, i.e. S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, have 
included a company’s ERM system or its absence as a factor in their rating 
methodology for insurance, banking, and nonfinancial firms (Beasley et al., 
2008). These requirements have significantly driven firms to embrace ERM. 
Accenture (2011) reported that 79% of the global financial services firms and 
56% of the global resource and energy firms had ERM programs in place.  
However, Duckert (2011) argued that the SOX undermined ERM, and 
regarded the recent financial crisis as proof that the compliance efforts were 
not the panacea for all the problems of companies. Power (2009) also noted 
the danger of ERM turning out to be the “rule-based compliance” and failure 
to be integrated into decision-making and business processes. This was 
confirmed by the Harvard Business Review Analytic Services (HBRAS, 2011), 
which found that the main barrier to embedding ERM was overemphasis on 
compliance rather than fundamental processes. 
Although compliance and corporate governance requirements have driven 
firms to adopt ERM, firms carried out ERM for potential benefits (Pagach and 
Warr, 2011) and such benefits should be convincing to the management of 
firms (Deloitte, 2009). Also, the benefits of advanced ERM have been 
believed to exceed the significant costs associated with initiating an ERM 




Table 3.1 Regulatory compliance and corporate governance requirements 
Initiatives Description 
Sarbanes–Oxley 
Act (SOX) in the 
US 
Enacted in 2002 as a reaction to major scandals including those affecting 
Enron and WorldCom, the SOX requires management and the external 
auditor to report on the adequacy of the company's internal control over 
financial reporting in Section 404. 
New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) 
Corporate 
Governance Rules  
In 2004, the NYSE adopted corporate governance rules that require the 
Audit Committees of its listed companies to discuss policies concerning 
risk assessment and risk management, including major financial risk 
exposures and the steps that management has taken to monitor and control 
such exposures.  
UK Corporate 
Governance Code 
The UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 aims at the companies listed in 
the London Stock Exchange. The Listing Rules require public listed 
companies to disclose how they have complied with the code and explain 
where they have not applied the code. The Code consolidates and refines 
previous reports and codes concerning opinions on good corporate 
governance, such as the Cadbury Report, the Greenbury Report, the 
Hampel Report, and the Turnbull Committee Report. 
KonTraG in 
Germany 
KonTraG is a law that requires the board to establish supervisory systems 
for risk management and internal revision, and calls for reporting on these 
systems to the supervisory board.   
Basel II Basel II, initially published in 2004, is to create an international standard 
that banking regulators can use when creating regulations about how much 
capital banks need to put aside to guard against the types of financial and 
operational risks banks face. 
Dey Report in 
Canada 
The Dey Report, commissioned by the Toronto Stock Exchange and 
released in December 1994, requires companies to report on the adequacy 
of internal controls.  
CoCo Report in 
Canada 
The CoCo Report, namely the “Guidance on Control” produced by the 
Criteria of Control Board (CoCo) of the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in 1995, specifies reporting on risk assessment and risk 
management. 
AS/NZS 4360 in 
Australia/New 
Zealand 
AS/NZS 4360:1995 called for a formalized system of risk management 
and for reporting to the organization’s management on the performance of 
the risk management system. While not binding, the standard created a 
benchmark for sound management practices.  
Peters Report in 
the Netherlands 
The Peters Report makes 40 non-mandatory recommendations on 
corporate governance, one of which concerns that the board should submit 
an annual report to the supervisory board on corporate objectives, strategy, 
related risks and control systems.  
ISO 31000:2009 ISO 31000:2009 provides generic guidelines intended to promote the 
adoption of consistent processes so as to ensure the risk is managed 
effectively, efficiently and coherently across organizations. 
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A general viewpoint from the literature is that ERM implementation can 
improve firm performance (Barton et al., 2002; Gordon et al., 2009; Hoyt and 
Liebenberg, 2011; Lam, 2003; Nocco and Stulz, 2006), which was found 
contingent on the match between ERM and the firm-specific factors, including 
environmental uncertainty, industry competition, firm size, firm complexity, 
and board of directors’ monitoring (Gordon et al., 2009). Also, the fact that the 
more established firms are more receptive to ERM adoption (Yazid et al., 
2011) underpins the view that ERM improves firm performance. With a more 
detailed view, benefits created by ERM include, but are not limited to: 
(1) Reduced earnings volatility (Gates, 2006; Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; 
Lam, 2003; Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Manab et al., 2010; Miccolis, 
2003; Narvaez, 2011; Walker et al., 2002); 
(2) Reduced costs and losses (Beasley and Frigo, 2010; Cumming and Hirtle, 
2001; Gregory, 2003; Harrington et al., 2002; Kleffner et al., 2003; KPMG, 
2010; Liu et al., 2011; Manab et al., 2010; Meulbroek, 2002; Towers 
Perrin, 2006); 
(3) Increased profitability and earnings (Gates, 2006; Manab et al., 2010; 
Miccolis, 2003);  
(4) Improved decision-making (Bugalla et al., 2010; Deloitte, 2010b; Gates, 
2006; HBRAS, 2011; Kleffner et al., 2003; KPMG, 2010; Lam, 2003; Liu 
et al., 2011; Manab et al., 2010; Millage, 2005; Narvaez, 2011; Towers 
Perrin, 2006; Williams, 2005); 
(5) Better risk reporting and communication (Chapman, 2006; Gates, 2006; 
Lam, 2003; Manab et al., 2010; Narvaez, 2011; Negus, 2010; Utter, 2006);  
(6) Increased management accountability (AON, 2010; Gates, 2006; HBRAS, 
2011; KPMG, 2010; Muralidhar, 2010; Narvaez, 2011; Williams, 2005);  
(7) Greater management consensus (Gates, 2006; Millage, 2005; Muralidhar, 
2010; Williams, 2005);  
(8) Competitive advantages (Acharyya, 2007; Gates, 2006; Lam, 2003; Nocco 
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and Stulz, 2006; Towers Perrin, 2006; Walker et al., 2002);  
(9) Better resource allocation (Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Liu et al., 2011; 
Meulbroek, 2002); 
(10) Improved owners’ satisfaction (Liu et al., 2011); and 
(11) Improved control of an enterprise on its projects (Liu et al., 2011). 
Some of these potential benefits were found to drive ERM implementation in 
firms. Reduced earnings volatility, reduced costs and losses, and increased 
profitability and earnings, which also contribute to improved shareholder 
value, were found to be significant drivers for ERM implementation in 
previous studies (Accenture, 2011; Manab et al., 2010; Rao, 2007). In addition, 
Gates (2006), Miccolis (2003) and Muralidhar (2010) indicated that 
competitive advantages drove ERM implementation, while Manab et al. 
(2010), Rao (2007) and Liu et al. (2011) found that improvement in 
decision-making was a driver for ERM implementation. Moreover, Liu et al. 
(2011) indicated that improved control of an enterprise on its projects, 
improved owners’ satisfaction and better resource allocation motivated 
construction firms to implement ERM. Although better risk reporting and 
communication, increased management accountability, and greater 
management consensus have not been considered as significant drivers for 
ERM in the existing literature, these are hypothesized to drive ERM 
implementation in CCFs in this research. 
In addition, a broader scope of risks from globalization, market and greater 
risk interdependence were believed to drive firms to embrace an integrated 
approach to risk management (Lam and Kawamoto, 1997; Liebenberg and 
Hoyt, 2003). Towers Perrin (2006) claimed that natural disasters like 
hurricanes, global pandemics such as avian flu, and increased liability risks 
were the key factors that raise the emphasis on ERM. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU, 2007) found that macroeconomic volatility, cost of 
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capital, and political uncertainty were the key external drivers for ERM. 
Deloitte (2010a) indicated that catastrophic events such as stock market 
crashes and the current credit crisis were likely to trigger ERM 
implementation. Pagach and Warr (2011) found that firms with more volatile 
operating cash flows and riskier stock returns were more likely to embrace 
ERM. 
Moreover, technological advancement was also considered as a major external 
driver (Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003) as ERM needs a lot of computing power 
(Segal, 2011). Advances in IT have enabled firms to gather better data for 
certain risks, model complex risks, measure risks more precisely, and better 
understand risk interdependence across a firm (Davenport and Bradley, 2000; 
Green, 2001; Jablonowski, 2001). There are currently a variety of ERM 
software packages, which make ERM implementation more efficient. 
However, Manab et al. (2010) found that the technology was considered as a 
driver for ERM implementation by few firms in Malaysia. 
The above forces that drive ERM would compel the board and senior 
management to request for ERM implementation. Kleffner et al. (2003) found 
that 51% of Canadian firms viewed the encouragement from the board as key 
factors underlying their ERM adoption. Gates (2006) indicated that the board 
request was a primary driver for ERM implementation. Request and 
encouragement from top management is an internal force that drives ERM 
implementation in a firm. In addition, Narvaez (2011) believed that board and 
senior executives should drive ERM implementation because ERM involves 
the commitment of the entire enterprise. 
3.3.5 Hindrances to ERM implementation 
It is not easy to implement ERM because ERM implementation faces some 
hindrances. As a survey conducted in North America discovered, 70% of the 
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respondents (audit committee members) identified ERM as their most 
challenging issue in the next 12 months (CFO/Crowe, 2008). There are a 
number of factors hindering ERM implementation available in the literatures 
relating to ERM. These hindrances include (where “H” represents 
“hindrance”): 
H01: Low data quality (Muralidhar, 2010; RMA, 2006; Schlottmann et al., 
2005); 
H02: Lack of data (RMA, 2006; Ross, 2005; Schlottmann et al., 2005; Tang et 
al., 2007); 
H03: Insufficient resources (e.g. time, money, people, etc.) (AON, 2010; 
Beasley et al., 2010c; Blades, 2010; Bowling and Rieger, 2005; 
CFO/Crowe, 2008; Gates, 2006; KPMG, 2010; Miccolis, 2003; Miccolis 
et al., 2000; Rao, 2007; RMA, 2006; Roth, 2006); 
H04: Lack of a formalized ERM process (Miccolis, 2003; Miccolis et al., 2000; 
Rao, 2007); 
H05: Lack of risk management techniques and tools (CFO/Crowe, 2008; 
Miccolis, 2003; Miccolis et al., 2000; Muralidhar, 2010; Rao, 2007; 
Segal, 2007; Shaw, 2005; Tang et al., 2007); 
H06: Lack of internal knowledge, skills and expertise (AON, 2010; 
CFO/Crowe, 2008; KPMG, 2010; Miccolis, 2003; Miccolis et al., 2000; 
Rao, 2007; Tang et al., 2007); 
H07: Lack of qualified personnel to implement ERM (Kleffner et al., 2003; 
RMA, 2006); 
H08: Lack of a risk management information system (RMIS) (CFO/Crowe, 
2008; Muralidhar, 2010; Ross, 2005; Tang et al., 2007); 
H09: Unsupportive organizational structure (Blades, 2010; CFO/Crowe, 2008; 
EIU, 2001; Kleffner et al., 2003; Rao, 2007; Ross, 2005); 
H10: Unsupportive organizational culture (Blades, 2010; De la Rosa, 2006; 
Kimbrough and Componation, 2009; Kleffner et al., 2003; Merkley, 2001; 
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Miccolis, 2003; Miccolis et al., 2000; Muralidhar, 2010; Rao, 2007; 
Shimpi, 2010); 
H11: Lack of a common risk language (Muralidhar, 2010; Nielson et al., 
2005); 
H12: Lack of risk awareness in the organization (De la Rosa, 2006; Muralidhar, 
2010); 
H13: Confidence in the existing risk management practices (Beasley et al., 
2010c; Roth, 2006); 
H14: Existence or re-emergence of the silo mentality (Kleffner et al., 2003); 
H15: Lack of shared understanding and approach to risk management across 
departments (CFO/Crowe, 2008); 
H16: Lack of understanding relating to an effective ERM process (EIU, 2001); 
H17: Perception that ERM adds to bureaucracy (Beasley et al., 2010c; RIMS 
and Marsh, 2006); 
H18: Perception that ERM increases costs and administration (KPMG, 2010); 
H19: Perception that ERM interferes with business activities (CFO/Crowe, 
2008); 
H20: Inadequate training on ERM (Gupta, 2011); 
H21: Lack of an ERM business case (Aabo et al., 2005; AON, 2010; KPMG, 
2010); 
H22: Lack of perceived value or benefits (AON, 2010; Beasley et al., 2010c; 
Blades, 2010; KPMG, 2010; Roth, 2006); 
H23: Lack of commitment from the board and senior management (AON, 
2010; Bowling and Rieger, 2005; CFO/Crowe, 2008; KPMG, 2010; Ross, 
2005; Roth, 2006; Spicer, 2006); 
H24: Not perceived as priority by senior management (Merkley, 2001; 
Miccolis, 2003; Muralidhar, 2010); 
H25: Lack of the board or senior management leadership (Beasley et al., 
2010c); 
H26: The movement of the ERM champion from senior management into 
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other areas without a successor (Simkins, 2008); 
H27: Lack of consensus on benefits of ERM among board members and senior 
management (Gates, 2006); 
H28: Other competing priorities (Beasley et al., 2010c; Gates, 2006; KPMG, 
2010); 
H29: Lack of a clear ERM implementation plan (AON, 2010); 
H30: Inability to coordinate with other departments (Gupta, 2011); 
H31: Lack of a set of metrics for measuring ERM performance (RIMS and 
Marsh, 2006); 
H32: Unclear ownership and responsibility for ERM implementation (AON, 
2010); 
H33: Organizational turf (Miccolis, 2003; Miccolis et al., 2000); 
H34: Employees’ reluctance to give up power (EIU, 2001); 
H35: People’s reluctance to share risk information (Simkins, 2008); and 
H36: Recession and business downturn (Kleffner et al., 2003). 
Hence, 36 factors hindering ERM implementation were summarized from a 
total of 30 literatures on ERM. Because of these hindrances, the percentage of 
companies adopting or implementing ERM was not high. According to 
Beasley et al. (2010b, c), 46% of the global respondents had a formal ERM 
process that regularly provides a robust, systematic report of aggregate top risk 
exposures to the board and senior management. In contrast, only 11% of the 
US respondents possessed a complete formal ERM process. The status was 
better in Singapore as another survey indicated that 81% of the 203 firms in 
Singapore had ERM programs in place, and that approximately 53% had 
implemented ERM for more than three years (KPMG, 2010). 
3.4 Existing ERM frameworks 
A framework serves as a guide, an outline or overview of interlinked items 
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(activities) to facilitate an approach towards achieving a specific goal. An 
ERM framework is described as a specific set of functional activities and the 
associated definitions that define the ERM system in an organization and its 
relationship with the organizational system (Dafikpaku, 2011). According to 
the Corporate Governance Council of Singapore (CGC, 2012), the design and 
pace of implementation of ERM frameworks vary greatly among firms. Some 
firms wish to be best in class, some simply to be in the pack, whilst for others, 
the barest minimum of formality suffices (CGC, 2012). 
3.4.1 CAS ERM framework 
The CAS (2003) conceptualized ERM as cutting across the two dimensions of 
risk type and risk management process. As shown in Figure 3.2, some risk 
management process steps apply to each risk type individually, while others 
apply to all the risk types in the aggregate. 
Risk management process  
Types of risk 
Hazard   Financial Operational Strategic 
Establish Context   
Identify Risks         
Analyze/Quantify Risks         
Integrate Risks   
Assess/Prioritize Risks         
Treat/Exploit Risks         
Monitor and Review   
Figure 3.2 CAS ERM framework 
Source: CAS (2003: p.9) 
Enterprises are generally exposed to four types of risks (CAS, 2003): (1) 
hazard risks, which include risks from fire and other property damage, natural 
perils, theft and other crime, personal injury, business interruption, disease and 
disability, and liability claims; (2) financial risks, which consist of risks 
stemming from asset value, interest rate, foreign exchange, commodity, cash 
flow, credit, inflation/purchasing power, and hedging/basis risk; (3) 
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operational risks, which include risks from business operations, empowerment, 
IT, and information/business reporting; and (4) strategic risks, which include 
risks from reputational damage, competition, customer needs, social and 
cultural trends, technological innovation, capital availability, and regulatory 
and political trends. It is worth noting that the precise slotting of individual 
risk factors under each of these four categories is less important than the 
recognition that ERM covers all categories and all material risk factors that 
can influence the organization’s value. The risk management process 
dimension includes seven iterative elements, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. The 
CAS risk management process is similar to the one shown in Figure 3.1, 
except with the absence of communication and consultation with internal and 
external stakeholders at each step of the process. Although “establish context” 
involves communication policy with the identified shareholders, it fails to 



















Figure 3.3 CAS risk management process 
Source: CAS (2003: p.11) 
3.4.2 COSO ERM framework 
The COSO (2004) has developed an ERM conceptual framework. This 
framework builds on and extends the integrated framework for internal control 
issued in 1994, and is applicable to all industries. As shown in Figure 3.4, this 
framework has three dimensions, specifying how the people from each level of 
an enterprise implement the eight ERM components in order to achieve the 
four categories of corporate objectives.  
In this framework, ERM implementation covers eight interrelated components: 
59 
 
internal environment, objective setting, event identification, risk assessment, 
risk response, control activities, information and communication, and 
monitoring. These components comprise the “component dimension”. 
Meanwhile, the four categories of objectives (i.e. strategic, operations, 
reporting, and compliance) share a depiction at the top of the cube, 
representing the “objective dimension”. In addition, ERM should be 
implemented across an enterprise, at the four levels including: subsidiary, 
business units, division, and entity-level. This is the “hierarchy dimension” of 
the ERM cube. This dimension varies by the size and type of the entity that 















































Figure 3.4 COSO ERM framework 
Source: COSO (2004: p.5) 
This framework intends to provide a model to facilitate the organizations in 
considering and understanding their risk-related activities at all levels of the 
organization as well as their impacts on one another (Moeller, 2007). ERM is 
not strictly a serial process, where one component affects only the next. 
Instead, it is a multidirectional, iterative process in which almost any 
component can and does influence another. The effectiveness of ERM could 
be judged in terms of whether these eight components are present and 
functioning effectively (COSO, 2004).  
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In terms of the objectives, the strategic category involves overarching 
activities such as corporate governance, strategic objectives, and business 
models; the operations level relates to business processes, value chains, 
financial flows, and related issues; reporting objectives refer to reports 
produced for both internal and external purposes, and is concerned with how 
to communicate corporate performance on multiple dimensions; and 
compliance considers organizational reporting on legal, contractual, and other 
regulatory requirements (Wu and Olson, 2008: p.32). According to the COSO 
(2004), ERM can provide reasonable assurance of achieving objectives 
relating to reliability of reporting and compliance with laws and regulations 
because these two categories are within the realms of corporate control. As for 
the strategic and operational objectives, whose achievement may be out of 
corporate control, ERM can provide reasonable assurance that the 
management and the board are made aware of the extent to which the 
enterprise is moving towards achievement of these objectives.  
Furthermore, this framework can also be accomplished within a specific 
subsidiary, unit or division, representing a form of “partial adoption” while 
still retaining an enterprise-wide focus. Protiviti (2006) suggested that some 
strategic operating units should have distinctly different risk profiles because 
of distinctively different objectives and strategies, manage distinctive product 
groups, serve heterogeneous markets and act as standalone profit centers. 
Additionally, considering a competitive environment among different strategic 
units, the risk profiles for these units may differ so that it may be appropriate 
to manage them separately. Under such circumstances, a decentralized 
approach may make more sense with ERM applied in the selected operating 
units. However, Fraser and Simkins (2007) considered this as a misconception, 
and argued that in such cases, managers would only care about the risks within 
their silos, without an understanding of their effects on the firm’s overall risk.  
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3.4.3 ISO 31000:2009 risk management framework 
The ISO published a common risk management framework in ISO 
31000:2009, which incorporates the best practices from the COSO, Project 
Management Institute (PMI), AS/NZS 4360:2004, as well as other leading 
international risk management standards. Hence, the ISO framework is current 
best practice for risk management frameworks (Shortreed, 2010).  
As Figure 3.5 illustrates, the ISO 31000:2009 risk management framework 
consists of five components: mandate and commitment, design of framework 
for managing risk, implementing risk management, monitoring and reviewing, 
as well as continual improvement of the framework. The underlying concept 
of this framework is a quality management approach using the Deming 
paradigm of Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) (Deming, 1986), which indicates 
that the framework is designed, implemented, monitored and continuously 
improved. With the continual improvement of the framework, the quality of 
decision-making is also improved.  
Mandate and commitment
Design of framework for managing risks
Understanding the organization and its context
Establishing risk management policy
Accountability
Integration into organizational process
Resources
Establishing internal communication and 
reporting mechanisms
Establishing external communication and 
reporting mechanisms
Implementing risk management
Implementing framework for risk 
management
Implementing the risk management 
process
























































Figure 3.5 ISO 31000:2009 risk management framework 
Source: ISO 31000:2009 
62 
 
ISO 31000:2009 provides an internationally recognized benchmark for the 
design and implementation of the ERM framework. Although this approach 
for developing and implementing ERM is similar to and compatible with other 
approaches, it is the first standard to provide a complete and practical solution 
(Shortreed, 2010). It also merits attention that ISO 31000:2009 is a guideline 
standard rather than a standard requiring accreditation. Thus, a risk manager is 
able to flexibly implement the risk management process in a manner suitable 
for his or her organization.  
3.4.4 SASAC ERM framework 
In 2006, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) of the State Council of China issued the Guidance to Enterprise Risk 
Management for Central Enterprises to drive ERM implementation in central 
enterprises following the massive losses by China Aviation Oil (Singapore) in 
futures investments (Ockenden, 2004). The term “central enterprise” is 
defined as state-owned enterprises whose investor is the SASAC with the 
authority vested by China’s State Council, namely the enterprises owned by 
China’s central government. Some of the leading CCFs are central enterprises, 
such as China Railway Construction Corp. Ltd., China Railway Group Ltd., 
China Communications Construction Group (Ltd.), China State Construction 
Engineering Corp., and China Metallurgical Group Corp.  
Similar to ISO 31000: 2009, the SASAC defines risk as “effects of uncertainty 
on enterprise business objectives” (SASAC, 2006). In this guidance, risk 
management process encompasses:   
(1) Collection of initial risk management information 
Initial information involving strategic risks, financial risks, market risks, 
operational risks and legal risks should be collected by functional 
departments and business units. This information includes cases of the 
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enterprises suffering losses due to ineffective risk management, historical 
data and forecast for the future, and will be employed in risk assessment. 
(2) Risk assessment 
Risk assessment consists of risk identification, risk analysis and risk 
evaluation. Risk assessment can be conducted by functional departments 
and business units, or intermediaries with qualifications, good reputation 
and experienced professionals. Both qualitative and quantitative methods 
can be employed in risk identification, analysis and evaluation. 
(3) Development of risk management tactics 
Risk management tactics include identifying risk appetite, selecting risk 
response measures and tools, as well as defining the principles of human 
and financial resource allocation, based on the enterprise’s internal and 
external context and strategy. 
(4) Formulation and implementation of risk management solutions 
Based on the risk management tactics, an enterprise can formulate and 
implement risk management solutions, which include the specific 
objectives of solutions, necessary organizational leadership, relevant 
business processes, necessary resources, risk response measures, as well as 
risk management tools. The risk management solutions can be handled 
through outsourcing or internal control. 
(5) Monitoring and improvement of risk management 
Each unit and department should periodically review its own risk 
management practices and find the defects. A risk communication channel 
across the enterprise should be established, and thus sets a foundation for 
monitoring and improving ERM. 
In addition, the SASAC (2006) identifies five objectives for ERM 
implementation of central enterprises: 
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(1) Ensure risks controlled within the risk appetite that fits the corporate 
objectives; 
(2) Ensure true and reliable internal and external information communication, 
especially the communication between enterprises and shareholders; 
(3) Ensure compliance with laws and regulations; 
(4) Ensure the implementation of the corporate institutions and key measures 
for achieving business objectives, as well as the effectiveness of business 
management; improve efficiency and effectiveness of business activities; 
lower the uncertainty of business objective achievement; and  
(5) Ensure the establishment of crisis management plans against major risk 
occurrence, in order to avoid suffering heavy losses caused by human 
errors or disasters. 
This guidance emphasizes the organizational structure for ERM. If possible, 
an enterprise can establish triple lines of defense to manage risks. Functional 
departments and business units act as the first line of defense, and the risk 
management department and the board-level risk management committee 
comprise the second line of defense, followed by the last line of defense: the 
internal audit department and the audit committee of the board. The guidance 
also advocates the application of IT in risk management and suggests 
establishing a RMIS that covers the risk management process and internal 
control activities, including risk information collection, storage, analysis, 
testing, dissemination, reporting, and disclosure. This system should also 
facilitate integration and sharing of the information from various departments 
and units. In addition, this guidance emphasizes the creation of a risk 
management culture at all levels of an enterprise and the incorporation of the 
risk management culture into the corporate culture. Furthermore, this guidance 
suggests linking the creation of the risk management culture with the salary 
and manpower institutions, which can strengthen risk awareness of 
management at all levels, especially the senior level.  
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3.5 ERM in construction firms 
The construction industry is a project-based industry. Product uniqueness, 
on-site production and ad hoc project teams with relatively high turnover rates 
are typical characteristics of the industry (Tserng et al., 2009). Additionally, 
the construction industry is usually blamed for its inefficient operations (Cox 
and Thompson, 1997), and the short term perspective hinders innovation and 
technical development (Dubois and Gadde, 2000, 2002). Moreover, a 
construction project typically involves a variety of parties, such as the client, 
main contractor, subcontractors, designers, and suppliers. These parties work 
in a diversity of disciplines and technologies (Burtonshaw-Gunn, 2009), thus 
leading to the fragmentation of the construction industry (Ang and Ofori, 
2001). Furthermore, complexity in construction, which results from the 
industry specific uncertainties and interdependences among tasks (Gidado, 
1996), is another characteristic. The uncertainties stem from the unfamiliarity 
of management with local resources and the local environment, lack of 
complete specifications for the activities at the construction site, lack of 
uniformity of materials, work, and teams with regard to place and time, and 
unpredictability of the environment (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). These 
characteristics increase the difficulty in using a centralized approach to 
decision-making (Dubois and Gadde, 2002).  
Construction activities are risky, because risks are inherent in all construction 
projects (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2002), which are one-off endeavors 
with unique features such as long period, complicated processes, abominable 
environment, financial intensity and dynamic organization structures (Zou et 
al., 2007b). A construction firm depends on construction projects to generate 
revenues and profits to sustain the business. Project managers deal with risks 
based on their own professional disciplines and experiences, and tend to care 
only about the projects they are participating in. Hence, a construction firm 
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usually emphasizes PRM, but tends to fail to deal with risks at the firm level. 
Similarly, there have been many studies on PRM in the construction industry, 
but few focus on ERM in construction firms. 
Risk management should cover not only project risks, but also the risks 
encountered by being a business enterprise (Schaufelberger, 2009). 
Overemphasis on PRM will lead to lack of coordination between different 
projects, increase difficulties in achieving the strategic objectives, result in 
inadequate transparency across multiple projects, and thus bring about low 
efficiency in risk management, inappropriate resource distribution among 
various projects and little access to company-wide information (Adibi, 2007). 
For construction firms venturing into the international arena, a global view to 
identify risks has been recommended to replace the consideration of only 
project risks (Zhi, 1995). Therefore, construction firms need ERM which 
provides a holistic view of the risks that their projects face, and link these 
factors with the corporate strategy (Adibi, 2007). The construction industry 
was expected to experience a growth in ERM implementation (Deloitte, 
2010a). 
Both ERM and PRM are approaches to dealing with risks that a firm faces, but 
at different levels (Liu et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2013). Hence, ERM and PRM 
do not contradict each other. They share a similar management process, in 
which risk identification, analysis and response are critical steps.  
However, ERM and PRM have different goals due to their different levels. 
ERM deals with risks at the enterprise level, focuses on the strategic, 
operations, reporting, and compliance objectives of a firm, and deals with risks 
that could negatively and positively affect these objectives (COSO, 2004). 
Compared with ERM, PRM addresses risks at the project level and focuses on 
project objectives, such as time, cost, quality, and safety objectives. PRM aims 
to increase the probability and impact of positive events, and decrease the 
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probability and impact of events that can negatively affect project objectives 
(PMI, 2008). It merits attention that project objectives are the main elements 
of operational objectives of a construction firm because the operation of a 
construction firm mainly depends on the construction projects that it is 
engaged in.   
PRM is still necessary and should not be considered as a hindrance to 
implementing ERM in a construction firm. PRM has been considered as one 
of the nine project management knowledge areas (PMI, 2008), and is critical 
to the success of projects and the survival of construction firms. Thus, ERM 
cannot replace the role that PRM plays in the construction industry. In fact, 
PRM can be regarded as an integral part of ERM because project risks are 
within the entire risk profile of a construction firm and ERM should be 
implemented at all levels of a firm, including the project level. Effective PRM 
practices, which properly deal with project risks, can contribute to ERM 
effectiveness throughout a firm. In turn, ERM provides a new way to improve 
PRM in construction firms (Liu et al., 2013) because ERM implementation 
involves better communication of project risk information, thus helping the 
management to make better informed decisions and deal with project risks 
more effectively and efficiently.  
However, ERM implementation in CCFs was still at the infancy stage. The 
recent survey conducted by Liu et al. (2011) with 34 leading CCFs in the 
international market indicated that 52.9% of the respondents had established a 
full-time risk management department in their respective organizations. In 
addition, only 14.7% had fully implemented ERM, and 17.6% had established 
their ERM strategies and routines, but had not fully implemented them yet.  
Implementing ERM in a construction firm is actually an organization change 
because the staff has been accustomed to PRM. Thus, ERM in construction 
firms should be implemented steadily and gradually (Adibi, 2007). An ERM 
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framework should be developed in order to guide ERM implementation in 
construction firms and help them to overcome the negative influence that 
hinders ERM implementation. 
3.6 A proposed ERM framework for construction firms 
Based on the existing ERM frameworks and the project-based nature of the 
construction industry, an ERM framework is proposed for construction firms, 
thus fulfilling the first research objective, “propose an ERM framework to 
facilitate the ERM implementation in construction firms.” As Figure 3.6 
indicates, this framework consists of the following components: (1) an ERM 
process; (2) commitment of the board and senior management; (3) training 
programs; (4) resources; (5) ERM ownership; (6) risk-aware culture; (7) 
objectives; (8) a common risk language; (9) PRM; (10) RMIS; (11) risk 
communication; and (12) monitoring, review and continuous improvement of 
the ERM framework.  
The project-based nature of the construction industry requires that the ERM 
framework specifically for construction firms should be different from the 
existing ones for other industries, where the project-based nature is not a 
dominant characteristic. Thus, it is the component “PRM” that makes the 
proposed ERM framework different from the existing frameworks. In addition, 
the component “objectives” includes project objectives, representing the 
project-based nature. Except for these two components, the other components, 
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Figure 3.6 A proposed ERM framework for construction firms 
The ERM process is the key component of this framework. In this framework, 
the ERM process adopts the process described in ISO 31000:2009. 
Construction firms tend to have PRM in place. According to the PMI (2008), 
project risks can be managed through six phases, i.e. plan risk management, 
identify risks, perform qualitative analysis, perform quantitative analysis, plan 
risk responses, as well as monitor and control risks. Besides this process, there 
are other PRM processes in the literature (APM, 2004; Fairley, 2002; Hillson 
and Simon, 2007; Kliem and Ludin, 1997; Perry and Hayes, 1985). 
Irrespective of the number of phases, risk identification, risk analysis and risk 
response are the generally recognized phases (Low et al., 2009; Uher and 
Toakley, 1999). These three phases can be corresponded to the risk 
identification, analysis, evaluation and response in the ERM framework. The 
context establishment in the ERM process could seldom be found in the PRM 
process because the context typically concerns things at the enterprise level 
rather than the project level. The internal context establishment is crucial for 
ERM implementation in a construction firm because their existing internal 
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context tends to fit only PRM. It is necessary for construction firms to change 
the internal context to make it fit ERM. Some of the remaining components of 
the ERM framework, such as commitment of the board and senior 
management, resources, training programs, ERM ownership, culture, as well 
as risk communication and reporting mechanisms, concern change in the 
internal context of construction firms. 
The commitment of the board and senior management is critical to 
implementing ERM across an enterprise (Abrams et al., 2007), and was 
considered as a prerequisite for implementing ERM (Barton et al., 2002). 
Without such commitment, the corporate culture or mindset at all levels within 
a firm would not be changed to be receptive to ERM. Such commitment can 
also signify the priority in implementing ERM to the personnel in a firm, and 
ensure that resources (including funds, people, time, expertise, procedures, 
tools, etc.) are allocated for ERM implementation. Hence, ERM policies, 
guidelines, and an implementation plan should be developed and made known 
to all the staff of a firm. The commitment of the board and senior management 
should be continuous, and ensures that the change in the ERM champion does 
not interrupt ERM implementation. 
Resources are necessary for ERM implementation in construction firms 
because the ERM program that changes the accustomed way to manage risks 
concerns the need for funds, people and time input. Besides these inputs, 
resources should also include intellectual resources, such as knowledge, skills 
and expertise. In order to make people perceive the benefits or value of an 
ERM program, a set of metrics should be created to measure ERM 
performance. Such a set of performance indicators also contributes to the 
continuous improvement of ERM practices. 
ERM should be implemented at all levels of firms, not just at the senior 
management level. However, during the initial stage of ERM implementation, 
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management at the middle or lower middle level may view the impact of ERM 
as negative, such as an extra burden to their existing responsibilities, thus 
resisting the ERM programs. Hence, resources should also be allocated for 
training programs. These programs are necessary to help the personnel at all 
levels throughout a firm to clearly understand the necessity of ERM 
implementation, the ERM philosophy, the ERM procedure, the relationship 
between ERM and PRM, as well as the potential benefits of ERM. In order to 
make such programs effective, stakeholders’ needs should be analyzed and 
training strategies should be developed. Successful business cases for ERM 
can be used to illustrate the values and benefits of ERM. Thus, 
misunderstanding of ERM will be reduced or even eliminated, and the 
commitment at all levels within the organization will form. It merits attention 
that the effectiveness of such training programs depends on the 
employee-manager relationships and mutual trust.  
Similar to the ERM implementation in other industries (such as the financial 
or energy industry), implementing ERM in the construction industry also 
requires an owner. A senior executive may be appointed to be responsible for 
enterprise-wide risk oversight. Alternatively, a stand-alone risk management 
department or a board-level risk management committee may be set up to take 
charge of ERM. These methods all concern changes in the existing 
organizational structure. 
In addition, because ERM implementation is viewed as an organizational 
change, change in the organizational culture is also necessary. Cultural 
elements unsupportive of ERM implementation should be changed. Cultural 
changes may involve discarding the “blame culture”, a shift from “do not 
report bad news” to “report as early as possible”, and from “how do risks 
affect my project” to “how do risks affect the entire firm” (IMA, 2007). Thus, 
a risk-aware culture can be created. A risk-aware culture requires clear 
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commitment of the board and senior management, involvement of all the 
stakeholders, learning, accountability, and open communication on all risk 
management issues and the lessons learnt (Hopkin, 2010). Instituting clear 
accountability for risks has been identified as a successful approach to creating 
a risk culture (AON, 2010). The risk-aware culture should be embedded into 
the organizational culture, which can encourage management at all levels to be 
aware of the potential project and enterprise risks. Hence, due to the 
pervasiveness of risk awareness throughout the firm, risk management 
becomes a critical part of the corporate culture (Barton et al., 2002; 
Kimbrough and Componation, 2009). 
Moreover, risk information is critical to manage risks at both project and 
enterprise levels. Thus, mechanisms need to be set up to motivate individuals 
to embrace ERM and share risk information across projects. Open risk 
communication across different projects enables each project team to obtain 
adequate risk information. The relevant risk information and experience in 
previous projects should also be collected for risk identification, analysis and 
evaluation. Risk information or historical data from outside the firm should 
also be collected, as long as the information or data is relevant and reliable. 
Risk communication also concerns risk reporting, which should be customized 
to gather and deliver the right information to the right people at various levels 
of the business, internally and externally. Benefiting from risk reporting, the 
board and senior management can have a clear perspective of the firm’s entire 
risk profile to make better-informed decisions.  
In order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of risk communication 
and reporting, a RMIS needs to be set up and placed on the intranet of the 
construction firm with sufficient resources. A RMIS improves risk 
communication through providing an information platform, which facilitates 
risk information distribution from one project to another. In addition, a RMIS 
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can facilitate data-based risk reporting, which leads to rapid and accurate 
evaluation of risk and timeliness of reporting (Duckert, 2011). A RMIS can 
also record risk management activities, provide traceability of decisions and 
continuous improvement in risk management. Hence, it contributes to 
organizational learning through storing the valuable project data, experience 
and knowledge after the project completion. Besides these functions, some 
RMIS software packages can undertake risk identification and analysis, and 
provide response plans. Although the cost of a RMIS is relatively high, large 
firms can still gain enough marginal benefits from RMIS to offset the costs 
(Hopkin, 2010).  
Successful risk communication can also be attributed to the development of a 
common risk language. The risk language clearly explains terminologies and 
methods to be used universally in the organization, and contributes to a 
common understanding of risks. The risk language should be communicated to 
all risk management practitioners at all levels of the firm. To facilitate the 
acceptance of the risk language, a glossary that is a collection of key terms can 
be created and disseminated across the firm. The risk language also underpins 
the risk culture of the organization because it facilitates open communication, 
which is a component of a risk-aware culture (Hopkin, 2010). 
In construction firms, PRM is still necessary and can be considered as an 
integral part of ERM. Better PRM can assure the achievement of the 
objectives of the projects that the firms are engaged in, and thus further 
contributes to the achievement of the objectives at the enterprise level. 
The ERM framework is also evolving continuously for improvement, so it also 
needs monitoring, review and improving. This is consistent with the ISO 
31000:2009 risk management framework.  
To embrace ERM, construction firms can customize the framework by 
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selecting the components according to their stage in ERM implementation. 
ERM should be implemented step-by-step. In the initial stage of ERM 
implementation, the commitment of the board and senior management as well 
as training is essential. The ERM responsibility can be included in the CEO’s 
function, because creating a stand-alone department or a board-level 
committee for ERM involves changes in the organizational structure, which is 
time-consuming. Change in the organizational culture unsupportive of ERM 
can be another thorny issue for the firm. Staff in construction firms tends to be 
accustomed to PRM practices and only care about the project they are engaged 
in, even though they possess risk awareness. To create a risk-aware culture 
throughout the firm and to embed it into the corporate culture, accountability 
at all levels needs to be instituted. Additionally, motivation mechanisms are 
necessary for staff to care about not only the project objectives but also the 
enterprise objectives. Thus, individuals would share risk information in their 
projects with their counterparts in other projects, which ensures risk 
communication. A common risk language should be developed to ensure the 
success of risk communication and to improve the risk culture. If possible, the 
construction firm can develop or purchase a RMIS, and embed it in the 
intranet.  
3.7 An ERM maturity model for construction firms 
3.7.1 Existing ERM maturity models 
ERM maturity reflects the sophistication of ERM implementation. To 
understand the ERM maturity of a firm, a starting point can be the assessment 
of its current ERM practice. It is necessary for a firm to assess its ERM 
maturity because such assessment can help the management staff to obtain a 
clear view of the status quo, strengths and weaknesses of its ERM 
implementation. Based on the assessment results, the management staff can 
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take appropriate actions and prioritize resources to improve the weak areas of 
the ERM implementation.  
An ERM maturity model reviews the ERM performance throughout the 
organization, tracks various criteria, grades them on their maturity level, and 
thus takes a snapshot of where the ERM program stands and measure the 
progress of ERM implementation (Narvaez, 2011). Several ERM maturity 
models have been developed to help organizations in various industries to 
assess their ERM maturity and to identify the strengths and weaknesses of 
their ERM practices. Thus, they can derive measures to fill the existing gaps 
between the status quo and the best practices. 
S&P evaluated an insurer’s ERM practices by five criteria: the risk 
management culture, risk controls, emerging risk management, risk and capital 
models, and strategic risk management (Santori et al., 2007). Each criterion 
was assigned a weight according to the specific situation faced by each insurer, 
and the assessment led to an ERM score of a weak, adequate, strong, or 
excellent level.  
In addition, the University of California (UC, 2009) applied an ERM maturity 
level framework, which consisted of 29 criteria based on the eight components 
of the COSO ERM framework and categorized ERM maturity into five levels: 
ad hoc, initial, repeatable, manageable, and leadership.  
The Washington State Office of Financial Management (WSOFM, 2010) also 
developed a model for the state agencies to score their ERM efforts. The ERM 
maturity was measured in five areas, and the overall ERM maturity range from 
level 1 (beginning) to 6 (advanced). 
Moreover, Ciorciari and Blattner (2008) developed a complex ERM maturity 
model for banks. They detailed the eight components of the COSO ERM 
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framework into 26 topics, which were further detailed into 123 elements. 
These elements were evaluated along a maturity level scale including the very 
weak, poor, mid, good and optimized levels.  
AON (2010) also proposed an ERM maturity self-assessment model for 
organizations in a wide range of industries. In this model, ERM 
implementation was assessed against nine criteria, which were also considered 
as hallmarks of advanced ERM. ERM implementation was categorized into 
initial/lacking, basic, defined, operational, and advanced levels. 
Furthermore, the Risk and Insurance Management Society (RIMS, 2008) 
collaborated with LogicManager Inc. to develop a risk maturity model for 
ERM. This model had seven core attributes that described the fundamental 
characteristics of an effective ERM program: adoption of the ERM-based 
approach, ERM process management, risk appetite management, root cause 
discipline, uncovering risks, performance management, business resiliency 
and sustainability. These attributes contained 25 competency drivers, and the 
competency drivers contained 68 best practices (key readiness indicators), 
against which organizations scored the effectiveness, proactivity, and coverage 
of each competency driver implementation. 
Therefore, it can be seen that the keys of the above ERM maturity models are 
the criteria or attributes that describe an effective or successful ERM program 
and relate to the components of the existing ERM frameworks. Although 
AON’s (2010) model can be used to assess ERM maturity level in various 
industries, there has not been an ERM maturity model specifically for 
construction firms. Hence, this research proposes such a model to assess ERM 
maturity in construction firms.  
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3.7.2 The criteria in the ERM maturity model 
To develop an ERM maturity model, maturity criteria needs to be established. 
These criteria should reflect the characteristics of an advanced or successful 
ERM practice. These criteria were established based on the components of the 
proposed ERM framework for construction firms (see Figure 3.6), and the 
criteria mentioned in the literature relating to the best practices and key 
characteristics in ERM (see Table 3.2). If a firm has practiced these criteria 
thoroughly, its ERM implementation can be deemed as highly mature. These 
criteria are: 
Table 3.2 ERM maturity criteria 
Code ERM maturity criteria 
Literature 
Sum 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
M01 Commitment of the board and senior 
management 
 √ √    √ √ √ √  √  √   √ √ 10 
M02 ERM ownership √ √ √ √     √ √ √ √  √     9 
M03 Risk appetite and tolerance √  √    √ √ √   √    √   7 
M04 Risk-aware culture  √ √ √  √  √ √  √ √  √  √ √ √ 12 
M05 Sufficient resources √     √ √  √    √       5 
M06 Risk identification, analysis and 
response 
√ √ √  √    √   √ √  √ √ √ √ 11 
M07 Iterative and dynamic ERM process 
steps 
√ √ √  √ √   √ √  √  √ √ √ √  12 
M08 Leveraging risks as opportunities √ √   √    √    √    √  6 
M09 Risk communication  √    √  √ √   √   √  √ √ 8 
M10 A common risk language       √         √   2 
M11 A risk management information 
system  
  √ √  √ √   √     √    6 
M12 Training programs      √  √ √  √     √ √  √ 7 
M13 Formalized key risk indicators       √     √   √    3 
M14 Integration of ERM into business 
processes 
 √ √ √     √    √     √ 6 
M15 Objective setting     √    √          2 
M16 Monitoring, review and improvement 
of ERM framework 
     √         √             √     3 
Literature: 1. Aabo et al. (2005); 2. AON (2010); 3. Barton et al. (2002); 4. Cendrowski and 
Mair (2009); 5. Ciorciari and Blattner (2008); 6. Dafikpaku (2011); 7. Duckert (2011); 8. EIU 
(2007); 9. Narvaez (2011); 10. Garvey (2008); 11. Muralidhar (2010); 12. RIMS (2008); 13. 
Segal (2011); 14. Stroh (2005); 15. UC (2009); 16. Ward (2006); 17. Hallowell et al. (2013); 
18. WSOFM (2010). 
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M01: Commitment of the board and senior management  
Commitment of the board and senior management is not only regarded 
as a driver for ERM, but also as a critical success factor (Stroh, 2005). It 
was also among the criteria in some ERM maturity models (AON, 2010; 
RIMS, 2008). Visible commitment makes people perceive ERM as a 
priority for the leadership. Garvey (2008) argued that risk management 
must be a priority for the leadership. More importantly, the commitment 
should be continual and should not be interrupted by changes in the 
ERM champion because ERM practice is an on-going process (Bowling 
and Rieger, 2005; Simkins, 2008). Consultants, if employed, should 
supplement, not replace, the involvement of upper management in the 
ERM implementation (Barton et al., 2002). 
M02: ERM ownership 
Due to the centralized nature of ERM, ERM needs a risk owner to 
oversee an enterprise’s entire risk profile at a high level rather than 
different overseers managing specific risks (Banham, 2004). A chief risk 
officer (CRO) position can be created to take responsibility for risk 
oversight, and thus signals the firm’s emphasis on risk management to 
its employees and investors (Cendrowski and Mair, 2009; Lam, 2003). 
Alternatively, firms may include the ERM responsibility in the C-level 
executives, such as chief executive officers (CEOs) and the chief 
financial officers (CFOs), or create a stand-alone department or a 
board-level risk management committee. Who the ERM owner is should 
be openly communicated to all the staff. In addition, each risk should 
have a risk owner. Risk owners should have sufficient authority to 
oversee any risk-related action, and should be responsible for managing 
the risks that fall within the limit of their accountability. The authority 
and responsibility of risk owners should be clearly defined, made known 




M03: Risk appetite and tolerance 
Risk appetite is the “amount and type of risk that an organization is 
willing to pursue and retain”, while risk tolerance is an “organization's 
or stakeholder's readiness to bear the risk after risk response in order to 
achieve its objectives” (ISO, 2009a: p.9). Risk appetite, which is 
established by management with oversight of the board of directors, 
relates primarily to the business model and is a guidepost in strategy 
setting, while risk tolerance relates primarily to the organization’s 
objectives and is tactical (COSO, 2004; Protiviti, 2006). Risk tolerance 
can be measured, and is measured in the same units as the related 
objectives in most cases. In setting risk tolerance, management should 
consider the relative importance of the related objectives, and aligns risk 
tolerance with risk appetite. Operating within risk tolerance provides 
management with greater assurance that the company is within the risk 
appetite, which, in turn, produces a higher degree of comfort that the 
company will achieve its objectives (COSO, 2004). Risk appetite and 
tolerance should be clearly defined and made known to all the staff 
within a firm. 
M04: Risk-aware culture 
Nothing is more crucial to the success of ERM efforts in an organization 
than a supportive culture (Brooks, 2010; Cendrowski and Mair, 2009). 
Without such a culture, the organization cannot ensure that good 
risk-adjusted decisions were consistently made (Brooks, 2010), and thus 
their ERM systems and procedures would fail (De la Rosa, 2006). Such 
a culture is called a risk-aware culture (Brooks, 2010; Protiviti, 2006), 
risk management culture (Santori et al., 2007), or risk culture (Collier, 
2009; Sanchez et al., 2009; Zou et al., 2010) in the existing literature 
relating to ERM. It enables decision makers to recognize and understand 
the importance of risk identification, risk assessment, and risk 
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communication, and requires the explicit expression and deliberation 
about the expected behaviors (Brooks, 2010). A strong risk-aware 
culture is necessary for ERM success (Brooks, 2010; Sanchez et al., 
2009) and such a culture requires buy-in of organizational individuals at 
all levels (Hopkin, 2010) and embedment into the corporate culture 
(AON, 2010). In addition, risk awareness should be integrated into the 
decision-making process (AON, 2010; Santori et al., 2007), especially in 
the strategic decision-making process. Advanced ERM practices 
typically embed the management system into their culture (Derr, 2009; 
Stroh, 2005). 
M05: Sufficient resources  
Sufficient resources, such as funds, qualified staff, time, knowledge and 
expertise, are necessary for ERM implementation in construction firms. 
Resources should also be consistently allocated for improving the risk 
management process, tools, techniques, personnel skills, etc. Hence, 
ERM implementation can be maintained at a high level. Additionally, 
resources should be distributed for risk response based on the results of 
risk analysis and risk priority (Aabo et al., 2005; RIMS, 2008). 
M06: Risk identification, analysis and response 
Management needs to identify all categories of potential risks from 
internal and external sources that the enterprise faces. Risk analysis 
techniques help management prioritize the risks identified and identify 
the key ones. Thus, a corporate risk profile, which is “a periodic 
documentation of key risks to an organization to achieving its stated 
objectives over a specific future time” (Fraser, 2010: p.171), can be 
formed. It can be a list of top risks or a risk map, that has been used in 
the successful ERM practice (Aabo et al., 2005). The appropriate risk 
response measures are then identified, considering their significance in 
terms of likelihood and impact. Residual risks, which remain after the 
response measures are fully implemented, should be assessed. 
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M07: Iterative and dynamic ERM process steps  
An ERM process encompasses monitoring and review, risk 
identification, risk analysis, risk evaluation and risk response. The 
iterative and repetitive steps comprise a continuous improvement cycle. 
Such an ERM process also involves monitoring, identifying and 
assessing new risks that may emerge following changes in the 
environment (AON, 2010; Dafikpaku, 2011; Garvey, 2008; Santori et al., 
2007; UC, 2009), thus enabling an enterprise to deal with risks in a 
proactive way and to update its risk profile. 
M08: Leveraging risks as opportunities 
Risks encompass both threats and opportunities (Ward and Chapman, 
2003). In addition to focusing on dealing with downside risks (threats), 
ERM also involves leveraging and exploiting the upside risks 
(opportunities) for competitive advantages (Banham, 2004; COSO, 2004; 
Dafikpaku, 2011; Miccolis and Shah, 2000; Pagach and Warr, 2010; 
Stroh, 2005). Opportunities exist where a risk is more dangerous to 
competitors, or where an enterprise has a greater ability to manage the 
risk than its competitors (Berry and Phillips, 1998). The more an 
enterprise understands its risk landscape, the more it can leverage 
opportunities (AON, 2010). The RIMS (2008) suggested that enterprises 
should routinely identify and explore strategic opportunities during 
planning for adverse events.  
M09: Risk communication 
Risk information should flow up, down and across an organization 
(Narvaez, 2011). Relevant and reliable risk information obtained from 
various sources should be communicated transparently across multiple 
projects and departments of a construction firm in order to be shared by 
everyone in the firm. In addition, front-line employees who deal with 
critical operating issues are in the best position to recognize problems as 
they arise (COSO, 2004). Transparent risk communication allows and 
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encourages individual comments and expert views during the 
development of cross-functional understanding of risks and risk 
management strategies (AON, 2010). Moreover, there should be a 
mechanism in place to ensure that critical risk information is reported to 
the board and senior management in a periodic or timely manner 
(Dafikpaku, 2011). Furthermore, there should be clear communication 
lines established to ensure that line managers, project managers and staff 
are promptly notified of critical information and decisions (Barton et al., 
2002). 
M10: A common risk language 
A common risk language, which explains the terminologies and 
methodologies and contributes to a common understanding of their 
meanings and context throughout the enterprise, is viewed as a key 
quality of an effective ERM program (Duckert, 2011). This is because 
such a risk language would underpin risk culture, facilitate risk 
communication, cut through the layers and break down the silos 
(Espersen, 2007). This risk language should be communicated to all risk 
management practitioners and then used consistently in all 
communications, thus contributing to a common understanding of its 
meaning and contents across the company (Duckert, 2011). In contrast, 
without such a language, the risk management team will have to spend 
much time resolving communication issues at the expense of their 
primary responsibilities. A glossary of risk terms, which provides risk 
management practitioners with a common reference resource for risk 
terminologies, could be created and distributed within the organization 
(Espersen, 2007), and facilitates the acceptance of the risk language.  
M11: A risk management information system (RMIS) 
ICT plays a key role in enabling the flow of information and knowledge 
across an enterprise (Dafikpaku, 2011). Thus, a firm should consider 
potential technological solutions to support the on-going activities that 
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facilitate risk awareness and risk response in a timely manner (Arnold et 
al., 2011). A RMIS serves as a platform for risk communication and 
reporting, records risk management activities, or even undertakes risk 
identification and analysis and provides response plans. All the relevant 
staff should know how to apply this RMIS in ERM, to ensure that the 
functions are fully used.  
M12: Training programs 
To succeed in implementing ERM, it is critical that individuals at all 
levels throughout an enterprise accept ERM (Nocco and Stulz, 2006). 
Hence, training programs can be used to reduce misunderstanding and 
anxiety about ERM, and help personnel clearly understand the ERM 
philosophy and policy, the ERM process, and the value of ERM. Such 
programs can also instill risk awareness into the minds of the employees 
and contribute to the application of ERM tools and techniques within the 
firm. As the ERM implementation matures, such programs can serve as 
an organizational learning mechanism which enables employees to learn 
about ERM techniques and lessons from past projects.  
M13: Formalized key risk indicators (KRIs) 
A KRI is “a measure to indicate the potential, presence, level, or trend of 
a risk” (Hwang, 2010: p.126). In other words, it is a measure used to 
indicate how risky an activity is (Narvaez, 2011). KRIs help monitor 
risks and involve predetermined thresholds for each KRI that will trigger 
actions by management to adjust its strategies proactively to manage the 
risks accordingly (Beasley et al., 2010a). Duckert (2011) argued that 
well-defined KRIs were critical to successful ERM implementation, and 
that a data-centric approach to ERM with well-defined KRIs would be 
the only sensible way to establish it in the 21
st
 century. KRIs should be 
identified for all the risks that a firm faces and need to be periodically 
analyzed and revisited by risk owners (RIMS, 2008).   
M14: Integration of ERM into business processes 
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ERM should be fully integrated into the management and business 
processes of an enterprise (COSO, 2004). These include 
decision-making and strategic planning. An ERM program is only 
effective if it is used to inform decision making (Narvaez, 2011). In all 
decision-making processes, especially in strategic decision-making, the 
risks identified should be consistently considered, and emerging risks 
should also be anticipated. Integration of ERM into decision-making is 
an important indication that risk management is being embedded in the 
corporate culture (AON, 2010).  
M15: Objective setting 
An enterprise should consider how risks affect its ability to achieve the 
objectives (Narvaez, 2011) because risk is defined as “effect of 
uncertainty on objectives” in ISO 31000:2009 (p.1). Objective setting is 
one of the eight components of the COSO ERM framework, and is seen 
as a precondition to risk identification, risk assessment and risk response 
(COSO, 2004). Hence, corporate objectives should be clearly identified, 
and understood by staff at all levels. All objectives should have 
performance measures and all performance measures should be linked 
with objectives. Thus, deviations from plans or expectations should be 
assessed against the corporate objectives and project objectives 
(Hopkinson, 2011).  
M16: Monitoring, review and improvement of ERM framework 
Ongoing monitoring and review of the ERM framework are also 
necessary (Ward, 2006) to ensure that risk management is effective and 
continuously supports organizational performance. According to ISO 
31000:2009, management should periodically measure progress against 
the risk management plan, and review whether the risk management 
framework, policy and plan are still appropriate. Considering the results 
of monitoring and reviews, decisions should be made on how the ERM 
framework, policy and plan can be improved. 
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Based on the literature review, this research identifies 71 ERM best practices, 
which are related to the 16 criteria and serve as the sub-criteria. These 
practices enable assessors to easily understand the criteria and assess their 
ERM maturity according to their current ERM practices. The detailed 
descriptions of these best practices are presented in Section 7.2.3.  
The importance of these criteria varies from one to another; hence weights 
should be assigned to them. The maturity level of construction firms therefore 
depends on the weights of the criteria and the implementation levels of the 
criteria. The assessment of the implementation levels involves the subjective 
and imprecise judgments of individuals. The imprecision results from several 
sources, such as unquantifiable information, incomplete information or 
unavailable information (Chen et al., 1992). 
3.7.3 A fuzzy ERM maturity model 
Since ERM maturity assessment involves multiple criteria, five multi-criteria 
analysis methods, including the FST, artificial neural network (ANN), 
preference ranking organization method for enrichment evaluations 
(PROMETHEE), analytic hierarchy process (AHP), and genetic algorithm 
(GA), were reviewed. Their advantages and disadvantages are summarized in 
Table 3.3. 
In the context of this research, multiple criteria have various weighs. As the 
PROMETHEE method has no specific guidelines to determine the weights, 
this method is not applicable in this research. Although the AHP method can 
determine the weights of criteria, the number of pairwise comparisons to be 
made is potentially very large. As the ERM maturity model has 16 criteria, a 
total of 120 (i.e., 16 × (16 – 1) / 2 = 120) pairwise comparisons need to be 
made. Such a lengthy task would lead to a low response rate for the survey. In 
addition, respondents may find it difficult to distinguish among the nine-point 
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scale using the AHP. Hence, the AHP method is not applicable in this research. 
Moreover, the ERM maturity model needs to be embedded into the proposed 
KBDSS. The GA is likely to have a long computational time, and the selection 
and implementation of encoding and fitness function can be difficult. These 
drawbacks of the GA may make the KBDSS not user-friendly. Hence, the GA 
is also not applicable in this research.
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Table 3.3 Advantages and disadvantages of different multi-criteria analysis methods 
Methods Advantages Disadvantages 




Shapiro, 2002; Sii 
et al., 2001) 
 
• It is possible to implement 
human knowledge and 
experience using natural 
language and linguistic terms. 
• It is unnecessary to have precise 
mathematical models. 
• It can deal with uncertain and 
imprecise data and ambiguous 
information. 
• It gives a more flexible structure 
for combining qualitative and 
quantitative information. 
• It is difficult to define accurate membership 
functions.  
• There is no standard and systematic method 
for the transformation of the human 
knowledge or experience into the rule base 
of a fuzzy inference system, no general 
procedure for choosing the optimal number 
of rules, since a large number of factors are 
involved in the decisions. 
• Fuzzy system software products are 
complex from the perspective of end users. 
Artificial neural 
network (ANN)  
(Godjevac, 1995; 
Tu, 1996; Wang 
and Elhag, 2007) 
• It can implicitly detect complex 
nonlinear relationships between 
independent and dependent 
variables. 
• When an element of the ANN 
fails, it can continue without any 
problem by their parallel nature.  
• It is capable of modeling the data 
of multiple inputs and multiple 
outputs. 
• It is unnecessary to know the 
concrete functional relationship 
between outputs and inputs. 
• It needs training to operate.  
• High processing time is required for large 
neural networks.  
• It has limited ability to explicitly identify 
possible causal relationships. 
• It has slow convergence speed. 
• It uses “black box” data processing 
structure. 
• It requires greater computational resources. 
• It is prone to over-fitting. 
• There is subjectivity in designing an ANN 
and determining its parameters. 
• It adopts networks without any constraint 
conditions. If there are any constraints on 
inputs and/or outputs, it will be difficult for 













2010; Brans and 
Mareschal, 2005; 
• It can classify the alternatives 
which are difficult to be 
compared because of a trade-off 
relation of evaluation standards 
as non-comparable alternatives.  
• Only the evaluations have to be 
performed of each alternative on 
each criterion. 
• It is based on the importance of a 
performance difference between 
two solutions, which is best 
describing whether a solution 
should be preferred to another 
• It does not build hierarchies of criteria, so it 
may become very difficult for the 
decision-maker to obtain a clear view of the 
problem and to evaluate the results in the 
case of many criteria. 
• It has no specific guidelines to determine 
the weights.  
• It is rather uncommunicative and tends to 
act as a black box to the non-professional 
users.  
• Rank reversal problems are likely to occur. 
• It cannot always be applied to non-convex 
problems. 
Table 3.3 (Continued)  
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Methods Advantages Disadvantages 
Macharis et al., 
2004) 
one. • Since it relies upon value functions, it 
proves to be a less objective method than 
the alternative models available. 
• Because of the outranking principles, no 
independent ratings, but rankings, are only 
produced by PROMETHEE. 
Analytic hierarchy 
process (AHP)  
(Belton and 
Stewart, 2002; 
Macharis et al., 




• It is able to check inconsistencies 
and accept limited 
inconsistencies.  
• It decomposes a decision 
problem into its constituent parts 
and builds hierarchies of criteria.  
• It helps to capture both 
subjective and objective 
evaluation measures.  
• It is uniquely positioned to help 
model situations of uncertainty 
and risk since it is capable of 
deriving scales where measures 
ordinarily do not exist. 
• Ranking irregularities can occur when the 
AHP or some of its variants are used. This 
rank reversal is likely to occur e.g. when a 
copy or a near copy of an existing option is 
added to the set of alternatives that are 
being evaluated.  
• It can be considered as a complete 
aggregation method of the additive type. 
The problem with such aggregation is that 
compensation between good scores on some 
criteria and bad scores on other criteria can 
occur.  
• The decision problem is decomposed into a 
number of subsystems, within which and 
between which a substantial number of 
pairwise comparisons need to be completed. 
• It is sometimes difficult to distinguish 
among the nine-point scale and there is the 








• It solves problems with multiple 
solutions.  
• It can solve multi-dimensional, 
non-differential, non-continuous, 
and even non-parametrical 
problems.  
• It can be easily transferred to 
existing simulations and models. 
• Choosing and implementation of encoding 
and fitness function can be difficult. 
• Certain optimization problems (such as 
variant problems) cannot be solved by 
means of the GA.   
• The computational time is long. 
• In many problems, the GA may have a 
tendency to converge towards local 
optima or even arbitrary points rather than 
the global optimum of the problem. 
• Operating on dynamic data sets is difficult, 
as genomes begin to converge early on 
towards solutions which may no longer be 




The ERM maturity model, which serves as a tool for self-assessment by 
practitioners, should make users feel that it is user-friendly. The most 
important advantage of the FST over the ANN is that the FST can deal with 
vague, imprecise and ambiguous information and uses natural language and 
linguistic terms (Godjevac, 1995; Higgins and Goodman, 1993). Specifically, 
in the real-world, human factors are likely to noticeably influence the 
decision-making process. The manner of human thinking, including the 
perception of preferences, is ambiguity, subjective, and imprecise 
(Zimmermann, 2001). The problems relating to the ambiguity and imprecision 
in human judgments cannot be handled by the classical set theory. However, 
the FST, first proposed by Zadeh (1965), can deal with such problems and 
quantify the linguistic facet of available data and preferences for individual or 
group decision-making (Pedrycz et al., 2011; Zimmermann, 2001). Therefore, 
the FST is adopted to develop the ERM maturity model. 
A fuzzy set Ã in X allows partial membership, and the membership value can 
range from 0 to 1. A fuzzy set Ã in X can be annotated as a set of ordered 
pairs: 
 ̃  {(    ̃(   |   }                                        (3.1) 
where μÃ (x) is the membership function. μÃ (x) specifies the grade or degree to 
which any element x in X belongs to the fuzzy set Ã, and ranges in the interval 
[0,1].  
Five types of membership functions have been widely used in practical 
applications: (1) triangular; (2) trapezoidal; (3) S function; (4) Gaussian; and 





Table 3.4 Five types of membership functions 
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Source: Ross (2010) 
Among these membership functions, the triangular membership function has 
been most commonly adopted (Hsu and Yang, 1997; Nieto-Morote and 
Ruz-Vila, 2012; Tah and Carr, 2000; Xu et al., 2010b). The triangular 




representation and information processing in a fuzzy environment (Chou and 
Chang, 2008; Lam et al., 2010; Xu et al., 2010b). Moreover, the precision in 
the shape of the membership functions is unimportant due to the quantitative 
nature of the problems with vague predicates, and fuzzy numbers with simpler 
membership function shapes tend to have more intuitive and more natural 
interpretation (Nieto-Morote and Ruz-Vila, 2011, 2012). Hence, the TFN is 
used in this model to quantify the qualitative information. 
A TFN, denoted as Ã = (a, b, c), can be defined by the following membership 
function: 
    ̃(   {
            
(    (           ⁄
(    (     ⁄       
 (3.2) 
where a is the lower bound of variable x; b represents the strongest grade of 









Figure 3.7 Triangular fuzzy number 
The fuzzy arithmetic operations of any two TFNs, Ã1= (a1, b1, c1) and Ã2= (a2, 
b2, c2), follow these operational rules: 
Addition: Ã1 + Ã2 = (a1 + a2, b1 + b2, c1 + c2)                                (3.3) 
Subtraction: Ã1 – Ã2 = (a1 – c2, b1 – b2, c1 – a2)                                 (3.4)      
Multiplication: Ã1 × Ã2 = (a1×a2, b1×b2, c1×c2)                              (3.5) 




Scalar multiplication: k × Ã = (k × a, k × b, k × c) if k > 0                          (3.7) 
                  k × Ã = (k × c, k × b, k × a) if k < 0                        (3.8) 
The concept of linguistic variables lies at the root of the FST. Compared to 
numerical variables whose values are numbers, linguistic variables are 
considered as variables whose values are linguistic terms, i.e. words or 
sentences in a natural or artificial language (Nieto-Morote and Ruz-Vila, 2012; 
Zadeh, 1973). This concept plays a fundamental role in the decision-making 
problems where decision makers face the difficulty in assigning exact 
numerical values to some variables due to the availability and uncertainty of 
information (Nieto-Morote and Ruz-Vila, 2012). Thus, the decision maker 
tends to prefer the use of linguistic variables. Each linguistic term needs to be 
transformed to a fuzzy number, which enable these terms to be mathematically 
operable. In this research, a linguistic variable i.e. the implementation level of 
each best practice under each criterion is defined. According to the “seven 
plus or minus two” principle (Miller, 1956), the model adopts the scale of five, 
which makes it convenient for users to judge. The linguistic values of this 
variable are defined as: very low, low, medium, high, and very high. These 
fuzzy terms are transformed into TFNs, respectively. 
Each fuzzy set has to overlap its neighboring sets to some degree. In most 
cases, the overlap for triangle-to-triangle fuzzy regions averages between 25% 
and 50% of the fuzzy set base (Cox, 1998). Driankov et al. (1996) argued that 
the crossing point for two overlapping membership functions must be 50% for 
control applications and a little lower for classifiers and others. Hence, this 
research adopts 50% as the degree to which each triangular fuzzy region 
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Figure 3.8 Membership functions of linguistic values 
The Likert scale provides unambiguous results that are easy to interpret 
(Ekanayake and Ofori, 2004). As Table 3.5 shows, a five-point Likert scale 
(1=very low, 2=low, 3=medium, 4=high, 5=very high) is used to measure the 
importance of the criteria in a survey with the experts who have professional 
knowledge or practical experience about risk management in construction 
firms. 
Table 3.5 Fuzzy numbers of the linguistic values 
Linguistic value Range of % of likelihood Fuzzy number 
Very low  0-25 (0, 0, 0.25) 
Low   0-50 (0, 0.25, 0.5) 
Medium  25-75 (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) 
High  50-100 (0.5, 0.75, 1) 
Very high  75-100 (0.75, 1, 1) 
The criteria without significant importance in the one-sample t-test are 
excluded. Thus, the weights (W) can be assigned to the criteria retained by the 
mean scoring method. This method was adopted to establish the relative 
importance of causes of delay in building construction projects in Hong Kong 
(Chan and Kumaraswamy, 1996) and to determine the weights of risk 
allocation criteria and critical risk factors in PPP projects in China (Xu et al., 
2010a; Xu et al., 2010b). The mean score (   ) for each ERM maturity 
criterion can be calculated by the following equation: 
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where    is the score given to significantly important criterion i by the 
respondents, ranging from 1 to 5;    is the frequency of each rating; and n is 
the total number of responses concerning a particular criterion. Thus, the 
weight for the criterion i can be computed by the following equation: 
 𝑊         ∑      
 
   ⁄                                                                        (3.10) 
where 𝑊  represents the weight for the criterion i and ∑ 𝑊  
 
     ;     is 
the mean score of the criterion i; and n is the number of the criteria retained.  
The input data of the model are the implementation levels of all the best 
practices, which are rated by the participants in the ERM maturity assessment. 
Thus, the implementation level of a best practice can be computed as follows: 
 ̃   (             3)    ⁄   ∑  ̃   
𝑘
         (3.11) 
where  ̃   is the TFN of the implementation level of the best practice p under 
criterion i; k is the number of the individuals who participate in assessing the 
implementation level;  ̃    is the TFN of the implementation level of the best 
practice p under criterion i assessed by individual j; and     ,     , and    3 
represent the lower bound, the strongest membership degree, and the upper 
bound of  ̃  , respectively.  
The implementation level of each maturity criterion is measured by the 
average implementation level of all the best practices under this criterion: 
 ̃  (          3      ⁄  ∑  ̃  
𝑢
        (3.12) 
where  ̃  is the TFN of the implementation level of criterion i; u is the 
number of the best practices under criterion i;    ,     and   3  denote the 




respectively; and  
Thus,  ̃ can be calculated as follows: 
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where   ,    and  3 represent the lower bound, the strongest membership 
degree, and the upper bound  ̃, respectively; and     can be calculated using 
equation 3.12. 
Defuzzification is the operation of producing a crisp number that adequately 
represents the fuzzy number. There are several defuzzification methods 
available, such as the max-membership principle, centriod method, weighted 
average method, and mean-max membership (Chou and Chang, 2008; 
Negnevitsky, 2006; Ross, 2010). Four popular defuzzification methods are 
presented in Table 3.6. 
The centroid method is adopted in this research to transform the fuzzy number 
of the maturity level into a crisp value because it is one of the most popular 
methods (Negnevitsky, 2006) and has several desirable properties: (1) the 
defuzzified values tend to move smoothly around the output fuzzy region; (2) 
it is relatively easy to calculate; and (3) it can be applied to both fuzzy and 
singleton output set geometries (Cox, 1998). This method finds the point 
where a vertical line would slice the aggregated fuzzy set into two equal 
masses. This point represents the center of gravity (COG) of the fuzzy set 
(Negnevitsky, 2006): 
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Table 3.6 Four defuzzification methods 
Name Equation Diagram 
Max-membership 
principle 
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Weighted average 
method 















Source: Ross (2010) 
In this research, the fuzzy set is a triangle, whose COG is easy to calculate. 
Therefore, the crisp number of ERM maturity level, i.e. the ERM maturity 
index (ERMMI), can be calculated by the following equation: 
        ⁄  (       3                                                 (3.16)
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where     is the crisp number of the implementation level of the best practice 
p under criterion i; and    is the crisp number of the implementation level (i.e. 
maturity score) of criterion i. 
The ERMMI is in the interval of [0, 1] and tends to fall into the regions of two 




 (m, n = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) of  ̃. 
Therefore, the ERMMI can be translated to the linguistic term whose 
membership value is higher (see Figure 3.9):  
        (          {    (           (      }                       (3.20) 
Therefore, the fuzzy ERM maturity model provides a method to allow the 
management staff to understand the extent to which their construction firm 
implements ERM. The assessment result can be either a crisp number or a 
linguistic term to demonstrate the maturity level. An example is presented in 
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This chapter reviews the literature on risk management as well as ERM 
fundamentals and frameworks. Drivers for and hindrances to ERM 
implementation in the literature are identified. This chapter also discusses 
ERM implementation in construction firms, and its relationship with the 
existing PRM practices. Implementing ERM in construction firms can be 
viewed as a gradual organizational change because it concerns shaking the 
accustomed approach to managing risks, i.e. PRM. This chapter proposes a 
customizable ERM framework for construction firms at different stages of 
implementing ERM. Furthermore, this chapter develops a fuzzy model for 




4 Theories of Organizational Behavior 
4.1 Introduction 
Organizational behavior is “a field of study that investigates the impact that 
individuals, groups, and structure have on behavior within an organization, 
and then it applies that knowledge to make organizations work more 
effectively” (Robbins and Judge, 2007: p.34). The behavior is collectively 
influenced by the individual, the group, the organization, and the environment 
(Mullins, 2007).  
From the perspective of organizational behavior, ERM can be considered as a 
process of organizational change from the traditional, silo-based risk 
management approach to a holistic and integrated risk management approach. 
This change should be led by an individual or a team (a change agent), which 
is supported by the board and senior management, through motivation, 
organizational learning and creation of a risk-aware culture. This chapter 
reviews the literature on theories of organizational change, organizational 
learning, organizational culture, motivation, and leadership, under the 
umbrella of organizational behavior theories. In addition, factors that drive and 
resist organizational change are identified. Some sources of resistance to 
organizational change can be directly or indirectly linked to organizational 
learning, organizational culture, motivation and leadership. Moreover, the 
relationships among these theories of organizational behavior are elaborated in 
this chapter.  
4.2 Organizational change 
4.2.1 Two perspectives on organizational change 




as well as informal aspects of organizational life. Senior and Fleming (2006) 
indicated that the organization systems operated in internal, external and 
temporal environments whose elements interacted with each other to form the 
triggers of change.  
According to Choi and Ruona (2011), organizational change can be defined 
from two perspectives: strategic management and organizational development 
(OD). From the strategic management perspective, organizational change can 
be viewed as a process of implementing corporate strategy (Child, 1972; 
Dunphy, 2000), based on power-coercive and rational-empirical strategies. 
The change process is driven by a small group of people with leadership roles, 
and they must apply directive and coercive actions to force change recipients 
to comply with the proposed change goals (Choi and Ruona, 2011). In 
comparison, OD encompasses a collection of planned change interventions, 
built on humanistic-democratic values, that seeks to improve organizational 
effectiveness and employees’ well-being (Robbins, 2003). From the OD 
perspective, organizational change can be thought of as intentional efforts to 
make differences in the organizational work context to improve individual 
development and organizational performance (Porras and Robertson, 1992).   
4.2.2 Paradigms and typologies of organizational change 
Hayes (2007) provided a good review of the literature on paradigms of 
organizational change. There are two paradigms of organizational change: (1) 
the punctuated equilibrium paradigm; and (2) gradualist paradigm. The 
punctuated equilibrium paradigm involves “relatively long periods of stability 
(equilibrium), punctuated by compact periods of qualitative, metamorphic 
change (revolutionary)” (Gersick, 1991: p.12). This paradigm involves the 
change of deep structures, which determines the basic patterns that maintain 
its existence. The essence of the punctuated equilibrium paradigm lies in the 




the persistent deep structures, and periods of revolution with fundamental 
transformation of the deep structures. Weick and Quinn (1999) and Gersick 
(1991) referred to the change during the period of disequilibrium in this 
paradigm as revolutionary change, while Tichy and Devanna (1986) and 
Kotter (1996) used the term transformational change. 
In comparison, the gradualist paradigm posits that fundamental change 
(organizational transformation) can occur through a process of continuous 
adjustment and does not require some major discontinuous jolt to the system 
in order to trigger a short episode of revolutionary change, which therefore 
means the change is evolutionary and cumulative (Hayes, 2007). Some 
scholars referred to this type of change as continuous change (Weick and 
Quinn, 1999) or incremental change (Hayes, 2007).  
In the punctuated equilibrium paradigm, evolutionary change also occurs 
during the period of equilibrium but cannot fundamentally transform the deep 
structures. While the punctuated equilibrium paradigm focuses on the 
interdependence of organizational sub-units and a web of interdependent 
relationships, the gradualist paradigm stresses the relative independence of 
sub-units (Hayes, 2007). Weick and Quinn (1999) suggested that the loose 
interdependence could confine the continuous adjustments within sub-units, 
thereby hindering the adjustments from cumulating and creating fundamental 
change.  
In addition, Lewin (1951) differentiated between the planned and unplanned 
change. Planned change involves a deliberate, purposeful, and explicit 
decision to engage in a program of change (Levy, 1986). In unplanned change, 
the response is adaptive, spontaneous, and accidental (Porras and Robertson, 
1992). 




second-order change. First-order change “may involve adjustments in systems, 
processes, or structures, but it does not involve fundamental change in strategy, 
core values, or corporate identity” (Newman, 2000: p.604). First-order change 
maintains and develops the organization (Bate, 1998). It is incremental and 
evolutionary change. By contrast, second-order change “transformational, 
radical, and fundamentally alters the organization at its core” (Newman, 2000: 
p.604). It is akin to discontinuous and revolutionary change (Levy, 1986). 
4.2.3 Models of planned organizational change 
Lewin (1947) found groups were consistently in a “quasi-stationary 
equilibrium” state, and that change could occur only by changing the driving 
and restraining forces. In addition, Lewin (1947) found that a change towards 
a higher level of group performance was frequently short-lived and groups 
returned to their previous performance level, and suggested that the 
permanency of the new state should be included in the objective of a planned 
change. Therefore, Lewin (1947) proposed a three-step model of planned 
change consisting of unfreezing, moving, and refreezing:  
(1) Unfreezing is to shake people’s habitual modes of thinking and behavior to 
enhance their awareness of the need for change. This involves weakening 
the forces that maintain the status quo, strengthening the forces that push 
for change, and introducing discrepancies between desirable goals and the 
current situation. 
(2) Moving is the process of making the actual changes that moves the current 
situation to the desired state. This step involves the new types of individual 
behavior and the establishment of new strategies and structure, with 
associated systems to help secure the new ways of working.  
(3) Refreezing is to stabilize or institutionalize the changes by helping 
employees to integrate the changed behavior or attitude into their normal 




management is crucial to this step. 
Although the refreezing step is laudable to prevent organizations from 
backsliding to the previous state, it would ignore the increasingly volatile 
environment where modern organizations operate and the need for continuous 
change. Hence, this step seems to be suitable for only small-scale change 
projects because of its assumption that organizations operate in a stable state 
(Burnes, 2004). 
Based on Lewin’s (1947) model, other organizational change models were 
proposed. Lippittet et al. (1958) expanded the three steps to five phases: 
development of a need for change (unfreezing), establishment of a change 
relationship between the change agent and the client organization, working 
toward change (moving), generalization and stabilization of change 
(refreezing), and achieving a termination in the relationships. In addition, 
Egan (1988) developed a model which focused more on the moving phase, 
and argued that this phase should include the assessment to the current 
scenario (diagnosis), the creation of a preferred scenario (visioning) and the 
design of plans that move the system from the current to the preferred scenario 
(planning for change). 
4.2.4 Theory E and Theory O 
Beer and Nohria (2000c, b) suggested that organizational change could be 
achieved through two significantly different approaches called Theory E and 
Theory O. Theory E is change based on economic value while Theory O is 
change based on organizational capability. In Theory E, shareholder value is 
the only legitimate measure of corporate success. This “hard” change strategy 
involves the use of economic incentives, drastic layoffs, downsizing and 
restructuring, and focuses on the strategy, structure, and systems of 




incentives and consultants. In comparison, Theory O is to develop 
organizational culture and capability through individual and organizational 
learning. This “soft” approach is geared to cultivating a high-commitment 
organizational culture, has high-level involvement and collaboration, and has 
been viewed as an organizational development strategy (Hayes, 2007; Mullins, 
2007). However, it is too indirect and takes too long, especially when the need 
for change is urgent (Hayes, 2007). Thus, far fewer senior executives hold true 
to Theory O (Beer, 2001).  
Table 4.1 Theory E and Theory O of organizational change 
Dimensions Theory E Theory O Theories E and O Combined 




Explicitly embrace the paradox 
between economic value and 
organizational capability 
Leadership Manage change from 
the top down 
Encourage participation 
from the bottom up 
Set direction from the top and 
engage the people below 
Focus Emphasize structure 
and systems 
Build up corporate 
culture: employees’ 
behavior and attitudes 
Focus simultaneously on the 
hard (structures and systems) 
and the soft (corporate culture) 
Process Plan and establish 
programs 






commitment-use pay as 
fair exchange 
Use incentives to reinforce 




problems and shape 
solutions 
Consultants support 
management in shaping 
their own solutions 
Consultants are expert resources 
who empower employees 
Source: Beer and Nohria (2000b: p.137)  
Although these two approaches are distinct, Beer and Nohria (2000c, b) argued 
that combining the two theories enabled an organization to adapt, survive, and 
prosper in the long run, and suggested embracing the two approaches along 
the key dimensions of change, i.e. goals, leadership, focus, process, reward 




4.2.5 Drivers for organizational change 
An organization can be viewed as an open system of interrelated components 
that transacts with a larger environment. Many scholars have suggested that 
the drivers for organizational change came from the external and internal 
environment (e.g., Holbeche, 2006; Lunenburg, 2010; Senior and Fleming, 
2006). The external and internal driving forces of organizational change are 
listed in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2 Driving forces of organizational change 
External forces Internal forces 
Technical advancements Need for reorganization 
Globalization  Need for higher profitability 
Competition pressures Conflict between organizational components 
Social and cultural factors The changing nature and composition of the workforce 
Economic factors   
Political and legal pressures  
Market changes  
As for the external forces, Tichy (1983) proposed a framework for identifying 
and understanding drivers for organizational change, including broad 
categories such as technical, political, and cultural forces. Kaestle (1990) 
recognized that marketplace dynamics and IT were the two basic drivers for 
organizational change. Jick (1995) identified competitive pressures and the 
pursuit of competitive advantages as accelerators of change while Pascale et al. 
(1996) suggested that the rapid pace of change and competitive pressures were 
key forces for organizational change. In addition, Holbeche (2006) believed 
that globalization, emerging e-economy, and factors underlying in the social 
context could drive organizations to reinvent themselves in order to survive 
and thrive. Brimley and Garfield (2009) indicated that laws and regulations 
and economic factors (such as recession or inflation) were among the forces 
driving organizational change. 




can also be triggered by the internal factors (Holbeche, 2006). Janjua and 
Sobia (2010) found that the internal needs for restructuring, growth and new 
products provided opportunities for organizations to change. Moreover, 
Robbins (2003), Senior and Fleming (2006), and Mullins (2007) identified the 
need for reorganization and higher profitability, conflict between 
organizational components and the changing nature and composition of the 
workforce as the internal forces for organizational change. 
4.2.6 Resistance to organizational change 
Despite the potentially positive outcomes, change is often resisted by 
individuals. Resistance to change is a natural human response to imposed and 
significant change, based on the assumption that individuals get used to 
particular ways of behaving that have worked for them in the past (Holbeche, 
2006). However, some studies argued that individuals just resisted the way 
change was imposed on them, rather than the change itself (Dent and 
Goldberg, 1999; Fuegen and Brehm, 2004; Senge, 1990).  
Thomas and Hardy (2011) identified two dominant approaches to 
conceptualizing resistance to change: (1) demonizing it; and (2) celebrating it. 
Demonizing resistance to change considers resistance as a problem that 
hinders the attempts to change organizations. This was a long established 
assumption in the literature on organizational change, and was a dominant 
view in both management practices and theories (Coch and French, 1948; 
Dent and Goldberg, 1999; Giangreco and Peccei, 2005; McCarthy et al., 2008). 
Different from this approach, celebrating resistance to change has recently 
emerged and views resistance as part of successful change. Resistance to 
change may stem from positive intention (Piderit, 2000), and contributes to 
organizational change through challenging change agents (Ford and Ford, 




This research adopts the demonizing approach to viewing the resistance to 
change because it concerns the hindrances to implementing ERM in 
construction firms, and these hindrances have only negative impacts on ERM 
implementation. Previous studies that have adopted the demonizing approach 
involved individual and organizational sources of resistance to organizational 
change. In this research, a total of 21 sources of resistance to organizational 
change (i.e. C01-C21) were identified from previous studies (George et al., 
2008; Hayes, 2007; Low, 1998; Mullins, 2007; Recardo, 1995; Robbins, 2003). 
Out of these sources, 15 are at the individual level while six are at the 
organizational level: 
Category I: Individual sources of resistance 
C01: Habits  
Individuals tend to respond to situations in an established and 
accustomed way (Low, 1998), which serves as a means of comfort and 
security. Proposed change to habits would be resisted, especially if the 
habits are well established. 
C02: Fear of the unknown 
Changes with the uncertainty or ambiguity tend to cause anxiety or fear, 
and threaten the psychological safety of individuals. Hence, these people 
are likely to resist the change (Robbins, 2003). 
C03: Parochial self-interest 
Individuals resist the change that is perceived as causing them to lose 
something of value because it is common for people to focus on their 
own best interests rather than those of the total organization (Kotter and 
Schlesinger, 1979). Hence, individuals will assess the impact of change 
in terms of how it affects their ways of working (convenience or 
freedom), job security, economic value (income or other rewards), job 
satisfaction, career prospects, and so on, and in terms of how it 




groups which they belong to (Recardo, 1995). 
C04: Social factors 
Individuals who may believe that change will hurt their images, result in 
ostracism from peers, or simply make them feel “different” (Low, 1998), 
tend to resist the change. 
C05: Lack of individual capability to change 
Individuals tend to consider their own skills and competencies, and 
determine the likelihood of their success in new roles. They are likely to 
resist the change if they feel they lack the personal capabilities for 
success (Mullins, 2007). 
C06: Misunderstandings 
Individuals do not understand the reason for change and its impact on 
them are reluctant to embrace change. Misunderstandings cause 
individuals to perceive that the change will cost them more than they will 
gain (Hayes, 2007). Such misunderstandings are likely to be a result of 
poor communication and lack of trust. 
C07: Insufficient resources 
One of the key variables used by individuals to judge management 
commitment is the sufficiency of resources allocated for change 
(Recardo, 1995). Without timely and sufficient resources to complete the 
task, individuals who are asked to embrace a change will feel frustrated 
and thus resist the change. The resources may include people, budget, 
time, expertise, and other necessary inputs. 
C08: Inadequate rewards and punishments 
If a change agent neither rewards the desired behavior or output 
measures nor punishes noncompliance, then employees will have little 
incentive for embracing the change (Low, 1998). Employees who try to 
embrace the change tend to have feelings of being inequitably treated 
because they spend much in the change but get only a little in return 




C09: Poor internal communication 
Poor communication within an organization renders individuals unable to 
understand the vision of change and the impact of change on them. In 
addition, change agents cannot understand people’s concerns (Hayes, 
2007; Recardo, 1995). Hence, people are likely to resist the change. 
Simply providing information does not reduce resistance because 
decisions of whether or not to resist are based upon whether or not 
people agree with the change proposed. 
C10: Lack of the board and senior management commitment 
Commitment of the board and senior management represents the support 
from the top management. A transformational change within an 
organization requires such commitment, which can ensure the resources 
for the change and the authority of change agents. Lack of such 
commitment implies that the change is not perceived as a priority among 
board and senior management, and thus results in skepticism and 
cynicism across the organization (Hayes, 2007).  
C11: Lack of trust in management 
Trust in management involves individuals’ perceived confidence levels in 
management’s ability to lead effective change, and their feelings that 
they can depend on management to do what is in the best interest of the 
organization and its members. Lack of trust in management is strongly 
related to individuals’ anger, frustration, and anxiety, as well as resistance 
to change (Oreg, 2006). Skepticism and cynicism are two concepts 
related to trust and are also predictors of resistance to change (Stanley et 
al., 2005). 
C12: Inconsistency 
Inconsistency in change messages delivered by change agents is related 
to resistance (Larson and Tompkins, 2005). This inconsistency reflects 
management’s ambivalence about the change initiative, and thus provides 




C13: Low-level employee-manager relation 
The effectiveness of management tactics in reducing resistance to change 
depends on the level of employee-manager relationship (Furst and Cable, 
2008). Low-level employee-manager relation tends to make employees 
experience less trust in management. Hence, the management tactics in 
reducing resistance would be less effective. 
C14: Ineffective management styles 
Different management styles can affect the strength of resistance to 
change. Szabla (2007) found that collaborative change leaders were the 
most effective in reducing resistance to change, that those perceived as 
focusing only on facts and logic were less effective, and that those using 
power and coercion were the least effective. 
C15: Selective information processing 
Individuals shape their world through their perceptions. This can lead to 
a biased view of a particular situation, which fits most comfortably into a 
person’s own perception of the reality (Low, 1998; Mullins, 2007; 
Robbins, 2003). Thus, they ignore the information that challenges the 
world they have created. 
Category II: Organizational sources of resistance 
C16: Threats to power or influence 
Change will be resisted by the groups whose power or influence such as 
the control over decisions, resources or information is threatened. These 
groups perceive such power or influence as their “territorial rights.” 
C17: Threats to resource allocations 
The groups that benefit from the current resource allocations tend to feel 
threatened by the change that affects the future allocations, and resist it. 
C18: Limited focus of change 
Organizations are composed of several interdependent subsystems. 




modifying the organizational structure to match is likely to be resisted 
(Robbins, 2003). 
C19: Organizational culture 
The pervasive nature of organizational culture significantly influences 
organizational processes and individuals’ behavior. Ineffective or 
unsupportive culture is likely to result in a lack of flexibility for, or 
acceptance of change (George et al., 2008).  
C20: Group inertia 
Group norms specify appropriate and inappropriate behavior and govern 
the interaction between group members. The change that alters task and 
role relationship in a group disrupts group norms and the informal 
expectations that members have of one another, and thus is likely to be 
resisted by group members. Even if individuals would like to change 
their behavior, the group norms may act as a constraint and make them 
resist the change (Hayes, 2007). 
C21: Structural inertia 
The structure of an organization provides a strong element of stability. 
Adaptive, flexible organizations are likely to enjoy competitive 
advantages over rigid, static organizations (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). 
The more mechanistic or bureaucratic the structure is, the less likely the 
organization responds to change. 
4.2.7 Approaches to overcoming resistance to change 
Several approaches to breaking the resistance to change are available. Kotter 
and Schlesinger (1979) proposed six approaches for change agents to deal 
with the resistance to organizational change. These approaches are situational, 
and thus the selection of approaches should depend on contextual factors.  
A01: Education and communication 




change. The education process can involve one-on-one discussions, 
presentations to groups, or memos and reports. This tactic assumes that 
resistance is based on inadequate or inaccurate information and analysis, 
and requires good relationships between change initiators and resistors. 
Such relationships are characterized by mutual trust and credibility. 
However, this approach is time-consuming if many people are involved. 
A02: Participation and involvement 
Coch and French (1948) demonstrated that workers showed much more 
acceptance to a change in work practice when they were allowed to 
participate in the design and development of the change. With a 
participative change effort, the change agents listen to the people 
involved in the change and use their advice. When change agents believe 
they do not have all the information they need to design and implement 
the change, or when they need the commitment of others to do so, 
people’s involvement can reduce resistance to change, obtain 
commitment, and increase the quality of the change decision. However, 
this approach is likely to lead to a poor solution and great 
time-consumption if not carefully managed. 
A03: Facilitation and support 
Facilitation and support are most helpful when fear and anxiety lie at the 
heart of resistance. Change agents can provide new-skills training, a 
short paid leave of absence, or simply listening and providing emotional 
support. The basic drawback of this approach is that it can be 
time-consuming and expensive and still fail. If time, money, and 
patience are not available, then using supportive methods is not very 
practical. 
A04: Negotiation 
People can be motivated to change by rewarding the behavior that will 
facilitate the change. This approach is to exchange something of value 




clear that someone is going to lose out as a result of a change and yet his 
or her power to resist is significant. Negotiated agreements can be a 
relatively easy way to avoid major resistance, despite high costs. In 
addition, once a change agent negotiates with one party to avoid major 
resistance, he or she is open to the possibility of blackmail. 
A05: Manipulation and co-optation 
Manipulation is the covert attempt to influence others to change. This 
approach is used when other tactics do not work, or are too expensive. 
Manipulation normally involves the deliberate biasing of information 
and the conscious structuring of events. Examples of manipulation are 
twisting and distorting facts to make them more attractive, withholding 
undesirable information, and creating rumors to get employees to accept 
a change. Co-optation is a common form of manipulation. Co-opting an 
individual involves giving him or her a desirable role in the change 
decision. Co-opting a resistance group involves providing the leaders of 
it key roles in the change decision. However, this is not a form of 
participation because the advice of the co-opted merely gets the 
endorsement rather than a better decision. Both manipulation and 
co-optation are relatively inexpensive and easy ways to gain the support 
of an individual or a group, but this approach can backfire if people 
become aware that they are being tricked into not resisting, are not being 
treated equally, or are being lied to. Once a reputation as a manipulator is 
developed, the change agent may lose credibility. 
A06: Coercion 
Change agents essentially force people to accept a change by explicitly 
or implicitly threatening them. Examples of coercion are threats of 
transfer, loss of promotion possibilities, and negative performance 
evaluations. Using coercion is as risky as manipulation because people 
strongly resent forced change. However, in situations where speed is 





In addition, Recardo (1995) proposed ways to effectively reduce resistance to 
organizational change, which can supplement Kotter and Schlesinger’s (1979) 
approaches:  
A07: Communicating a clear vision of the change 
The senior management team is typically in the best position to develop 
a clear vision of the desired state. Such a vision will communicate the 
fact that something is broken, while creating a sense of urgency in 
employees to act. 
A08: Leadership of senior management 
Successful large-scale organizational change needs the leadership of 
senior management. Senior management should act as role models and 
openly demonstrate their commitment. Also, they must clearly 
communicate their expectations and hold people accountable for success. 
A09: Modification of the organization’s architecture 
Depending on the type of change, one or more elements of the 
organization’s architecture may need to be modified to support the 
change. For instance, the organizational structure, business systems (e.g. 
performance management and administrative policies), and 
infrastructure (e.g. the physical layout of offices) may need modification. 
A10: Modification of performance measures and rewards 
The desired behavior in the status quo and desired state tend to be 
significantly different. Recardo (1995) illustrated the necessity to modify 
the performance measures and rewards through comparing behavior and 
performance measures rewarded in a traditional manufacturing 
environment with those in a Just-in-Time (JIT) or Total Quality 
Management (TQM) environment. 




Resources can take the form of money, facilities, equipment, or access to 
key people. A change initiative with adequate resources tends to signal 
the support from the top management and competent management.  
The above 11 approaches could be adopted to overcome the 21 sources of 
resistance to organizational change, as shown in Table 4.3. Taking a different 
perspective on the attitude towards change, Choi and Ruona (2011) focused on 
the readiness for organizational change rather than resistance. They pointed 
out that individuals in an environment with strong emphasis on a learning 
culture were more likely to be ready for organizational change than those who 
have not. Furthermore, Rowden (2001) proposed that the learning organization 
approach enabled organizations to be attuned to the changing environment and 
thus created constant readiness for change. The following part of this chapter 
focuses on organizational learning. 
Table 4.3 Approaches to overcoming resistance to organizational change  
Source of 
resistance 
Approaches to overcoming resistance to organizational change 
A01 A02 A03 A04 A05 A06 A07 A08 A09 A10 A11 
C01  √    √      
C02   √   √      
C03    √  √      
C04 √ √    √      
C05 √  √         
C06 √ √    √ √     
C07           √ 
C08      √    √  
C09 √      √     
C10        √    
C11  √    √      
C12      √  √    
C13 √ √ √         
C14      √      
C15 √ √    √      
C16    √ √       
C17    √ √       
C18       √     
C19 √ √          
C20 √   √ √ √      




4.3 Organizational learning 
4.3.1 Definition of organizational learning 
Organizational learning has numerous definitions. Senge (1990) defined 
organizational learning as “a continuous testing of experience and its 
transformation into knowledge available to whole organization and relevant to 
their mission” (p.6). Huber (1991) viewed it as a combination of four 
processes: knowledge acquisition, information distribution, information 
interpretation and organizational memory. Argyris and Schön (1996) provided 
a less restrictive definition that organizational learning emerged when 
organizations acquired information (knowledge, understandings, know-how, 
techniques and procedures) of any kind by any means. Moreover, Dimovski et 
al (2008) defined it as a process of information acquisition and information 
interpretation that resulted in behavioral and cognitive changes, which should 
exert impact on organizational performance. 
Organizational learning stems from the knowledge acquisition of the 
individuals within the organization, and progresses with the exchange and 
integration of this knowledge until collective knowledge is created (Hedberg, 
1981; Jerez-Gómez et al., 2005). Organizational learning has its roots in 
individual learning (Senge, 1990; Shrivastava, 1983), but it is distinct from 
adding together the individual learning of the organization’s different members 
(Alas and Sharifi, 2002; Argyris and Schön, 1978; Hedberg, 1981). Individual 
learning alone does not necessarily result in organizational learning (Kim, 
1993).  
4.3.2 Types of organizational learning 
Argyris and Schön (1978) distinguished between single-loop and double-loop 
learning. Single-loop learning involves the production of matches, or the 




change in the underlying governing policies or value. Single-loop learning was 
considered as the lower-level learning, and partially contributes to short-term 
improvements (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). This type of organizational learning 
works when a firm operates in a relatively unchanging market environment 
(McGill and Slocum, 1993). By contrast, double-loop learning involves 
re-examining and challenging the governing values and policies in order to 
facilitate the learning process, and enables organizational members to 
understand the environment, develop appropriate responses to new 
requirements, and manage change effectively (Garratt, 1995). This type of 
change was viewed as a higher-level change (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). It is 
characterized by considering problems as the challenges that the firm faces 
and dealing with the root causes (Kululanga, 1999). In addition, Senge (1994) 
distinguished between adaptive learning and generative learning, comparable 
to single-loop and double-loop learning. The adaptive learning enables the 
organization to improve what it is doing, while generative learning challenges 
and redefines the basic requirements of the tasks and how they should be 
undertaken (Bennett, 1998).  
Argyris (1977) proposed the idea of deutero learning, which involved learning 
how to learn and helped organizations to improve the performance of 
single-loop and double-loop learning (Morgan, 1997). Deutero learning is 
conceptualized as behavioral adaptions of conditioning in relationships in an 
organizational context (Visser, 2007). Thus, deutero learning is continuous, 
behavioral-communicative and largely subconscious (Rowe and Boyce, 2009).  
4.3.3 Approaches to organizational learning 
Sfard (1998) proposed two metaphors of learning: the acquisition and 
participation metaphors, which are also called the cognitive-behavioral 





From the perspective of the acquisition metaphor, the mind is a container of 
knowledge, and learning is a process of filling the container and implanting 
knowledge there. Knowledge is viewed as a property or capacity of an 
individual mind (Paavola et al., 2004). Sense (2011) distinguished between 
cognitive and behavioral perspectives in this metaphor. The cognitive 
perspective involves knowledge, understanding and insights, i.e. the 
organization gaining knowledge regardless of whether that knowledge is 
converted into actions, while the behavioral perspective concerns either an 
actual change or a potential behavioral change (Tsang, 1997). Hence, learning 
is a process of knowledge acquisition through experienced-based changes in 
behavior or cognition. This approach is aligned with Huber’s (1991) four-stage 
approach to organizational learning, which consisted of knowledge acquisition, 
information distribution, information interpretation and organizational 
memory.  
By contrast, the participation metaphor regards learning as a process of 
participation in cultural practices and shared learning activities. From this 
perspective, learning cannot be separated from working and other social 
practices where it is used (Brown and Duguid, 1991). In this view, learning 
and process activities (knowing) rather than outcomes or products (knowledge) 
are emphasized. Learning is “situated” in these relations and networks of 
activities of participation (Paavola et al., 2004). Situated learning evolves 
through the processes of observation, dialogue, storytelling and conversations 
between people as they participate and interact within a practice (Sense, 2011).  
Sfard (1998) argued that both approaches were needed, which was consistent 
with the conclusion of Anderson et al. (2000). They are not simply rivals but 
complement each other. There is also a third approach to organizational 
learning: the knowledge-creation approach. It is based on the view that the 




understanding organizational learning (Ellström, 2010). There are three 
influential models of this approach:   
(1) Nonaka’s knowledge-creation model 
Nonaka (1991) distinguished between different types of knowledge: 
explicit and tacit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is described as 
knowledge that can be documented and stored in formats such as papers or 
drawings, whilst tacit knowledge is based on experience, mental models, 
and perspectives which are so deeply embedded in a person that the 
knowledge becomes the second nature to an individual. The dynamic of 
Nonaka’s model arises from the interactions between explicit and tacit 
knowledge. Nonaka (1991) proposed four basic patterns for creating 
knowledge in any organizations: socialization (conversion from tacit to 
tacit), combination (conversion from explicit to explicit), externalization 
(conversion from tacit to explicit), and internalization (conversion from 
explicit to tacit). 
(2) Engeström’s expansive learning model 
Engeström’s model viewed learning as an expansive cycle, which 
consisted of seven stages: questioning and criticizing certain extising 
practices, analyzing the situation, modeling a new solution to the 
problematic situation, examining the new model, implementing the new 
model, evaluating the process, and consolidating the new practice 
(Engeström, 1999). This model has also been used as an intervention 
method for facilitating innovative learning in organizations.  
(3) Bereiter's knowledge-building model 
Bereiter (2002) considered knowledge as a thing that can be systematically 
produced and shared among members of a community. Bereiter’s theory 
made a conceptual distinction between learning and knowledge building. 
In modern enterprises, knowledge consists of objects or conceptual 




goal of members of an innovative expert community is not to learn 
something but to create new knowledge and add the value of conceptual 
artifacts. 
4.3.4 Impediments to organizational learning 
Similar to the presence of resistance to change, there are impediments to 
organizational learning (Alas and Sharifi, 2002; Ellström, 2010; Hayes, 2007; 
Salaman and Butler, 1994), because individuals have been trained to think and 
act in conflicting ways (DiBella and Nevis, 1998). Hence, when involving 
change in behavior and mindset of organizational members, the learning 
process would be resisted within the organization. Due to the interaction 
between change and learning, there may be overlap between the resistance to 
change and learning. Several impediments to organizational learning are listed 
below: 
L01: Lack of leadership commitment and support 
Leadership plays a special role in learning because it is “where the 
exchange of information is launched, becomes systematic, and then is 
monitored and rewarded” (Goeser and Davenport, 1996: p.28). Leaders 
need to make organizational learning a central element in the 
organization’s strategy, create organizational learning mechanisms to turn 
individual learning into organizational learning, produce cultural and 
psychological conditions conducive to learning (Popper and Lipshitz, 
2000), allocate resources for learning, and facilitate learning on the part 
of organizational members (Ellström, 2010). Hence, lack of leadership 
support will impede organizational learning and make employees 
perceive organizational learning as not being emphasized. 
L02: Lack of internal knowledge 
Because organizational learning stems from knowledge acquisition 




organization tends to inhibit the learning process, even though 
organizations can also acquire knowledge from external sources. Lack of 
internal knowledge can partly be attributed to the lack of qualified 
personnel with tacit knowledge.  
L03: Lack of organizational commitment 
Organizational commitment is “the extent to which organizational 
members identify with an organization’s goals and values and make no 
distinction between promoting its interests and their own personal ones” 
(Lipshitz et al., 2002: p.87). Organizational commitment allows diffusion 
of individual learning into the organization (Lewitt and March, 1988) and 
is viewed as an inducement for people’s willingness to share their 
knowledge (Davenport and Prusak, 1998), on which organizational 
learning crucially depends. The people who feel more commitment 
towards the organization will share their information more with the 
organization and other employees (Atak and Erturgut, 2010). Hence, lack 
of organizational commitment tends to interrupt knowledge transfer, and 
impedes organizational learning. 
L04: Lack of psychological safety 
Psychological safety is a state in which people feel safe to make errors 
and honestly discuss what they think and how they feel. Without 
psychological safety, individuals are reluctant to take risks for learning. 
Edmondson (1999) found that high-level and low-level learning teams 
differ in the extent to which their members feel psychologically safe. 
Tolerance for errors that is inevitably generated from organizational 
learning is a policy that contributes positively to employees’ 
psychological safety. In addition, commitment to the workforce also 
improves psychological safety through employment security, and is 
essential for organizational commitment to the goals and values. 
Organizational learning expected to bring about layoffs will be resisted 




L05: Lack of motivation 
Positive and negative rewards are common to motivate individual 
learning. Lack of motivation for organizational learning results in 
passivity, hidden sabotage, or outright rejection of accepting new 
knowledge and sharing crucial knowledge with others (Szulanski, 1996). 
A reward system is also necessary to stimulate innovative behavior, 
because innovation is much riskier, more difficult and time-consuming. 
Lack of such reward system may discourage the people engaged in 
innovation and thus impede organizational learning. 
L06: Reluctance to share knowledge 
Organizational members may be reluctant to spend time sharing 
knowledge, because they are overwhelmed with work or believe their 
time can be spent more profitably elsewhere (Husted and Michailova, 
2002). Their reluctance to share knowledge may also derive from the fear 
of losing a position of privilege and superiority, the lack of motivation 
for sharing as well as the perception that the knowledge source is 
unreliable (Szulanski, 1996). Hence, knowledge transfer is interrupted, 
and individual learning does not contribute to organizational learning. 
This is fragmented organizational learning (Kim, 1993). 
L07: Reluctance to accept knowledge 
People may be reluctant to accept knowledge even if others are willing to 
share knowledge with them. People may reject the knowledge of others 
due to the unreliability of the source or idleness. The reluctance of 
potential knowledge recipients can increase the internal stickiness of 
knowledge and lower knowledge distribution, which ultimately impedes 
learning within an organization. 
L08: Lack of knowledge absorptive or retentive capacity 
Absorptive capacity is indicated in the knowledge recipients’ ability to 
value, assimilate, and apply new knowledge. Lack of this capacity may 




(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Additionally, retentive capacity is reflected 
by the ability of a recipient to institutionalize the use of new knowledge. 
A transfer of knowledge is effective only when the knowledge transferred 
is retained. Hence, lack of such capacity allows people to regard initial 
difficulties during the integration of received knowledge as an excuse for 
discontinuing its use (Szulanski, 1996).  
L09: Lack of channels for dialogue and sharing meaning 
The essence of organizational learning is the joint construction of 
meaning, which occurs through sharing and dialogue (Hayes, 2007). 
Sharing meaning is constructed in the dialogue between organizational 
members (Dixon, 1997). Thus, lack of accessible channels for dialogue 
and sharing meaning is a barrier to organizational learning. 
L10: Arduous relationships 
Individual exchanges are required during a transfer of knowledge, 
especially when the knowledge transferred has tacit elements that is 
deeply embedded in people (Nonaka, 1994). To some extent, the success 
of such exchanges depends on the ease of communication and the 
intimacy of the relationship between the knowledge source and recipient. 
An arduous relationship tends to create additional difficulties in the 
knowledge transfer (Szulanski, 1996).  
L11: Downsizing or layoff strategies 
Downsizing, a form of restructuring, involves departure of people with 
valuable experience and knowledge. Their departure disrupts the 
networks of interpersonal relationships among employees where 
organizational learning is generated (Fisher and White, 2000). In addition, 
large-scale layoffs cause voluntary turnover, particularly among the 
better qualified employees who possess valuable knowledge and who can 
best contribute to future learning (Pfeffer, 1998). Especially in the case of 
fragmented organizational learning, loss of individuals means loss of 




to organizational learning when they leave the firm. 
L12: Unsupportive organizational culture 
Salaman and Butler (1994) claimed that the resistance to learning may 
derive from unsupportive organizational culture, which would engender 
behavior and attitudes detrimental to learning and thus hinders the 
learning process. One example is blame culture, which is related to the 
passive attitudes towards errors and failures within an organization. 
Blame culture exerts fear on people that they will be blamed for their 
errors or failures, raises the possibility of the same mistake being made 
repeatedly, and limits the sharing of information. Thus, individuals are 
motivated to play safe and avoid experimentation, which stifles creativity 
and learning (Hayes, 2007). Another example is organizational defensive 
routines, which are action, policy, or practice that prevents organizational 
participants from experiencing embarrassment or threat and, at the same 
time, prevents them from discovering the causes of the embarrassment or 
threat (Argyris, 1995). The defensive routines that are incorporated into 
the organizational culture can affect new arrivals, despite the movement 
of organization members (García-Morales et al., 2006). These routines 
inhibit double-loop learning, overprotect the individuals and the 
organization (Argyris, 1990), and make organizational members become 
“skillfully incompetent (Argyris, 1986).”  
4.3.5 Organizational learning, learning organization and organizational 
change 
The accelerating pace of change in the environment has heighten 
organizational learning in the West, even though it is not a new concept 
(Burnes et al., 2003). To deal with an increasingly complex environment, 
organizations recognize the need to acquire and utilize the knowledge in order 




lead to new knowledge and skills, as well as new attitudes and behavior 
(Mullins, 2007).  
Learning is fundamentally about change (Spector and Davidsen, 2006). 
Organizational learning has not actually occurred if no behavioral or cognitive 
changes occur (Dimovski et al., 2008). Sanchez (2005) suggested that 
“learning leads to change in an individual’s beliefs about causal relationships 
in the world and within an organization”, and that “organizational learning can 
be said to occur when there is a change in the content, conditionality, or degree 
of belief of the beliefs shared by individuals who jointly act on those beliefs 
within an organization” (p.16). However, change is not necessarily the result 
of learning processes. Some changes in behavior may be triggered by 
situational factors and have little or nothing to do with organizational learning 
(Ellström, 2010). 
Learning is a medium for change (Alas and Sharifi, 2002), and improves the 
ability to adapt to change, both at the individual and organizational levels 
(Garvin, 1993; Senge, 1990). Pettigrew and Whipp (1993) argued that 
collective learning was one of the pre-conditions for sustainable change. 
Clarke (1994) and Nadler (1993) suggested that individual and organizational 
learning encouraged the commitment to, and shared ownership of, the 
organization’s vision, actions, and decisions that were necessary to respond to 
the external environment. Benjamin and Mabey (1993) regarded questioning 
the status quo as the essence of bottom-up change, and suggested that the 
openness and knowledge of staff from employee’s learning pressed managers 
to question the purpose and direction of the organization. Learning and change 
were not only parallel and simultaneous, but are also interactive processes, as 
learning has a mediating role in the change process (Lähteenmäki et al., 2001). 
In the tumultuous environment, learning also helps to reduce uncertainty and 




these should not be isolated from each other.  
The inextricable link between change and learning is also considered as a 
supporting rationale for learning organizations (Senge et al., 1994). A learning 
organization is “where people continually expand their capacity to create 
desirable results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of 
thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people 
are continually learning how to learn together” (Senge, 1990: p.3). A learning 
organization is viewed as an ideal type of organization, which has the capacity 
not only to facilitate the learning of its members, but also to transform this 
learning into continuous organizational renewal (Ellström, 2010). The terms 
organizational learning and learning organization are actually different. 
Organizational learning is a process of activities, whereas the learning 
organization is a form of organization (Tsang, 1997). Organizational learning 
and the learning organization can and should co-exist (Gorelick, 2005).  
Learning organizations are designed to anticipate and react to changing 
external and competitive environments in a positive and proactive manner, and 
help to establish internal organizational structures that are more capable of 
responding to the turbulence of change (Watkins and Marsick, 1993). 
Characteristics of learning organizations help to overcome resistance to 
change and facilitate learning (Alas and Sharifi, 2002). Kontoghiorghes et al. 
(2005) found that open communications and information sharing, risk taking 
and new idea promotion, as well as resource availability are the characteristics 
that strongly predict rapid organizational change adaption. Moreover, Rowden 
(2001) claimed that four characteristics of learning organizations contributed 
to the their response to change. These are: 
(1) Constant readiness 
Learning organizations exist in a constant state of readiness for change, 





(2) Continuous planning 
Learning organizations develop flexible, open plans that are fully shared 
and embraced by the entire organization.  
(3) Improvised implementation 
Rather than implementing plans regularly, learning organizations 
improvise change, encouraging experimentation, rewards small wins, and 
institutionalizing success throughout the organization. 
(4) Action learning 
Rather than waiting for the problems to arise to compel reevaluation, 
learning organizations take action, reflect, and adjust courses as they go, 
seeking to improve the speed and effectiveness by which they learn how to 
change. 
4.4 Organizational culture 
4.4.1 Definition of organizational culture 
There has been no consensus on the definition of organizational culture. 
Robbins (2003) believed that organizational culture refers to a system of 
shared meaning held by members that distinguishes the organization from 
other organizations. Cummings and Worley (2005: p.509) defined 
organizational culture as “the pattern of assumptions, values, and norms that 
are shared by an organization’s members.” As a long time researcher of 
organizational culture, Schein (1990: p.111) defined organizational culture as 
“a pattern of basic assumptions, invented, discovered, or developed by a given 
group, as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore 
is to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel 




4.4.2 Model of organizational culture 
Models of organizational culture enable different cultural characteristics to be 
linked with one another (Senior and Fleming, 2006). Schein (1990, 1992) 
distinguished three levels of organizational culture: observable artifacts, 
espoused values, and basic underlying assumptions. At the surface, there are 
visible artifacts of the organization, i.e. the organizational structure, rules of 
conduct, dress codes, policies, procedures, symbols, stories, heroes, 
ceremonies and rituals, and other overt behavior of organizational members. 
Beneath this dimension are espoused values, which reflect the work of the 
organization in the form of articulated strategies, ideologies, attitudes, and 
philosophies. Finally, the deepest level is the taken-for-granted and underlying 
assumptions that are deeper manifestations of values and that determine 
perceptions, thoughts, feelings and behavior. These assumptions are reflected 
in and give meaning to the expressed values and observable artifacts and 
patterns of behavior at the surface (Ashkanasy et al., 2000). Schein (2004) also 
emphasized the effects of situational contingencies arising from the external 
environment on the values and artifacts, and argued that overt behaviors are 
the joint product of cultural predilection and environmental stimuli.  
4.4.3 Functions of organizational culture 
Culture performs a host of functions within an organization. According to 
Brown (1995), organizational culture helps avoid conflict, and thus facilitates 
the processes of coordination and control. It also reduces the complexity and 
uncertainty of the organizational context so that any actions taken are in 
tandem with organizational rationalities as seen by most organizational 
members. In addition, the functions of organizational culture include 
responding to both external adaption and internal integration issues (Schein, 
1990). External adaption issues develop consensus on the core mission, 




pursued, the basic means to be used to achieve the goals, the criteria to be used 
for measuring results, as well as the methods of coping with success and 
failure. Internal integration deals with the creation of a collective identity and 
with ways of working and living together (Schermerhorn et al., 2011). 
Moreover, organizational culture conveys a sense of identity for organization 
members, and facilitates the generation of organizational commitment (Peters 
and Waterman, 1982). Furthermore, Robbins (2003) indicated that 
organizational culture could distinguish one organization from others, convey 
a sense of identity for organization members, and facilitate the commitment to 
something larger than individual interests. Organizational culture also serves 
as the social glue that helps hold the organization together and guides and 
shapes the individual behavior and attitudes in the organization. 
4.4.4 Typologies of organizational culture 
In an organization, culture can be categorized into dominant culture, 
subculture and counterculture. A dominant culture expresses the core values 
that are shared by a majority of the organization’s members, and is referred to 
as the organization’s culture (Robbins, 2003). Organizations also comprise 
subcultures throughout its occupational groups, various divisions and 
geographic regions. Some subcultures enhance the dominant culture by 
espousing parallel values and assumptions; other subcultures emphasize 
different but not competing values; still others are countercultures which 
directly oppose the dominant values of the organization (McShane and Von 
Glinow, 2007). Strong subcultures are often found in task forces, special 
project groups and teams in the organizations, and bind individuals intensely 
together to complete a task (Schermerhorn et al., 2011). They retained the core 
values of the dominant culture, but are modified to reflect the unique situation 
or values to the members of a unit or department of the organization (Robbins, 




ethical behavior, to prevent individuals from blindly following one set of 
values (McShane and Von Glinow, 2007; Sinclair, 1993). Moreover, they 
enable organizations to be more in tune with the changing environment 
(Boisnier and Chatman, 2003).  
Organizational cultures differed significantly in terms of their relative 
strengths (Brown, 1995), and can be differentiated between strong and weak 
cultures (Robbins, 2003). Gordon and DiTomaso (1992) provided a 
comprehensive literature review on the definition of the strength of an 
organization’s culture. It had been defined as coherence (Deal and Kennedy, 
1982; Weick, 1985), homogeneity (Ouchi and Price, 1978), congruence 
(Schall, 1983), thickness (Sathe, 1983), penetration (Louis, 1985), as well as 
internalized control (DiTomaso, 1987). Strong organizational cultures, defined 
as “a set of norms and values that are widely shared and strongly held 
throughout the organization” (O'Reilly and Chatman, 1996: p.166), can 
increase behavioral consistency across individuals in an organization 
(Sørensen, 2002). Conversely, a weak culture implies the absence of a 
dominant pervasive culture but an organization made up of various cultures, 
some of which conflict with each other (Senior and Fleming, 2006). 
Individuals in a weak culture would waste much time trying to understand 
what they should do and how they should do it (Deal and Kennedy, 1982). 
4.4.5 Organizational culture and change 
Strong cultures exert a stabilizing force on organizations by encouraging 
cohesion, organizational commitment, and desirable work behavior among 
members (Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Nemeth and Staw, 1989; O'Reilly and 
Chatman, 1996). This stability brings about cultural clarity and consistency 
among members, which is an asset to an organization in a stable environment 




However, the stability can also be a liability and burden for the organization to 
be competitive and responsive to the dynamic environment (Boisnier and 
Chatman, 2003; Brown and Harvey, 2005; Tushman and Smith, 2002). 
Organizational performance in changing environments depends on the ability 
of a firm to modify its routines in response to changes in conditions. Nemeth 
(1997) argued that the uniformity, loyalty, commitment and potentially 
“cult-like” behavior brought about by strong cultures could stifle an 
organization’s ability to respond to change. Sørensen (2002) found that in 
relatively stable environments, firms with strong cultures had more reliable 
performance but this was not the case in volatile environments. Jaskyte and 
Dressler (2005) found that the higher the cultural consensus on values such as 
stability, security, low level of conflict, predictability, rule orientation, team 
orientation, and collaboration, the less innovative the organization may be.  
Therefore, the contents of strong cultures should be change-oriented. Schein 
(1992) suggested that the culture of modern organizations should be strong but 
limited to differentiate basic assumptions that were vital to organizational 
survival and success from everything else that was desirable but not 
mandatory. In fact, making organizations responsive to change does not 
necessarily need to weaken the strong culture. Boisnier and Chatman (2003) 
found that various subcultures enabled organizations to become agile and 
generate responses to the environment without necessarily losing its internal 
coherence.  
According to the level model of Schein (1990, 1992), the organizational 
structure is at the artifacts level of organizational culture. The organizational 
structure is also an element of the cultural web (Johnson et al., 2008), and was 
also considered as particularly relevant to the ease with which change occurs 
(Senior and Fleming, 2006). By examining the relationship between the 




Stalker (1961) identified the mechanistic and organic management systems. 
These two contrasted forms of management systems have been employed to 
depict organizational structures (Hayes, 2007; Senior and Fleming, 2006) and 
cultures (Kimbrough and Componation, 2009; Reigle, 2003). The mechanistic 
management system is suited to stable environments, while the organic one is 
appropriate to unpredictable and dynamic environments and tends to have a 
decentralized and adaptive internal organization. Hence, the organic type 
appears more capable of responding to change than the mechanistic one. 
Senior and Fleming (2006) claimed that the mechanistic organizational 
structure and the role culture (Handy, 1993) were unsupportive of some types 
of change due to their structural characteristics and the attitudes, beliefs and 
values held by the individuals working in them. 
In addition, Kanter (1983) provided two extreme organizational cultures: the 
segmentalist culture and the integrative culture. These are not only distinct in 
structural characteristics but also differ in the attitudes, beliefs and values of 
the organizational members. The segmentalist culture compartmentalizes 
events, actions and problems, has segmented structures and weak coordination 
mechanisms, divides resources among departments, avoids conflict and 
confrontation, as well as stresses precedents and procedures. Conversely, the 
integrative culture combines the ideas from unconnected sources, views 
problems as wholes, challenges established practices, encourages exchange of 
information and ideas, as well as looks for novel solutions to problems. It is 
evident that the segmentalist culture stifles organizational change, while the 
integrative culture is supportive of change. Thus, an integrative culture linked 
to an organic structure is suitable for organizations to change.  
Due to the pervasive nature of organizational culture, organizational change 
takes place within the context of an organization’s culture, and needs a change 




not an easy task for an organization. The greater degree of change and the 
greater impact on the existing culture, the greater resistance to change and 
lower chance of success (Brown and Harvey, 2005). Despite the difficulty in 
changing organizational culture, two approaches were found in previous 
studies. Austin and Ciaassen (2008) argued that sustainable changes in 
organizational culture involved changing the basic assumptions, then 
addressing the values level, and, finally, dealing with the cultural artifacts. 
However, Beer et al. (1994) advocated first changing the organizational 
context (such as individuals’ responsibilities, roles and the interpersonal 
relationship), which would result in changed behavior and associated attitudes. 
This was consistent with the view of Peters (1992) who advocated rapid and 
complete destruction of existing hierarchical organization structures as a 
precursor to behavioral change. 
Carrying out organizational change and the sequential change in 
organizational culture involves motivating organizational members. The next 
section discusses motivation theories.  
4.5 Motivation 
4.5.1 Definition of motivation 
Motivation was defined as the processes that account for an individual’s 
intensity, direction, and persistence of effort toward attaining a goal (Robbins, 
2003). There are various motivation theories, which predict behavior (Mitchell, 
1982) and describe why and how human behavior is activated and directed 
(Seiler et al., 2012). These can be divided into two broad categories: content 
theories and process theories (Mullins, 2007; Seiler et al., 2012). Content 
theories of motivation are concerned with identifying individuals’ needs and 
their relative strengths, and the goals that they pursue in order to satisfy their 




process theories are concerned with how behavior is initiated, directed and 
sustained. They focus on the actual process of motivation (Mullins, 2007). A 
number of authors on organizational behavior (McShane and Von Glinow, 
2007; Mullins, 2007; Robbins, 2003; Schermerhorn et al., 2011) have also 
provided good reviews of the literature on theories of motivation. 
4.5.2 Content theories of motivation 
Major content theories of motivation include Maslow’s hierarchy of needs 
theory, Alderfer’s ERG theory, and Herzberg’s two-factor theory. 
4.5.2.1 Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory 
Maslow (1943) identified five levels of individual needs, which range from the 
self-actualization and esteem needs at the top, to social, safety and 
physiological needs at the bottom of a pyramid (see Figure 4.1). This theory 
assumes that peoples pursue these needs in a specific hierarchical order, which 
means that individuals turn their attention to higher-order needs only after 
lower-order ones have been met. For instance, physiological needs, which are 
the most basic needs, must be satisfied before safety needs are activated; 







Most basic of all human needs: nourishment, clothing 
and accommodation; sexuality; rest and relaxation.
Need for security, protection, and stability in the 
physical and interpersonal events of day-to-day life.
Need for love, affection, sense of belongingness, care 
and support in one’s relationships with other persons
Need for self-esteem, respect, prestige, status, 
recognition, appreciation from others.
Need to fulfill one's potential, and to grow and use 






























Despite the intuitive appeal of Maslow’s theory, critics argued that his work 
did not have a great deal of scientific support (Heylighen, 1992; 
Rauschenberger et al., 1980; Schott, 1992; Wahba and Bridwell, 1976). 
However, Maslow’s theory has encouraged organizations to begin thinking 
broadly about what motivates their employees and laid the foundation for 
subsequent research on non-economic sources of employee motivation (Stroh 
et al., 2002). 
4.5.2.2 Alderfer’s ERG theory 
The ERG theory, which was proposed by Alderfer (1969), collapses Maslow’s 
five-need categories into three: existence needs (E), which are the basic 
physiological needs and protection from physical danger; relatedness needs 
(R), which desire for satisfying interpersonal relationships; and growth needs 
(G), which desire for continued personal growth and development and thus 
fulfill one’s potential. Different from Maslow’s theory, the ERG theory 
emphasizes a frustration-regression component. When circumstances prevent a 
higher-level need from being fulfilled, a person shifts his or her attention to 
fulfillment of needs lower down the hierarchy. Thus, continual frustration in 
individual attempts to fulfill growth needs enables relatedness needs to be 
motivators. In addition, Alderfer et al. (1974) claimed that more than one need 
may be activated at the same time. The ERG theory provides a more flexible 
approach to understanding human needs than does Maslow’s theory, and has 
garnered encouraging support (Rauschenberger et al., 1980; Tracy, 1984). 
4.5.2.3 Herzberg’s two-factor theory 
Herzberg (1966) argued that two categories of factors were primary sources of 
job satisfaction and job dissatisfaction (see Figure 4.2). These two categories 
of factors are hygiene factors and motivator factors. Hygiene factors are 




security, status, quality of supervision, organizational polices and 
administration, as well as interpersonal relationships. Failure to fulfill 
employee’s hygiene factors causes their job dissatisfaction. However, 
fulfillment of these factors does not satisfy workers. For example, low salary 
makes people dissatisfied but higher salary does not necessarily motivate or 
satisfy them. Motivator factors are sources of job satisfaction. These factors 
include sense of achievement, opportunities for personal growth, recognition, 
autonomy and responsibility. These factors are critical to job satisfaction, 










Figure 4.2 Herzberg’s two-factor theory 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the link between Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory, 
Alderfer’s ERG theory, and Herzberg’s two-factor theory, highlighting and 
matching the need components of each theory. 














Figure 4.3 Linking Maslow’s, Alderfer’s and Herzberg’s theories of motivation 
4.5.3 Process theories of motivation 
Process theories of motivation include equity theory, expectancy theory, goal 
theory, and attribution theory. This section explains the equity theory and the 




4.5.3.1 Equity theory 
The equity theory is based on the phenomenon of social comparison and is 
best known through the writing of Adams (1963, 1966). This theory posits that 
felt inequity is a motivating state of mind, and that people will act to reduce or 
eliminate such inequity in the rewards received compared with others.  
People tend to make comparisons of their job inputs and outcomes relative to 
those of others. Inputs are what a person brings to exchange, such as time, 
effort, loyalty, hard work, commitment, ability, tolerance, determination, 
enthusiasm, personal sacrifice, trust in superiors, skill and experience. 
Outcomes are what this person receives from the organization in exchange for 
the inputs, such as pay, recognition, fringe benefits, promotion and status. 
Both inputs and outputs are weighted by their importance to the person, and 
these weights vary from one person to another. People tend to compare their 
outcome-input ratio with that of relevant others. Thus, the equity theory 
explains why pay alone does not determine motivation. Besides the 
outcome-input ratio, the referent choice is another important variable in the 
equity theory. People are likely to compare themselves to their friends and 
colleagues in their organizations, or their past jobs (Robbins, 2003). The 
referent choice could be influenced by gender, length of tenure, level in the 
organization, and amount of education or professionalism (Kulik and Ambrose, 
1992). 
Table 4.4 Outcome-input ratio comparisons and perceptions 
Outcome-input ratio comparison Perceptions 
O/IA < O/IB Negative inequity due to being under-rewarded 
O/IA = O/IB Equity 
O/IA > O/IB Positive inequity due to being over-rewarded 
Note: O/IA represents the outcome-input ratio of the person; and O/IB represents the 
outcome-input ratio of relevant others. 
Source: Robbins (2003: p.170)  




person may feel equity or inequity, as exhibited in Table 4.4. Based on the 
equity theory, a person is motivated to reduce or eliminate his or her 
perception of inequity through six possible ways (Adams, 1966):  
(1) Change the work inputs;  
(2) Change the outcomes; 
(3) Distort the inputs and outcomes cognitively; 
(4) Leave the field, e.g. quit the job, obtain a transfer, and absenteeism; 
(5) Action others, e.g. alter or cognitively distort the referent’s inputs and 
outcomes, or force the referent to leave the field; and 
(6) Change the object of his or her comparison. 
The equity theory can be employed to explain the sources of some resistance 
to organizational change (Hayes, 2007). Whether individuals will be motivated 
to support or resist change depends on their expectation about whether the net 
benefits accruing to them will be equitable when compared to the net benefits 
accruing to the referents in the changed situation. Individuals who expect that 
comparable others will receive more favorable outcomes as a result of the 
change will feel that they are being treated unfairly, thereby resisting the 
change. Hence, even if expecting to receive a net increase in outcomes, people 
still tend to resist the change due to the perception of negative inequity. 
Conversely, there will be less resistance or more support when people feel 
they are being treated equitably relative to others. Hence, change agents need 
to identify the individuals who may feel that they are being treated inequitably, 
and explore the possibilities of improving the availability of valued outcomes 
for them and of redistributing costs and benefits between them in order to 
produce greater equity. 
4.5.3.2 Expectancy theory 




cognitive explanations of the human behavior that cast a person as an active, 
thinking, predicting creature in his or her environment. The expectancy 
theory indicates that work motivation is determined by individual beliefs 
relating to effort-performance relationships and work outcomes. People make 
decisions based on their perceptions of the degree to which behavior can 
satisfy a desired want or need. Vroom (1964) suggested that motivation was a 
function of expectancy, instrumentality and valence. Expectancy refers to the 
perceived probability that an individual’s effort will lead to a desired level of 
performance. Instrumentality is the perceived probability that the level of 
performance will lead to the attainment of a desired outcome. Valence is the 
perceived value of the work outcomes, and ranges from -1 (very undesirable 
outcome) to +1 (very desirable outcome). Vroom (1964) claimed that 
motivation, expectancy, instrumentality and valence were related to one 
another by the following equation: 
Motivation = Expectancy × Instrumentality × Valence                (4.1) 
The expectancy theory captures the important role of cognitions in motivation 
(Stroh et al., 2002). This theory suggests that managers should always try to 
intervene actively in work situations to maximize work expectancies, 
instrumentalities and valences that support organizational objectives (Vroom, 
1964). The managerial implications of the expectancy theory are summarized 
in Table 4.5. 
Moreover, Hayes (2007) proposed a expectancy model to illustrate the 
motivation to support or resist change (see Figure 4.4). Hayes (2007) argued 
that whether individuals would be motivated to support or resist change 
depended on their expectations or beliefs about their ability to deliver a 
satisfactory level of performance (expectancy), and whether a satisfactory 





Table 4.5 Managerial implications of the expectancy theory 
Variable Managerial implications 
Expectancy Select people with the required ability 
Provide required training and clarify job requirements 
Identify clear performance goals 
Support them with sufficient resources 
Provide examples of similar people who have successfully performed the 
task 
Provide counseling and coaching to employees who are not confident 
Instrumentality Clarify possible rewards for performance 
Confirm performance-reward relationships by providing performance 
contingent rewards 
Provide examples of other people whose good performance has resulted in 
higher rewards 
Valence Identify the needs important to each person 
Match available rewards to the needs 
Minimize the presence of counter-valence outcomes 








Perceived equity of 
received outcomes
Understanding of 
performance required and 
how this is to be delivered
 
Figure 4.4 An expectancy model of the motivation to support or resist change 
Source: Hayes (2007: p.209)  
Individuals are more likely to resist change when they expect that the change 
will undermine their ability to achieve a satisfactory level of performance, 
regardless of how hard they work. This expectation may derive from the 
misunderstandings about the processes and procedures to be applied in the 
changed situation, which is perceived to undermine their abilities to produce 
satisfactory performance. Thus, change agents need to help individuals 
develop a clear understanding of how the change will affect the way they work 




to consider redeploying some individuals to the roles that will better utilize 
their existing competencies, and provide training to develop more relevant 
competencies. Individuals should also be involved in the redeployment and the 
planning of the change to assure that the factors that are considered to 
undermine their abilities to deliver satisfactory performance will be minimized 
(Hayes, 2007). 
In addition, individuals are more likely to resist change when they expect the 
change to undermine their achievement of valued outcomes. Individuals may 
fear that they will lose some outcomes they value in the existing situation. 
However, they may also anticipate some gains. Hence, change agents need to 
empathize with them in order to gain a better understanding of how they 
expect the change to affect the performance-outcome relationship. Thus, 
managers may modify the change to strengthen the performance-outcome 
relationship and involve individuals in the planning of change to assure them 
that the change will strengthen this relationship (Hayes, 2007). 
4.6 Leadership 
4.6.1 Definition of leadership 
Robbins (2003) defined leadership as the ability to influence a group towards 
the achievement of goals. The source of influence may be formal or informal. 
The possession of a formal managerial rank in an organization does not 
necessarily enable a manager to lead effectively. The ability to influence may 
arise outside the formal structure of an organization. Thus, management and 
leadership are different.  
Kotter (1990, 1996) argued that management was about coping with 
complexity, while leadership was about coping with change. Management is a 




running smoothly, and includes some important aspects, such as planning, 
budgeting, organizing, staffing, controlling, and problem solving. Leadership 
is a set of processes that creates organizations in the first place or adapts them 
to significantly changing circumstances. Leaders set a direction by developing 
a vision of the future along with strategies for producing the changes 
necessary to achieve the vision, align people by communicating this direction, 
and keep people moving in the right direction by motivation and inspiration to 
achieve the vision (Kotter, 1990). Bedeian and Hunt (2006) suggested viewing 
leadership as a subset of management, yet they indicated that both were 
important to facilitate organizational performance. 
Robbins (2003), Mullins (2007) as well as Senior and Fleming (2006) have 
insightfully reviewed the literature on various theories relating to leadership. 
4.6.2 Trait theories of leadership 
Trait theories focus on the traits of leaders, and consider that personal qualities 
and characteristics that differentiate leaders from non-leaders (Robbins, 2003). 
Some studies revealed strong evidence of an identifiable set of personality and 
cognitive traits that are expected to characterize successful leaders. Lord et al. 
(1986) found that six traits distinguished successful leaders from others: 
intelligence, having an extrovert personality, dominance, masculinity, 
conservatism, and being better adjusted. Kirkpatrick and Locke (1991) 
summarized six key traits, including drive (achievement, motivation, ambition, 
energy, tenacity, and initiative), leadership motivation (the desire to lead but 
not to seek power as an end in itself), honesty and integrity, self-confidence 
(including emotional stability), cognitive ability, as well as knowledge of the 
business. 
Obviously, trait theories of leadership have some limitations. Robbins (2003) 




(1990b) found that more than 300 studies had failed to produce a definitive list 
of agreed-on traits common to all effective leaders. Additionally, trait theories 
involve subjective judgments in determining who is a so-called good or 
successful leader. Even if there are some inborn traits making for good or 
successful leaders, these talents still need encouragement and development 
(Mullins, 2007).  
4.6.3 Behavioral theories of leadership 
Behavioral theories of leadership posit that specific behavior differentiates 
leaders from non-leaders (Robbins, 2003). One of the most extensive studies 
on these theories was the Ohio State studies, which began at Ohio State 
University in the late 1940s (Stogdill and Coons, 1951). The results indicated 
that two major dimensions accounted for leadership behavior: (1) initiating 
structure and (2) consideration. Initiating structure refers to the extent to which 
a leader is likely to define and structure his or her role and those of 
subordinates in the search for goal achievement, while consideration describes 
the extent to which a leader is likely to have job relationships characterized by 
mutual trust, respect for subordinates’ ideas and regard for their feelings.  
Similarly, the studies undertaken at the University of Michigan proposed two 
dimensions of leadership behavior: (1) employee-oriented and  (2) 
production-oriented (Likert, 1961). Employee-oriented leaders, also known as 
person-oriented leaders, emphasized interpersonal relations. They cared about 
the needs of their employees and accepted individual differences among 
members. In contrast, production-oriented leaders, also known as task-oriented 
leaders, tended to be more concerned with the accomplishment of their groups’ 
tasks.  
It merits attention that employee-oriented leadership is similar to consideration, 




and Judge, 2007). In the Michigan studies, employee-oriented leaders were 
found to be associated with higher group productivity and higher job 
satisfaction, while production-oriented leaders were associated with low 
productivity and low job satisfaction. Hence, the Michigan studies emphasized 
employee-oriented leadership over production-oriented leadership. However, 
the Ohio State studies concluded that both consideration and initiating 



















Thoughtful attention to the needs of 
people for satisfying relationships 
leads to a comfortable friendly 
organization atmosphere and work 
tempo.
Team management
Work accomplishment is from 
committed people; interdependence 
through a “common stake” in 
organization purpose leads to 
relationships of trust and respect.
Impoverished management
Exertion of minimum effort to get 
required work done is appropriate to 
sustain organization membership.
Authority-compliance
Efficiency in operatons results from 
arranging conditions of work in such 
a way that human elements interfere 














Middle of the road management
Adequate organization performance is 
possible through balancing the necessity to 
get work with maintaining morale of 
people at a satisfactory level.
 
Figure 4.5 The managerial grid 
Source: Blake and Mouton (1966: p.31) 
In addition, Blake and Mouton (1964) proposed a managerial grid based on 
the styles of concern for people and concern for production (see Figure 4.5). 
These styles represent the dimensions of consideration or employee-oriented 
leadership and initiating structure or employee-oriented leadership. Blake and 
Mouton (1964) found that managers performed best under a 9,9 style. 
However, they did not really provide any new information in addition to the 




4.6.4 Contingency theories of leadership 
Contingency theories of leadership propose that the best leadership style can 
only be determined when the situation (task) and the followers (willingness, 
training, interdependence, etc.) are considered. Certain situations and certain 
follower types need certain leadership styles (Mills et al., 2009). Major 
contingency theories of leadership include Fielder’s contingency model, the 
Path-Goal theory, Hersey and Blanchard’s situational leadership theory, and 
Vroom and Yetton’s leader-participation model.  
4.6.4.1 Fielder’s contingency model  
Fielder’s (1967) contingency model proposes that effective group performance 
depends on the appropriate match between the leader’s style and the degree to 
which the situation gives control to the leader. For identifying the leadership 
style, Fiedler (1967) created the least preferred co-worker (LPC) scale in 
which the leaders were asked about the person with whom they least enjoyed 
working. The scale was a questionnaire consisting of 16 items used to reflect a 
leader’s underlying disposition toward others. Fiedler (1967) stated that 
leaders with high LPC scores would be relationship-oriented (person-oriented) 
and the ones with low scores would be task-oriented. In addition, Fiedler 
(1967) identified three contingency dimensions, which defined key situational 
factors that would strongly influence leadership effectiveness. These were: 
(1) Leader-follower relationship: the degree of confidence, trust and respect 
members have in their leader. 
(2) Task structure: the degree to which the group’s task is structured or 
unstructured. 
(3) Position power: the power of the leader by virtue of the organizational 
position and the degree to which the leader can exercise authority on group 




Hence, eight combinations of group-task situations were constructed by 
Fiedler (1967) who argued that leadership effectiveness may be improved by 
changing the leadership situation. Leader-follower relations, task structure, 
and position power can be changed to make the situation more compatible 
with the characteristics of the leader. As shown in Table 4.6, when the 
situation is very favorable (good leader-follower relationship, structured task, 
and strong position power) or very unfavorable (poor leader-follower 
relationship, unstructured task, and weak position power), a task-oriented 
leader (low LPC score) would be more effective. When the situation was 
moderately favorable and the variables were mixed, a relationship-oriented 
leader would be more effective. 




Task structure Position power Leadership style 
1 Good Structured Strong Task-oriented style 
recommended 2 Good Structured Weak 
3 Good Unstructured Strong 
4 Good Unstructured Weak Relationship-oriented 
recommended 5 Poor Structured Strong 
6 Poor Structured Weak 
7 Poor Unstructured Strong Task-oriented style 
recommended 8 Poor Unstructured Weak 
Source: Fiedler (1967) 
4.6.4.2 Path-goal theory 
Developed by House (1971, 1996), the path-goal theory maintains that it is the 
leaders’ job to assist followers in achieving their goals and to provide the 
necessary direction and/or support to ensure that their goals are compatible 
with overall organization objectives.  
House (1996) identified four leadership behavior. The directive leader gives 
specific guidance of performance to followers. The supportive leader is 




leader consults with followers and considers their suggestions before making 
decisions. The achievement-oriented leader sets high goals and expects 
followers to have high-level performance. In contrast to Fiedler’s (1967) 
model, House (1996) assumed that leaders are flexible and that the same 
leader can practice different types of behavior at different times in varying 
situations.  
4.6.4.3 Situational leadership theory 
Hersey and Blanchard (1974, 1993) developed the situational leadership 
theory, which argued that the right leadership style should be contingent on 
the readiness of the leaders’ followers. The readiness refers to the extent to 
which people have the ability and willingness to accomplish a specific task. 
The most effective behavior depends on the ability and motivation of a 
follower. The situational leadership theory provides four scenarios:  
(1) If followers are unable and unwilling to do a task, the leader needs to give 
clear and specific guidance but with limited supportive behavior (telling);  
(2) If followers are unable but willing, the leader needs to display high task 
orientation and high relationship (selling);  
(3) If the followers are able but unwilling, the leader needs to emphasize 
two-way communication and supportive behavior but with limited 
guidance (participating); and  
(4) If the followers are able and willing, the leader does not need to do much 
(delegating). 
4.6.4.4 Leader-participation model 
Vroom and Yetton (1973) developed a leader-participation model that related 
leadership behavior and participation in decision-making. This model consists 
of a sequential set of rules which should be followed in determining the form 




incorporating seven contingency variables and five leadership styles. The 
leadership styles range from the leader’s making decisions completely by 
himself or herself to sharing the problem with the group and developing a 
consensus decision. Vroom and Jago (1988) revised this model and expanded 
the contingency variables to twelve. These variables relate to quality 
requirement, commitment requirement, leader information, problem structure, 
commitment probability, goal congruence, subordinate conflict, subordinate 
information, time constraint, geographical dispersion, motivation time, as well 
as motivation development. 
4.6.5 Transformational leadership 
Burns (1978) developed the initial ideas on transactional and transformational 
leadership in the political context. Bass (1985) applied these concepts to the 
organizational context. Most of the leadership theories (trait, behavior and 
contingency theories) focus on transactional leadership (Mills et al., 2009). 
Transactional leadership is based on legitimate authority within the 
bureaucratic structure of the organization. It emphasizes the clarification of 
goals and objectives, tasks and outcomes, as well as organizational rewards 
and punishments. Followers obtain some valued outcomes when they act 
according to the leader’s wishes (Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978). By contrast, 
transformational leadership occurs when leaders broaden and elevate the 
interests of their followers, when they generate awareness and acceptance of 
the purposes and mission of the group, and when they inspire their followers 
to transcend their own interests for the good of the group (Bass, 1990a). 
Transformational leadership is also associated with terms such as “visionary” 
and “charismatic” leadership (Keegan and Den Hartog, 2004). 
Transformational leadership is composed of four basic components: (1) 
idealized influence (charisma of the leader, and the respect and admiration of 




the growth and developmental needs of followers); (3) intellectual stimulation 
(motivation for followers to propose new approaches for improving work 
performance and creative problem solutions); and (4) inspirational motivation 
(the behavior of the leader which provides meaning and challenge to the 
followers’ work) (Bass and Avolio, 1990). The followers of transformational 
leaders was found to show higher levels of commitment to their organizational 
mission, a willingness to work harder, greater levels of trust in their leader, 
and higher levels of cohesion (Avolio, 1999). However, transformational 
leadership does not detract from transactional; rather it builds on top of the 
transactional base to augment leader effectiveness (Bass and Avolio, 1990). 
The best leaders should typically display both transformational and 
transactional leadership (Bass and Avolio, 1993).  
4.6.6 Leadership in times of change 
Leadership was found to be the key to successful change (AMA, 1994). The 
characteristics and behavior of the organizational leaders who act as change 
agents influence the success or failure of organizational change initiatives 
(Battilana et al., 2010). All leaders must act as role models, tackle resistance, 
create readiness for change and build commitment at all levels of an 
organization (Holbeche, 2006). They have to develop a constructive process, 
get people involved in the change process, provide clear change goals and help 
develop a culture supportive of learning and experimentation. The key 
attributes for effective change leaders are honesty/integrity/trustworthiness, 
inspiration, competence, high level of emotional intelligence, and strong 
interpersonal skills (Graetz et al., 2006). Task-oriented behavior and 
person-oriented behavior (Likert, 1961; Stogdill and Coons, 1951) were 
important to influence organizational change (Nadler and Tushman, 1999). As 
Beer and Nohria (2000a) indicated, leaders adopting Theory E tended to be 





Transformational leadership seemed to be appropriate for leading change 
(Eisenbach et al., 1999; Holbeche, 2006; Senior and Fleming, 2006). Tichy 
and Devanna (1986) suggested that transformational leaders engaged in a 
process which consisted of three sequential phases: recognizing the need for 
revitalization, creating a new vision, and institutionalizing change. Bommer et 
al. (2005) found that transformational leadership was associated with lower 
employees’ cynicism about organizational change. Herold et al. (2008) found 
that transformational leadership was significantly positively related to 
followers’ support for change but not associated with leaders’ 
change-appropriate behavior. Dulewicz and Higgs (2004) found a preference 
for transformational leadership style on complex change projects and a 
preference for transactional leadership style on simple change projects. 
However, Jaskyte and Dressler (2005) indicated that transformational 
leadership was not significantly correlated with the organization’s ability to 
implement change in nonprofit human service organizations.  
In addition, as the contingency theories of leadership have indicated, 
leadership styles should vary according to the different characteristics of 
different situations, which included an organization’s stage of development, 
the nature of the change process, as well as the forces that drive and resist 
organizational change (Senior and Fleming, 2006). Dunphy and Stace (1993) 
linked four styles of change leadership (collaborative, consultative, directive 
and coercive) with four types of change (fine-tuning, incremental adjustment, 
modular transformation and corporate transformation). Transformational 
change tended to demand directive/coercive leadership.  
Furthermore, the leadership of change should take account of both drivers for 
and resistance to change (Strebel, 1994). Hence, leading change is concerned 




depends on the identification of the sources of resistance. It also depends on 
leaders’ ability to be task-oriented (both strategically and tactically) when time 
requires it, and to be person-oriented to deal with more individualized 
resistance to change (Senior and Fleming, 2006). 
1 Establishing a Sense of Urgency
   Examining market and competitive realities         
   Identifying and discussing crises, potential crises, or major opportunities
2 Forming a Powerful Guiding Coalition               
 Assembling a group with enough power to lead the change effort
 Encouraging the group to work together as a team
3 Creating a Vision                                  
   Creating a vision to help direct the change effort
   Developing strategies for achieving that vision
4 Communicating the Vision                           
   Using every vehicle possible to communicate the new vision and strategies
   Teaching new behaviors by the example of the guiding coalition
5 Empowering Others to Act on the Vision             
   Getting rid of obstacles to change 
   Changing systems or structures that seriously undermine the vision
   Encouraging risk taking and nontraditional activities and actions
6 Planning for and Creating Short-Term Wins          
   Planning for visible performance improvements, or “wins”
   Creating those improvements 
   Visibly recognizing and rewarding employees involved in the improvements
7 Consolidating Improvements and Producing More Change
   Using increased credibility to change systems, structures, and policies that do not fit  the vision 
   Hiring, promoting, and developing employees who can implement the vision
   Reinvigorating the process with new projects, themes, and change agents
8 Institutionalizing New Approaches                
   Creating better performance through customer- and productivity-oriented behavior, more and  
   better leadership, and more effective management
   Articulating the connections between the new behaviors and corporate success
   Developing the means to ensure leadership development and succession
 
Figure 4.6 Kotter’s eight-stage process for leading change 
Source: Kotter (1996)  
Several errors made by leaders tend to undermine the organizational change 
programs. Kotter (1995, 1996) suggested that transformational change efforts 
failed through eight big errors of leaders: not establishing a great enough sense 
of urgency, not creating a sufficiently powerful guiding coalition, lacking a 




to the new vision, not systematically planning for and creating short-term wins, 
declaring victory too soon, and not anchoring changes in the corporate culture. 
Kotter (1995, 1996) also proposed an eight-stage process for leading 
organizational change of any magnitude (see Figure 4.6). Each stage is 
associated with one of the eight errors.  
More recently, Battilana et al. (2010) emphasized three key activities involved 
in the implementation of planned organizational change: communicating the 
need for organizational change, mobilizing others to support the change, and 
evaluating the change implementation. They found that leaders who were 
more effective at person-oriented behavior were more likely to focus on the 
communicating activities in implementing planned organizational change, and 
that leaders who were more effective at task-oriented behavior were more 
likely to focus on both the mobilizing and evaluating activities. 
4.7 Relationships among the theories of organizational 
behavior 
This section elaborates the relations among organizational change, 
organizational learning, organizational culture, motivation, and leadership 
theories. As shown in Figure 4.7, organizational change is affected by a 
number of factors, which are indicated by arrows pointing to organizational 
change. These factors can further be linked to the other four theories of 
organizational behavior, indicating that the other four theories can indirectly 









Sources of resistance to change
· Habits 
· Fear of the unknown
· Parochial self-interest
· Social factors
· Lack of individual capabilities to change
· Misunderstandings
· Insufficient resources
· Inadequate rewards and punishments
· Poor internal communication
· Lack of board and senior management 
commitment
· Lack of trust in management
· Inconsistency
· Low-level employee-manager relation
· Ineffective management styles
· Selective information processing
· Threats to power or influence
· Threats to resource allocations




Impediments to organizational 
learning
§ Lack of leadership commitment 
and support
§ Lack of internal knowledge
§ Lack of organizational  
commitment
§ Lack of psychological safety
§ Lack of motivation
§ Reluctance to share knowledge
§ Reluctance to accept knowledge
§ Lack of knowledge absorptive 
or retentive capacity
§ Lack of channels for dialogue 
and sharing meaning
§ Arduous relationships
§ Downsizing or layoff strategy














New knowledge and skills




Content theories of motivation
o Hierarchy of needs theory
o ERG theory
o Two-factor theory
Process theories of motivation
o Equity theory
o Expectancy theory
Process for leading change
Establish a sense of urgency 
Form a powerful guiding coalition 
Create a vision 
Communicate the vision 
Empower others to act on the vision 
Plan for and create short-term wins 
Consolidate improvements and 
produce still more change






















A clear vision of the change
Leadership of senior management
Modification of the organization’s 
architecture
Modification of performance 
measures and rewards










































· Social and cultural factors
· Market changes
· Economic factors
· Political and legal pressures
· The need for reorganization
· The need for profitability
· Conflicts within organizations









Figure 4.7 Relationships among theories of organizational change, organizational learning, organizational culture, motivation, and leadership 
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There are forces that drive and resist organizational change. Driving forces 
derive from the internal and external environments of organizations, while 
resistance to change tends to stem from inside the organizations, at the 
individual and organizational levels. As Figure 4.7 indicates, some sources of 
resistance to change shown in the dash-line boxes can be linked to other 
organizational behavior theories.  
Organizational change tends to take place within the culture of an organization 
due to the pervasive nature of the organizational culture (Austin and Ciaassen, 
2008). Unsupportive organizational culture, structural inertia, and group 
inertia are the sources of resistance that can be linked to the organizational 
culture theory. Some types of organizational culture are unsupportive of 
change. For instance, although a strong culture contributes to the cohesion, 
organizational commitment and desirable behavior, it is likely to undermine 
the organization’s ability to respond to change (Nemeth, 1997). The 
segmentalist culture (Kanter, 1983) is an extreme example that stifles 
organizational change.  
In addition, according to the level model of Schein (1990, 1992), 
organizational structure is at the observable artifacts level of organizational 
culture. The mechanistic organizational structure (Burns and Stalker, 1961) is 
a type of structure suitable for the stable environment and unsupportive of 
some types of change (Senior and Fleming, 2006).  
Moreover, group inertia tends to be the result of group norms, which can be 
considered as a subculture of the organization. Such norms tend to distinguish 
appropriate and inappropriate behavior, and identify the tasks and roles within 
the group. Some group norms may reduce the willingness of group members 
to change, and thus hinder organizational change. However, subcultures may 
also propagate the dominant organizational culture, prevent individuals from 
blindly following one set of values (McShane and Von Glinow, 2007; Sinclair, 
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1993), and enable organizations to be more appropriate to the changing 
environment (Boisnier and Chatman, 2003). Hence, a strong culture with 
several subcultures tends to be appropriate to change. However, if the 
dominant culture is unsupportive of change, cultural change is necessary. An 
integrative culture linked to an organic structure tends to facilitate 
organizational change. 
Some of the sources of resistance to change can be linked to motivation 
theories. According to the two-factor theory of Herzberg (1966), salary, 
rewards, job security, status, psychological safety, and power are hygiene 
factors. Hence, failure to fulfill the hygiene factors can be related to the 
following sources of resistance: habits, parochial self-interest, inadequate 
rewards and punishments, as well as threats to power, influence, and resource 
allocation. These sources will bring about job dissatisfaction and resistance to 
change. Other content theories of motivation are also applicable to the sources 
of resistance. For instance, some social factors may be linked to the esteem 
needs and love (social) needs in Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs theory, 
and the relatedness in Alderfer’s (1969) ERG theory.  
In addition, inadequate rewards and punishments during the change process 
may affect the expectation of individuals over whether their net benefits will 
be equitable in comparison to the net benefits of others in the changed 
situation. According to the equity theory, individuals who expect inequity in 
the changed situation will be motivated to resist the proposed change.  
Moreover, according to Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory, motivation is a 
function of expectancy, instrumentality and valence. These three variables can 
be linked to some sources of resistance to change. Insufficient resources and 
lack of capability to change tend to make individuals feel they are unable to 
achieve the desired performance. Lack of the board and senior management 
commitment indicates that the change is not perceived as a priority by the 
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leaders, so the resources for the change cannot be ensured and individuals tend 
to be skeptical about the change. Poor internal communication mechanisms 
and selective information processing can lead to misunderstandings. The 
misunderstandings by individuals over the processes and procedures of the 
change may lead to individuals’ perceptions that the change would undermine 
their ability to deliver satisfactory performance. Hence, these sources of 
resistance tend to lower the expectancy variable and the motivation to change. 
Inadequate rewards can lead to misunderstandings about the 
performance-outcome relationship, and thus affect individuals’ judgments on 
the instrumentality. If the change is perceived to threaten individuals’ interests, 
accustomed ways and psychological safety, or some groups’ power, influence, 
and resource allocations, the values of the outcomes for them will be 
undesirable, which indicates low valence and low motivation to change. 
Therefore, the motivation mechanisms of an organization with change 
initiative should concern individuals’ and groups’ needs, increase the 
expectancy, instrumentality and valence, and try to avoid inequitable rewards. 
Such motivation mechanisms can also facilitate the leadership of change 
agents. 
Leadership is necessary and key to the success of organizational change. 
Several sources of resistance to change can be linked to the leadership theories. 
Trust is the foundation of leadership and the effectiveness of leadership 
depends on the ability to gain the trust of followers (Robbins, 2003). 
Inconsistency in change agents’ words and the actual change initiative will 
threaten individuals’ trust in change agents. In times of change, individuals 
will turn to personal relationships for guidance. A low level of 
employee-manager relationships indicates a low level of trust in change agents. 
Lack of trust in management arises from doubts of employees about the 
change agents’ abilities to lead an effective change, thus resulting in 
skepticism and cynicism about the change. Therefore, these three sources of 
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resistance tend to undermine individuals’ trust in change agents, and thereby 
weaken the leadership of change agents. Furthermore, management styles of 
change agents also influence individuals’ attitudes and readiness to change. 
Szabla (2007) found that collaborative change leaders tended to be effective in 
reducing resistance to change, while leaders using power and coercion seemed 
to be ineffective. The behavioral theories and contingency theories of 
motivation concern selecting appropriate and effective management styles. 
According to the contingency theories of leadership, the best leadership style 
can only be determined when the situation and the followers are considered. 
Ineffective management styles usually fail to match the situation and 
followers.  
Compared to transactional leaders (trait, behavior and contingency theories of 
leadership), transformational leaders inspire their followers to transcend their 
own interests for the good of the organization (Bass, 1990a). Transformational 
leadership is composed of idealized influence, individualized consideration, 
intellectual stimulation, and inspirational motivation (Bass and Avolio, 1990), 
and has been considered appropriate for leading change (Eisenbach et al., 
1999; Holbeche, 2006; Senior and Fleming, 2006). Transformational 
leadership can improve the trust of followers in their leader (Avolio, 1999) and 
lower their cynicism about change (Bommer et al., 2005). However, it merits 
attention that both transformational and transactional leadership is necessary 
for leading organizational change (Kanter, 1992; Tourish and Pinnington, 
2002). Regardless of leadership styles, change leaders have to follow a process 
to implement organizational change. Kotter’s (1995, 1996) eight-stage process 
can be used for leading organizational change of any magnitude. 
Organizational learning is necessary for organizations to respond to the 
external environment (Clarke, 1994; Nadler, 1993). Organizational learning 
has been considered as a medium (Alas and Sharifi, 2002) or preconditions for 
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change (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1993). Organizational learning results in new 
knowledge and skills, as well as new attitudes and behavior (Mullins, 2007). 
Organizational learning and the learning organization can and should co-exist 
(Gorelick, 2005). A learning organization typically has four characteristics: 
constant readiness, continuous planning, improvised implementation, and 
action learning (Rowden, 2001), which contribute to the organization’s 
readiness to change and improve its ability to respond to change. 
There are also several impediments to organizational learning in the literature, 
which would indirectly impede organizational change. As indicated in Figure 
4.7, some impediments in the dash-line boxes can be linked to the 
organizational culture, motivation and leadership theories. Organizational 
culture unsupportive of learning, which is embodied by blame culture and 
defensive routines, can be linked to the organizational culture theory. A 
learning culture, which requires people to have “a willingness to embrace the 
dynamic challenges to learn while they work and work while they learn” 
(Burghardt and Tolliver, 2010: p.xi), facilitates organizational learning. In turn, 
organizational learning can contribute to the strength and degree of internal 
consistency of an organizational culture (Schein, 1990).  
Moreover, motivation is necessary for sharing and accepting knowledge. 
Individuals may be reluctant to spend time sharing knowledge because of the 
time constraint (Husted and Michailova, 2002) and the fear of losing privilege 
and superiority (Szulanski, 1996). Individuals may also be reluctant to accept 
the knowledge due to idleness. Hence, measures should be taken to motivate 
people to share and accept knowledge, thereby facilitating organizational 
learning.  
Furthermore, the commitment and support of the leaders is essential for 
organizational learning in terms of cultivating a learning culture, creating 
psychological safety and organizational commitment, and institutionalizing 
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organizational learning mechanisms (Popper and Lipshitz, 2000). Lack of 
leadership commitment and support to organizational learning can be linked to 
the leadership theory. In addition, leaders also need to allocate resources for 
learning. Hence, lack of leadership commitment and support will lower 
people’s expectancy variable in Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory, and can 
thus be linked to motivation theory. Similarly, lack of internal knowledge and 
lack of knowledge absorptive and retentive capability make people feel that 
the probability that their efforts cause desirable performance is relatively low. 
In addition, psychological safety is a hygiene factor of Herzberg’s (1966) 
two-factor theory, which can be represented by fear of the unknown, social 
factors, and self-interest in the sources of resistance to change. Failure to 
fulfill this factor leads to job dissatisfaction, and thus impedes organizational 
learning. 
It is worth noting that some impediments to organizational learning overlap 
the sources of resistance to organizational change, such as lack of 
psychological safety, unsupportive organizational culture, lack of leadership 
commitment and support, arduous relationships, as well as lack of motivation. 
This also suggests that the impediments to organizational learning indirectly 
raise the resistance to organizational change. 
4.8 Summary 
ERM can be considered as a change from silo-based risk management to 
holistic and integrated risk management. Implementing ERM in construction 
firms is also an organizational change because individuals in these firms tend 
to be accustomed to PRM. Besides driving forces, this change also encounters 
resistance arising from the organization or individuals, and influence from 
other aspects of organizational behavior. In this chapter, five theories of 
organizational behavior, including organizational change, organizational 
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learning, organizational culture, motivation, and leadership, are reviewed. In 
addition, the relationships among these organizational behavior theories are 
presented by linking organizational change to the other four theories. The 
literature review in this chapter sets the foundation for interpreting the critical 




5 Conceptual Model: Linking ERM Implementation to 
Theories of Organizational Behavior 
5.1 Introduction 
Implementing ERM in construction firms, where individuals are used to PRM, 
tends to be a steady and gradual process. It concerns changes in not only 
people’s mindset, but also the organizational context. Hence, this chapter first 
links ERM implementation in construction firms to the organizational change 
theory. ERM implementation in construction firms can be considered as an 
incremental, evolutionary and continuous organizational change, which also 
requires organizational learning as a medium (Alas and Sharifi, 2002), change 
in the organizational culture (including the organizational structure) (Senior 
and Fleming, 2006), appropriate motivation measures, and the leadership of 
change agents. The drivers for organizational change can also drive ERM 
implementation, and the sources of resistance to change can be linked to the 
hindrances to ERM implementation. In addition, some hindrances to 
implementing ERM can also be linked to organizational learning, 
organizational culture, motivation, and leadership theories. The negative 
impacts of these hindrances can be reduced by implementing the 
corresponding components in the ERM framework for construction firms. As 
there have been no studies that link ERM to theories of organizational 
behavior, this research for the first time expands the literature by developing 
the linkages between ERM implementation and theories of organizational 
behavior. Finally, a conceptual model is proposed in this chapter to illustrate 
the relationship between ERM implementation in construction firms and the 
organizational behavior theories. 
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5.2 Linking ERM implementation to organizational change 
theories 
As construction firms usually deal with risks through PRM due to their 
project-based nature, implementing ERM in a construction firm requires 
changes in the organizations and at the same time, is likely to spawn several 
benefits. As one of the most significant benefits is the improvement in firm 
performance (Barton et al., 2002; Gordon et al., 2009; Hoyt and Liebenberg, 
2011; Lam, 2003; Nocco and Stulz, 2006), ERM implementation is consistent 
with the OD perspective of organizational change, which is intended to 
improve organizational performance (Porras and Robertson, 1992). However, 
as the ERM program matures, ERM becomes integrated into strategic 
planning (AON, 2010), which is consistent with the strategic management 
perspective of organizational change. 
Considering that implementing ERM in construction firms needs a clear 
implementation plan developed by the senior management and that lack of 
such a clear plan can hinder the ERM implementation (AON, 2010), ERM 
implementation can be viewed as a planned change. In addition, ERM 
implementation is an on-going process rather than a quick one-off exercise 
(Bowling and Rieger, 2005), and should proceed in incremental steps (IMA, 
2007). In large organizations, it is likely to take three to five years to fully 
integrate ERM into the business process (Shortreed, 2010). Thus, ERM 
implementation is consistent with the gradualist paradigm of organizational 
change, which indicates that fundamental change can be achieved through 
continuous adjustments without triggering a short episode of revolutionary 
change (Hayes, 2007), and can be viewed as a continuous, evolutionary, 
incremental, and first-order organizational change. Furthermore, ERM 
implementation is likely to be driven by legal compliance and corporate 
governance requirements, advances in IT, and increasing complicated risks, 
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which constitute the external demand for organizational change. Hence, ERM 
programs can be viewed as an adaption change, which is an incremental and 
adaptive response to a pressing external demand for change (Nadler and 
Tushman, 1995).  
Beer and Nohria (2000c, b) suggested that organizational change can be 
achieved through Theory E and Theory O. Although ERM implementation can 
bring earning growth and consistency, and improve shareholder value, the 
economic value is not the only focus of ERM. Implementing ERM needs not 
only the commitment from the top management, but also the involvement of 
the staff at all levels of a firm. It increases management accountability, creates 
a risk-aware culture, and integrates this culture into the organizational culture. 
It also contributes to decision-making and improves competitiveness. Hence, 
ERM implementation is the combination of Theory E and Theory O because it 
contributes to both economic value and organizational capability.  
The drivers for ERM implementation can be linked to the drivers for 
organizational change. The legal compliance and corporate governance 
requirements are partly political and legal pressures from external 
environments. Benefits of ERM, which include earning growth and 
competitive advantages, can be linked to the need for higher profitability and 
competitive pressures. A broader scope of risks stems from globalization, 
market, social and cultural factors, market changes, as well as economic 
factors. Advances in IT can be seen as technical advancements. The request 
and encouragement of the board and senior management can be attributed to 
the above four categories of drivers, and can thus be linked to the 
aforementioned drivers for organizational change.  
Some of the hindrances to ERM implementation can be linked to the sources 
of resistance to organizational change, and these sources can be further linked 
to organizational learning, organizational culture, motivation, and leadership 
 164 
 
theories. The links between hindrances to ERM implementation and sources of 
resistance to organizational change (see Table 5.1) are indicated in Table 5.2.   
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Table 5.1 Sources of resistance to organizational change 
No. Sources of resistance No. Sources of resistance 
C01 Habits C11 Lack of trust in management 
C02 Fear of the unknown  C12 Inconsistency 
C03 Parochial self-interest C13 Low-level employee-manager 
relation 
C04 Social factors  C14 Ineffective management styles 
C05 Lack of individual capability to change  C15 Selective information processing 
C06 Misunderstanding C16 Threats to power or influence 
C07 Insufficient resources C17 Threats to resource allocations 
C08 Inadequate rewards and punishments C18 Limited focus of change 
C09 Poor internal communication C19 Organizational culture 
C10 Lack of commitment of the board and senior 
management  
C20 Group inertia 
C21 Structural inertia 
The hindrances H01-H08, H21, H31 and H36 can be linked to insufficient 
resources (C07) in the sources of resistance to organizational change. 
Organizational change needs a variety of resources, which is also the case for 
ERM implementation. In addition to money, time, and people, ERM 
implementation also needs some resources that contribute to dealing with risks. 
For example, high quality historical data (H01 and H02) and risk management 
techniques and tools (H05) are necessary for people to identify, analyze, 
evaluate and respond to risks. A RMIS (H08) can be established to facilitate 
risk communication and reporting, as well as the ERM process. A set of 
metrics to measure ERM performance (H31) can be seen as a resource, which 
provides an understanding that efforts of individuals can lead to performance 
and helps them perceive the value and benefits of ERM. To enable individuals 
to fully understand ERM, successful business cases (H21) should be employed 
to illustrate how to implement ERM and to create the benefits or value. It 
merits attention that all the above resources cannot be ensured without the 
commitment of the board and senior management.  
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Table 5.2 Linking hindrances to ERM implementation to sources of resistance to organizational change 
Code Hindrances to ERM implementation 
Sources of resistance to organizational change  
C01 C02 C03 C04 C05 C06 C07 C08 C09 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16 C17 C18 C19 C20 C21 
H01 Low data quality       √   √            
H02 Lack of data       √   √            
H03 Insufficient resources (e.g. time, money, people, 
etc.) 
      √   √            
H04 Lack of a formalized ERM process       √   √            
H05 Lack of risk management techniques and tools       √   √            
H06 Lack of internal knowledge, skills and expertise      √  √   √            
H07 Lack of qualified personnel to implement ERM     √  √   √            
H08 Lack of a RMIS       √   √            
H09 Unsupportive organizational structure          √           √ 
H10 Unsupportive organizational culture          √         √ √  
H11 Lack of a common risk language      √   √ √            
H12 Lack of risk awareness within the organization          √         √   
H13 Confidence in the existing risk management 
practices 
√              √    √ √  
H14 Existence or re-emergence of the silo mentality √ √             √    √ √  
H15 Lack of shared understanding and approach to risk 
management across departments 
     √   √ √ √  √         
H16 Lack of understanding relating to effective ERM 
process 
     √   √ √ √  √         
H17 Perception that ERM adds to bureaucracy       √   √ √ √  √  √       
H18 Perception that ERM increases costs and 
administration  
     √   √ √ √  √  √       
Table 5.2 (Continued) 
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Code Hindrances to ERM implementation 
Sources of resistance to organizational change  
C01 C02 C03 C04 C05 C06 C07 C08 C09 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16 C17 C18 C19 C20 C21 
H19 Perception that ERM interferes with business 
activities 
     √   √ √ √  √  √       
H20 Inadequate training on ERM      √   √ √ √  √  √       
H21 Lack of an ERM business case      √ √  √ √            
H22 Lack of perceived value or benefits of ERM      √   √ √ √  √         
H23 Lack of commitment of the board and senior 
management 
      √   √            
H24 Not perceived as a priority by senior management       √               
H25 Lack of board or senior management leadership       √   √            
H26 The movement of the ERM champion from senior 
management into other areas without a successor  
      √   √  √          
H27 Lack of consensus on benefits of ERM among board 
members and senior management 
      √   √            
H28 Other management priorities       √               
H29  Lack of a clear ERM implementation plan       √   √            
H30 Inability to coordinate with other departments     √                 
H31 Lack of a set of metrics for measuring performance 
of ERM 
      √   √            
H32 Unclear ownership and responsibility for ERM 
implementation 
         √            
H33 Organizational turf   √             √ √     
H34 Employees’ reluctance to give up power   √ √            √      
H35 People's reluctance to share risk information   √     √ √             
H36 Recession and business downturn       √   √            
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Recession and business downturn (H36) tend to force the firm to curb the 
expenditures in the risk management area (Kleffner et al., 2003) and to employ 
downsizing or layoff strategies, which result in loss of knowledge, skills, and 
expertise due to the departure of qualified and experienced personnel (Fisher 
and White, 2000; Pfeffer, 1998). This would deteriorate the lack of internal 
knowledge, skills, and expertise (H06), and the lack of qualified employees to 
implement ERM (H07). Other competing priorities (H28) may grab the 
resources that should have been allocated for ERM programs (Gates, 2006), 
and indirectly lead to insufficient resources (C07) for ERM programs.  
Moreover, lack of internal knowledge and qualified personnel (H06 and H07) 
can also be viewed as lack of individual capability to change (C05), which 
makes individuals unable to adapt to the change and thus resist it. ERM 
implementation also requires an ability to coordinate with other departments to 
break down the silos. Inability to coordinate with other departments (H30) 
makes employees incompetent for the positions engaged in ERM 
implementation, and can thus be linked to lack of individual capability to 
change (C05) in the sources of resistance to change.  
Due to the pervasive nature of organizational culture, unsupportive 
organizational culture (C19) tends to lead to resistance to change. Constraints 
created by group norms (C20) also hinder group members to embrace the 
change. The negative cultural influence on change is also likely to hinder 
ERM implementation. Lack of risk awareness (H12), confidence in the 
existing risk management practices (H13), as well as existence of the silo 
mentality (H14) are examples of the passive mindset towards ERM, which 
hinders ERM implementation. People tend to respond to change in their 
accustomed ways when confronted with change (Robbins, 2003). Thus, when 
confronted ERM implementation, employees who are accustomed to the 




approach. Even after accepting training on ERM, employees may be 
influenced by the silo mentality. This is the influence from their long 
established habits (C01), which are influenced by the organizational culture 
(C19) or group norms (C20). Selective information processing (C15) tends to 
make people harbor a biased view of a particular situation. This biased view 
can contribute to employees’ confidence in the existing risk management 
practices (H13) and existence of the silo mentality (H14). 
The organizational structure provides a strong element of stability. 
Mechanistic or bureaucratic structures make organizations less capable of 
responding to change. This is also the case for ERM implementation. Hence, 
unsupportive organizational structure (H09) that hinders ERM implementation 
can be linked to structural inertia (C21) in the sources of resistance.  
Poor internal communication (C09) and selective information processing (C15) 
make people unclear of the vision, the need, and the impacts of the change, or 
form biased perception on the change. In turn, poor communication renders 
change agents unable to understand people’s concerns. Misunderstandings 
(C06) about ERM can be linked to some hindrances to ERM implementation, 
such as lack of shared understandings and approach to risk management across 
departments (H15), lack of understanding about an effective ERM process 
(H16), lack of perceived value or benefits (H22), as well as the perceptions 
that ERM adds to bureaucracy, increases costs and administration, and 
interferes with business activities (H17-H19). Adequate training on ERM (H20) 
and illustration of ERM business cases (H21) tend to reduce the 
misunderstandings (C06). However, the effectiveness of training programs 
depends on the employee-management relationship (C13), which is 
characterized by mutual trust and credibility (Kotter and Schlesinger, 1979; 
Robbins, 2003). Lack of trust in the management (C11) undermines the 




about ERM. A common risk language should be included in the training 
programs, and a glossary of risk terms need to be created and distributed 
across the organization. Lack of such a risk language (H11) would lead to 
misunderstandings (C06) about the ERM philosophy, process and 
methodologies, and cause the management to spend much time resolving 
communication issues as a result of the confusion about risk terms (Espersen, 
2007). 
Commitment of the board and senior management represents the support from 
the top management, and is viewed as a driver for ERM implementation. Due 
to this commitment, resources can be allocated for ERM implementation; 
training programs can be sponsored; risk communication and reporting 
mechanisms can be created; ERM ownership and accountabilities are 
identified; and a risk-aware culture can be created and embedded into the 
organizational culture. By contrast, lack of commitment from the board and 
senior management (C10) may lead to insufficient resources (H01-H08, H21, 
H31) and training (H20), unclear understandings about ERM (H15-H19 and 
H22), as well as unclear ERM plans (H29), ownership and responsibilities 
(H32). Even if there is such commitment, ERM may not be perceived as a 
priority by the board and senior management (H24) because a firm is likely to 
have other competing priorities (H28), which also need resources. For 
example, the priority of a construction firm tends to be to win bids or to 
complete projects, which directly affects the survival and development of a 
firm. Thus, true commitment of the top management should involve 
prioritizing ERM implementation.  
In addition, ERM implementation should be led by a senior manager or a 
board-level committee. Acharyya (2008) considered the leadership of CEO is 
the key driving force of ERM. Moreover, ERM implementation takes a 




process, during which there may be changes in senior management roles. The 
movement of the ERM champion from senior management into other areas 
without a successor (H26) may result in resource allocation cuts and would 
scuttle ERM implementation mid-way (Simkins, 2008). This also represents 
the inconsistency (C12) in the commitment of the top management and the 
actual ERM implementation. Hence, even if the ERM program does not stop, 
employees will resist it due to the ambivalence of management. Recession and 
business downturn (H36) would also force the board and senior management 
to adjust the resource allocation to ensure the survival of the firm, and thus 
lead to suspending the ERM program. Furthermore, top management may 
commit to ERM without consensus on the benefits of ERM (H27) if the 
chairman of the board or CEO has confidence in ERM. However, Gates (2006) 
found that the lack of such consensus (H27) resulted in the difficulty in 
persuading other leaders of the benefits. Hence, the commitment of the top 
management tends to be inconsistent and controversial, and hinders ERM 
implementation at lower levels within the firm. 
It is common for people to focus on their own best interests rather than those 
of the total organization (Hayes, 2007; Kotter and Schlesinger, 1979). Hence, 
people or groups resist the organizational change that causes them to lose 
something that they value. Organizational turf (H33) have been identified as a 
major barrier to ERM implementation (Miccolis, 2003; Miccolis et al., 2000). 
These issues can be linked to the parochial self-interest (C03), threat to power 
or influence (C16), and resource allocations (C17) in the sources of 
organizational resistance to change. In addition, individuals with power tend to 
resist the ERM program that requires them to give up their power (H34). This 
is because the ERM programs threaten the influence or power of these groups 
and individuals, and losing their long established influence or power makes 




People’s reluctance to share risk information (H35) with people from other 
projects will hinder ERM implementation in construction firms. The 
reluctance to share risk information (H35) may derive from the fear that the 
information would be used against them (Simkins, 2008), and that others 
would benefit from the risk information at the expense of their resources spent 
in collecting the risk information, which indirectly undermines their own 
interests if there is no rewarding system within the organization. Also, 
reluctance to share risk information (H35) can result from the lack of 
motivation and internal communication mechanisms, which stifles their 
willingness to share risk information. Thus, the hindrance H35 can be linked 
to fear of the unknown (C02), parochial self-interest (C03), inadequate 
rewards and punishments (C08), and poor internal communication (C09) in 
the sources of resistance. 
5.3 Linking ERM implementation to organizational learning 
theories 
Learning is a medium for change (Alas and Sharifi, 2002), and improves the 
ability to adapt to change, at both individual and organizational levels (Garvin, 
1993; Senge, 1990). Organizational change and learning are parallel and 
interact with each other (Lähteenmäki et al., 2001). As a continuous, 
evolutionary and incremental organizational change, ERM implementation 
cannot be isolated from organizational learning.  
In project-based construction firms, it is necessary for the individuals who are 
accustomed to PRM to learn ERM fundamentals and how to further PRM 
contributions to ERM. Without this individual learning process, ERM cannot 
be implemented at all levels across the firm, because individual learning is the 
basis of organizational learning. In addition, the existing learning processes 




is an integral part of ERM. The focus on learning from risks is likely to 
institutionalize risk information and change PRM practices to a 
corporate-level approach (Dikmen et al., 2008). Furthermore, Smallman (1996) 
indicated that organizational learning could provide a powerful tool that 
enabled organizations to learn from past errors and disasters, within their own 
organizations or from others. Smallman (1996) also argued that organizational 
learning, together with data collection and collation as well as forecasting, 
comprised holistic risk management. Organizational learning is the key of 
ERM, and requires a no blame culture (Smallman, 1996).  
ERM implementation in a construction firm can be viewed as a combination 
of the cognitive-behavioral, sociocultural, and knowledge-creation approaches 
to learning. This is because ERM implementation involves acquiring 
knowledge relevant to ERM from inside and outside the firm and changing 
behavior or cognition. To achieve adequate risk communication, ERM 
implementation needs the participation of all the individuals from all the 
projects that the firm is engaged in. Risk communication across projects is 
situated in the relations or networks between the staff from different projects. 
In addition, because ERM implementation is a multi-year process, the firm can 
review the ERM framework, identify problems and solve them, and develop 
an improved framework. This aligns with Engeström’s (1999) expansive 
learning model, described in Section 4.3.3. During the ERM implementation 
process, some tacit knowledge embedded in employees can be converted to 
the explicit knowledge, and used by all employees in the firm. This process is 
consistent with Nonaka’s (1991) knowledge-creation model, described in 
Section 4.3.3. ERM practices also tend to provide the firm with opportunities 
to build new knowledge and expertise that helps to implement ERM in the 
constrcution industry. This echoes Bereiter's (2002) knowledge building model, 




There are intricate relationships amongst data, information, and knowledge. 
According to Liew (2007), the purpose of data is to record activities or 
situations, and thus all the data are historical. Information comes from both 
current and historical sources. The source of data and information is activities 
and situations. Information from historical sources is actually the processed or 
analyzed data. According to Nonaka (1991), knowledge can be explicit or tacit. 
Explicit knowledge can be easily communicated and shared, and correspond to 
information. Thus, in some cases, data, information and knowledge are 
interchangeable. It is necessary for a firm to collect adequate historical data 
for risk management at project and enterprise levels. High-quality data are 
selected and processed, and becomes information and a form of explicit 
knowledge. In a construction firm, projects are sources of data and 
information. Since there are various stakeholders of a project, people engaged 
in a project have opportunities to collect risk information and relevant 
knowledge in collaboration with other stakeholders (e.g. partnering, alliancing, 
joint ventures, subcontracting). Risk information from projects can be viewed 
as a form of explicit knowledge and should be communicated across the firm 
to facilitate ERM implementation.  
Some of the 12 impediments to organizational learning (see Table 5.3) can be 
linked to hindrances to ERM implementation, as shown in Table 5.4.  
Table 5.3 Impediments to organizational learning 
Code Impediments to organizational learning Code Impediments to organizational learning 
L01 Lack of leadership commitment and 
support 
L07 Reluctance to accept knowledge 
L02 Lack of internal knowledge L08 Lack of knowledge absorptive or 
retentive capacity 
L03 Lack of organizational commitment L09 Lack of channels for dialogue and 
sharing meaning. 
L04 Lack of psychological safety L10 Arduous relationships 
L05 Lack of motivation L11 Downsizing or layoff strategies 
L06 Reluctance to share knowledge L12 Unsupportive organizational culture 
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Table 5.4 Linking hindrances to ERM implementation to impediments to organizational 
learning 
Code Hindrances to ERM implementation 
Impediments to organizational learning 
L01 L02 L03 L04 L05 L06 L07 L08 L09 L10 L11 L12 
H01 Low data quality √ √                     
H02 Lack of data √ √                     
H03 Insufficient resources (e.g. time, 
money, people, etc.) 
√               √        
H04 Lack of a formalized ERM process √ √                     
H05 Lack of risk management 
techniques and tools 
√ √                     
H06 Lack of internal knowledge, skills 
and expertise  
√ √           √     √   
H07 Lack of qualified personnel to 
implement ERM 
√ √           √      √   
H08 Lack of a RMIS √               √       
H09 Unsupportive organizational 
structure 
√                       
H10 Unsupportive organizational culture √                     √ 
H11 Lack of a common risk language √                       
H12 Lack of risk awareness within the 
organization 
√                     √ 
H13 Confidence in the existing risk 
management practices 
                      √ 
H14 Existence or re-emergence of the 
silo mentality 
      √               √ 
H15 Lack of shared understanding and 
approach to risk management across 
departments 
√                       
H16 Lack of understanding relating to 
effective ERM process 
√                       
H17 Perception that ERM adds to 
bureaucracy  
√     √                 
H18 Perception that ERM increases costs 
and administration  
√     √                 
H19 Perception that ERM interferes with 
business activities 
√     √                 
H20 Inadequate training on ERM √             √  √       
H21 Lack of an ERM business case √                       
H22 Lack of perceived value or benefits 
of ERM 
√     √  √               
H23 Lack of commitment of the board 
and senior management 
√               √      
H24 Not perceived as a priority by senior √                √      
Table 5.4 (Continued) 
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Code Hindrances to ERM implementation 
Impediments to organizational learning 
L01 L02 L03 L04 L05 L06 L07 L08 L09 L10 L11 L12 
management 
H25 Lack of board or senior 
management leadership 
√               √      
H26 The movement of the ERM 
champion from senior management 
into other areas without a successor  
√               √      
H27 Lack of consensus on benefits of 
ERM among board members and 
senior management 
√                       
H28 Other management priorities √                        
H29 Lack of a clear ERM 
implementation plan 
√                       
H30 Inability to coordinate with other 
departments 
  √                     
H31 Lack of a set of metrics for 
measuring performance of ERM 
√       √               
H32 Unclear ownership and 
responsibility for ERM 
implementation 
                       
H33 Organizational turf       √                 
H34 Employees’ reluctance to give up 
power 
      √                 
H35 People's reluctance to share risk 
information 
  √  √ √ √ √       √     
H36 Recession and business downturn √   √  √              √   
Similar to ERM implementation, organizational learning also needs 
commitment from the leadership. Such commitment requires senior 
management to sustain organizational learning by articulating the vision and 
communicating the learning-oriented values of the firm. Without leadership 
commitment, organizational learning mechanisms would not be 
institutionalized; a learning culture would not be created; and resources for 
learning would not be allocated. 
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Hence, a majority of the hindrances to ERM implementation can be linked to 
lack of leadership commitment and support (L01), such as the hindrances 
directly related to the board and senior management (H23-H27), those related 
to various resources (H01-H08, H21, H28, H31 and H36), and those deriving 
from inadequate training on ERM (H11, H12, H15-H20 and H22). 
As a change in the approach to risk management, ERM implementation needs 
to acquire knowledge. Data analysis is the heart of ERM (Driver and Bernard, 
2012). Lack of the high-quality historical data, which are the predecessor of 
information and knowledge, can lead to lack of internal risk information. Lack 
of internal knowledge about ERM, and lack of the qualified staff, who possess 
the knowledge about risk management and the ability to coordinate with other 
departments or units, may inhibit internal sharing of knowledge. This problem 
can be solved by employing external consultants, recruiting employees with 
the relevant skills or experience, or collaboratively learning with other firms. 
In addition, a firm’s lack of knowledge about risk management process, tools 
and techniques, which also hinders its PRM, tends to result from lack of an 
organizational learning mechanism that helps to convert tacit knowledge to 
explicit knowledge. Thus, the hindrances related to data, information, 
knowledge and ability (H01-H07 and H30) can be linked to lack of internal 
knowledge (L02) in the impediments to organizational learning. In some cases, 
lack of internal knowledge may be a facade, and the fact is that individuals are 
reluctant to share their tacit knowledge. Hence, people’s reluctance to share 
risk information (H35) can also be linked to L02. 
Organizational commitment is a psychological state which enables employees 
to feel that they work for the joint benefits of themselves, their fellow 
members and the organization (Lipshitz et al., 2002). Organizational 
commitment allows diffusion of individual learning into the organization 
(Lewitt and March, 1988) and induces the willingness of employees to share 
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their knowledge (Davenport and Prusak, 1998). ERM implementation needs 
organizational commitment because the firm needs the tacit knowledge of 
employees about PRM that can contribute to ERM implementation. Such tacit 
knowledge can be their experience in using risk management tools, techniques, 
their views about risks, as well as anything that can contribute to ERM 
implementation. In addition, risk information from projects needs to be 
communicated across a firm to facilitate ERM implementation. People’s 
reluctance to share risk information hinders individual learning from 
contributing to organizational learning, and leads to fragmented learning. The 
arduous relationship between the risk information sharer and recipients can 
increase the difficulty in communicating, or raise people’s reluctance to share 
the risk information they have collected from all sources. Thus, people’s 
reluctance to share risk information (H35) can be linked to lack of 
organizational commitment (L03) and arduous relationship (L10). 
Lack of psychological safety (L04) is another issue affecting ERM 
implementation, during which individuals and groups in the firm may fear or 
worry that their own interests are being threatened. Anxiety may also derive 
from the perception that ERM has negative influence on the firm, such as 
additional bureaucracy, costs, administration, and unnecessary interference 
with business activities. As psychological safety can be seen as a hygiene 
factor (Herzberg, 1966), lack of it results in job dissatisfaction. If the fear or 
anxiety continues to exist, individuals and groups will not be committed to 
ERM implementation, the silo mentality will continue, and the reluctance to 
share risk information will increase. Thus, the hindrances related to 
self-interest (H33 and H34) and individual perception (H14, H17-H19 and 
H22) can be linked to lack of psychological safety (L04). 
Individuals need motivation to embrace ERM because ERM implementation 
will take their time, energy and knowledge which are scarce resources in the 
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workdays of most employees. They will not spend these scarce resources 
unless the return is meaningful and beneficial for them. Hence, without 
motivation mechanisms, individuals would be reluctant to share risk 
information and spend any resources learning the ERM philosophy. Although 
organizational commitment can also cause the knowledge sharers to assume 
that others accepting the knowledge are more willing to share knowledge with 
them (Davenport and Prusak, 1998), motivation mechanisms are still 
necessary to ensure ERM implementation at all levels. In addition, ERM 
performance should be measured and linked to or complement the key 
performance indicators (KPIs). The lack of a set of metrics to measure ERM 
performance may undermine the ability of the firm to provide tangible benefits 
or value of ERM and to link ERM performance to KPIs. Thus, the hindrances 
H22, H31 and H35 can be linked to lack of motivation (L05).  
In order to implement ERM, individuals should be trained and provided with 
knowledge relevant to ERM implementation, and have to accept risk 
information from various projects. Employees’ inability to absorb or retain 
such knowledge represents low-level individual learning. This threatens the 
effectiveness of knowledge transfer and causes employees to be unqualified 
for their role in ERM implementation. Thus, the hindrances H06, H07 and 
H20 can be linked to lack of knowledge absorptive or retentive capacity (L08). 
Organizational learning needs a channel through which dialogue and 
knowledge sharing occurs. During ERM implementation, risk communication 
also needs a channel for internal knowledge sharing, which can be a periodical 
meeting, or a RMIS. Training programs, which allow external and internal 
trainers to share their experience and knowledge about ERM, can also serve as 
a communication channel. Hence, inadequate training on ERM (H20) and the 
lack of a RMIS (H08) can be linked to the lack of accessible channels for 
dialogue and sharing (L09).  
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During a recession or business downturn (H36), a firm tends to adopt 
downsizing or layoff strategies (L11), which may aggravate the lack of 
knowledge and qualified personnel (H05 and H06). Also, the psychological 
safety of employees (L04) and organizational commitment (L03) are 
threatened. In addition, leadership commitment and support cannot persist 
(L01), which tends to lead to the stagnation of organizational learning and 
ERM programs. Thus, the hindrance H36 can be linked to L01, L03, L04 and 
L11 in the impediments to organizational learning. 
Unsupportive organizational culture (L12), such as the blame culture and 
defensive routines, impedes people from learning from errors, failures, and 
challenging the existing rules and policies. ERM implementation involves 
learning from the past mistakes, errors, failures and disasters and providing the 
rationale behind ERM. Organizational culture unsupportive of learning 
renders such mistakes, errors, failures and disasters as taboos, and discourages 
people from discovering the root causes of them. Hence, employees will still 
retain confidence in the existing risk management practices and silo mentality 
(H13 and H14), and cannot appreciate the necessity of implementing ERM 
throughout the firm to overcome the weaknesses of the current practices. The 
confidence in the current risk management practice and failure to learn from 
past experience contributes to the underlying assumption of employees that the 
current practices can deal with most of the risks faced by their firm. Thus, 
employees do not care about the potential risks and lack risk awareness (H12).  
ERM implementation needs organizational learning and change in an 
unsupportive organization culture (Smallman, 1996). The next section 




5.4 Linking ERM implementation to organizational culture 
theories 
Organizational culture holds the organization together, guides and shapes the 
individual behavior and attitudes in the organization (Robbins, 2003). Strong 
culture contributes to organizational stability, which can be a liability or 
burden during change (Boisnier and Chatman, 2003; Brown and Harvey, 2005; 
Martin, 1992; Tushman and Smith, 2002). Subcultures enable organizations to 
become agile so as to generate responses to the environment without 
necessarily weakening the strong culture and the internal cohension (Boisnier 
and Chatman, 2003). However, some subcultures in various groups of an 
organization can also discourage group members from embracing change even 
if the organizational culture is supportive of change. 
ERM programs have to be implemented within the corporate culture due to its 
pervasive nature. In reality, organizational culture has already been invoked in 
various ERM frameworks despite different terms being used to describe it. 
Examples are “establish context” (CAS, 2003), “internal environment” (COSO, 
2004), and “context establishment” (ISO, 2009b). A strong organizational 
culture, which shapes the behavior and attitudes of employees towards the risk 
management approach and de-emphasizes risk awareness, contributes to 
confidence in the existing risk management practices, the silo mentality, and 
low risk awareness. Therefore, an unsupportive culture (H10) hinders ERM 
implementation through impeding change in behavior and attitudes. Kleffner 
et al. (2003) found that nearly half of the Canadian respondents identified a 
corporate culture that discouraged ERM as a major hindrance to ERM 
implementation. Miccolis (2003) identified an unsupportive organizational 
culture as the top barrier to implementing ERM in various industries.  
As shown in Table 5.5, the lack of risk awareness (H12), confidence in the 
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existing risk management practices (H13), as well as the silo mentality (H14) 
that hinder ERM implementation can be seen as examples of the passive 
attitudes towards ERM implementation, and can thus be linked to the espoused 
value and basic assumption levels of Schein’s (1990, 1992) three-level 
organizational culture model, described in Section 4.4.2. An unsupportive 
organizational structure (H09), which hinders ERM implementation, can be 
linked to the visible artifact level of the three-level organizational culture 
model.  
Table 5.5 Linking hindrances to ERM implementation to the three-level organizational culture 
model 







H09 Unsupportive organizational structure √   
H10 Unsupportive organizational culture √ √ √ 
H12 Lack of risk awareness within the organization  √ √ 
H13 Confidence in the existing risk management practices  √ √ 
H14 Existence or re-emergence of the silo mentality  √ √ 
A culture that is receptive to change, such as an organic or integrative culture, 
seems to facilitate successful ERM implementation. ERM implementation 
requires effective and open communication as well as coordination and 
collaboration across the firm, which leads to risk transparency throughout the 
organization (Lam, 2003). These qualities of ERM appear to align with the 
organic characteristics. However, some attributes of ERM are consistent with 
mechanistic characteristics. For example, ERM espouses following a risk 
management process and advocates the use of a common language and a 
centralized risk management approach. Although the attributes of ERM can be 
consistent with the characteristics of both the organic and mechanistic cultures, 
Kimbrough and Componation (2009) found that an organic culture enabled 
firms to make further progress in ERM implementation, and suggested that the 
firms with cultures nearer the mechanistic end should take measures to modify 
their culture to support ERM. They also suggested that ERM deployment 
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should demonstrate the desired cultural characteristics, such as 
cross-functional cooperation and open communication, trust in the 
competency of colleagues, as well as willingness to address the risks affecting 
the firm as a whole. In order to determine whether or not the culture needs 
modification, the firm can assess its corporate culture against the desirable 
cultural characteristics. Reigle’s (2003) organizational culture assessment 
instrument can be adopted for this purpose.  
A risk-aware culture (or risk culture) possesses the desirable cultural 
characteristics for ERM implemenation. It is represented by risk awareness 
throughout the firm, and thus helps detect risky incidents early and contributes 
to open risk communication. Such a risk-aware culture should be embedded in 
the organizational culture. Thus, managing risk is ingrained in the corporate 
culture (Barton et al., 2002), and potential risks are considered in 
decision-making.  
5.5 Linking ERM implementation to motivation theories 
In some cases, individuals need motivation to accept organizational change. 
The motivation theory, in turn, can be used to explain some causes of the 
resistance to change. Hence, implementing ERM should consider the 
motivation, and its influence on the behavior and attitude of individuals or 
groups. Negative motivation can lead to hindrances to ERM programs. Some 
hindrances to ERM implementation have their root causes in motivation 
theories, as Table 5.6 indicates.  
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Table 5.6 Linking hindrances to ERM implementation to motivation theories 




Expectancy Instrumentality Valence 
H01 Low data quality  √   
H02 Lack of data  √   
H03 Insufficient resources (e.g. time, money, 
people, etc.) 
 √   
H04 Lack of a formalized ERM process  √   
H05 Lack of risk management techniques and 
tools 
 √   
H06 Lack of internal knowledge, skills and 
expertise  
 √   
H07 Lack of qualified personnel to implement 
ERM 
 √   
H08 Lack of a RMIS  √   
H14 Existence or re-emergence of the silo 
mentality 
√    
H15 Lack of shared understanding and approach 
to risk management across departments 
 √   
H16 Lack of understanding relating to effective 
ERM process 
 √   
H17 Perception that ERM adds to bureaucracy  √ √   
H18 Perception that ERM increases costs and 
administration  
√ √   
H19 Perception that ERM interferes with 
business activities 
√ √   
H20 Inadequate training on ERM  √ √  
H21 Lack of a business case for ERM  √   
H22 Lack of perceived value or benefits of ERM  √   
H23 Lack of commitment from the board and 
senior management 
 √ √  
H24 Not perceived as a priority by senior 
management 
 √ √  
H25 Lack of board or senior management 
leadership 
 √ √  
H26 The movement of the ERM champion from 
senior management into other areas without 
a successor 
 √ √  
H27 Lack of consensus on benefits of ERM 
among board members and senior 
management 
 √ √  
H28 Other competing priorities  √   
H29 Lack of a clear ERM implementation plan     
H30 Inability to coordinate with other  √   
Table 5.6 (Continued) 
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Expectancy Instrumentality Valence 
departments 
H31 Lack of a set of metrics for measuring ERM 
performance 
 √   
H33 Organizational turf √   √ 
H34 Employees’ reluctance to give up power √   √ 
H35 People's reluctance to share risk information √    
H36 Recession and business downturn   √     
Some hindrances to implementing ERM concern the needs of individuals and 
can thus be explained by content theories of motivation. According to the 
two-factor theory of Herzberg (1966), salary, rewards, job security, status, 
psychological safety, and power are hygiene factors. Failure to fulfill these 
hygiene factors leads to job dissatisfaction. In the context of ERM 
implementation, the power of employees can correspond to their job security, 
and organizational turf can correspond to interests of groups. Hence, threats to 
the power of employees (H34) and organizational turf (H33) can be 
considered as lack of hygiene factors, thus leading to job dissatisfaction.  
In addition, ERM implementation can raise fear or anxiety within the firm if 
there are inadequate training programs (H20). Employees may fear that the 
ERM program increases bureaucracy (H17), costs and administration (H18), 
and exerts unnecessary interference with business activities (H19), and believe 
that the current silo-based approach does not need change. Employees may 
also worry that others may benefit from risk information sharing at the 
expense of their resources and are reluctant to share risk information (H35). 
Fear or anxiety represents the lack of psychological safety and results in job 
dissatisfaction. Hence, employees would be reluctant to support the ERM 
program and have silo mentality.
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More hindrances to implementing ERM can be explained by the process 
theories of motivation. According to Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory, 
motivation is a function of expectancy, instrumentality and valence. Under the 
circumstances of ERM implementation, lack of relevant resources (H01-H08, 
H21, and H30), and inadequate training on ERM (H20) lowers the expectancy 
variable in employees. 
Also, other competing priorities (H28), lack of commitment and leadership of 
the board and senior management (H23 and H25), the movement of the ERM 
champion (H26), lack of consensus on benefits of ERM (H27), and business 
downturn (H36) can lower the expectancy. Misunderstandings, such as the 
perception that ERM adds to bureaucracy (H17), costs and administration 
(H18), and unnecessary interference with business activities (H19), lack of 
understanding about an effective process (H16), lack of perceived benefits or 
value (H22), and lack of shared understanding and approach to risk 
management across departments (H15) may make employees perceive that the 
ERM program would undermine their ability to deliver satisfactory 
performance, and lower their expectancy. 
In addition, instrumentality concerns the performance-outcome relationship. 
The hindrances related to the board and senior management (H23-H27) tend to 
make employees perceive that leaders are not likely to confirm performance 
contingent rewards. Even if there is an ERM performance contingent reward 
system, employees still need to understand this system. Internal training on 
ERM can show employees a clearer picture of how they can obtain ERM 
performance contingent rewards. Thus, inadequate training (H20) can cause 
misunderstandings about the reward system for ERM performance, and the 
probability that performance leads to the desired outcome would be perceived 
as being low.  
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Furthermore, valence plays a key role in motivation. The valence can be 
negative, if the outcome is undesirable, which renders the motivation negative. 
Hence, the threats to organizational turf (H33) and power (H34) can lead to 
negative valence and motivation.  
The expectancy theory also provides some managerial implications for ERM 
implementation. Training programs are crucial to reduce or eliminate 
misunderstandings about ERM implementation. These programs should 
provide a clear view of the metrics to measure ERM performance, and how 
ERM implementation affects the way employees work and their ability to 
achieve a desirable level of performance. Employees also need to know that 
ERM implementation is supported by the board and senior management, who 
can ensure that the resources required are given. It is also possible for 
managers to redeploy the roles of employees to help them better use their 
competencies. These actions can ensure that employees have a relatively 
accurate estimation of the probability that their efforts lead to desirable 
performance, i.e. the expectancy. Moreover, an ERM performance contingent 
rewarding system should be created to strength the performance-outcome 
relationship. Training programs should help employees to understand this 
rewarding system. These measures can contribute to relatively accurate 
expectations of employees that the performance leads to their valued outcomes, 
i.e. the instrumentality. Furthermore, managers need to anticipate the 
consequences of ERM implementation, because some consequences can lead 
to negative valences for some individuals. Managers need to help them 
recognize all the potential gains available to them and ensure that they fully 
understand the possible losses if there is no ERM program in place.  
According to Adams’s (1963, 1966) equity theory, people act to reduce or 
eliminate such inequity in the rewards received compared with others. Hence, 
people who expect that comparable others receive more favorable outcomes 
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spawned by the change are likely to feel that they are being treated unfairly 
relative to comparable others, and thus resist the change (Hayes, 2007). 
Although no hindrances to ERM implementation can be linked to this theory, 
this theory provides some managerial implications for ERM programs. The 
management needs to identify the employees who feel that they are being 
treated inequitably during ERM implementation, and explores the possibilities 
of improving their valued outcomes as well as the possibilities of 
redistributing costs and benefits between them in order to produce greater 
equity.  
5.6 Linking ERM implementation to leadership theories 
Leaders of the organization play a key role in ERM implementation. The 
commitment of the board and senior management is considered as a driver for 
ERM. Such tone at the top represents the support, and ensures the resource 
allocation, the initiation of a training program, the creation of a risk 
communication mechanism and a risk language, the identification of ERM 
ownership and accountability, as well as the cultivation of a risk-aware culture 
throughout the firm. In contrast, lack of high-level commitment, which is also 
a source of resistance to change, can be linked to several hindrances to ERM 
implementation, as Table 5.2 indicates.  
ERM requires a top-down view of the risks that a firm faces. Visible senior 
executive leadership is critical to an ERM process (Branson, 2010). ERM 
implementation requires change in corporate culture or mindset of 
management at all levels within a firm, and transparent sharing of risk 
information across silos. Senior executive leadership reinforces the importance 
of the movement toward a more transparent enterprise-wide view of risk 
management (Branson, 2010). The leaders of ERM programs can be CROs, 
CFOs, and CEOs. The appointment of a CRO, who is exclusively devoted to 
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leading ERM, can signal the firm’s emphasis on risk management to its 
employees (Cendrowski and Mair, 2009). 
Kotter (1995, 1996) identified eight errors of leaders that result in the failure 
of transformational change efforts: not establishing a great enough sense of 
urgency, not creating a sufficiently powerful guiding coalition, lacking a 
vision, under-communicating the vision, permitting obstacles to the new 
vision, not systematically planning for and creating short-term wins, declaring 
victory too soon, and not anchoring changes in the corporate culture. Some of 
these errors can be linked to the hindrances to ERM programs.  
A vision is a picture of the future and helps clarify the direction in which an 
organization needs to move. This vision needs to be effectively communicated 
to individuals. If the vision of change concerns short-term sacrifices of 
employees, leaders need to inform them of some new growth possibilities that 
can be spawned by the change (Kotter, 1995). Lack of a vision of ERM 
implementation and lack of an effective communication approach can lead to 
resistance to ERM programs because employees may perceive that ERM 
produces bureaucracy, costs, administration, and unnecessary interference with 
business activities.  
Under-communicating the vision may also expand the side-effects of ERM 
implementation, such as changes in somebody’s power or threats to 
organizational turf. Thus, communication skills are a key attribute of change 
leaders. This attribute has been identified as one of the inborn traits that make 
for good or successful leaders in the trait theory of leadership (Graetz et al., 
2006; Kirkpatrick and Locke, 1991). Given the behavioral theories of 
leadership (Blake and Mouton, 1966; Likert, 1961; Stogdill and Coons, 1951), 
Battilana et al. (2010) found that leaders more effective at person-oriented 




In addition, there may be some obstacles to the new vision, such as the 
unsupportive organizational structures and culture, which hinders employees 
from embracing ERM. Leaders need to reduce or remove these obstacles and 
mobilize employees to accept the change. Battilana et al. (2010) found that 
leaders leaning towards task-oriented behaviors were more likely than other 
leaders to focus on mobilizing employees.  
Moreover, lack of a short-term win tends to make employees lose momentum 
or even join the employees who resist the change (Kotter, 1995). Since ERM 
implementation is a multi-year process, employees need compelling evidence 
that the program produces benefits or value. Leaders should provide 
employees with some perceivable benefits or value of ERM, which involves 
the metrics to measure ERM performance. Lack of such a set of metrics is 
likely to conceal ERM performance and renders employees unable to perceive 
the benefits or value of ERM. Creating a short-term achievement concerns the 
evaluation of a change program. Battilana et al. (2010) found that leaders who 
were more effective at task-oriented behaviors were more likely than other 
leaders to focus on evaluating change implementation.  
Furthermore, change leaders should institutionalize the change. Once the 
pressure for change is removed, change is subject to degradation, unless new 
behaviors are rooted in social norms and shared values. This can explain why 
ERM should be integrated into the business process. Thus, a risk-aware 
culture that encourages full engagement and accountability at all levels needs 
to be fused into the corporate culture. Such a risk-aware culture is considered 
as a hallmark of an advanced ERM program (AON, 2010). Thus, even if the 
ERM champion from the senior executive moves or retires, ERM practices 
will not disappear in the firm.  
Based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that leaders of ERM 
programs need to adopt different leadership styles while dealing with different 
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hindrances to ERM implementation. This aligns with the contingency theories 
of leadership. Dunphy and Stace (1993) linked four styles of change 
leadership (collaborative, consultative, directive and coercive) with four types 
of change (fine-tuning, incremental adjustment, modular transformation and 
corporate transformation). Most ERM implementation is incremental at the 
initial stage. Hence, a consultative style of change leadership is likely to be 
appropriate.  
5.7 Conceptual model 
The conceptual model contributes to the fulfillment of the fourth research 
objective, which involves analyzing the drivers for and hindrances to ERM 
implementation in tandem with theories of organizational behavior. As shown 
in Figure 5.1, the conceptual model describes the relationships between the 
proposed ERM framework (see Section 3.6) and the influential factors (i.e. 
drivers and hindrances), as well as the relationship between the theories of 
organizational behavior and the proposed ERM framework and factors. 
The core of the conceptual model is the proposed ERM framework for 
construction firms, which describes key activities of ERM implementation. 
The proposed ERM framework is underpinned by drivers for and hindrances 
to ERM implementation in the conceptual model. Some components of the 
ERM framework can reduce the negative effects of the hindrances to ERM 
implementation, which is represented by one-way arrows.  
This chapter has linked ERM implementation, especially the drivers for and 
hindrances to ERM implementation, to organizational change, organizational 
learning, organizational culture, motivation, as well as leadership theories, 
respectively. These linkages are represented by bold two-way arrows. The five 
interactive organizational behavior theories provide the rationale behind the 
forces that drive and hinder ERM implementation.  
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As ERM implementation is seen as an incremental, continuous, and 
evolutionary organizational change, the hindrances to and drivers for ERM 
can be linked to the resistance to and drivers for organizational change. 
Organizational learning serves as a medium for change (Alas and Sharifi, 
2002). Several impediments to learning also hinder organizational change and 
can thus be linked to the hindrances to ERM implementation. Organizational 
culture, which influences employees’ behavior and attitudes, has been 
considered in the organizational “context” (CAS, 2003) or “environment” 
(COSO, 2004; ISO, 2009b) component in the existing ERM frameworks. 
Motivation interacts with organizational change and learning, and can be 
linked to some hindrances to ERM implementation by virtue of the content or 
process theories of motivation. Most organizational change needs leadership 
commitment, which concerns the motivation issues because such commitment 
can affect the expectation of employees about their performance and 
achievement of outcomes. Mistakes of leaders tend to result in failure of the 
change (Kotter, 1995). Some of these mistakes can be linked to hindrances to 
ERM implementation.  
The interactions among organizational change, organizational learning, 
organizational culture, motivation, and leadership are indicated in this 
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Figure 5.1 Conceptual model
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6 Research Methodology 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the research design and data collection methods used in 
this research. Combining multiple methods has been recommended to be used 
in construction management research because this approach overcomes some 
of the inherent limitations of a single approach and facilitates a complete 
understanding of a given construction management research phenomenon 
(Love et al., 2002). Also, combining both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches in research design and data collection has been advocated because 
of its greater utility, even though it is more expensive in terms of time, money 
and energy (Abowitz and Toole, 2010; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998).  
The overall research framework is illustrated in Figure 6.1. A literature review 
on ERM (see Chapter 3) and theories of organizational behavior (see Chapter 
4) was conducted. Based on the literature review, an ERM framework for 
construction firms is proposed, and ERM maturity criteria and best practices 
as well as potential factors that drive and hinder ERM implementation were 
identified in Chapter 3. The importance of the ERM maturity criteria and the 
applicability of the ERM best practices were checked using the data collected 
from the first survey (coded as Survey I). Thus, the significantly important 
criteria and the significantly applicable best practices were included in the 
proposed fuzzy ERM maturity model. Follow-up interviews were performed 
with the practitioners who were originally included in the questionnaire survey 
sample for their comments on the results of Survey I. Then, the second survey 
(coded as Survey II) was conducted to collect the data relating to the 
implementation of the best practices as well as the factors driving and 
hindering ERM implementation in CCFs based in Singapore. Organizational 
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Figure 6.1 The research framework 
In addition, to get an understanding of ERM implementation in 
Singapore-based CCFs, case studies were conducted using the information 
collected from the interviews and past documents. Also, specific action plans 
for improving ERM practices were identified and checked through the 
interviews. Furthermore, this research developed a KBDSS, which contains a 
knowledge base comprised of the important ERM maturity criteria, the 
applicable ERM best practices, and the action plans, as well as the fuzzy ERM 
maturity model. The KBDSS can also be used to compute the scores of the 
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maturity criteria and the ERMMI of each CCF. The KBDSS was validated 
through case testing (see Section 9.8). 
6.2 Research design 
Research design is a plan for testing the hypothesis or for interpreting events. 
The common types of research designs include case studies, surveys, 
experiments, correlation or regression, comparisons, and historical designs 
(Tan, 2008). Case studies are appropriate for the in-depth understanding or 
interpretation of particular instances; surveys are used to obtain broad 
population characteristics and reasons for certain actions or preferences; 
experiments are used to test cause and effect relations by controlling and 
manipulating variables; correlation or regression analysis is used when 
experiment control is difficult or impossible; comparative research is used to 
explain similarities and differences between multiple groups; and historical 
research seeks to explain the past to understand or draw lessons for the present 
and future (Tan, 2008).  
This research involves collection of professional views on ERM criteria and 
best practices as well as the perceived factors that drive and hinder ERM 
implementation. Hence, two rounds of surveys were conducted in this research. 
One obtained professional views on the importance of the ERM maturity 
criteria and the applicability of the best practices from the professionals in the 
industry and academia, while the other collected the ERM implementation 
levels and the significance of the factors influencing ERM implementation in 
CCFs based in Singapore.  
In addition, Yin (2009) believed that a case study is an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident. Unlike surveys constrained by the rigid limits, case studies 
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can lead to new and creative insights, development of new theories, and have 
high validity with practitioners (Voss et al., 2002). Yin (2009) recommended 
case studies to focus on the questions about “what, why, and how”. As this 
research attempts to investigate how ERM is implemented in CCFs based in 
Singapore, cases studies were adopted. 
6.2.1 Surveys 
Two surveys were conducted with different groups of respondents. Survey I 
obtained the importance of the ERM maturity criteria and the applicability of 
the ERM best practices in CCFs. Survey II extracted the critical factors that 
could drive and hinder ERM implementation in CCFs based in Singapore, and 
collected the implementation levels of the ERM best practices. 
Survey I intended to collect the views of professionals about the importance of 
the ERM maturity criteria, which could be used to calculate the criterion 
weights, as well as the applicability of the best practices of ERM. The 
population for this survey included all the industry practitioners with extensive 
experience in risk management in CCFs, and all the academics who have 
gained in-depth knowledge of risk management in CCFs through research. As 
there was no sampling frame in this survey, the sample was a non-probability 
sample. The non-probability sampling plan can be used to obtain a 
representative sample (Patton, 2001), and has been recognized as appropriate 
when the respondents were not randomly selected from the entire population, 
but were rather selected based on whether they were willing to participate in 
the study (Wilkins, 2011). There are four types of non-probability samples: 
convenience samples, purposive samples, quota samples and snowball samples. 
Convenience samples are not representative, and are used mainly for 
exploratory work, pretesting of questionnaires or where a quick opinion is 
required. Purposive samples are drawn by judgment (Tan, 2008). These are 
not applicable to this survey. Thus, quota and snowball sampling were used in 
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Survey I. The use of multiple types of sampling methods can help overcome 
some of the inherent limitations of any particular sample of data (Abowitz and 
Toole, 2010). The sample was stratified according to the institution types 
(CCFs and academic institutions). The sample consisted of (1) the industry 
practitioners from CCFs in Mainland China and their overseas subsidiaries, 
and (2) the academics from universities located in Mainland China and Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region. In addition, the respondents were asked 
to provide referrals for additional respondents. 
Survey II intended to investigate the ERM maturity levels and to identify the 
critical factors influencing ERM implementation in CCFs based in Singapore. 
The population of Survey II was all the CCFs based in Singapore. At the time 
of this research, there were 46 CCFs registered with the Registry of Public 
Sector Contractors administered by the BCA of Singapore. As the registry 
serves the procurement needs of the public sector, contractors not registered 
with the BCA are not precluded from conducting business outside of the 
public sector. Hence, there may be more CCFs in Singapore. These 46 CCFs 
comprised the sampling frame of Survey II. Since the sampling frame was not 
large, it was used as the sample. As ERM generally adopts a top-down 
approach (Dickinson, 2001; Olson and Wu, 2008), the management staff at a 
higher level tends to know more about ERM implementation than lower-level 
staff. The senior management from these CCFs was first contacted prior to the 
middle management, such as project managers, being approached as 
appropriate. 
6.2.2 Case studies 
As Survey II uncovered the extent to which CCFs implemented ERM but not 
how to implement ERM, case studies were used to provide an understanding 
of how specific Singapore-based CCFs actually implemented ERM, and why 
they implemented ERM in such a manner.  
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For a given set of available resources, the fewer the case studies, the greater 
the opportunity for in-depth observations (Voss et al., 2002). Single, in-depth 
case studies are often used in longitudinal research (Karlsson and Åhlström, 
1995; Narasimhan and Jayaram, 1998). However, a single case study has 
limitations related to the generalizability of the conclusions, the risks of 
misjudging of a single case, and of exaggerating easily available data (Voss et 
al., 2002). The ERM implementation in one CCF with a higher financial grade 
cannot be generalized to a relatively small one. Thus, multiple case studies 
were used in this research and comparison across cases was made. Given the 
resource limitation, multiple cases may reduce the depth of study, but can 
augment external validity, and help guard against observer bias (Voss et al., 
2002). To enhance the depth of case studies, three case studies were conducted. 
A large, medium and small CCFs were selected for case studies because firm 
size has been identified as a variable positively related to ERM adoption 
(Beasley et al., 2005; Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011) and significantly affecting 
ERM system design (COSO, 2004) and improvement of firm performance 
(Gordon et al., 2009).  
6.3 Data collection methods 
In this research, analysis of past documents, questionnaires and interviews 
were used to collect both qualitative and quantitative data for gaining a clear 
understanding of ERM implementation in CCFs based in Singapore. This is 
because no single data collection method is ideal and combined methods such 
as using both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods have been 
highly recommended (Abowitz and Toole, 2010).  
6.3.1 Analysis of past documents 
Past documents about the CCFs, which were the subjects of the case studies, 
were analyzed to obtain an overview of the risk management practices in these 
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firms. These documents included their internal documents (such as operational 
and management manuals) about ERM, academic literature concerning risk 
management in the case firms, as well as media coverage. Internal documents 
were collected by interpersonal networking, while the literature and media 
coverage was available in the Internet. Analysis of past documents helped in 
the conduct of case studies, which intended to provide an understanding of 
how these CCFs implemented ERM and in what manner.  
6.3.2 Questionnaires and interviews 
Among the various data collection methods, the questionnaire has been 
recognized as the most cost-effective and most popular mean to collect 
information (Gravetter and Forzano, 2012) and has been widely used by 
researchers in the studies relating to risk management (Hwang et al., 2013a; 
Liu et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2004; Zhao et al., 2013). Thus, questionnaires 
were designed to collect data in this research. The terminology used was 
explained in the questionnaires to ensure that the respondents were clear about 
the questions. 
The pilot study was performed with four professionals to solicit comments on 
the readability, comprehensiveness, and accuracy of the questionnaire. Three 
of them were from CCFs based in Singapore while the other one was from a 
university in China. All of them had over 10 years of working or research 
experience. As they believed that the 16 criteria can comprehensively reflect 
the characteristics of a mature ERM program, no new criteria were added. In 
addition, based on their comments, new best practices were added, revisions 
were made to improve the readability and accuracy of the statement of the best 
practices, and footnotes were added to explain the terminologies used.  
The finalized questionnaire of Survey I included four parts (see Appendix 1). 
The first part was an introductory letter, which explained the research 
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objectives and contact details. The second part solicited the profile of the 
respondents, such as their affiliation and working or research experience. In 
the third part, the best practices related to each criterion were listed. Because 
these practices were collected from the literature relating to the successful or 
advanced ERM practices in various industries, their applicability in CCFs 
should be checked. The respondents were requested to rate the applicability of 
each practice in CCFs using another five-point Likert scale (1 = very 
inapplicable, 2 = inapplicable, 3 = medium, 4 = applicable, and 5 = very 
applicable). In this part, open-ended questions were also presented to ask for 
other suggested practices that the experts deemed important and applicable. In 
the fourth part, the respondents were asked to rate the importance of each 
ERM maturity criterion according to a five-point Likert scale (1 = very low, 2 
= low, 3 = medium, 4 = high, and 5 = very high) based on their actual 
professional experience on risk management in CCFs. 
In Survey I, the finalized questionnaires were sent to experts by email. Email 
questionnaires could provide an easier and more immediate means of response, 
and a potential decrease in delivery time and cost. These questionnaires are 
self-administered, provide geographical flexibility and allow respondents time 
to think about the questions before responding (Tan, 2008). The problem of 
poor response rate can potentially be lessened by follow-up calls.  
After the questionnaire survey and data analysis, four practitioners who were 
originally included in the questionnaire survey sample were interviewed for 
their comments on the analysis results. These comments were used to support 
the exclusion of the ERM best practices that were found inapplicable in CCFs. 
In Survey II, the questionnaire was structured in four parts (see Appendix 2). 
Similar to the questionnaire in Survey I, the first part explained the research 
objectives and contact details, while the second part was meant to profile the 
respondents and their firms, such as their designations, years of work 
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experience, and the financial grade. In the third part, respondents were asked 
to rate the significance of the factors identified from the literature review in 
driving or hindering ERM implementation in their firms. They could make 
judgments based on the status quo in their firms, and responded to questions 
using a five-point Likert scale (1 = very insignificant, 2 = insignificant, 3 = 
neutral, 4 = significant, and 5 = very significant). In the last part, the ERM 
best practices, which were found significantly applicable in Survey I, were 
presented, and the implementation level of each best practice was rated on a 
five-point Likert scale (1 = very low, 2 = low, 3 = medium, 4 = high, and 5 = 
very high). Respondents rated by comparing similar current practices in their 
firms with the best practices under each criterion.  
The questionnaires of Survey II were sent to the management in the CCFs 
registered with the BCA through emails, or handed to them personally. 
Handing to them personally was preferred to emails because it provided 
opportunities for conducting interviews to collect data for case studies. 
Having conducted Survey II, semi-structured interviews, which are common 
in interviews (Tan, 2008), were performed with the managers from 
Singapore-based CCFs, who agreed to be interviewed. A questionnaire was 
designed for the interview, including seven groups of questions (see Appendix 
3). The first group was used to collect the basic information relating to the 
firm and interviewee. The following five groups of questions were used to 
collect their opinions relating to the factors affecting ERM implementation, 
ERM ownership, risk communication, the risk-aware culture, as well as the 
ERM process in the interviewees’ firms, respectively. Most questions in the 
questionnaire were open-ended for the interviewees to supply their own 
answers without being constrained by a fixed set of possible responses. These 
questions served as an interview guide and can be asked in different ways, 
which helped the interviewers to tailor the questions to the interview context 
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and to the interviewees. In addition, new questions were allowed to be raised 
during the semi-structured interviews to gain an understanding of ERM 
implementation in the interviewees’ firms. The information from the 
semi-structured interviews was used in the case studies.  
6.4 Data analysis methods 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was computed to test the reliability and internal 
consistency of the responses. The alpha can range from 0 to 1 and should be at 
least 0.7 for a scale to be reliable (Nunnally, 1978).  
The one-sample t-test, which can test the null hypothesis that the population 
mean is equal to a specified value, was used to test whether all the maturity 
criteria were significantly important and whether all the best practices were 
significantly applicable in CCFs. This method has been applied in the 
construction management research that compared means with a test value 
(Hwang et al., 2013a; Hwang et al., 2013b; Ling et al., 2013; Low and Chuan, 
2006).  
In addition, the ranking technique has been widely used to rank the relative 
importance of the factors in the construction management domain (El-Razek et 
al., 2008; Hwang et al., 2009; Hwang et al., 2013b; Yang et al., 2010; Zhao et 
al., 2013). In this research, the maturity criteria were ranked according to their 
mean importance scores and these scores were also used to calculate the 
weights of the criteria, using equations 3.9 and 3.10 in Section 3.7.3.  
Moreover, to measure the degree of agreement associated with the importance 
ranking of the ERM maturity criteria between the practitioners and academics 
in Survey I, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient was calculated and 
statistically tested. The Spearman rank correlation is a method of computing a 
correlation between the ranks of scores between two groups, and has been 
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widely used in construction management research (El-Razek et al., 2008; 
Hwang et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2013). The correlation 
coefficient is calculated on the ranks of scores, not the scores themselves. As a 
result, without the consideration of normality or equal variance of data, this 
statistical method can be used focusing on difference in rank orders of data 
rather than difference in means (Hwang et al., 2009). A significance level of 
0.05 (two-tailed) was used for this analysis. 
Together with the weights collated from Survey I, the implementation level of 
each best practice collected from Survey II was used to calculate the ERM 
maturity level. Using the fuzzy ERM maturity model, the maturity scores of 
each criterion and the overall maturity score (i.e. ERMMI) could be calculated. 
As these scores can be interpreted with linguistic terms, all the CCFs obtained 
a term representing their ERM maturity levels. Furthermore, to check the 
relationship between ERM maturity levels and firm characteristics, the 
chi-square (χ2) contingency table analysis was performed at the significance 
level of 0.05. This method determines the extent to which a statistical 
relationship exists between two variables (McClave et al., 2010) and has been 
viewed as one of the most widely used statistical tools for categorical data 
analysis (Hwang et al., 2014; Xia et al., 2012). Also, the criteria were ranked 
based on their scores to see which areas had relatively weak implementation, 
whilst the Spearman rank correlation was conducted to check the agreement 
on the maturity criterion score ranking between CCF groups with different 
characteristics. 
Similarly, the drivers for and hindrances to ERM implementation were ranked 
according to their mean scores, respectively. The one-sample t-test was also 
employed to test whether the influence of the drivers and hindrances was 
significant, and the Spearman rank correlation was conducted to examine 
whether there was agreement on the rankings between the respondent groups. 
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In addition, the independent-sample t-test, which can test whether there were 
differences in means between two independent samples, was conducted to 
check the differences in the mean scores of the drivers and hindrances between 
the respondent groups. 
The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software, which has been 
widely adopted for statistical analysis in a variety of studies, was used to 
conduct the data analysis for this research. 
6.5 Summary 
This research adopted a combination of multiple methods in research design 
and data collection. Two rounds of surveys were conducted to examine the 
ERM maturity levels and critical factors affecting ERM implementation in 
CCFs based in Singapore. Survey I intended to obtain the importance of the 
ERM maturity criteria and the applicability of the best practices from the 
professionals in CCFs and their overseas subsidiaries as well as the academics 
who were familiar with ERM practices in CCFs. Survey II identified the 
critical drivers for and hindrances to ERM implementation, and obtained the 
actual implementation level of each best practice deemed to be significantly 
applicable in Survey I from the CCFs based in Singapore. Case studies were 
used to provide an understanding of how ERM was implemented in the CCFs. 
Analysis of past documents, questionnaires and semi-structured interviews 
were conducted to collect data. Various statistical analysis methods were used 
to analyze the data collected from the two rounds of surveys.
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7 Data Analysis and Discussions 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis of the data collected from the two rounds of 
surveys. Specifically, Survey I produced 89 completed questionnaires from 25 
academics and 64 practitioners of CCFs. The analysis results indicated that all 
the 16 ERM maturity criteria were significantly important, and that 66 out of 
the 71 ERM best practices were significantly applicable in the CCFs. The five 
practices that were found not significantly applicable were excluded, and the 
exclusion was supported by the relevant comments garnered from four 
interviews with the practitioners who were originally included in the survey 
sample. Thus, the 16 criteria and 66 best practices were included in the ERM 
maturity model.  
Survey II was conducted with the practitioners from the CCFs based in 
Singapore and 35 responses were received. The analysis results reported that 
the overall ERM maturity level of the surveyed Singapore-based CCFs was 
low. Thus, Hypothesis 2 that “ERM maturity level in CCFs based in Singapore 
is low” was supported. Additionally, the analysis results indicated the 
significant association between ERM maturity level and firm size, which 
implied that the larger firms were likely to have higher-level ERM maturity. 
Moreover, 13 factors were reported to significantly drive ERM 
implementation, and 25 factors were found to significantly hinder ERM 
implementation in these CCFs. Although there were differences in the mean 
scores of a couple of drivers and hindrances, this research reported the 
significant agreement on the rankings of the drivers and hindrances between 
the low- and medium-maturity CCFs, respectively. Furthermore, the 
significant drivers and hindrances were interpreted in tandem with the theories 
of organizational behavior. Specifically, the theories of organizational change 
were used to interpret the significant drivers for ERM implementation, whilst 
the theories of organizational change, organizational learning, organizational 
culture, motivation, as well as leadership theories, were employed to interpret 
the significant hindrances to ERM implementation.   
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7.2 Analysis results and discussions of Survey I 
7.2.1 Sample profile 
Survey I intended to solicit the importance of the ERM maturity criteria and 
the applicability of the ERM best practices in CCFs. From April to June 2012, 
a total of 390 questionnaires were sent, and 89 completed questionnaires were 
received from 25 academics and 64 practitioners, representing a response rate 
of 22.8%. This rate was consistent with the norm of 20-30% with most 
questionnaire surveys in the construction industry (Akintoye, 2000; Yang et al., 
2010). The profile of the respondents is indicated in Table 7.1.  
In terms of experience, 51.7% of the respondents had more than 10 years of 
experience in the industry or academia, thus assuring the response quality. 
Specifically, 37.5% of the practitioners and 88.0% of the academics had over 
10 years of experience, respectively, and around 18.0% of all the respondents 
had over 20 years of experience. 
As for the geographical locations, all the academic respondents were from 
universities located in Mainland China, but some of them had the knowledge 
of risk management in CCFs in the international market. Meanwhile, among 
the 64 respondents from the industry, 37 (57.8%) were from China while 12 
(18.8%), 11 (17.2%), 2 (3.1%) and 2 (3.1%) were from the overseas divisions 
of CCFs in Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America, respectively. Some of the 
37 practitioners had also worked in overseas divisions. Thus, the data can 
reflect the opinions on ERM maturity criteria from CCFs in the global 
construction market.  
With respect to the designations of the respondents, 14 (56.0%) of the 25 
academics were professors while 11 (44.0%) were associate professors, 
representing 12.4% and 15.7% of all the respondents, respectively. The 
designations of the practitioners were more diversified. In most CCFs, 
managing director, president, vice president, enterprise chief engineer, and 
president assistant were recognized at the senior level. Among the 64 
practitioners, 14 (21.9%) held positions in the senior management, occupying 
 208 
 
15.7% of all the respondents. In addition, 18 (28.1%) and 32 (50.0%) of the 
industry respondents held positions in the department management and project 
management, accounting for 20.2% and 36.0% of all the respondents, 
respectively. 
Table 7.1 Profile of the respondents in Survey I 
Characteristics Categorization 
Industry  
(N = 64) 
  Academia  
(N = 25) 
  Overall  
(N = 89) 
N % N % N % 
Work 
experience 
5-10 years 40 62.5%  3 12.0%  43 48.3% 
11-15 years 8 12.5%  6 24.0%  14 15.7% 
16-20 years 7 10.9%  9 36.0%  16 18.0% 
21-25 years 4 6.3%  4 16.0%  8 9.0% 
Over 25 years 5 7.8%   3 12.0%   8 9.0% 
Location China 37 57.8%  25 100.0%  62 69.7% 
Asia (excluding China) 12 18.8%  — —  12 13.5% 
Africa 11 17.2%  — —  11 12.4% 
Europe 2 3.1%  — —  2 2.2% 
Latin America 2 3.1%   — —   2 2.2% 
Designation Professor — —  11 56.0%  11 12.4% 
Associate professor — —  14 44.0%  14 15.7% 
Managing director 1 1.6%  — —  1 1.1% 
President 2 3.1%  — —  2 2.2% 
Vice president 5 7.8%  — —  5 5.6% 
Enterprise chief engineer * 4 6.3%  — —  4 4.5% 
President assistant 2 3.1%  — —  2 2.2% 
Deputy chief economist 1 1.6%  — —  1 1.1% 
Operation director 2 3.1%  — —  2 2.2% 
Manager of the Department of Contract 
and Legal affairs 
1 1.6%  — —  1 1.1% 
Deputy manager of the Department of 
Engineering 
2 3.1%  — —  2 2.2% 
Market investment investigator 1 1.6%  — —  1 1.1% 
Manager of the Department of 
International Market 
1 1.6%  — —  1 1.1% 
Business manager 3 4.7%  — —  3 3.4% 
Contract and business manager 1 1.6%  — —  1 1.1% 
Contract manager 4 6.3%  — —  4 4.5% 
Technical director 1 1.6%  — —  1 1.1% 
Safety director 1 1.6%  — —  1 1.1% 
Project chief engineer ** 4 6.3%  — —  4 4.5% 
Project director 2 3.1%  — —  2 2.2% 
Project execution management 1 1.6%  — —  1 1.1% 
Project manager 6 9.4%  — —  6 6.7% 
Deputy project manager 14 21.9%  — —  14 15.7% 
Project schedule manager 2 3.1%  — —  2 2.2% 
Site manager 2 3.1%  — —  2 2.2% 
Project cost manager 1 1.6%   — —   1 1.1% 
* In CCFs, enterprise chief engineer is a senior management designation.  
** In CCFs, project chief engineer is the person who takes charge of the project technical issues.  
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7.2.2 Importance of the ERM maturity criteria in CCFs 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was calculated to test the reliability of the 
responses. The alpha should be at least 0.7 for a scale to be reliable (Nunnally, 
1978). The coefficient of 0.920 suggested that the data relating to the 
importance of the ERM maturity criteria had high reliability.  
Table 7.2 Importance ranking of the ERM maturity criteria in CCFs 
Code ERM maturity criteria 
Overall  Industry  Academia 
Mean Rank p-value Weight   Mean Rank   Mean Rank 
M01 Commitment of the board and 
senior management 
4.55 1 0.000* 7.21%  4.47 1   4.76 1 
M02 ERM ownership 4.16 4 0.000* 6.59%  4.13 4  4.24 5 
M03 Risk appetite and tolerance 3.51 15 0.000* 5.56%  3.56 15  3.36 15 
M04 Risk-aware culture 3.82 12 0.000* 6.06%  3.78 13  3.92 10 
M05 Sufficient resources 4.01 6 0.000* 6.36%  3.95 6  4.16 6 
M06 Risk identification, analysis and 
response 
4.28 2 0.000* 6.79%  4.17 3  4.56 2 
M07 Iterative and dynamic ERM 
process steps 
3.97 8 0.000* 6.29%  3.95 6  4.00 8 
M08 Leveraging risks as opportunities 3.61 14 0.000* 5.72%  3.63 14  3.56 14 
M09 Risk communication 3.90 10 0.000* 6.18%  3.92 9  3.84 12 
M10 A common risk language 3.40 16 0.000* 5.40%  3.48 16  3.20 16 
M11 A RMIS 3.76 13 0.000* 5.97%  3.83 12  3.60 13 
M12 Training programs 3.92 9 0.000* 6.22%  3.95 6  3.84 12 
M13 Formalized KRIs  3.89 11 0.000* 6.16%  3.88 11  3.92 10 
M14 Integration of ERM into business 
processes 
4.08 5 0.000* 6.47%  3.92 9  4.48 3 
M15 Objective setting 4.26 3 0.000* 6.75%  4.20 2  4.40 4 
M16 Monitoring, review and 
improvement of ERM framework 
3.97 8 0.000* 6.29%   3.92 9   4.08 7 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is 0.920. 
* The one-sample t-test result is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient is 0.849 and significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).  
As indicated in Table 7.2, the criteria are ranked according to their mean 
scores and the overall importance mean scores of the criteria range from 3.40 
to 4.55. To test whether each criterion was significantly important to a mature 
ERM program in CCFs, the one-sample t-test was conducted. The p-values of 
all the criteria were 0.000, suggesting that all the criteria had importance 
scores significantly different from the test value of 3.00. Thus, all the 16 
criteria were significantly important to ERM maturity and used in the ERM 
maturity model. Hypothesis 1 that “ERM maturity level in CCFs depends on a 
set of critical criteria” was supported. Using equation 3.9 and 3.10 in Section 
3.7.3, the weights of the 16 criteria were also calculated. The calculation 
process is presented in Appendix 5. As Table 7.2 indicates, the criteria weights 
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range from 7.21% to 5.40%.  
In addition, the Spearman rank correlation was applied. The correlation 
coefficient of 0.849 with the statistical significance at the 0.05 level (p-value = 
0.000) implied that the practitioners and academics agreed on the overall 
importance ranking of the 16 criteria. 
A total of six criteria obtained overall importance mean scores over 4.00. 
“Commitment of the board and senior management” (mean = 4.55) was 
ranked first by both the practitioners and academics, suggesting that the tone 
at the top was perceived the most important to a mature ERM program in 
CCFs. This result was consistent with the survey finding of the Harvard 
Business Review Analytic Services (HBRAS, 2011) that the support from the 
board and the senior executives was critical to establishing effective ERM. As 
ERM is a top-down approach (Dickinson, 2001; Olson and Wu, 2008), the 
support, encouragement and commitment at the senior level are of great 
importance to ERM implementation. Also, the commitment of the board and 
senior management was found to be an internal force that can drive ERM 
implementation within firms in various industries (Gates, 2006; Kleffner et al., 
2003). Thus, the board and senior management in CCFs should be committed 
to ERM implementation. Such commitment should be visible to make 
employees perceive ERM as a priority for the leadership, and more 
importantly, should not be interrupted by changes in the ERM champion 
because ERM implementation is a multi-year journey (Bowling and Rieger, 
2005; Simkins, 2008). 
“Risk identification, analysis and response” occupied the second position 
(mean = 4.28), implying that CCFs attached great importance to the actual 
execution of ERM because this criterion described the critical steps of a 
generic risk management process. More specifically, management needs to 
identify all categories of potential risks from internal and external sources, and 
then prioritizes them using risk analysis techniques. Thus, a list of top risks or 
a risk map that has been used in the successful ERM cases (Aabo et al., 2005) 
can be developed, and appropriate risk response measures can be developed to 
deal with the critical risks. In addition, the high mean score of this criterion 
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confirmed the validity of the COSO ERM framework (COSO, 2004) because 
this criterion can reflect three components of this framework, i.e. event 
identification, risk assessment, and risk response.  
The third ranked criterion was “objective setting” (mean = 4.26), indicating 
that clearly identified objectives at various levels were perceived highly 
important to ERM implementation in CCFs. As risk is defined as the effect of 
uncertainty on objectives in ISO 31000:2009, risk is closely associated with 
objective setting. Objective setting was also recognized as the precondition to 
risk identification, assessment and response, and one of the eight components 
in the COSO ERM framework (COSO, 2004). Thus, objectives should be 
clearly identified and deviations from plans should be assessed against the 
objectives (Hopkinson, 2011). More importantly, as ERM should be applied in 
strategy setting (COSO, 2004), strategic objectives should attract more 
attention from the management (Bowling and Rieger, 2005). 
“ERM ownership” was ranked fourth (mean = 4.16), suggesting that 
successful ERM implementation in CCFs needed an owner to centralize risk 
management and to take charge of risk oversight. This was consistent with the 
ERM practices in other industries (Banham, 2004). An ERM owner can be a 
dedicated senior executive, a stand-alone department, a board-level risk 
committee, or even a Chief Risk Officer (CRO). Also, the creation of the ERM 
owner can signal the corporate emphasis on risk management to its employees 
and investors (Cendrowski and Mair, 2009) and who the ERM owner is should 
be openly communicated to all the staff.  
The fifth ranked criterion was “integration of ERM into business processes” 
(mean = 4.08), indicating that the respondents believed that ERM 
implementation did not stand alone and should be embedded into other 
processes. This result echoed the Guidance issued by the SASAC (2006), 
which stipulated that ERM should be fully integrated into the management and 
business processes of an enterprise. These processes include, but are not 
limited to decision-making and strategic planning. In all decision-making 
processes, especially in strategic decision-making, the risks identified should 
be consistently considered, and emerging risks should also be anticipated. Also, 
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previous studies indicated that ERM should be incorporated at organizational 
planning and strategy stages (Sharman, 2002) and integrated with other 
initiatives (Chitakornkijsil, 2010). However, full integration of ERM is 
time-consuming. This would take from three to five years in large companies 
once ERM is initiated because of delays in moving level by level in the 
company and the need for change management to overcome inertia (Shortreed, 
2010). 
Another highly ranked criterion was “sufficient resources” (mean = 4.01), 
implying sufficient resources, such as funds, qualified staff, time, knowledge 
and expertise, were inevitable and necessary for ERM implementation in 
CCFs. Thus, to advance ERM implementation, resources should be 
consistently allocated for improving the risk management process, tools, 
techniques, and personnel skills. On the other hand, insufficient inputs of time, 
fund and staff, lack of internal knowledge and expertise, and lack of risk 
management techniques and tools would greatly hinder ERM implementation 
and success (Gates, 2006; Muralidhar, 2010; Rao, 2007). 
Although “leveraging risks as opportunities” (mean = 3.61), “risk appetite and 
tolerance” (mean = 3.51), and “a common risk language” (mean = 3.40) were 
the bottom three criteria, they were still perceived significantly important to a 
mature ERM program. The perceived significant importance of “leveraging 
risks as opportunities” concurred with the viewpoints of previous research that 
ERM can not only deal with threats but also leverage and exploit opportunities 
for competitive advantages (Banham, 2004; COSO, 2004; Dafikpaku, 2011; 
Miccolis and Shah, 2000; Pagach and Warr, 2010; Stroh, 2005). In addition, 
the Guidance issued by the SASAC (2006) stipulated that enterprises should 
identify their risk appetite and tolerance according to their internal and 
external environment and development strategies. Thus, “risk appetite and 
tolerance” obtained significant importance from the respondents. Lastly, the 
perceived significant importance of “a common risk language” echoed the 
viewpoint of Duckert (2011) that a well-defined risk language used throughout 
the enterprise was key to an effective ERM program, while the bottom rank of 
this criterion was in line with the findings of Liu et al. (2011) that most of 
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CCFs lacked a uniform risk language and only 20.6% of the surveyed CCFs 
used such a language. 
7.2.3 Applicability of the ERM best practices in CCFs 
As Table 7.3 indicates, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient values of the 
applicability of the best practices related to the maturity criteria range from 
0.703 to 0.938, indicating the acceptable reliability of the data.   
The mean scores of the best practice applicability ranged from 3.02 to 4.21. 
The one-sample t-test was used to test whether each ERM best practice was 
significantly applicable in CCFs. The test value of 3.00 and the significance 
level of 0.05 were adopted in this research. Out of the 71 ERM best practices, 
five obtained p-values over 0.05, indicating that their mean scores were not 
significantly different from 3.00. Thus, these five practices were not 
recognized significantly applicable in CCFs, despite their applicability in the 
organizations of other industries.  
These five practices were: “All the staff actively participate in the ERM 
process” (mean = 3.15; p-value = 0.223); “The authority and responsibility of 
risk owners is understood by staff at all levels of a firm” (mean = 3.17; p-value 
= 0.167); “There is neither a blame-culture nor defensive routines in a firm” 
(mean = 3.07; p-value = 0.563); “The risk language is understood and 
maintained by all the staff within a firm” (mean = 3.13; p-value = 0.259); and 
“Staff at all levels clearly understand how to apply the RMIS in ERM 
practices” (mean = 3.02; p-value = 0.834). 
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Table 7.3 Applicability of the ERM best practices in CCFs 
Best practices Mean p-value 
M01 Commitment of the board and senior management (α = 0.703) 
B01.1 A written ERM policy is approved by the board and senior management and is 
made known to all the staff. 
4.00 0.000* 
B01.2 An ERM plan is developed and tailored to the corporate objectives and 
context. 
4.21 0.000* 
B01.3 All the risk-related decision-making and ERM practices are fully consistent 
with the ERM policy and plan. 
3.46 0.000* 
B01.4 The board and senior management actively takes part in ERM. 4.03 0.000* 
B01.5 The commitment is continual and is not interrupted by changes in the board 
or senior management. 
3.87 0.000* 
M02 ERM ownership (α = 0.759) 
B02.1 A dedicated senior executive, or a stand-alone department, or a board-level 
committee takes charge of risk oversight and centralizes risk management. 
3.84 0.000* 
# All the staff actively participate in the ERM process. 3.15 0.223 
B02.2 Each category of critical risk has a risk owner, who fully understands the risks 
falling within the limit of his or her accountability. 
3.63 0.000* 
B02.3 All risk owners have sufficient authority to oversee any risk-related action, and 
accept clear defined responsibility for managing the risks. 
3.58 0.000* 
# The authority and responsibility of risk owners is understood by staff at all 
levels of a firm. 
3.17 0.167 
B02.4 ERM is incorporated into the performance review and assessment of risk 
owners. 
3.78 0.000* 
M03 Risk appetite and tolerance (α = 0.835) 
B03.1 Risk appetite is formally and clearly defined according to the corporate 
strategy. 
3.82 0.000* 
B03.2 Risk appetite is made known to all the staff in the firm. 3.30 0.010* 
B03.3 Risk tolerance for each specific risk is formally and clearly defined according 
to the corporate objectives. 
3.44 0.000* 
B03.4 Differences between risk tolerance defined and actual risks are regularly 
assessed. 
3.65 0.000* 
B03.5 Expected effects of risk response strategies are assessed against risk 
tolerance. 
3.67 0.000* 
M04 Risk-aware culture (α = 0.801) 
B04.1 A risk-aware culture is created throughout a firm and makes staff at all levels 
have risk awareness. 
4.08 0.000* 
B04.2 A climate of trust is built up within a firm and project teams. 4.11 0.000* 
B04.3 Risk-aware culture is incorporated into the corporate culture. 3.74 0.000* 
# There is neither a blame-culture nor defensive routines in a firm. 3.07 0.563 
B04.4 The expected behavior within the organization is explicitly expressed to 
sustain a strong risk-aware culture. 
3.44 0.000* 
M05 Sufficient resources (α = 0.812) 
B05.1 Resources are continuously invested in improving the risk management 
process, tools, techniques, personnel skills etc. 
3.96 0.000* 
B05.2 Resources are allocated for risk response based on the results of risk analysis 
and risk priority. 
4.03 0.000* 
B05.3 A firm has sufficient qualified staff and internal knowledge, skills and 
expertise to implement ERM. 
3.73 0.000* 
B05.4 External consultants or experts are used to reinforce and complement existing 
internal knowledge and skills about ERM. 
4.11 0.000* 
B05.5 A comprehensive set of metrics is consistently applied to measure ERM 
performance. 
3.82 0.000* 
M06 Risk identification, analysis and response (α = 0.898) 
B06.1 A firm adopts a formalized and standardized ERM process at project and firm 
levels. 
3.91 0.000* 
Table 7.3 (Continued) 
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Best practices Mean p-value 
B06.2 The risk information collected is ensured to be relevant and reliable. 4.04 0.000* 
B06.3 Qualitative and quantitative risk management tools and techniques are 
consistently used. 
3.87 0.000* 
B06.4 A firm comprehensively identifies sources of risk, areas of impacts and their 
causes and potential impacts. 
3.96 0.000* 
B06.5 The likelihood of occurrence and impact magnitude of all the risks identified 
are analyzed in order to identify the risk rank and management priority. 
4.01 0.000* 
B06.6 The relationship of different risks is considered and assessed. 3.71 0.000* 
B06.7 The appropriate risk response strategy is identified through considering the 
risk significance, risk appetite and tolerance, resource availability, cost versus 
benefit comparisons, as well as the enterprise objectives. 
4.03 0.000* 
B06.8 Risk response is designed to deal with critical risks at their sources. 3.91 0.000* 
M07 Iterative and dynamic ERM process steps (α = 0.901) 
B07.1 New and emerging risks are consistently identified in a timely and proactive 
manner. 
4.01 0.000* 
B07.2 Risk information is collected from various sources and updated regularly. 3.93 0.000* 
B07.3 Risk identification, analysis, and response activities are continuously 
monitored, reviewed and improved. 
3.91 0.000* 
B07.4 The ERM process is clearly recorded to make it convenient to review and 
improve. 
3.79 0.000* 
B07.5 Residual risks that still remain after the response measures have been fully 
implemented are assessed. 
3.66 0.000* 
M08 Leveraging risks as opportunities (α = 0.817) 
B08.1 It is enterprise-widely recognized that opportunities are an aspect of risks. 3.53 0.000* 
B08.2 Opportunities are regularly identified and explored during risk management 
planning. 
3.63 0.000* 
B08.3 Opportunities are regularly assessed by weighing the expected benefits and 
relevant likelihood against the potential losses and their likelihood. 
3.69 0.000* 
B08.4 Opportunities for the expected improvement of firm performance are actively 
pursued through ERM. 
3.70 0.000* 
B08.5 Risk taking of a firm is aligned with its core competencies and risk appetite. 3.71 0.000* 
M09 Risk communication (α = 0.797) 
B09.1 Risk information is consistently communicated and shared across projects and 
departments within the firm. 
3.72 0.000* 
B09.2 Critical risk information is reported to the board and senior management in a 
periodic or immediate manner according to risk severity or urgency. 
4.06 0.000* 
B09.3 Clear communication lines are established to ensure line managers, project 
managers and front-line staff are promptly notified of critical information and 
decisions from senior management. 
3.99 0.000* 
B09.4 Individual comments and views of internal or external experts are encouraged 
during the ERM process. 
3.78 0.000* 
M10 A common risk language (α = 0.868) 
B10.1 The risk language clearly explains the risk management terminologies and 
methodologies used within a firm. 
3.67 0.000* 
# The risk language is understood and maintained by all the staff within a firm. 3.13 0.259 
B10.2 The risk language is used consistently in all the communication within a firm. 3.28 0.016* 
M11 A RMIS (α = 0.801) 
B11.1 A RMIS serves as a platform for risk communication and reporting, records 
ERM activities, undertakes risk identification and analysis, and facilitates 
selecting response strategies.   
3.67 0.000* 
# Staff at all levels clearly understand how to apply the RMIS in ERM practices. 3.02 0.834 
B11.2 The functions of the RMIS are fully used in ERM practices. 3.35 0.001* 
M12 Training programs (α = 0.894) 
B12.1 Formalized training programs ensure that staff at all levels clearly understand 
the ERM policy, the ERM process and the potential benefits of ERM, thus 
3.93 0.000* 
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Best practices Mean p-value 
reducing misunderstanding and anxiety about ERM. 
B12.2 Regular training is provided to staff to maintain their high-level knowledge 
and skills relating to ERM. 
3.81 0.000* 
B12.3 Training programs make staff learn from successes and failures from both 
previous and on-going projects. 
3.99 0.000* 
B12.4 The staff who are professional or experienced in ERM share their knowledge 
relating to ERM with trainees in training programs. 
4.11 0.000* 
M13 Formalized KRIs (α = 0.938) 
B13.1 KRIs are identified for all the critical risks that a firm faces. 3.54 0.000* 
B13.2 KRIs are continuously reviewed and updated. 3.67 0.000* 
B13.3 KRIs are regularly monitored and analyzed by risk owners. 3.69 0.000* 
B13.4 KRIs act as early warning signals of increasing risk exposures in a firm. 3.80 0.000* 
M14 Integration of ERM into business processes (α = 0.776) 
B14.1 Management across a firm consistently considers risk information, risk 
tolerance and appetite, and risk response strategies in all decision-making 
activities, especially in strategic decision-making. 
3.89 0.000* 
B14.2 ERM is fully integrated into all daily management and business processes. 3.56 0.000* 
B14.3 The implementation levels of the ERM best practices are periodically assessed 
to identify gaps and improve ERM practices. 
3.60 0.000* 
M15 Objective setting (α = 0.803) 
B15.1 Objectives of the firm are clearly identified and understood by staff at all 
levels.   
3.84 0.000* 
B15.2 All objectives have performance measures and all performance measures are 
linked with objectives. 
3.71 0.000* 
B15.3 Deviations from plans or expectations are assessed against the corporate 
objectives and project objectives. 
3.79 0.000* 
M16 Monitoring, review and improvement of the ERM framework (α = 0.892) 
B16.1 A firm periodically monitors the progress of ERM implementation against, 
and deviation from, the ERM plan. 
3.81 0.000* 
B16.2 A firm periodically reviews whether the ERM framework, policy and plan are 
still appropriate, according to the firm's external and internal context. 
3.72 0.000* 
B16.3 Decisions are made on improving the ERM framework, policy and plan, based 
on results of monitoring and reviews.  
3.76 0.000* 
* The one-sample t-test result is significant at the 0.05 level (test value = 3.00). 
# The best practice is not significantly applicable in CCFs. 
  
Four practitioners who were originally included in the survey sample were 
interviewed (see Table 7.4) to garner their comments on the best practices that 
were not found significantly applicable in CCFs. These comments were used 
to support the exclusion of these practices.  
Table 7.4 Profile of the interviewees in Survey I  
Interviewee Work experience  Designation Location 
1 10 years  Contract manager Saudi Arabia 
2 11 years  Project manager China 
3 18 years  Vice president China 




According to Hofstede’s cultural dimensions theory (Hofstede, 1980, 1984; 
Hofstede et al., 2010), power distance describes the extent to which the less 
powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect 
and accept that power is distributed unequally. Hofstede et al. (2010) reported 
that the power distance index (PDI) value of China was 80, ranked second in 
Asia and among the top 10 in the world. The high PDI value indicated that the 
inequalities amongst people were recognized acceptable in China, which could 
explain the high centralization of CCFs. As the interviewed project manager 
indicated, there was high-level centralization in most CCFs, which tended to 
prevent the lower-level staff from participating in ERM because the superiors 
believed that the low-level staff should focus on project management and 
technical issues. This interviewee also reported that it would be impossible to 
get all the staff to actively participate in ERM due to the high personnel 
turnover in CCFs and the lack of timely training. In addition, as the majority 
of the workers in the Chinese construction industry are peasant-workers with 
little education (Tam et al., 2004), they are not knowledgeable enough to 
participate in the ERM process. Thus, “All the staff actively participate in the 
ERM process” was deemed not applicable in CCFs. 
Similarly, as all the four interviewees indicated, it was impossible for the 
CCFs to get all their staff to understand the authority and responsibility of risk 
owners because of the presence of temporary workers and the high staff 
turnover, as well as the limited education of workers in CCFs. These 
characteristics can distinguish the construction industry from other industries, 
such as financial, energy and manufacturing industries. Also, the staff focusing 
on technical issues may not be too concerned about the authority and 
responsibility of risk owners as they are not much involved with ERM. 
“There is neither a blame-culture nor defensive routines in a firm” was 




follow their superiors because the superiors have more power. This can also be 
supported by the high PDI value in China (Hofstede et al., 2010), indicating 
that the subordinates accepted the inequalities of power distribution. The 
superiors have the power to punitively blame the subordinates that make the 
errors or troubles even if the superiors may not use it. To avoid the errors and 
blame as well as the consequent embarrassment, staff may perform defensive 
routines. Thus, it is difficult to remove either the blame-culture or defensive 
routines from CCFs. In addition, the vice president interviewed believed that 
the absence of blame-culture and defensive routines would allow employees to 
feel free to make errors. This interviewee argued that the freedom to make 
errors was likely to result in more unnecessary errors, and that the negative 
effect far outweighed the positive effect on the firm. 
Moreover, “The risk language is understood and maintained by all the staff 
within a firm” did not obtain significant applicability in CCFs. It is difficult to 
make all the staff to maintain the use of the risk language although training 
programs can help them understand this language. As the vice president 
indicated, the employees at the lower level (e.g. workers) just understand the 
risk terms relating to safety and do not need to understand the entire set of risk 
terms as they have limited knowledge. The staff whose work focuses on 
technical issues would not have much to do with respect to management issues 
and thus they may not have many opportunities to use the risk language. 
Moreover, the two interviewees working in the overseas market revealed that 
it was impossible for all the staff to understand the risk language because 
some staff and workers were indigenous people who cannot speak Mandarin, 
which was the main language in CCFs.  
Lastly, in terms of the understanding of the RMIS application in ERM 
practices, the project manager and vice president reported that purchasing 
ERM software or setting up a RMIS could involve high expense but the 




(2009) and Shen et al. (2006) who indicated that although CCFs had applied 
the ICT in office automation, finance management, and communication, few 
of them used the ICT as tools for daily decision-making or construction 
management. Also, even if there was a RMIS in place, some older 
management staff in CCFs would be reluctant to learn how to use ICT in 
construction management and they may believe that their experience can solve 
most problems. In addition, the high staff turnover and the limited education 
levels of workers made it impossible that “staff at all levels clearly understand 
how to apply the RMIS in ERM practices”. 
Thus, these five practices without significant applicability were removed from 
the preliminary set of best practices, while the other 66 were retained and used 
as the sub-criteria under the ERM maturity criteria in the fuzzy ERM maturity 
model. The second research objective, which involves the development of an 
ERM maturity assessment model for CCFs, was fulfilled. 
7.3 Analysis results and discussions of Survey II 
7.3.1 Sample profile 
Questionnaire Survey II intended to investigate the ERM maturity levels and 
to identify the critical factors that drove and hindered ERM implementation in 
CCFs based in Singapore. From September 2012 to January 2013, all the 46 
CCFs based in Singapore, which were registered with the BCA, were 
contacted. A total of 35 professionals from different firms completed the 
questionnaires, representing a high response rate of 76.1%. Although the 
sample size was relatively small, statistical analysis could still be performed 
because the central limit theorem holds true when the sample size is larger 
than 30 (Chong and Zin, 2012; Hwang et al., 2013b; Ling et al., 2009; Mann, 
2005; Ott and Longnecker, 2001; Zhao et al., 2013). The profile of the 35 




Table 7.5 Profile of the CCFs and respondents in Survey II 
Characteristics Categorization N % 
CCFs Financial grade* A1 8 22.9% 
A2 1 2.9% 
B1 5 14.3% 
C1 10 28.6% 
C3 5 14.3% 
L6 2 5.7% 
L5 2 5.7% 
L1 1 2.9% 
CR01 1 2.9% 
Experience in 
Singapore 
≤ 5 years 8 22.9% 
6-10 years 6 17.1% 
11-15 years 14 40.0% 
16-20 years 7 20.0% 
Respondents Designation Managing director 1 2.9% 
Vice president 2 5.7% 
Director 3 8.6% 
Chief accountant 1 2.9% 
Manager of Department of Finance 2 5.7% 
Manager of Department of Safety 2 5.7% 
Safety director 1 2.9% 
Technical director 2 5.7% 
Project director 4 11.4% 
Market manager 2 5.7% 
Technical manager 2 5.7% 
Project manager 9 25.7% 
Business manager 1 2.9% 
Cost manager 1 2.9% 
Site manager 2 5.7% 
Work experience 5-10 years 12 34.3% 
11-15 years 8 22.9% 
16-20 years 11 31.4% 
21-25 years 1 2.9% 
26-30 years 3 8.6% 
* If a CCF has multiple financial grades, this table presents the highest grade.  
 
Table 7.6 Contractor registration system of the BCA 
Construction 
Workheads  
CW01 and CW02 A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 C3 
Tendering limit (S$ Million) Unlimited 85 40 13 4 1.3 0.65 
Specialist 
Workheads 
CR, ME, MW, and SY L6 L5 L4 L3 L2 L1   
Tendering limit (S$ Million) Unlimited 13 6.5 4 1.3 0.65   
Note: CW01=General building; CW02=Civil engineering 





In Singapore, the Contractors Registry functions as an administrative body 
only for the public sector procurement. Thus, contractors unregistered with the 
BCA are not precluded from conducting business as contractors or suppliers 
outside the public sector. There are six major groups of registration workheads: 
Construction Workheads (CW), Construction Related Workheads (CR), 
Mechanical & Electrical Workheads (ME), Maintenance Workheads (MW), 
Supply Workheads (SY), and Regulatory Workheads (RW) (BCA, 2013a). As 
shown in Table 7.6, there are seven financial grades for CW, from grade A1 
without tendering limit, to grade C3 with a tendering limit of S$0.65 million. 
In addition, there are six financial grades for CR, ME, MW, and SY, from 
grade L6 without tendering limit, to L1 with a tendering limit of S$0.65 
million. However, CR01 (minor construction works) has a single grade.  
When firms were measured by the financial grades in the Contractors Registry 
of the BCA, 25.8% of the surveyed CCFs were A1 and A2 contractors, and 
14.3%, 28.6% and 14.3% were B1, C1, and C3 contractors, respectively. 
Additionally, six firms were under the specialist workheads (two for L6, two 
for L5, one for L1 and one for CR01). In this research, according to the 
financial grade and tendering limit, the 35 CCFs were divided into three 
groups: (1) large CCFs, with grades of A1, A2, and L6; (2) medium CCFs, 
with grades of B1 and L5; and (3) small CCFs, with grades of C1, C3, L1, and 
CR01. The large, medium and small CCFs represented 31.4%, 20%, and 48.6% 
of all the surveyed CCFs, respectively. 
These 35 CCFs had an average of approximately 11 years of experience in the 
Singapore construction market. Specifically, 60% of them had been founded 
for more than 10 years, but none had operated in Singapore for over 20 years.  
Table 7.5 also indicates the profile of the 35 respondents. In terms of 
designations, a total of six respondents (17.1%) held positions in the senior 




directors and managers, respectively. The remaining respondents held 
positions in the areas of finance, safety, business, market, technique, and cost, 
respectively. The diversified designations of the respondents ensured that the 
data can represent the opinions of the management of various areas in CCFs 
based in Singapore. In addition, 65.7% of the respondents had over 10 years of 
experience in the construction industry and four of them had worked for over 
20 years, thus assuring the response quality. 
7.3.2 ERM Maturity of CCFs based in Singapore 
Using the fuzzy ERM maturity model described in Section 3.7.3 and the 
implementation levels of best practices collected from Survey II, this research 
calculated the ERMMI values of all the 35 CCFs. As Table 7.7 shows, 71.4% 
of these CCFs had ERMMI values ranging from 0.125 to 0.375, which could 
be interpreted as the low ERM maturity level. The remaining CCFs obtained 
ERMMI values between 0.375 and 0.625, indicating that their ERM maturity 
was at the medium level. The overall mean ERMMI of all the surveyed CCFs 
in Singapore was 0.325 (see Table 7.8), implying that their overall ERM 
maturity level was low. Thus, Hypothesis 2 that “ERM maturity level in CCFs 
based in Singapore is low” was supported.  
Table 7.7 ERMMI values of the CCFs based in Singapore  
ERMMI N % Linguistic term 
0.125-0.250 11 31.4% Low 
0.250-0.375 14 40.0% 
0.375-0.500 6 17.1% Medium 
0.500-0.625 4 11.4% 
In addition, firm size has been recognized as a variable that can influence 
ERM implementation. Previous studies suggested that larger firms were more 
likely to implement ERM because they were more complex, faced a wider 
range of risks, and had more resources to support ERM implementation 




Moreover, COSO (2004) indicated the importance of firm size when designing 
an ERM system, and Gordon et al. (2009) found that the ERM-performance 
relation was dependent on the proper match between the firm size and the 
ERM system. Thus, it is worth investigating the relationship between the ERM 
maturity level and the size of the CCFs based in Singapore.  
Table 7.8 Relationship between ERM maturity level and firm size 
Firm size 
ERM maturity level 
Total Mean ERMMI 
Low Medium 
Large 3 8 11 0.449   
(A1, A2 and L6) 27.3% 72.7% 100.0%  
Medium 6 1 7 0.309   
(B1 and L5) 85.7% 14.3% 100.0%  
Small 16 1 17 0.251   
(C1, C3, L1 and CR01) 94.1% 5.9% 100.0%   
Total 25 10 35 0.325  
  71.4% 28.6% 100.0%   
Note: χ2 = 15.497, p-value = 0.000, and degree of freedom = 2. 
The χ2 contingency table analysis was performed and the p-value was 0.000 
(see Table 7.8). This result suggested that the null hypothesis that ERM 
maturity was independent of firm size was rejected, and that there was 
significant association between ERM maturity and firm size. Thus, the larger 
firms were likely to have higher-level ERM maturity, which was consistent 
with the findings in the literature (Beasley et al., 2005; Colquitt et al., 1999; 
Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011).  
Most of the large CCFs in Singapore were the overseas subsidiaries of Chinese 
central enterprises, which had to comply with the requirements in the 
Guidance issued by the SASAC (2006). All the central enterprises, including 
those with subsidiaries in the international construction market, should 
formally submit a report of their ERM implementation status to the SASAC on 
an annual basis. As the information in the report should include the ERM 
implementation in their subsidiaries, the parent companies should audit their 




companies of the large CCFs based in Singapore were the companies listed in 
either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and 
thus had to comply with the regulations relating to internal controls and 
information disclosure. These listed companies were required to include the 
ERM implementation status in their annual reports, which should be 
accessible to their shareholders. Therefore, the large CCFs based in Singapore 
were more likely to implement ERM than the small and medium ones. 
Furthermore, the respective mean ERMMI values of large, medium and small 
CCFs were 0.449, 0.309 and 0.251, which were in a descending order and 
therefore substantiated the χ2 contingency table analysis result.  
Thus, the third research objective, which involves the investigation of ERM 
maturity levels of Singapore-based CCFs, was fulfilled. ERM maturity is a 
“snapshot” of ERM implementation, and can thus be influenced by the 
interactions between the drivers for and hindrances to ERM implementation. 
Thus, the following sections present the analysis of the driving and hindering 
factors. 
7.3.3 Drivers for ERM implementation in CCFs based in Singapore 
As Table 7.9 indicates, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient value of data relating 
to the influence of the drivers on ERM implementation in CCFs based in 
Singapore is 0.877, suggesting that the data had high reliability. 
7.3.3.1 Overall ranking 
As shown in Table 7.9, the mean scores of the 17 drivers range from 2.26 to 
4.17. These drivers were ranked based on the overall mean scores. To test 
whether the influence of the drivers was statistically significant, the 
one-sample t-test was performed. The analysis results indicated that 13 out of 
the 17 factors obtained p-values lower than 0.05, implying that their mean 




factors significantly drove ERM implementation in CCFs based in Singapore. 
The top five drivers are analyzed and discussed as follows. 
Table 7.9 The overall scores and ranking of the drivers for ERM implementation 
Code Drivers for ERM implementation Mean Rank p-value  
D01 Legal and regulatory compliance requirements 2.80 15 0.361 
D02 Non-mandatory reports or standards 2.26 17 0.000* 
D03 Credit rating agencies’ requirements 2.63 16 0.085 
D04 Reduced earnings volatility 3.89 4 0.000* 
D05 Reduced costs and losses 3.97 2 0.000* 
D06 Increased profitability and earnings 3.83 6 0.000* 
D07 Improved decision-making 4.17 1 0.000* 
D08 Better risk reporting and communication 3.31 13 0.039* 
D09 Increased management accountability  3.54 8 0.000* 
D10 Greater management consensus 3.46 11 0.002* 
D11 Competitive advantages 3.94 3 0.000* 
D12 Better resource allocation 3.49 10 0.001* 
D13 Improved clients’ satisfaction 3.51 9 0.000* 
D14 Improved control of an enterprise over its projects 3.86 5 0.000* 
D15 A broader scope of risks 3.80 7 0.000* 
D16 Advances in information technology  3.09 14 0.619 
D17 Request and encouragement from the board and senior 
management 
3.43 12 0.011* 
Cronbach’s lpha = 0.877  
* The one-sample t-test result is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
“Improved decision-making” was recognized as the most significant factor in 
driving ERM implementation (mean = 4.17). This result implied that the 
potential of ERM in improving decision-making had attracted great attention 
from CCFs based in Singapore and motivated them to implement ERM. Also, 
this result confirmed the findings of previous research that ERM can 
contribute to better decisions (Bugalla et al., 2010; Deloitte, 2010b; Gates, 
2006; HBRAS, 2011; Kleffner et al., 2003; KPMG, 2010; Lam, 2003; Manab 
et al., 2010; Millage, 2005; Narvaez, 2011; Towers Perrin, 2006; Williams, 
2005), and echoed the argument in the literature that this factor drove ERM 
implementation (Liu et al., 2011; Manab et al., 2010; Rao, 2007). The 
operations and management of a construction firm inevitably involve various 
decision-making processes, such as those relating to strategy development, 




selection. Effective ERM implementation involves risk awareness and risk 
communication across a firm, and identification and explicit articulation of 
risks provides more information for decision makers. Thus, the management 
can think early about the likely outcomes of their decisions and try to mitigate 
the occurrence of what would cause the desired outcomes to fail.  
“Reduced costs and losses” obtained the second position in the driver ranking 
(mean = 3.97), suggesting that CCFs in Singapore implemented ERM for less 
costs and losses. This result was consistent with the finding of Liu et al. (2011) 
that eliminating losses caused by risks was the most important motivator for 
ERM implementation in the top CCFs in the international market. According 
to previous studies, ERM implementation helped reduce costs and losses in 
various organizations (Beasley and Frigo, 2010; Cumming and Hirtle, 2001; 
Gregory, 2003; Harrington et al., 2002; Kleffner et al., 2003; KPMG, 2010; 
Manab et al., 2010; Meulbroek, 2002; Towers Perrin, 2006). In the 
international construction market, contracting projects usually involves higher 
risk exposure and possibility of losses (Zhi, 1995). In recent years, some 
overseas subsidiaries of leading Chinese companies suffered huge losses in the 
international construction market (China, 2011; Cienski, 2011). Thus, the 
CCFs based in Singapore tried to avoid losses through risk management at 
both the project and firm levels, although Singapore had relatively good social 
order and security status. In addition, similar to the silo-based approach to risk 
management, overemphasizing PRM in construction firms would create 
inefficient coordination between various projects and departments as well as 
duplication risk management expenditure. From this angle, ERM 
implementation could reduce costs of risk management in construction firms. 
“Competitive advantages” occupied the third position in the driver ranking 
(mean = 3.94), indicating that CCFs based in Singapore implemented ERM to 
obtain potential competitive advantages. Previous studies have recognized 




Gates, 2006; Lam, 2003; Nocco and Stulz, 2006; Towers Perrin, 2006; Walker 
et al., 2002) and indicated that this factor was an internal driver for ERM 
implementation (Gates, 2006; Miccolis, 2003; Muralidhar, 2010). The analysis 
result was consistent with these arguments. Construction firms with mature 
ERM programs tend to have high-level capabilities of risk management at 
both project and firm levels, and are better prepared to take risks and seize 
opportunities instead of blindly bearing risks and offering bids with low 
profits. Construction projects are the main revenue and profit sources of 
construction firms and the international construction market is usually 
characterized by intense competition. Thus, the construction firms with 
high-level risk management capabilities have the advantages of managing 
project risks effectively and efficiently, compared with their competitors, and 
are more likely to assure the achievement of project objectives and to win 
contracts.  
“Reduced earnings volatility” was ranked fourth (mean = 3.89), suggesting 
that this potential benefit drove CCFs based in Singapore to implement ERM. 
Previous research identified lower volatility of earnings as a potential benefit 
of ERM implementation (Gates, 2006; Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; Lam, 2003; 
Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Manab et al., 2010; Miccolis, 2003; Narvaez, 
2011; Walker et al., 2002), and recognized this benefit as a significant driver 
for ERM implementation (Accenture, 2011; Manab et al., 2010; Rao, 2007). 
Although traditional risk management would reduce earnings volatility from a 
specific source, it tends to overlook potential interdependences between risks 
(Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003) and cannot assure earnings consistency. As a 
holistic approach to risk management, ERM can identify risk interdependences 
and reduce earnings volatility by preventing the aggregation of risks across 
different sources (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003). In 
the Singapore construction industry, CCFs also face inter-related risks. For 




depends on imports, the risks relating to labor and material availability could 
be associated with schedule delays (Hwang et al., 2013b) or other risks. 
Construction firms should therefore deal with risk interdependences by 
holding a portfolio view of these risks through ERM implementation, and 
diminish earnings volatility. 
“Improved control of an enterprise over its projects” was ranked fifth (mean = 
3.86), implying that CCFs based in Singapore implemented ERM for better 
control their construction projects. This result substantiated the finding of Liu 
et al. (2011) that this factor was an important driver for ERM implementation 
in the leading CCFs in the international market. The construction industry is a 
project-based industry, where construction firms typically depend on their 
construction projects to earn revenues and profits. As the profitability of a 
construction firm is dependent on the profitability of the projects that it is 
engaged in, the firm needs to keep control over its projects. ERM 
implementation requires the establishment of ERM ownership and risk 
reporting mechanisms, which allows the firm to centralize risk management 
across the firm and control its projects. Thus, the executives and directors of 
the firm can be clear about the revenues and profits of all the projects and 
develop response strategies to timely deal with the losses that are likely to 
occur.  
In addition to the top five drivers for ERM implementation in CCFs based in 
Singapore, there were some other noteworthy results. Although “advances in 
IT” was considered as a major external driver in other industries (Liebenberg 
and Hoyt, 2003), this factor was not perceived as a significant driver in CCFs 
based in Singapore (mean = 3.09), implying that technological advancements 
might not significantly drive ERM implementation in these CCFs. As the 
CCFs in the international construction market had low-level ICT application in 
construction management and decision-making (Lu et al., 2009), the 




and decision-making processes in the CCFs. This result also confirmed the 
exclusion of the practice of “staff at all levels clearly understand how to apply 
the RMIS in ERM practices” in Section 7.2.3. 
Moreover, the 11 drivers (D04-D11) relating to the potential benefits of ERM 
implementation were found to have significant positive influence on ERM 
implementation, while the three drivers (D01-D03) relating to compliance and 
corporate governance requirements were ranked bottom and their influence 
was not statistically significant. Although these results contradicted the 
findings of Manab et al. (2010) and Gates (2006) that compliance and 
corporate governance requirements were the top driving forces in financial and 
energy firms, they agreed with the viewpoints of Pagach and Warr (2011) that 
companies adopted ERM for its potential benefits, and indicated that CCFs 
based in Singapore appeared not to comply with corporate governance 
requirements because most of these CCFs were medium and small firms.  
7.3.3.2 Low- vs. medium-maturity CCFs 
Out of the 35 surveyed CCFs, 10 obtained medium-level ERM maturity while 
25 had low-level. As the influence of the drivers tends to differ with maturity 
levels, this section investigates the differences in the scores and ranks of the 
drivers for ERM implementation between the low- and medium-maturity 
CCFs.  
The mean scores ranged from 1.96 to 4.12 in the low-maturity CCFs, but 
appeared to be higher in the medium-maturity CCFs, ranging from 3.00 to 
4.50. To check the differences in the mean scores between the two CCF groups, 
the independent-sample t-test was performed. The p-values below 0.05 
represented the significant differences in the mean scores. The analysis results 
showed that the mean scores of five drivers significantly differed between the 




Table 7.10 Scores and ranks of the drivers: Low- vs. medium-maturity CCFs 
Code Drivers for ERM implementation 
Low- 
maturity 
  Medium- 
maturity p-value 
Mean Rank   Mean Rank 
D01 Legal and regulatory compliance requirements 2.28 16  4.10 5 0.000* 
D02 Non-mandatory reports or standards 1.96 17  3.00 16 0.003* 
D03 Credit rating agencies’ requirements 2.32 15  3.40 12 0.017* 
D04 Reduced earnings volatility 3.88 2  3.90 8 0.929 
D05 Reduced costs and losses 3.76 6  4.50 1 0.014* 
D06 Increased profitability and earnings 3.72 7  4.10 5 0.200 
D07 Improved decision-making 4.12 1  4.30 2 0.566 
D08 Better risk reporting and communication 3.44 11  3.00 16 0.179 
D09 Increased management accountability  3.64 8  3.30 13 0.250 
D10 Greater management consensus 3.56 9  3.20 14 0.245 
D11 Competitive advantages 3.84 4  4.20 3 0.213 
D12 Better resource allocation 3.44 11  3.60 11 0.592 
D13 Improved clients’ satisfaction 3.36 12  3.90 8 0.038* 
D14 Improved control of an enterprise over its projects 3.76 6  4.10 5 0.164 
D15 A broader scope of risks 3.84 4  3.70 10 0.562 
D16 Advances in information technology  3.12 14  3.00 16 0.756 
D17 Request and encouragement from the board and 
senior management 
3.24 13   3.90 8 0.062 
* The independent-sample t-test result is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient is 0.554 (p-value = 0.021). 
“Legal and regulatory compliance requirements”, “non-mandatory reports or 
standards”, and “credit rating agencies’ requirements” represented the external 
requirements that were likely to drive ERM implementation. The results 
indicated that these external drivers had lower influence on ERM 
implementation in the low-maturity CCFs than that in the medium-maturity 
firms. Specifically, “legal and regulatory compliance requirements” obtained a 
high score (mean = 4.09) in the medium-maturity CCFs, which was 
significantly higher than that in the other group (mean = 2.28). This result 
suggested that if a CCF had to comply with legal and regulatory requirements 
relating to ERM, this firm was very likely to initiate an ERM program. As 
Table 7.8 indicates, eight out of the 10 medium-maturity CCFs are large-sized 
firms. In Singapore, the large CCFs were the overseas subsidiaries of the 




Given the real-world circumstances faced by the CCFs, the sources of such 
requirements were the Guidance issued by the SASAC (2006) as well as the 
internal control regulations promulgated by the stock exchanges because there 
has been neither laws or acts relating to ERM in China. In contrast, most of 
the low-maturity CCFs were the overseas subsidiaries of the firms owned and 
administrated by the provincial or municipal governments, rather than the 
central government. Thus, they would not face such regulatory requirements.   
In addition, the mean score of “credit rating agencies’ requirements” in the 
medium-maturity CCFs (mean = 3.40) was significantly higher than that in the 
low-maturity ones (mean = 2.32). This was because that most of the CCFs in 
this group were the overseas subsidiaries of the listed companies, whose credit 
rating influenced their reputation and the confidence of their shareholders. To 
obtain high credit ratings, these firms should implement ERM and audit the 
ERM implementation of their overseas subsidiaries. However, this driver 
exerted less influence on the ERM implementation in the low-maturity CCFs, 
suggesting that these firms might not face the pressures from the credit rating 
agencies.  
“Non-mandatory reports or standards” gained the mean scores of 1.96 and 
3.00 from the low- and medium-maturity CCFs, respectively. Although the 
difference was significant, it should be noted that this driver obtained the 
bottom score in both CCF groups. Thus, the non-mandatory requirements did 
not drive ERM implementation in the Singapore-based CCFs. 
Moreover, “reduced costs and losses” was ranked top (mean = 4.50) and sixth 
(mean = 3.76) in the medium- and low-maturity CCF groups, respectively. The 
difference in the mean scores between the two groups was significant, which 
implied that the medium-maturity CCFs focused more on this potential 
economic benefit, and that this driver had greater influence on this group. This 




CCFs, faced more pressures of reducing costs and losses, and ERM 
implementation can help relieve such pressures. 
“Improved clients’ satisfaction” received a significantly higher mean score 
(mean = 3.90) in the medium-maturity CCFs than that in the low-maturity 
CCFs (mean = 3.36). This result implied that this driver contributed more to 
the ERM implementation in the medium-maturity CCFs, and was consistent 
with the finding of Liu et al. (2011) that improved satisfaction of clients was a 
motivator for ERM implementation in the CCFs in the international market. 
As the Singapore construction market was not large, it was important for the 
CCFs to obtain good reputations in this market. Obtaining the satisfaction of 
clients was likely to contribute positively to their reputations and would 
increase the probability of winning contracts. Thus, to improve the satisfaction, 
the CCFs would implement ERM to better deal with risks and assure the 
achievement of project objectives.  
Furthermore, despite significant differences in the mean scores of the five 
drivers, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient of 0.554 with a p-value of 
0.021 indicated statistically significant agreement on the rankings of all the 
drivers between the low- and medium-maturity CCFs. The two groups shared 
seven common drivers in their respective top 10 rankings, despite differences 
in the ranks of some drivers.   
7.3.3.3 Interpretation from the perspective of organizational behavior 
It is worth reiterating that ERM implementation in construction firms can be 
considered as an incremental, evolutionary and continuous organizational 
change, which also requires organizational learning as a medium (Alas and 
Sharifi, 2002), change in the organizational culture (including the 
organizational structure) (Senior and Fleming, 2006), appropriate motivation 




of organizational change to interpret the analysis results relating to drivers for 
ERM implementation.  
Beer and Nohria (2000c, b) suggested that organizational change can be 
achieved through Theory E and Theory O described in Section 4.2.4. Some 
drivers, such as “reduced earnings volatility” (D04), “reduced costs and losses” 
(D05), and “increased profitability and earnings” (D06), are closely associated 
with economic performance and shareholder value, which suggested that 
Theory E could be used to implement ERM in the Singapore-based CCFs. 
Meanwhile, “improved decision-making” (D07), “better risk reporting and 
communication” (D08), “increased management accountability” (D09), 
“greater management consensus” (D10), “better resource allocation” (D12), 
and “improved control of an enterprise over its projects” (D14) represent the 
development of organizational capability, indicating that Theory O was 
applicable to ERM implementation. This therefore implied that both two 
theories can be used to implement ERM in the Singapore-based CCFs, and 
substantiated the argument of Beer and Nohria (2000c, b) that the combination 
of Theory E and Theory O was the most successful strategy for organizational 
change.  
In addition, Mullins (2007), Robbins (2003), and Senior and Fleming (2006) 
summarized several drivers for organizational change, some of which can be 
linked to the drivers for ERM implementation with significant influence.  
For example, “reduced earnings volatility” (D04), “reduced costs and losses” 
(D05), and “increased profitability and earnings” (D06) are internal drivers 
that represent the need for higher profitability within a company. Also, the 
potential “competitive advantages” (D11) resulting from ERM implementation 
can be seen as a response to the external competition pressures that drive 
companies to conduct organizational change to obtain advantages over the 




as globalization, social and cultural factors, political and legal pressures, 
market changes, and economic factors, are actually the sources of risks. Thus, 
these driving forces can be linked to “a broader scope of risks” (D15) that 
drive ERM implementation. 
7.3.4 Hindrances to ERM implementation in CCFs based in Singapore 
As Table 7.11 indicates, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient value of data relating 
to the influence of the hindrances to ERM implementation in CCFs based in 
Singapore is 0.895, showing the high data reliability. 
7.3.4.1 Overall ranking 
The mean scores of the 36 hindrances ranged from 2.40 to 4.54. These 
hindrances were ranked based on the overall mean scores and their mean 
scores, respectively.  
Similar to the analysis of the drivers, the one-sample t-test was also performed 
to check whether the hindrances had statistically significant influence on ERM 
implementation. The analysis results indicated that 25 out of the 36 hindrances 
obtained mena scores above 3.00 and p-values below 0.05, implying that their 
mean scores were significantly higher than the test value of 3.00. Thus, these 
25 factors significantly hindered ERM implementation in CCFs based in 




Table 7.11 Overall scores and ranks of the hindrances to ERM implementation 
Code Hindrance to ERM implementation Mean Rank p-value 
H01 Low data quality 3.34 25 0.032* 
H02 Lack of data 3.49 20 0.002* 
H03 Insufficient resources (e.g. time, money, people, etc.) 4.54 1 0.000* 
H04 Lack of a formalized ERM process 3.69 16 0.000* 
H05 Lack of risk management techniques and tools 3.71 15 0.000* 
H06 Lack of internal knowledge, skills and expertise  3.89 7 0.000* 
H07 Lack of qualified personnel to implement ERM 3.97 6 0.000* 
H08 Lack of a RMIS 3.46 22 0.004* 
H09 Unsupportive organizational structure 3.77 11 0.000* 
H10 Unsupportive organizational culture 4.06 4 0.000* 
H11 Lack of a common risk language 3.40 24 0.009* 
H12 Lack of risk awareness within the organization 3.77 11 0.000* 
H13 Confidence in the existing risk management practices 3.43 23 0.017* 
H14 Existence or re-emergence of the silo mentality 2.40 36 0.007* 
H15 Lack of shared understanding and approach to risk management 
across departments 
2.97 28 0.869 
H16 Lack of understanding relating to effective ERM process 3.11 26 0.501 
H17 Perception that ERM adds to bureaucracy  2.49 35 0.004* 
H18 Perception that ERM increases costs and administration  4.09 3 0.000* 
H19 Perception that ERM interferes with business activities 2.80 31 0.242 
H20 Inadequate training on ERM 4.03 5 0.000* 
H21 Lack of an ERM business case 3.86 8 0.000* 
H22 Lack of perceived value or benefits of ERM 4.26 2 0.000* 
H23 Lack of commitment of the board and senior management 3.54 18 0.001* 
H24 Not perceived as a priority by senior management 3.74 13 0.000* 
H25 Lack of board or senior management leadership 3.83 9 0.000* 
H26 The movement of the ERM champion from senior management 
into other areas without a successor  
2.74 32 0.083 
H27 Lack of consensus on benefits of ERM among board members and 
senior management 
2.94 29 0.701 
H28 Other management priorities 3.74 13 0.000* 
H29 Lack of a clear ERM implementation plan 3.83 9 0.000* 
H30 Inability to coordinate with other departments 2.69 33 0.07 
H31 Lack of a set of metrics for measuring performance of ERM 3.63 17 0.000* 
H32 Unclear ownership and responsibility for ERM implementation 3.49 20 0.005* 
H33 Organizational turf 2.69 33 0.078 
H34 Employees’ reluctance to give up power 2.86 30 0.377 
H35 People’s reluctance to share risk information 3.09 27 0.571 
H36 Recession and business downturn 3.49 20 0.004* 
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.895  




“Insufficient resources (e.g. time, money, people, etc.)” received the highest 
overall rating among the 36 hindrances (mean = 4.54). This result indicated 
that CCFs based in Singapore did not invest sufficient time, money and 
manpower in ERM implementation. In CCFs based in Singapore, the majority 
of time, money and people were invested into project construction, and 
insufficient resources were allocated for ERM programs, signaling that these 
firms did not attach adequate importance to ERM. In addition, considering that 
the criterion of “sufficient resources” obtained a high importance score in 
Survey I, the high score of this hindrance supported the low-level ERM 
maturity in the Singapore-based CCFs. Thus, ERM maturity of these CCFs 
cannot be improved without sufficient investments of resources. Moreover, the 
high rating of this hindrance confirmed the findings of past studies in other 
industries (AON, 2010; Beasley et al., 2010c; Blades, 2010; Bowling and 
Rieger, 2005; CFO/Crowe, 2008; Gates, 2006; KPMG, 2010; Miccolis, 2003; 
Miccolis et al., 2000; Rao, 2007; RMA, 2006; Roth, 2006).  
“Lack of perceived value or benefits” was the second most significant 
hindrance, indicating that CCFs based in Singapore did not perceived adequate 
value or benefits of ERM that motivated them to implement ERM. Although 
Hallowell et al. (2013) argued that the benefits of ERM could far outweigh the 
costs related to ERM initiation, more previous studies indicated that lack of 
tangible value or benefits was a significant barrier to ERM implementation 
(AON, 2010; Beasley et al., 2010c; Blades, 2010; KPMG, 2010; Roth, 2006), 
which was in line with the high rating of this hindrance in this research. Also, 
the high rating of this hindrance partly contributed to the high rating of 
“insufficient resources”. If the executives of a firm did not perceive value or 
benefits of ERM, they would neither emphasize ERM nor invest sufficient 
resources in ERM initiation, and misunderstand that ERM implementation was 
a waste of resource and could lower the profitability. Thus, unless there was 




would not be approved by the board and senior management. 
“Perception that ERM increases costs and administration” was ranked third 
(mean = 4.09). This result suggested that the perception of the management of 
Singapore-based CCFs that ERM led to additional costs and administration 
significantly hindered the ERM implementation in these firms. Also, this result 
was consistent with the findings of the KPMG survey, which reported that this 
hindrance was among the top five reasons for not implementing ERM in the 
Singapore-based firms in various industries (KPMG, 2010). In reality, ERM 
initiation and implementation inevitably involve additional costs and 
administration, but these have been expected to be exceeded by the benefits of 
ERM (Hallowell et al., 2013). This hindrance can be seen as a biased 
perception or misunderstanding of ERM implementation, which resulted from 
the difficulty in demonstrating tangible value or benefits of ERM.  
The fourth most significant hindrance was “unsupportive organizational 
culture” (mean = 4.06), implying that the existing corporate cultures of most 
CCFs in Singapore did not support ERM implementation. More specifically, 
this result indicated that the current corporate cultures of these CCFs were not 
likely to be in accordance with the risk appetite and tolerance, and that the 
behaviors directed by the corporate culture were not conducive to ERM 
implementation. In addition, according to Low et al. (2008), the national 
working culture of Chinese firms was likely to value efficiency over 
effectiveness. Thus, top management would not attach great importance to the 
risks faced by their firms, and seem impatient and eager to win available 
projects even through an unreasonably low price (Low et al., 2008). The high 
score of this hindrance also substantiated the finding in the literature that ERM 
implementation were discouraged by the culture in firms in a wide range of 
industries (Blades, 2010; De la Rosa, 2006; Kimbrough and Componation, 
2009; Kleffner et al., 2003; Merkley, 2001; Miccolis, 2003; Miccolis et al., 




“Inadequate training on ERM” occupied the fifth position in the overall 
ranking (mean = 4.03), implying that the inadequate training to the relevant 
staff significantly hindered ERM implementation in CCFs based in Singapore. 
Without adequate training, the relevant staff would not gain a clear 
understanding of ERM philosophy and policy, the ERM process, the 
application of ERM techniques and tools, and the potential benefits, and 
risk-aware culture would not be built up across the firm, even if the executives 
had initiated an ERM program. This result was consistent with the finding of 
Gupta (2011) that inadequate training posed difficulty in implementing ERM 
in organizations in various industries. Also, as training programs on ERM 
requires sufficient investments of time, money, and human resources, this 
result confirmed the significance of “insufficient resources (e.g. time, money, 
people, etc.)” in hindering ERM implementation. 
“Lack of qualified personnel to implement ERM” was ranked sixth among the 
36 hindrances (mean = 3.97). This result suggested that the Singapore-based 
CCFs did not have sufficient qualified personnel, which significantly hindered 
ERM implementation in these firms. Also, this result was consistent with the 
finding of Kleffner et al. (2003) that insufficient qualified personnel was an 
important deterrent to ERM implementation in the insurers. The staff qualified 
to implement ERM possess the knowledge, skills and experts relating to ERM, 
and can therefore be actively involved in ERM implementation. Without these 
qualified staff, the CCFs would face the difficulty in carrying out ERM. Under 
this circumstance, the CCFs would employ external consultants to provide 
training programs for the relevant staff, or to help initiate ERM.  
“Lack of internal knowledge, skills and expertise” received the seventh 
highest rating (mean = 3.89), implying that CCFs based in Singapore lacked 
internal knowledge, skills and expertise relating to ERM, which significantly 
hindered ERM implementation in these firms. Thus, this result was consistent 




implementation in various industries (AON, 2010; CFO/Crowe, 2008; KPMG, 
2010; Miccolis, 2003; Miccolis et al., 2000; Rao, 2007; Tang et al., 2007), and 
those reporting the low-level knowledge of risk management in CCFs in both 
domestic and international markets (Liu et al., 2007; Low et al., 2008). 
Because ERM was advocated in Chinese firms after the SASAC issued the 
Guidance in 2006 and the overseas subsidiaries of the leading CCFs initiated 
ERM after 2009 (Zhao et al., 2012), the Singapore-based CCFs were not likely 
to possess adequate internal knowledge, skills and expertise relevant to ERM 
and most of them obtained these resources from their parent companies. 
Moreover, the lack of qualified staff to implement ERM interacted with this 
hindrance because insufficient qualified human resources led to difficulty in 
generating the relevant knowledge, skills and expertise from inside these 
CCFs.  
“Lack of an ERM business case” was ranked eighth among the 36 hindrances, 
indicating that the inadequate ERM business cases negatively influenced ERM 
implementation in CCFs based in Singapore, which supported the argument of 
Aabo et al. (2005). Although there has been no one-size-fits-all approach to 
ERM, companies can benefit from adopting the best practices in successful 
ERM programs. The business cases that describe successful ERM 
implementation can also be used in the training programs on ERM, thus 
making it easier for the relevant management staff to understand the ERM 
fundamentals and perceive the potential value and benefits. Despite the case 
studies that present successful ERM implementation in the energy (Aabo et al., 
2005), manufacturing (Vedpuriswar, 2010), healthcare (Stroh, 2005) and 
insurance (Acharyya and Johnson, 2006) industries, there have been few cases 
describing successful ERM practices in the construction industry. Thus, CCFs 
lacked ERM business cases, which also undermined the effectiveness of the 
training on ERM.  




position (mean = 3.83), indicating that the absence of the senior-level 
leadership significantly hindered ERM implementation in CCFs based in 
Singapore. ERM has been seen as a top-down approach (Dickinson, 2001; 
Olson and Wu, 2008) and involves strategic planning and decision-making 
(AON, 2010). Thus, the visible leadership from the board and senior 
executives has been recognized as a critical component to an effective ERM 
program (Acharyya, 2008; Beasley et al., 2005) while the lack of such 
leadership would contribute to ERM failure (AON, 2010; Beasley et al., 
2010c). The leadership should be visible, signaling the support from the top 
management to ERM implementation. The high rating of this hindrance might 
be attributed to the invisibility of the senior-level leadership on ERM 
implementation because several respondents indicated that the leadership from 
the top management was not visible to the staff at the department or project 
level. 
Also, “lack of a clear ERM implementation plan” was ranked ninth, with the 
same mean score as “lack of the board or senior management leadership” 
(mean = 3.83). This result revealed that the Singapore-based CCFs lacked a 
clear plan to implement ERM, which significantly hindered ERM 
implementation. As an effective ERM program requires several years to 
develop (Hallowell et al., 2013), an organization needs to develop a clear plan, 
which should be tailored to its objectives and real-world circumstances, to 
guide the ERM implementation. The directors and senior executives should be 
involved in the ERM plan development because ERM has been recognized as 
a top-down approach to risk management (Dickinson, 2001; Olson and Wu, 
2008). In the CCFs, the lack of a clear ERM implementation plan tended to 
pose difficulty in resource allocations for ERM implementation, and made the 
management staff unable to be clear about the tasks and objectives relating to 
ERM implementation in different periods. 




bottom (mean = 2.40), which was different from the findings of Kleffner et al. 
(2003) that the existence, and in some cases the re-emergence, of the silo 
mentality was the main obstacle to ERM implementation of Canadian firms in 
various industries other than the construction industry. “Perception that ERM 
adds to bureaucracy” was ranked 35th, indicating that such passive perception 
did not influence ERM implementation in Singapore-based CCFs. This result 
significantly differed from the finding of Beasley et al. (2010b) that the 
concerns that ERM would add unnecessary bureaucracy could restrict the 
progress of ERM. 
7.3.4.2 Low- vs. medium-maturity CCFs 
Similar to the drivers, the influence of the hindrances was likely to differ 
between the low- and medium-maturity CCFs. Thus, this section investigates 
the differences in the scores and ranks of the hindrances to ERM 
implementation between the two CCF groups.  
In the low-maturity CCFs, the mean scores ranged from 2.52 to 4.60, while in 
the other group, they ranged from 2.40 to 4.40. To test the differences in the 
mean scores between the two CCF groups, the independent-sample t-test was 
performed. The p-values below 0.05 represented the significant differences in 
the mean scores. The analysis results showed that the mean scores of four 
hindrances significantly differed between the two groups at the 0.05 level (see 
Table 7.12).  
The mean score of “lack of risk management techniques and tools” in the 
low-maturity CCFs (mean = 3.88) was significantly higher than that in the 
medium-maturity firms (mean = 3.30). This result suggested that this 
hindrance exerted more negative influence on the ERM implementation in the 
low-maturity CCFs, and that the medium-maturity CCFs tended to have 




most practitioners in the construction industry relied on professional judgment, 
intuition and experience to manage risk (Akintoye and MacLeod, 1997; Wood 
and Ellis, 2003). The low-maturity CCFs might depend more on subjective 
judgment and experience than formal risk management techniques and tools. 
However, depending only on subjective judgment and experience may not be 
enough (Kartam and Kartam, 2001; Shen, 1997), and risk management 
techniques and tools should also be applied to deal with risk. It could be 
inferred that the application of risk management techniques and tools in the 





Table 7.12 Scores and ranks of the hindrances: Low- vs. medium-maturity CCFs 






Mean Rank   Mean Rank 
H01 Low data quality 3.44 24  3.10 24 0.323 
H02 Lack of data 3.44 24  3.60 10 0.623 
H03 Insufficient resources (e.g. time, money, people, etc.) 4.60 1  4.40 1 0.390 
H04 Lack of a formalized ERM process 3.84 14  3.30 18 0.123 
H05 Lack of risk management techniques and tools 3.88 12  3.30 18 0.048* 
H06 Lack of internal knowledge, skills and expertise  4.00 9  3.60 10 0.162 
H07 Lack of qualified personnel to implement ERM 4.04 7  3.80 5 0.443 
H08 Lack of a RMIS 3.40 25  3.60 10 0.554 
H09 Unsupportive organizational structure 3.84 14  3.60 10 0.413 
H10 Unsupportive organizational culture 4.16 4  3.80 5 0.213 
H11 Lack of a common risk language 3.56 20  3.00 27 0.077 
H12 Lack of risk awareness within the organization 3.76 17  3.80 5 0.909 
H13 Confidence in the existing risk management practices 3.48 22  3.30 18 0.640 
H14 Existence or re-emergence of the silo mentality 2.24 36  2.80 32 0.233 
H15 Lack of shared understanding and approach to risk 
management across departments 
3.00 29  2.90 29 0.760 
H16 Lack of understanding relating to effective ERM process 3.16 27  3.00 27 0.562 
H17 Perception that ERM adds to bureaucracy  2.52 35  2.40 36 0.749 
H18 Perception that ERM increases costs and administration  4.12 5  4.00 3 0.713 
H19 Perception that ERM interferes with business activities 2.80 31  2.80 32 1.000 
H20 Inadequate training on ERM 4.16 4  3.70 7 0.137 
H21 Lack of an ERM business case 4.08 6  3.30 18 0.005* 
H22 Lack of perceived value or benefits of ERM 4.32 2  4.10 2 0.409 
H23 Lack of commitment of the board and senior management 3.68 18  3.20 22 0.166 
H24 Not perceived as a priority by senior management 3.92 11  3.30 18 0.060 
H25 Lack of board or senior management leadership 4.00 9  3.40 14 0.104 
H26 The movement of the ERM champion from senior 
management into other areas without a successor  
2.76 32  2.70 34 0.854 
H27 Lack of consensus on benefits of ERM among board 
members and senior management 
3.00 29  2.80 32 0.548 
H28 Other management priorities 3.84 14  3.50 12 0.139 
H29 Lack of a clear ERM implementation plan 4.00 9  3.40 14 0.021* 
H30 Inability to coordinate with other departments 2.52 35  3.10 24 0.048* 
H31 Lack of a set of metrics for measuring performance of ERM 3.80 16  3.20 22 0.067 
H32 Unclear ownership and responsibility for ERM 
implementation 
3.64 19  3.10 24 0.058 
H33 Organizational turf 2.60 33  2.90 29 0.441 
H34 Employees’ reluctance to give up power 2.96 30  2.60 35 0.315 
H35 People’s reluctance to share risk information 3.20 26  2.80 32 0.233 
H36 Recession and business downturn 3.52 21   3.40 14 0.733 
* The independent-sample t-test result is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 




In addition, “lack of an ERM business case” received a significantly higher 
mean score in the low-maturity CCFs (mean = 4.08) than in the 
medium-maturity firms (mean = 3.30). This result indicated that the negative 
influence of this hindrance on the ERM implementation was more significant 
in the low-maturity CCFs, and that the medium-maturity CCFs were likely to 
have ERM cases in place. The medium-maturity CCFs had initiated formal 
ERM programs and were more likely to adopt business cases in their training 
programs on ERM. Also, the experience of implementing ERM in these CCFs 
could serve as business cases for themselves. It was more necessary for the 
low-maturity CCFs to collect ERM business cases and use them to convince 
the relevant staff that successful ERM implementation can bring about 
benefits and to provide a clear understanding of the ERM fundamentals. Thus, 
it could be inferred that adopting sufficient and effective ERM business cases 
in the training programs would help the CCFs improve their ERM maturity to 
a higher level. 
“Lack of a clear ERM implementation plan” obtained the mean scores of 4.00 
and 3.40 from the low- and medium-maturity CCFs, respectively. The 
difference between the two scores was significant, implying that this 
hindrance had more negative influence on the ERM implementation in the 
low-maturity CCFs. As the medium-maturity CCFs had initiated formal ERM 
programs, they were more likely to have ERM implementation plans and 
understand how to implement ERM step by step. By contrast, the low-maturity 
firms might not have such plans and tended to be unclear about the specific 
tasks for practicing ERM. Thus, the low-maturity CCFs should develop plans 
for the multi-year ERM journey, which can provide them with a clear 
understanding of the tasks and objectives relating to ERM, helping them climb 
to a higher level of ERM maturity.    
Furthermore, the mean score of “inability to coordinate with other departments” 




in the low-maturity ones (mean = 2.52), indicating that this hindrance was 
more influential in the medium-maturity CCFs than in the low-maturity firms. 
Specifically, this hindrance was ranked bottom in the low-maturity CCFs, 
implying that these firms had effective cross-department coordination. In 
comparison, the medium-maturity CCFs, most of which were large-sized firms, 
tended to face more problems relating to the coordination between 
departments than the other firms because they usually had more complex 
organizational structures.   
Despite significant differences in the mean scores of the four hindrances, the 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient of 0.830 with a p-value of 0.000 
indicated strong and statistical significant agreement on the rankings of all the 
hindrances between the two CCF groups. Despite differences in the ranks of 
some hindrances, the two groups shared seven common hindrances among 
their respective top 10 rankings. 
7.3.4.3 Interpretation from the perspective of organizational behavior  
This section intends to interpret the findings relating to hindrances to ERM 
implementation in the Singapore-based CCFs using the five theories of 
organizational behavior, i.e. organizational change, organizational learning, 
organizational culture, motivation, as well as leadership theories. Specifically, 
the significant hindrances can be linked to the sources of resistances to 
organizational change, the impediments to organizational learning, the 
three-level organizational culture model, the hygiene factors and the 
expectancy theory of motivation, as well as the potential errors of leaders. 
(1) Analysis from the perspective of organizational change 
Chapter 4 has identified 21 sources of resistance to organizational change, and 
some of them are associated with the 25 significant hindrances to ERM 




H31) can represent “insufficient resources” (C07) in the sources of resistance 
to organizational change. As an organizational change, ERM implementation 
needs a variety of resources, including not only the money, time and people, 
but also the high quality historical data, the internal knowledge, skills and 
expertise, the techniques, tools and information systems for risk management, 
the metrics to measure ERM performance, and business cases for training 
programs. Once an ERM program is initiated, sufficient resources should be 
allocated and the resource allocation should be considered in the ERM 
implementation plan approved by the board and senior management. Some 
resource investments would be prioritized to initiate ERM, thus signaling that 
the ERM program is really supported by the executives. Without necessary 
resources, the staff tend to feel frustrated while participating in the change and 
thus resist it (Hayes, 2007). It should be noted that the resource investments 
need the approval from the senior level, and thus these hindrances relating to 
resources can be associated with “lack of commitment of the board and senior 
management” (C10) in the sources of resistance. In turn, the significant 
hindrances relating to the top management (H23-H25) can be linked to 
“insufficient resources” (C07) in the sources of resistance.  
Two hindrances (H28 and H36) could also be indirectly linked to “insufficient 
resources” (C07). When adopting change, organizations would also need to 
sustain their operation and business processes. Thus, other prioritized issues 
would occupy the resources for the change program, probably resulting in the 
resource scarcity of the change program. In addition, subject to the decisions 
of the executives, “recession and business downturn” (H36) would incur the 
reduction in the expenditures for the change programs and the use of 
downsizing or layoff strategies that would led to loss of knowledge, skills, and 
expertise because of the departure of qualified and experienced personnel 
(Fisher and White, 2000; Pfeffer, 1998). Thus, this hindrance would contribute 




The board and senior management should support the organizational change 
program in a visible and continuous manner while the lack of the senior-level 
commitment tends to result in the skepticism and cynicism on the change 
program (Hayes, 2007). ERM implementation also needs the visible 
leadership and support from the board and senior management (Gates, 2006; 
Kleffner et al., 2003; Narvaez, 2011). Most of the significant hindrances can 
be lined to “lack of commitment of the board and senior management” (C10) 
in the sources of resistance to change. This is because without such 
commitment, sufficient resources would not be invested; ERM ownership and 
accountability would not be set up; and internal communication and training 
mechanisms would not be initiated. Consequently, the ERM program cannot 
obtain the commitment and support from the relevant staff and tends to fail. It 
is worth reiteration that the senior-level commitment should be true, visible 
and continuous, which means that the board and senior management should 
assign a higher priority to ERM implementation, despite other competing 
management priorities. 
In addition, to implement an organizational change, the change agent should 
ensure that the relevant staff can adapt to the change and participate in the 
change program. Three hindrances (H06, H07 and H30) can represent the 
“lack of individual capability to change” (C05) in the resistance sources. The 
staff would unconsciously think about whether they are qualified in the ERM 
implementation in terms of their knowledge, skills, expertise and capabilities. 
If they feel that are not likely to be competent in ERM implementation, they 
would not actively participate in ERM implementation, or even undermine it.  
Moreover, organizational culture also plays a critical role in organizational 
change because of its pervasive nature (Austin and Ciaassen, 2008). The 
hindrance “unsupportive organizational culture” (H10) could result from the 




resistance sources, as well as the specific cultural components of organizations 
that do not support ERM implementation (C19). One example of such 
components is the risk attitude that is not in accordance with the risk appetite 
and tolerance as well as the real-world circumstances faced by a firm. In 
addition, people tend to respond to change in their accustomed ways when 
confronted with change, and harbor a biased view of change that fits most 
comfortably into a person’s own perception of the reality (Robbins, 2003). 
Such behaviors and mindsets toward change could be influenced by the 
organizational culture or group norms. Thus, the hindrance “confidence in the 
existing risk management practices” (H13) can be associated with “habits” 
(C01), “organizational culture” (C19), “group inertia” (C20) and “selective 
information processing” (C15) in the sources of resistance. Based on the long 
established habits in dealing with risks, the staff would be still stuck to PRM 
at the initiative phase of ERM implementation. According to Hallowell et al. 
(2013), one challenge of ERM implementation was changing the thinking of 
all employees within an enterprise from considering only their function’s 
objectives to considering how decisions can affect the entire enterprise. Thus, 
some actions should be taken to change the passive mindsets and behaviors 
toward ERM. 
Furthermore, the change agent should allow the staff to understand the vision, 
the need, and the impacts of the change and try to remove their 
misunderstandings of the change program through adequate and effective 
internal communication (Hayes, 2007; Mullins, 2007; Robbins, 2003). Five 
hindrances (H11, H18, and H20-H22) can be linked to “misunderstanding” 
(C06) and “poor internal communication” (C09) in the sources of resistance. 
Training programs on ERM can be a communication channel, through which 
the staff can understand the ERM philosophy, policy, and process, as well as 
the application of ERM techniques and tools. Adoption of successful ERM 




can exceed the additional costs and administration. To enable the staff to better 
understand the terminologies used in the training, a glossary of risk terms need 
to be created and distributed throughout the firm, which facilitates the 
employment of a common risk language. Without such a language, the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the communication in the training programs 
and ERM implementation would not be assured because time could be wasted 
in resolving the issues caused by the confusion about the terminologies 
(Espersen, 2007). In addition, it should be noted that the effectiveness of 
training programs and communication depends on the relationship between the 
management and employees (Furst and Cable, 2008), which is characterized 
by mutual trust and credibility (Kotter and Schlesinger, 1979; Robbins, 2003). 
Thus, three out of the above five hindrances (H18, H20 and H22) relating to 
training and communication can be associated with “lack of trust in 
management” (C11) and “low-level employee-manager relation” (C13) in the 
sources of resistance. This implied that the ERM owner should ensure that 
they can obtain the trust from the relevant staff and sustain a good relation 
with them, to assure the effectiveness of training on ERM. Without effective 
and adequate training on ERM, the staff would hold a biased view of ERM 
from the angle that fits most comfortably into their perception, resulting from 
the “selective information processing” (C15). 
(2) Analysis from the perspective of organizational learning 
Organizational change and learning are closely associated with each other 
(Lähteenmäki et al., 2001) and organizational learning was recognized as a 
critical component of holistic risk management (Smallman, 1996). Thus, 
organizational learning is necessary for ERM implementation, and the factors 
that impede organizational learning would also negatively influence ERM 
implementation. Chapter 4 has identified 12 impediments to organizational 




to ERM implementation. 
Without the senior-level commitment and support, the learning culture would 
not be created; resources would not be invested into the learning and training 
programs; the staff would not perceive the learning as being emphasized; and 
finally, organizational learning mechanisms would not be set up and 
institutionalized. Thus, the significant hindrances relating to the top 
management (H23-H25), the organizational culture and structure (H09 and 
H10), the resource investments (H01-H08, H21 and H31), as well as the 
training and understanding of ERM (H11, H18, and H20-H22) can be linked 
to “lack of leadership commitment and support” (L01) in the impediments to 
organizational learning.  
According to the literature, organizational learning is associated with 
knowledge acquisition (Huber, 1991; Shrivastava, 1983; Tsang, 1997), 
participation in the learning process (i.e. situated learning) (Brown and Duguid, 
1991), and knowledge creation (Bereiter, 2002; Engeström, 1999; Nonaka, 
1991). In the CCFs, ERM implementation involves knowledge acquisition 
from inside and outside the firm, the participation of the relevant staff in the 
training programs and risk communication, as well as the creation of 
knowledge from the ERM practices. Six factors (H01, H02, and H04-H07) 
significantly hindered ERM implementaiton because they contributed to the 
“lack of internal knowledge” (L02) relating to ERM. Specifically, as the data 
are the predecessor of information and knowledge, the lack of high-quality 
data can result in the lack of internal knowledge. Also, the lack of a formalized 
ERM process, relevant techniques and tools represents a low level of 
knowledge relating to ERM. In addition, the staff qualified to implement ERM 
are likely to have the relevant knowledge, skills and expertise, and the lack of 
such staff can therefore led to the lack of internal knowledge.  




knowledge. A RMIS can serve as a platform where the relevant staff can 
communicate the risk information as well as the lessons learned in ERM 
implementation, while training programs allow external and internal trainers to 
share their experience and knowledge relating to ERM with others. Thus, 
“lack of a RMIS” (H08) and “inadequate training on ERM” (H20) hindered 
ERM implementation because they represented the lack of channels for 
sharing knowledge. As setting up such channels needs resource investments 
and senior-level support, the negative influence of the four hindrances (H03 
and H23-H25) can also be interpreted using this impediment to organizational 
learning. 
Even though there are channels for dialogue and sharing knowledge, the 
effectiveness of knowledge acquisition depends on the individuals’ ability to 
absorb and retain the knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Szulanski, 
1996). The personnel unqualified to implement ERM may also lack the 
capacity for absorbing and retaining the knowledge relating to ERM, thus 
contributing to the lack of internal knowledge, skills and expertise. Therefore, 
the two hindrances (H06 and H07) can be linked to “lack of knowledge 
absorptive or retentive capacity” (L08) in the impediments to organizational 
learning. In addition, downsizing or layoff strategies are often used when a 
firm faces a recession or business downturn. These strategies involve the 
departure or turnover of the staff, who may be experienced and knowledgeable, 
and would lead to the loss of the experience and knowledge (Fisher and White, 
2000; Pfeffer, 1998). Thus, the two hindrances (H06 and H07) can also be 
linked to “downsizing or layoff strategies” (L11) in the impediments to 
learning. 
In some cases, the staff would fear that their self-interest would be threatened 
due to organizational learning, thus leading to the lack of psychological safety. 




representative of “lack of psychological safety” (L04) because some staff may 
believe that the additional costs and administration threaten the firm 
performance, which is associated with the bonus or interest of them. Such a 
misunderstanding derives from the “lack of perceived value or benefits of 
ERM” (H22). Thus, the two significant hindrances (H18 and H22) can be 
linked to “lack of psychological safety” (L04).   
Motivation measures are necessary for organizational learning (Szulanski, 
1996). As the relevant employees need to spend time, energy and knowledge 
in ERM implementation, they should be convinced that these resources can 
pay off. Thus, the metrics to measure ERM performance should be developed 
and used. The tangible increase in firm performance can motivate the relevant 
staff to actively participate in the ERM implementation. In turn, the lack of 
such metrics and perceived benefits of ERM would discourage the staff from 
contributing to the learning process relating to ERM, thus hindering ERM 
implementation.    
Organizational learning can be impeded by the unsupportive organizational 
culture, such as the blame culture (Hayes, 2007) and defensive routines 
(Argyris, 1995). Three significant hindrances (H10, H12 and H13) can be 
linked to “unsupportive organizational culture” (L12) in the impediments to 
organizational learning. As ERM implementation includes learning from the 
past mistakes, errors, failures and disasters, the unsupportive culture would 
render these negative issues as taboos and discourage the staff from 
investigating the root causes of them. Consequently, the employees would 
remain confident in the existing risk management practices and not believe 
that it is necessary to implement ERM, which is likely to lead to the 
underlying assumption that the risks can be dealt with by the current risk 
management practices. Thus, the staff would not attach adequate importance 




(3) Analysis from the perspective of organizational culture 
ERM implementation is immersed in the organizational culture and 
organizational culture has been invoked in existing ERM frameworks (CAS, 
2003; COSO, 2004; ISO, 2009b). A strong but unsupportive organizational 
culture tends to hinder ERM implementation through stabilizing the behavior 
and attitudes of staff towards the existing risk management practices, creating 
inappropriate risk awareness, or stifling the ability to adapt to the change in 
the risk management approach.  
Four significant hindrances (H09, H10, H12 and H13) can be linked to the 
three-level culture model. Specifically, the organizational structure is at the 
visible artifact level of the three-level organizational culture model because 
the structure carries implications for the organizational culture (Graetz et al., 
2006). “Unsupportive organizational structure” (H10) would increase the 
difficulty of change occurrence (Senior and Fleming, 2006). In addition, to 
implement ERM smoothly, a risk-aware culture should be created and 
embedded in the organizational culture (Barton et al., 2002). Risk awareness 
represents the attitudes and mindsets of the staff towards risk, promotes 
employee vigilance, and makes risk events more likely to be detected early. 
Thus, “lack of risk awareness within the organization” (H12) is at the level of 
espoused values. Moreover, in a mature ERM program, the risk awareness 
should be deeply embedded in the corporate culture, and comprise the 
underlying and basic assumptions. Thus, this hindrance can be linked to the 
deepest level. Furthermore, a strong organizational culture would strengthen 
the confidence in the existing risk management practices, thus increasing the 
difficulty of the staff in embracing ERM practices. Such confidence indicates 
the positive attitudes towards the existing risk management practices and the 
underlying assumption that the existing practices are taken-for-granted and 




practices” (H13) can be associated with the levels of espoused values and 
basic assumptions of organizational culture. 
(4) Analysis from the perspective of motivation 
The employees usually need motivation to embrace organizational change, and 
in turn, the motivation theory, can be used to interpret sources of resistance to 
change. ERM implementation, as a change in the paradigm of risk 
management, requires the employment of motivation measures, and the 
hindrances may be related to motivation. 
Content theories of motivation emphasize the nature of needs and what 
motivates. ERM implementation can raise fear or anxiety within the firm. For 
instance, employees would the fear that the ERM program increases costs and 
administration, which may add to their work and threaten their self-interests. 
This perception represents the lack of psychological safety, which is a hygiene 
factor in the two-factor theory of Herzberg (1966). Thus, “perception that 
ERM increases costs and administration” (H18) tends to result in job 
dissatisfaction that hinders ERM implementation.  
The expectancy theory of motivation (Vroom, 1964) regards motivation as a 
function of expectancy, instrumentality and valence. Expectancy represents the 
perceived probability that the effort of an employee will lead to a desired level 
of performance. Most of the significant hindrances to ERM implementation 
can be linked to the expectancy variable. For example, the hindrances relating 
to resources (H01-H08, H21 and H31) tend to lower the expectancy variable 
in employees. This is because employees would not perceive that their efforts 
for ERM implementation are likely to result in the desired performance, 
without the sufficient investments of time, money, people, and necessary 
intellectual resources. “Other competing priorities” (H28) and “recession and 




the ERM program, thus lowering the expectancy variable.  
In addition, the misunderstandings relating ERM, such as the hindrances H18 
and H22, could impress the related staff that they would have additional work, 
and make them confused about the impact of ERM on firm performance. Thus, 
there is the possibility that the staff underestimated the expectancy variable. 
The negative influence of these misunderstandings could have been relieved 
by training on ERM. However, without adequate training, the 
misunderstandings would remain and the staff cannot obtain the knowledge 
and experience related to ERM practices, which contributes to a lower level of 
expectancy.  
Moreover, the lack of the senior-level commitment and leadership could 
render the employees the perception that their efforts relating to ERM 
implementation are not emphasized by the top management, which is likely to 
lower the probability that their efforts contribute to the desired performance. 
Thus, the significant hindrances relating to the senior-level commitment and 
leadership (H23-H25) can be linked to the variables of expectancy. 
Furthermore, instrumentality is the perceived probability that the performance 
will lead to the achievement of a desired outcome. The significant hindrances 
relating to the senior-level commitment and leadership (H23-H25) imply that 
the senior management would not confirm performance contingent rewards, 
and can thus be linked to the instrumentality variable. Another scenario is that 
there is an ERM performance contingent rewarding system, but the staff may 
not understand this system and underestimate the instrumentality variable. 
Thus, the training programs, which provide the staff with a clear 
understanding of ERM fundamentals, should also help them gain a clear 
understanding of the rewarding system. Conversely, inadequate training on 
ERM would not enable the staff to clearly understand the system even though 




probability that performance leads to the desired outcome.  
(5) Analysis from the perspective of leadership 
The role of the leadership in ERM implementation has been emphasized in 
previous studies (Acharyya, 2008; Beasley et al., 2005; Gates, 2006; Kleffner 
et al., 2003; Narvaez, 2011) because ERM requires a top-down view of the 
risks that a firm faces. Thus, the lack of the visible commitment and leadership 
at the senior level was identified as the significant hindrance to ERM 
implementation. Also, the errors made by leaders would hinder ERM 
implementation, and some of the significant hindrances can be linked to these 
errors identified in the literature relating to leadership (Kotter, 1995, 1996). 
These errors are: not establishing a great enough sense of urgency, not creating 
a sufficiently powerful guiding coalition, lacking a vision, 
under-communicating the vision, permitting obstacles to the new vision, not 
systematically planning for and creating short-term wins, declaring victory too 
soon, and not anchoring changes in the corporate culture.   
The lack of a clear understanding of ERM, such as the “perception that ERM 
increases costs and administration”, indicates an unclear vision of ERM 
implementation provided by the leaders or the under-communication of the 
vision. Thus, the leaders should launch effective training programs to present a 
clear vision of ERM and deal with the concerns of employees when the ERM 
program is initiated. To obtain the organizational commitment, the vision 
would be focused on how the employees benefit from the ERM programs. In 
addition, the leaders should attach importance to the communication skills 
used in the training programs to avoid the under-communication. According to 
the trait theory of leadership, the good communication skill is an inborn trait 
of a good leaders  (Graetz et al., 2006; Kirkpatrick and Locke, 1991). In 
terms of the behavioral theories of leadership (Blake and Mouton, 1966; Likert, 




person-oriented behaviors were found to be more appropriate for 
communication activities (Battilana et al., 2010).  
The existing organizational culture and structure may be unsupportive of ERM 
implementation, thus hindering the achievement of the vision. If the leaders do 
not intend to change the unsupportive culture and structure, these obstacles 
tend to continue undermining the ERM program. Thus, to make the relevant 
staff embrace ERM, the leaders should set to clear up all the obstacles, even 
though it would be time-consuming. 
In addition, as ERM implementation is a long-term journey spanning many 
years (Bowling and Rieger, 2005), the leaders of the ERM program should 
provide short-term wins to convince the senior management and the staff that 
the ERM implementation is beneficial, thus obtaining the continuous support 
and commitment from them. This tactic has been used in the case study 
conducted by Aabo et al. (2005). Such short-term achievement should be 
perceivable benefits. To clearly demonstrate the short-term wins of ERM 
implementation, a set of metrics to measure ERM performance should be 
developed and the successful business ERM cases could be used, although it is 
difficult to demonstrate these benefits (KPMG, 2010). The significant 
hindrances relating to the lack of short-term wins or failure to demonstrate 
these benefits (H21, H22 and H31) would discourage the senior management 
and the relevant staff. Thus, the leaders of the ERM program would adopt the 
task-oriented behavior to focus on the achievement and demonstration of 
short-term wins.  
Furthermore, once the pressure for change disappears, change is subject to 
degradation, unless new behaviors are rooted in social norms and shared 
values (Kotter, 1996). To sustain the ERM implementation in a company, the 
leaders need to integrate ERM into the business process. This involves 




culture. The risk-aware culture indicates the risk awareness across the 
company and the subsequent behaviors. Thus, even though the ERM 
champion from the senior executive moves or retires, ERM practices will be 
sustained in the firm. The lack of risk awareness indicates the lack of the 
risk-aware culture and can therefore be linked to the error of not anchoring 
changes in the corporate culture. 
7.4 Summary 
A total of 16 ERM maturity criteria and 66 ERM best practices were validated 
by Survey I and included in the proposed ERM maturity model. Using the data 
collected from Survey II, this model was employed to assess the ERM 
maturity in Singapore-based CCFs, and the results reported a low-level overall 
ERM maturity of these CCFs as well as the positive association between ERM 
maturity and firm size. In addition, 13 drivers for and 25 hindrances to ERM 
implementation were found to be significantly influential. Although a couple 
of drivers and hindrances had significantly different influence on ERM 
implementation between the low- and medium-maturity CCFs, there was 
agreement on the rankings of the drivers and hindrances between the two CCF 
groups, respectively. Furthermore, the drivers were interpreted using the 
theories of organizational change while the hindrances were explained in 
tandem with the theories of organizational change, organizational learning, 
organizational culture, motivation, as well as leadership. Thus, the second, 




8 Case Studies 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents case studies of the ERM implementation in three CCFs 
based in Singapore. They were large-, medium-, and small-sized firms, 
respectively, and participated in the Survey II. Table 8.1 shows the profile of 
the six interviewees who provided information for the three case studies. In 
addition to the interviews, their past documents, including the internal 
documents about ERM and the reports in the mass media, were also reviewed.  
Table 8.1 Profile of interviewees for case studies  
No. Title Experience Firm BCA grade Firm size 
1 Deputy director 16 years Firm A CW01 A1 
CW02 B1 
Large 
2 Project manager 12 years  
3 Cost manager 5 years  
4 Project manager 14 years Firm B CW01 B1  
CW02 B1 
Medium 
5 Project manager 9 years  
6 Director 31 years Firm C CW01 C3 Small 
Also, this chapter presents the cross-case comparisons, which substantiated the 
association between ERM implementation and firm size as well as the key role 
of the parent companies in the ERM implementation of the overseas 
subsidiaries. 
8.2 Case study I: A large-sized CCF in Singapore 
8.2.1 Background 
Firm A was a Singapore-based subsidiary of Firm PA, which was a 
state-owned central enterprise and has been a listed corporation in the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange since 2009. By the end of 2010, Firm PA had 




Since the foundation in 1992, Firm A has completed approximately 150 
projects in Singapore. Firm A has been registered under CW01 (general 
building) with a financial grade of A1, and under CW02 (civil engineering) 
with a financial grade of B1 with the BCA. Hence, Firm A enjoyed unlimited 
tendering capacity in all types of building projects, and had a tendering limit 
of S$40 million in civil engineering projects. In addition, Firm A attained a 
turnover of S$561 million in 2008, S$569 million in 2009 and S$677 million 
in 2010. Its net profits had doubled from S$10 million in 2008 to S$20 million 
in 2010. At the time of this study, Firm A had over 700 staff, over 4,500 
skilled workers, and four subsidiaries. 
The board of Firm A consisted of six members, including the managing 
director (MD), who actually took charge of the business and operations of 
Firm A. The directors were also the senior executives. The chairman of Firm 
A was also the vice president of Firm PA, and the general manager of the 
Overseas Business Department in the headquarters of Firm PA, which 
indicated that he took charge of the entire overseas business of Firm PA.   
A deputy director, a project manager and a cost manager were interviewed to 
collect information. The deputy director can attend the board meeting and 
monthly operating meetings presided over by the MD, while the project 
manager and cost manager would be involved in PRM. Thus, the three 
interviewees were involved in risk management practices at project and firm 
levels, and competent to provide adequate and reliable information about 
ERM implementation in Firm A. In addition, information about the ERM 
practices in Firm A and Firm PA was collected from past documents, 
including internal documents about ERM and reports in the mass media. The 
internal documents, including operational and management manuals, were not 
marked confidential and were obtained through networking, while the reports 




8.2.2 Factors affecting ERM implementation 
ERM implementation in Firm A was closely related to directions from its 
parent company. As a listed company and a state-owned central enterprise, 
Firm PA had to comply with the internal control rules in the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange as well as the Guidance to ERM for Central Enterprises 
promulgated by the SASAC in 2006. The SASAC is responsible for the 
supervision and administration of the existing state-owned central enterprises. 
The SASAC has already taken ERM implementation into the performance 
evaluation system of central enterprises. The recent huge losses in Saudi 
Arabia and Poland of central enterprises (China, 2011; Cienski, 2011) 
compelled the SASAC to intensively supervise central enterprises’ 
investments outside of China and to push for ERM implementation in these 
enterprises. To comply with the requirements from the SASAC, Firm PA took 
the following steps: 
(1) In August 2007, Firm PA issued the ERM Implementation Plan (Trial); 
(2) In March 2008, Firm PA established an ERM leadership group, whose 
leader was the chairman of Firm PA, and the deputy leader was the vice 
president and the CFO;  
(3) In December 2008, Firm PA issued the Firm PA Guidance to ERM 
Implementation, which referred to the Guidance issued by the SASAC and 
replaced the ERM Implementation Plan (Trial);  
(4) In 2009, Firm PA issued the Guidance to ERM Implementation in 
Subordinate Enterprises of Firm PA; and 
(5) In 2009, ERM implementation was included in the Firm PA Internal 
Control Manual, and its annual Sustainability Report. 
These steps also drove the ERM implementation in Firm A, because the Firm 




ERM and report implementation status to the headquarters of Firm PA at the 
end of each year. Based on the ERM implementation in its subsidiaries, Firm 
PA developed a comprehensive annual report and submitted it to the SASAC. 
Hence, the ERM implementation in Firm A was directly driven by the 
compliance requirements from Firm PA, and indirectly driven by the 
requirements from the SASAC. The ERMMI of Firm A was 0.407, as found in 
Survey II, indicating its ERM maturity was at the medium level.  
Increasing and more complicated risks that Firm A faced was another factor 
that drove its ERM implementation. The recent European sovereign debt crisis 
and the uncertain political situation in the Middle East and North Africa would 
increase the volatility of prices of raw materials, and bring about some 
uncertainties to the international construction market. The risks whose origins 
were perceptibly far away from Singapore might also threaten the profitability 
and even the survival of the firms in Singapore. Although Singapore has a 
stable political situation, the firms should still emphasize risk management 
with the management having a strong risk-aware culture. Thus, Firm A 
implemented ERM to proactively control the risks within its risk appetite.  
The compliance requirements from Firm PA and a broader scope of risks 
caused the board and senior management to encourage ERM implementation 
in Firm A. The chairman of Firm A was a member of the ERM leadership 
group in Firm PA, and thus had commitment to ERM implementation. The 
other members of the board and senior management in Firm A were 
influenced by the chairman and were therefore committed to ERM 
implementation. The request and encouragement from the board and senior 
management drove the ERM implementation and ensured that risks were 
considered in strategic decision-making within the firm. The ERM 
implementation in Firm A was announced at an operating meeting. 




hinder ERM implementation. He explained that employees needed to perceive 
the underlying benefits to themselves and the firm, before the firm adopted 
ERM as a new risk management paradigm to complement the existing PRM 
practice. Otherwise, they would regard ERM implementation as an additional 
burden. In addition, he indicated that the chairman did not stay in Singapore 
and had to visit other overseas subsidiaries because he was in charge of the 
entire overseas business of Firm PA. However, the lack of the leadership of 
the chairman appeared to have little negative influence on ERM 
implementation in Firm A because the specific ERM implementation was led 
by the MD, who actually took charge of the business of Firm A.  
8.2.3 ERM ownership 
In Firm A, the chairman was ultimately responsible for ERM, but the MD 
actually took charge of ERM. The board collectively made decisions 
concerning ERM. Because projects were the only revenue source, the board 
was involved in risk management at all stages of the projects that Firm A was 
engaged in, especially the large-scale ones. The decisions relating to tendering 
strategies, material procurement and measures to deal with cost overrun were 
made by the board, because these decisions were related to not only project 
revenue, but also the profitability of the firm. For example, although the 
Department of Project Management was responsible for project tenders, the 
MD was the final decision maker of all tenders in Firm A. In addition, the 
project director indicated that he was empowered to deal with project cost 
overrun of no more than S$10,000. Any cost overrun more than S$10,000 
needed to be reported to the headquarters of Firm A to obtain the approval. All 
the critical decisions were discussed at the operating meeting, at which 
macroeconomic risks were also discussed and analyzed.  




The ERM responsibility was actually included in the function of the MD. The 
active participation of the board contributed to the effectiveness of ERM. In 
addition, there was no specialized risk management department or risk 
management committee of the board in Firm A, even though the Firm PA 
Guidance to ERM Implementation suggested establishing such a department 
or committee in the subsidiaries. The Department of Safety in Firm A focused 
only on the management of safety risks. In reality, in the operations of Firm A, 
the board itself had served as a risk management committee, and was involved 
in critical decision-making at both project and firm levels. The board also 
oversaw the entire risk profile of the firm, and centralized the risk 
management practice of each project team. Moreover, it is worth reiterating 
that construction firms are project-based and the construction projects that 
they are engaged in are their only revenue source. PRM was still emphasized 
in Firm A and was considered as a critical part of ERM. Each project had its 
own project team comprised of people with the necessary management skills 
and experience. The project team conducted PRM with the involvement of the 
board.  
8.2.4 Risk communication 
Within Firm A, the monthly operating meeting acted as a platform for 
communicating risk information. The MD presided over such meetings. The 
board members, heads of all the departments, as well as project directors and 
managers of all the ongoing projects attended this meeting at the headquarters 
of Firm A. At this meeting, the progress status of the ongoing projects was 
reported to the board, which could thus have a clear perspective of the entire 
risk profile of the firm. Risk information collected from various sources was 
communicated at this meeting, and the decisions made by the board were 
notified to the leaders of the departments and projects. However, the 




meeting because such information was sensitive and considered as 
confidential, and was only available to the directors and chief representatives 
from the headquarters. The costs of the projects that Firm A was engaged in 
were reviewed monthly. The cost information was directly reported to the 
headquarters of Firm A and discussed at the bimonthly Cost Meetings. 
Besides the regular meetings, emails and telephone calls were the main 
communication methods across project teams and departments in Firm A. 
Although every computer in Firm A can access the Internet, there was neither 
an intranet in Firm A, nor a RMIS in place. In each project team or department, 
there was a local area network (LAN) for sharing documents, but 
communication between projects and departments greatly depended on emails 
and telephone calls. The interviewees deemed these methods as convenient 
and effective, because using these methods did not hinder Firm A from 
attaining an increasing turnover.  
Firm A was supervised by Firm PA and had to report its operational status to 
Firm PA to account for all its losses or profits every year. In order to ensure 
the accuracy of the annual reports and to implement internal controls, Firm PA 
audited Firm A twice a year. Such internal audits from Firm PA began in 2006, 
just after the SASAC issued the Guidance. The Guidance suggested that an 
enterprise’s audit department should audit all the departments, business units, 
and subsidiaries of the enterprise at least once a year (SASAC, 2006). In this 
context, the control of Firm PA over Firm A was relatively strong because the 
chairman of Firm A was also the vice president of Firm PA.  
Firm PA cooperated with several consulting companies to analyze both the 
domestic and international macroeconomic situations, identify the 
macroeconomic risks and develop relevant risk response measures. Firm PA 
also collected the risks identified by most of its subsidiaries. Based on all the 




identified, the response plans for the major ones as well as the lessons learned 
were issued to all the subsidiaries in the forms of the Annual ERM Report of 
Firm PA (confidential) and the Risk Monitoring and Analysis Report.  
To ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of risk communication, Firm PA 
provided a glossary of risk terms in the Guidance to ERM Implementation. 
This glossary included explanation of 27 risk terms that would frequently be 
used in risk communication, and would facilitate forming a common risk 
language. As the deputy director and project manager revealed, these risk 
terms were understood by the middle and senior management, and widely 
communicated at operating meetings. However, the cost manager indicated 
that he was not unfamiliar with the risk language because this risk language 
was seldom used on the site. 
8.2.5 Risk-aware culture 
In the Firm PA Guidance to ERM Implementation, the risk-aware culture was 
defined as the attitudes, values and behavior towards risks created in the firm’s 
operations based on the corporate risk philosophy and corporate culture. The 
guidance emphasized creating the risk-aware culture and incorporating the 
culture into the corporate culture. The deputy director and project manager 
indicated that Firm A had cultivated a risk-aware culture through training and 
instituting clear accountability.  
Firm A emphasized training its staff and workers. The staff from middle 
management (e.g. project directors and managers) to frontline managers (e.g. 
quantity surveyors, and engineers) needed to attend various training courses 
held inside or outside Firm A. The workers employed by Firm A needed to 
accept safety training before working on site. These training programs, which 
served as an organizational learning mechanism, involved the staff at middle 




into the minds of the staff and workers.  
Besides training programs, accountability also facilitated cultivating the 
risk-aware culture in Firm A. At the senior level, ERM implementation was 
included in the KPIs of the executives. Firm PA identified the KPIs, and 
reviewed and assessed the attainment of the KPIs. To attain the KPIs, the 
senior executives had high-level risk awareness, and the MD made decisions 
for project tenders. At the middle level, project directors and managers signed 
accountability pledges, which clearly announced their responsibility for 
achieving safety, cost, quality, and schedule objectives, and linked their 
bonuses to these objectives. Failure to attain safety, cost, and schedule 
objectives would lead to reduction in bonuses, while surpassing the objectives 
or getting BCA rewards can bring about additional performance bonuses. Thus, 
the accountability pledges made project directors and managers aware of 
potential risks, and contributed to high-level risk awareness among the middle 
management. Hence, the accountability established in Firm A motivated the 
management at senior and middle levels to be vigilant against risks and to 
consider risks in decision-making. 
8.2.6 ERM framework 
The ERM framework in the Firm PA Guidance to ERM Implementation  
included the following components: initial risk information collection, risk 
identification and evaluation, response plan for major risks, risk response plan 
implementation, risk management review and improvement, RMIS 
establishment, and risk-aware culture creation. However, not all the 
components had been fulfilled in Firm A. 
Firm A collated risk information from all available sources, and this risk 
information helped to identify potential risks. Firm A had a risk checklist, 




previous projects. This risk checklist was reviewed every year, and some new 
risks were added. The renewed risk checklist was then reported to Firm PA. 
After collecting the risks identified by its subsidiaries, Firm PA identified the 
major risks. By the end of 2010, Firm PA had identified 1,314 risks, among 
which 280 risks occurred in 2010. 94 out of the 280 risks were new risks. 
Finally, Firm PA identified six major risks in 2010: (1) macroeconomic risks; 
(2) strategic management risks; (3) investment risks; (4) receivables risks; (5) 
overseas operational risks; and (6) quality and safety risks. All the risks 
identified, the response plans for the major ones, as well as the lessons learned 
were issued to all the subsidiaries in the forms of the Annual ERM Report of 
Firm PA (confidential) and the Risk Monitoring and Analysis Report. Firm A 
then updated its checklist by using the information from Firm PA at the 
beginning of the year.  
Instead of using software to evaluate risks, Firm A depended on experience 
and subjective judgments to analyze risks. However, Firm A had to be more 
serious in safety and health risks for the compliance with the Workplace 
Safety and Health (Risk Management) Regulations in Singapore, which 
stipulated that a record of risk assessment should be kept for at least three 
years (MOM, 2006a). The Ministry of Manpower (MOM) of Singapore 
proposed risk assessment guidelines, where risk assessment included three 
steps: hazard identification, risk evaluation and risk control (MOM, 2006b). 
The guidelines also recommended using a risk matrix to evaluate the risk level 
based on the severity and likelihood (MOM, 2006b), which still depended on 
experience and subjective judgments. 
Most decisions for developing and implementing risk response plans were 
made by the senior executives, who were very experienced in dealing with 
risks in the international construction market. For instance, the volatility of 




environment. Once aware of the upward trend of the prices, the top 
management would decide to enter into contracts or agreements with suppliers 
to keep the continuity of material supplies for one to two years in order to 
hedge the price fluctuation risks. In addition, Firm PA also provided guidance 
to risk response, which contributed to better-informed decisions in Firm A. 
For instance, Firm PA issued the Guidance to Engineering Contract Review 
Risk Management in December 2010, which identified the potential risks in 
contract review and tendering decision-making, provided optional risk 
response measures, and thus improved decision-making in tendering.  
Although the deputy director stated that Firm A had risk appetite and tolerance, 
he could not clearly point out the specific tolerance of each risk, indicating 
that the risk appetite and tolerance were not clearly expressed. Moreover, if 
Firm A did not win sufficient project contract values according to the KPIs, it 
would tender with a very low price to win the project in order to fulfill the 
KPIs set by Firm PA. Such tendering decisions would overlook some risks and 
exceed the risk tolerance. 
Firm A reviewed its ERM every year and reported the review results and plans 
for improvement to Firm PA. ERM implementation in Firm A was also 
reviewed and audited by Firm PA twice a year. The Risk Monitoring and 
Analysis Report issued by Firm PA also provided lessons of some successful 
risk management practices in other subsidiaries, which would help Firm A to 
improve its ERM implementation.   
The Firm PA Guidance to ERM Implementation recommended establishing a 
RMIS for collecting, storing, analyzing, and communicating risk information, 
but Firm A did not have such a system. Risk-aware culture is also an 
important component in the ERM framework in Firm A. Firm A had created a 
risk-aware culture through training programs and accountability, and such a 




8.3 Case study II: A medium-sized CCF in Singapore 
8.3.1 Background 
Firm B was founded in Singapore in 2006, and registered as a B1 contractor 
under the workheads of CW01 and CW02. Hence, this firm had a tendering 
limit up to S$40 million in general building and civil engineering projects. 
Firm PB, as the parent company of Firm B, was a state-owned enterprise 
administered by a provincial government, but not a central enterprise. Firm PB 
started to contract overseas construction projects in 1992, and had 12 overseas 
subsidiaries or branches over the world, including Firm B. At the time of this 
study, Firm B had over 200 staff and over 1,000 skilled workers. The board 
consisted of five directors and the MD took charge of the business and 
operations of Firm B.  
The interviewees were two project managers. In Firm B, project managers 
were at the same hierarchy as the department manager. They directly reported 
to the deputy MD, who was a director and took responsibility to oversee all 
the construction projects that Firm B was engaged in. In addition, the 
interviewees can attend the regular meetings, which were held in the 
headquarters of Firm B and presided over by the MD. This allowed them to be 
informed of the latest decisions and the operation and business status of Firm 
B, and to participate in the risk management practices at the firm level. Thus, 
the interviewees were competent to provide reliable information for this study. 
Also, the relevant information was collected from the internal documents and 
reports relating to risk management. 
8.3.2 Factors affecting ERM implementation 
As the interviewees indicated, the parent company, Firm PB, had initiated a 




implementation in 2008. After the disclosure of the huge losses of China 
Railway Construction Corporation Limited in Saudi Arabia (China, 2011), 
Firm PB issued a Guidance to Overseas Project Risk Management in 2011, 
with the help of an external consultant. However, this guidance focused on 
PRM rather than ERM, and thus had limited influence on the ERM in Firm B. 
Firm PB did not require ERM implementation in its overseas subsidiaries or 
branches although Firm PB set business objectives for its subordinates. Thus, 
Firm B did not have a formal ERM program although it had regular PRM 
practices, which implied that Firm B had informal and immature ERM 
practices. This was confirmed by the finding of Survey II that the ERMMI of 
this firm was 0.310, at the low level. 
As for the factors that would drive ERM implementation, one interviewee 
focused on the potential benefits of ERM. He believed that it would be easier 
for ERM to be adopted by a company if ERM can demonstrate significant 
economic benefits that can exceed the costs associated with it. Meanwhile, the 
other interviewee indicated that the executives would adopt ERM if it can 
facilitate the achievement of project objectives and KPIs, which was among 
the primary concern of the project management staff. Thus, both interviewees 
paid attention to the potential benefits brought about by ERM implementation. 
Additionally, both of them revealed that the top management should be 
convinced of the potential benefits of ERM and agree to support ERM 
implementation. Without the support and commitment from the senior level, 
no new program can be initiated in Firm B.  
Moreover, one interviewee said that the existing risk management practices 
were adequate and effective because Firm B seldom suffered losses in the 
Singapore construction market, and that the management would not look for 
trouble to change these existing practices with a new set of management 




such confidence in the existing PRM practices would hinder the ERM 
initiation and made the staff perceive ERM as the source of additional costs 
and administration. More importantly, the top management did not show any 
intent to initiate an ERM program.  
8.3.3 ERM ownership 
Under the existing risk management system, project managers were 
responsible for the management of project risks, suggesting that they were 
project risk owners. In most cases, project managers were empowered to 
determine the response measures for the ordinary risks, whilst they still needed 
to obtain the senior-level approval on the proposed response plans for the 
critical risks or those difficult to deal with. 
At the firm level, as there was not a formal ERM program in Firm B, neither a 
position nor a stand-alone department dedicated to ERM implementation was 
established. As the MD was responsible for the business and operations of 
Firm B, the function of MD included the risk management responsibility. 
8.3.4 Risk communication 
As the interviewees indicated, risk information was communicated across the 
firm at the regular meetings held every month in the headquarters. All the 
directors, project managers and department managers attended these meetings, 
at which project managers also reported the construction progress and the cost 
status of the ongoing projects as well as the risk information collected from 
various sources.  
In addition, emails and telephone calls were still the main and timely 
communication methods across the firm. Although there was not a RMIS that 




RMIS that focused on legal risk management in 2012. From 2013 on, all the 
subsidiaries and branches of Firm PB, including Firm B, would report the 
information relating to legal and contract risks to Firm PB via the RMIS every 
month. According to the interviewees, it was not necessary to set up a RMIS 
or buy software for risk communication in Firm B because it was not 
economical and the staff had been used to the traditional communication 
methods.  
Moreover, Firm B needed to report its business and operations status to Firm 
PB on a quarterly basis, and Firm PB assigned the staff to audit Firm B every 
year to conduct internal control, as the ERM implementation plan of Firm PB 
required. Firm PB built up a risk information database, with the help of 
external consultants. This database consisted of risk checklists specifically for 
contracting projects in different overseas regions in the international market, 
and a risk analysis model. Meanwhile, this database was accessible to the 
relevant staff of Firm B, which enabled them to identify risk in Singapore. 
In the Guidance to Overseas Project Risk Management issued by Firm PB, 
there was a glossary of the risk terms that were frequently used in PRM, but 
not ERM. However, the interviewees indicated that Firm B had no specialized 
training programs on the guidance. Thus, the staff would learn and understand 
these risk terms from their own perspectives and no consensus on the risk 
terms had been reached. Thus, this glossary of risk terms contributed little to 
the creation of a common risk language that should be used in risk 
communication across the firm.  
8.3.5 Risk-aware culture 
As the interviewees indicated, the primary concern of the top management was 
to ensure the attainment of the objectives set by Firm PB and no safety 




the project profitability, which was among the KPIs of the project 
management staff. From the perspective of the interviewed project managers, 
the risk awareness of project management staff mainly resulted from the 
pressures to achieve the project objectives and attain the KPIs because such 
pressures linked the economic interests of the staff to the project profitability 
that was associated with the firm profitability. However, training programs did 
not play a key role in creating a risk-aware culture. Except the compulsory 
safety training, there was no formal training program for risk awareness 
cultivation. 
8.3.6 ERM framework 
Firm B did not have a formal ERM program and thus did not adopt any 
existing ERM framework. Although some risk management practices were 
consistent with the fundamentals of ERM, their current risk management 
practices were more like PRM. According to the Guidance to Overseas Project 
Risk Management, Firm B had adopted a formal PRM process, consisting of 
risk identification, analysis and response. However, the interviewees stated 
that Firm B did not have clearly defined its risk appetite and tolerance 
although they believed that the top executives had risk appetite in their mind. 
In addition, Firm B did not have a set of KRIs to help the relevant staff to 
proactively manage risks. 
As for risk identification, the staff in Firm B collected risk information from 
various sources and merged this information at the regular meetings. Also, 
they can obtain risk information from the risk information database of Firm 
PB. With this information, discussions were made with the involvement of top 
management, and a risk checklist was developed. The risks in the checklist 
consisted of both project risks and external risks, but did not include strategic 




would be updated when new risks were identified, when accidents occurred, or 
when the risk information database in Firm PB was updated. 
In terms of risk analysis, no risk management software and model was adopted 
to analyze risk. As the interviewees indicated, the relevant staff in Firm B 
estimated the likelihood of occurrence and the magnitude of impact of the 
risks in the checklist according to the experience or subjective judgments, 
resulting in a risk matrix that described the risk priority. In addition, the 
analysis of safety and health risks was documented to comply with the 
Workplace Safety and Health (Risk Management) Regulations in Singapore. If 
the likelihood of occurrence and the magnitude of impact of a risk had been 
discussed at a regular meeting, the risk analysis should have been recorded in 
the meeting summary. However, the analysis of other risks was not formally 
recorded for review. 
In Firm B, project managers, as the owners of project risks, were empowered 
to determine the response measures for the risks that were not very critical. 
However, the response measures for the critical risks were discussed at the 
regular meetings and finally decided by the MD. For example, the rise in 
foreign worker levies was seen as a critical risk because most CCFs in 
Singapore employed foreign workers rather than local workers and this risk 
would have ripple effects on project cost and schedule. Project managers 
cannot determine the response measures for such a risk, and the senior 
executives were involved to propose the response measures, which included 
collaborating with multiple labor suppliers, employing skilled workers and 
raising the productivity on site.  
Firm B did not need to submit an ERM report to Firm PB while Firm PB did 
not report its ERM implementation to the provincial government. Thus, Firm 
B did not regularly review and improve its risk management practices unless 




8.4 Case study III: A small-sized CCF in Singapore 
8.4.1 Background 
Firm C was a Singapore-based subsidiary of Firm PC. Firm PC was a 
state-owned enterprise administered by a municipal government, but not a 
central enterprise. Firm C was relatively independent from its parent company. 
Thus, Firm C did not have to report its operations status to Firm PC, and Firm 
PC did not interfere with the business of Firm C. However, Firm C had to give 
overhead expenses to Firm PC because its staff would obtain pensions from 
Firm PC after their retirement. 
Despite the early entry into Singapore in 1996, Firm C was registered as a 
CW01 C3 contractor under the BCA contractor registry system. Hence, this 
firm had a tendering limit up to S$0.65 million in general building projects. 
However, it should be noted that the BCA contractor registry functions as an 
administrative body only for the public sector procurement. Thus, Firm C can 
contract private projects without limits. Actually, Firm C only served as 
subcontractors under the main contractors with whom they had long-term 
collaboration. At the time of this study, Firm C had around 30 staff, over 1,000 
skilled workers, and no subsidiaries in Singapore. Additionally, the MD of 
Firm C took charge of the business and operations.   
The interviewee was a director with 31 years of work experience. He came to 
Singapore and joined Firm C in 1996 when it was founded. As Firm C was 
small, the interviewee also served as a project manager and participated in 
important decision making processes at the firm and project levels. Thus, the 




8.4.2 Factors affecting ERM implementation 
Although the interviewee had heard of ERM, he indicated that Firm C did not 
formally initiate a formal ERM program. According to the interviewee, it was 
not cost-effective to formally initiate an ERM program in Firm C because this 
firm was a small company that only acted as a subcontractor and most critical 
risks can be controlled or avoided through the long-term collaboration with 
main contractors. However, he believed that ERM was informally 
implemented across the firm. As Firm PC was neither a central enterprise nor 
a listed company, it did not need to comply with the internal control rules and 
the Guidance issued by the SASAC. In addition, the executives of Firm C 
were not required to initiate an ERM program by its parent company. Thus, 
the interviewee considered the lack of the senior-level request or 
encouragement as an important hindrance to ERM implementation in Firm C. 
Without such request, no resources would be invested in ERM and the staff 
would have no motivation to contribute to ERM implementation.  
Although Firm C did not have a formal ERM program, the interviewee 
believed that informal risk management could bring about benefits and helped 
assure the achievement of corporate and project objectives. As an integral part 
of ERM, PRM was emphasized because projects were the revenue sources of 
Firm C. More profits or bonuses would be obtained if the project objectives 
were fulfilled or over fulfilled. Such economic benefits drove the staff to 
conduct PRM, which would also contribute to ERM implementation. 
8.4.3 ERM ownership 
As the interviewee indicated, the majority of risks were faced in projects, 
rather than in company operation processes. In Firm C, project managers were 
responsible for the management of project risks, while the Department of 




interviewee, all the project managers in Firm C were very experienced in 
dealing with various issues in the construction of projects. In addition, the MD 
was involved in decision making relating to risk management at both company 
and project levels, and was the final decision maker of project tenders. In 
addition, the interviewee believed that neither a position nor a stand-alone 
department dedicated to ERM was necessary for Firm C. The MD 
subconsciously served as the ERM owner, as there was no formal ERM 
implementation.   
8.4.4 Risk communication 
In Firm C, there were quarterly meetings held in the headquarters. All the 
executives, project managers and department managers attended such 
meetings. Risk information and the construction progress of the ongoing 
projects were reported at the meetings. Besides the formal communication 
channel, emails and telephone calls were the main communication methods 
across project teams and departments and there was neither an intranet nor a 
RMIS in Firm C. In addition, Firm C did not need to report the status of its 
operation or ERM implementation to Firm PC, and Firm PC did not audit 
Firm C periodically. Hence, the communication between Firm C and Firm PC 
was inadequate.  
8.4.5 Risk-aware culture 
As the interviewee indicated, most of the experienced staff in Firm C had risk 
awareness, and the executives identified and analyzed potential risks before 
tendering. These potential risks were mainly technical and safety risks because 
they were closely related to the achievement of project objectives. Credit risks 
of main contractors could be avoided through bidding for the projects, of 
which the main contractors were the business partners of Firm C. In addition, 




instill safety awareness into their minds. Except the safety training, there were 
no formal training programs to cultivate risk awareness in Firm C. However, 
at the project level, the risk awareness of the staff was produced by the project 
performance assessment system in Firm C. The bonuses of the project staff 
were closely linked to the fulfillment of project objectives and profits. Thus, 
this performance assessment system rendered the staff aware of risks and 
facilitated the risk-aware culture in Firm C. However, this was different from 
using accountability to cultivate the risk-aware culture because of the lack of 
clear staff accountability statement in Firm C. 
8.4.6 ERM framework 
Because Firm C did not initiate a formal ERM program, it did not adopt any 
existing ERM framework or formal risk management process. Moreover, 
although the interviewee indicated that Firm C had risk appetite and tolerance, 
they were not explicitly defined and specified.  
As the interviewee indicated, Firm C did not have a formal risk checklist for 
risk identification. However, he believed that only safety and technology risks 
should be emphasized. Interestingly, the material price risks were not seen as 
critical because it was usually borne by the main contractors who procured 
materials from suppliers. Even if Firm C procured materials, they accepted the 
market price because the quantity was not large. In addition, strategic risks 
were not carefully considered because Firm C focused only on the short-term 
profits, rather than the long-term growth.  
Firm C analyzed safety risks using the techniques recommended by the MOM 
(2006a, b), and depended on the experience of project managers to analyze 
technical risks. The risk response measures were discussed at the quarterly 
meetings where the senior management provided advice and comments. The 




owner of the risk, and should be approved by the MD. However, the risk 
management practices were not periodically monitored and reviewed, which 
made Firm C lose the opportunities for improving its risk management 
practices. Moreover, the risk management activities were not documented and 
the lessons cannot be learned.  
8.5 Cross-case comparisons and discussions 
Comparisons were conducted to explain the differences and similarities in 
ERM implementation between the three cases (see Table 8.2). Only Firm A 
has formally initiated an ERM program although it was still at its infancy 
stage. Although Firm B and Firm C did not have formal ERM implementation, 
some of their risk management practices were consistent with the ERM 
fundamentals.  
8.5.1 Factors affecting ERM implementation 
In Firm A, the ERM implementation was primarily driven by the requirements 
from its parent company, Firm PA. Among the parent companies of the three 
case study firms, Firm PA was the only state-owned central enterprise and the 
only listed company. Thus, in order to meet the compliance requirements from 
the SASAC and the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Firm PA compelled its 
subsidiaries, including Firm A, to implement ERM.  
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Table 8.2 Cross-case comparisons 
Case study firm Firm A Firm B Firm C 
Parent company Firm PA, a state-owned central enterprise 
administered by China’s central government and 
listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
Firm PB, a state-owned enterprise administered by a 
provincial government. 
Firm PC, a state-owned enterprise 
administered by a municipal government. 
BCA grade CW01 A1; CW02 B1. CW01 B1; CW02 B1. CW01 C3. 
Firm history 20 years 7 years 16 years 
Formal ERM Yes No No 
Drivers for ERM Requirements from Firm PA. 
Increasing and more complicated risks. 
Request and encouragement from the board and 
senior management. 
Potential economic benefits of ERM. None 
Hindrances to 
ERM 
Lack of perceived benefits of ERM. Confidence in the existing risk management practices. 
Increased additional costs and administration. 
Lack of commitment of the top management. 
Lack of commitment of the top management. 
ERM ownership 
 
The MD took the responsibility for ERM 
implementation. 
The board itself had served as a risk management 
committee and oversaw the corporate risk profile. 
No ERM owner. 
The MD was involved in decision making relating to 
risk management at both company and project levels. 
No ERM owner 
The MD was involved in decision making 
relating to risk management at both company 
and project levels. 
Risk 
communication 
Communicate through monthly meetings, emails and 
telephone calls. 
No RMIS. 
Firm A reported to Firm PA every year and Firm PA 
audited Firm A every half a year. 
Firm PA collected various risk information, 
developed the response plans for the major risks and 
summarized the lessons learned every year, and 
Communicate through monthly meetings, emails and 
telephone calls. 
No RMIS. 
Firm B reported to Firm PB quarterly and Firm PB 
audited Firm B once a year. 
Firm PB built up a risk information database, 
containing risk checklists for contracting overseas 
projects and accessible to the relevant staff of Firm B. 
Communicate through quarterly meetings, 
emails and telephone calls. 
No RMIS. 
Firm C did not report to Firm PC and Firm PC 
did not audit Firm C. 
No common risk language. 
Table 8.2 (Continued) 
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Case study firm Firm A Firm B Firm C 
shared these with Firm A. 
Firm PA provided a glossary of risk terms and a 
common risk language was used at the senior and 
middle levels. 
Firm PB provided a glossary of risk terms but no 
common risk language was created or used. 
Risk-aware 
culture 
Risk-aware culture was created through training 
programs and instituting clear accountability. 
Training programs were provided for staff at all 
levels in Firm A. 
ERM implementation was included in the KPIs of 
the senior executives. 
Project directors and managers signed accountability 
pledges. 
The risk awareness of project management staff was 
mainly a result of the pressures to achieve the project 
profitability. 
Except the compulsory safety training, no formal 
training program was provided for risk awareness 
cultivation. 
 
The risk awareness of project management 
staff was mainly a result of the pressures to 
achieve the project profitability. 
Except the compulsory safety training, no 
formal training program was provided for risk 
awareness cultivation. 
 
ERM framework Firm A adopted the ERM framework recommended 
by Firm PA. 
No clearly defined risk appetite and tolerance. 
No formalized KRIs. 
Have a risk checklist including strategic risks. 
Regularly review and update the risk checklist. 
Depend on experience and subjective judgments to 
analyze risks. 
The senior executives discussed and determined risk 
response measures, referring to the guidance to risk 
response issued by Firm PA. 
Firm A reviewed its ERM every year and reported 
the results and plans for improvement to Firm PA. 
Firm B adopted the formal PRM process 
recommended by Firm PB. 
No clearly defined risk appetite and tolerance. 
No formalized KRIs. 
Have a risk checklist excluding strategic risks. 
Regularly review and update the risk checklist. 
Depend on experience and subjective judgments to 
analyze risks. 
The senior executives determined risk response 
measures. 
 
Have no formal risk management process. 
No clearly defined risk appetite and tolerance. 
No formalized KRIs. 
Have no formal risk checklist. 
Focusing only on safety and technology risks. 
Firm C analyzed safety risks using the 
techniques recommended by the MOM, and 
depended on experience to analyze technology 
risks. 
The senior executives determined risk 




In comparison, Firm PB and Firm PC were not listed companies, and were 
administered by either provincial or municipal governments, which had not 
promulgated the regulations relating to ERM. Not faced with the requirements 
from the authorities, Firm PB and Firm PC did not compel Firm B and Firm C 
to formally implement ERM, respectively. Thus, this result echoed the finding 
of Survey II that the driver “legal and regulatory compliance requirements” 
obtained a high score and rank in the medium-maturity CCFs, most of which 
were large CCFs.  
In addition, as a large-sized firm, Firm A was faced with increasing and more 
complicated risks as well as the higher likelihood to suffer losses. ERM can 
help it reduce losses in a proactive manner. Actually, the SASAC tried to 
promote ERM implementation due to a series of huge losses in the overseas 
subsidiaries of the central enterprises. Thus, the primary intent of the SASAC 
for ERM implementation was to avoid losses and protect the state-owned 
assets. This intent was also shared with Firm B, although it had no formal 
ERM program. 
In terms of the hindrances, lack of perceived benefits hindered ERM 
implementation in Firm A because few tangible benefits resulted from the 
ERM implementation at the early stage. In comparison, Firm B still focused 
on PRM rather than the holistic approach, i.e. ERM. The staff in Firm B were 
confident in the existing PRM practices and tended to believe that ERM 
increased costs and administration. To shake the mindsets on PRM, the top 
management should provide visible commitment and support to ERM. 
However, neither Firm B nor Firm C had such tone at the top, because of the 
lack of pressure from their respective parent companies. 
8.5.2 ERM ownership 
As for the ERM ownership, in Firm A, the ERM responsibility was included 
in the function of the MD and the board of Firm A oversaw the entire 
corporate risk profile and centralized the risk management practices across 
project teams and departments. Although previous studies recommended 
creating a CRO position (Beasley et al., 2005; Cendrowski and Mair, 2009; 
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Lam, 2003; Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Pagach and Warr, 2010), it appeared 
that the lack of a CRO position and a stand-alone ERM department did not 
negatively influence ERM implementation in Firm A. By contrast, Firm B and 
Firm C had no ERM owners. However, their top management was involved in 
decision making relating to risk management at both company and project 
levels. In addition, in all the three firms, project managers took the 
responsibility for the management of project risks, indicating that they 
appointed project managers as the project risk owners. These practices were 
consistent with some of the ERM best practices.  
8.5.3 Risk communication 
In terms of internal risk communication, the three case study firms had similar 
practices. All of them communicated risk information through regular 
meetings, emails and telephone calls. The frequencies of meetings were 
monthly in Firm A and Firm B, but quarterly in Firm C. However, none of 
them had a RMIS in place, which confirmed the finding of Lu et al. (2009) 
that the ICT applications for construction management and decision-making 
were limited in CCFs in the international market.  
As for the communication between subsidiaries and parent firms, Firm A 
reported their operations status to Firm PA every year and Firm PA audited 
Firm A every six months. Firm B reported its operations status to Firm PB 
quarterly, and Firm PB audited Firm B every year. Thus, the frequencies of the 
reporting and auditing between parent firms and subsidiaries were different 
between Firm A and Firm B. The more frequent audit from Firm PA 
represented the stronger control of Firm PA over the business and operations 
of Firm A. Such control was also strengthened by appointing the vice 
president of Firm PA as the chairman of Firm A. Additionally, Firm PA and 
Firm PB shared risk information with Firm A and Firm B, respectively. 
Specifically, Firm PA collated risks information from various subsidiaries, 
developed the response plans for the major risks, summarized the lessons 
learned every year, and shared these with Firm A. Firm PB built up a risk 
information database, which contained risk checklists for contracting projects 
in different overseas regions and was accessible to the relevant staff of Firm B. 
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In comparison, Firm C was relatively independent of its parent firm, and thus 
there was a lack of reporting, auditing, and risk information sharing 
mechanisms between Firm C and Firm PC. 
Firm PA and Firm PB issued a glossary of risk terms to Firm A and Firm B, 
respectively, which could facilitate the creation of a common risk language 
(Espersen, 2007). In Firm A, a risk language had been created and used in the 
communication at the monthly operating meetings. In comparison, most of the 
risk terms in the glossary for Firm B were associated with PRM rather than 
ERM, and the management staff did not have a common understanding of the 
risk terms because there were no training programs on risk management. Thus, 
in fact, a common risk language was neither created nor used in Firm B.  
8.5.4 Risk-aware culture 
To cultivate a risk-aware culture, Firm A provided training programs for the 
staff at all levels and established clear accountability for the senior and middle 
management staff. The training programs involved all levels of staff in 
creating the risk-aware culture and can be seen as an organizational learning 
mechanism. This was consistent with the viewpoint of Hopkin (2010) that the 
involvement of organizational individuals and organizational learning was an 
approach to creating a risk-aware culture. Also, the clear accountability made 
the senior and middle management vigilant against risks during 
decision-making. This practice agreed with AON (2010), which recommended 
instituting clear accountability as a successful approach to creating the 
risk-aware culture. Compared with Firm A, Firm B and Firm C had no formal 
training programs for creating risk awareness, except the compulsory safety 
training. In addition, in these two firms, the risk awareness of project 
management staff mainly resulted from the pressures to achieve the project 
profitability, which was closely related to the firm profitability. 
8.5.5 ERM framework 
As for the ERM framework, Firm A adopted the framework recommended by 
Firm PA. In comparison, Firm B and Firm C did not adopt any ERM 
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framework. Instead, Firm B used the PRM process recommended by Firm PB 
while Firm C did not have a formal risk management process.  
In addition, none of the three firms had clearly defined risk appetite and 
tolerance. In CCFs, risk appetite and tolerance may vary according to their 
real-world circumstances. For instance, at the end of each year, CCFs may risk 
tendering with a low price to fulfill the annual KPIs related to the contract 
amount set by the parent firm.  
Since risk identification, analysis and response are the three most critical steps 
in various ERM frameworks, this section focuses on the differences and 
similarities in these three steps among the three firms. As for risk 
identification, both Firm A and Firm B used risk checklists and regularly 
review and update them. The difference lied in that the former included 
strategic risks in the checklist whilst the latter did not because the latter did not 
formally initiate an ERM program. In comparison, Firm C, usually serving as 
a sub-contractor, did not have a risk checklist and focused only on safety and 
technology risks. In addition, although Firm A and Firm B had risk checklists, 
they did not develop a set of KRIs, which was the same with Firm C. The lack 
of KRIs would hinder these firms from dealing with risks in a proactive 
manner because the KRIs can help monitor risks and have predetermined 
thresholds (Beasley et al., 2010a). 
In terms of risk analysis, all the three case study firms adopted the techniques 
recommended by the MOM to analyze safety risks, and depended on 
experience and subjective judgments to analyze risks. This was consistent with 
the findings of previous studies that most risk management practices in the 
construction industry depended on experience and subjective judgments 
(Kartam and Kartam, 2001; Thevendran and Mawdesley, 2004; Wang and 
Yuan, 2011), instead of using the relevant risk analysis software.  
In the case of risk response, in Firm A, the senior executives determined the 
response measures with references to the guidance to risk response provided 
by Firm PA. In Firm B and Firm C, such references from parent firms were 
not available, and their senior executives selected the response measures 
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according to their experience and subjective judgments. 
Among the three firms, only Firm A reviewed its ERM every year and 
developed plans for improvement. The review results and plans for 
improvement were included in the annual ERM report, which was submitted 
to Firm PA at the beginning of each year. Firm A also referred to the 
successful practices in other subsidiaries, which were collected by Firm PA, to 
improve the ERM practices. In comparison, Firm B and Firm C did not 
regularly review and improve their risk management practices. 
8.5.6 Implications 
Some implications can therefore be drawn from the cross-case comparisons. 
Firstly, the comparisons implied that firm size influenced ERM 
implementation, thus confirming the finding of Survey II that there was 
association between ERM maturity and firm size.  
Secondly, the comparisons implied that the ERM implementation in 
Singapore-based CCFs was influenced by their respective parent companies. 
Because the parent companies of the large-sized CCFs in Singapore were 
either central enterprises or listed companies, they needed to implement ERM 
to comply with the requirements from the SASAC and the stock exchanges, 
thus driving their subsidiaries to initiate formal ERM programs. The 
requirements from the parent companies can result in the requests for and 
commitment to ERM implementation from the top management in the 
overseas subsidiaries. By contrast, parent companies of Firm B and Firm C 
were neither central enterprises nor listed companies; hence, they did not face 
regulatory requirements and did not have similar senior-level requests and 
commitment.  
Even if medium and small CCFs did not have formal ERM implementation, 
they may still have some practices consistent with the ERM fundamentals. For 
instance, Firm B had formal PRM implementation, while Firm C managed 
safety risk with the reference to the guidelines issued by the MOM. These 
practices were more or less consistent with the ERM fundamentals. In these 
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firms, the formal ERM programs could be initiated based on these existing 
risk management practices.   
8.6 Summary 
Based on the information collected from interviews and past documents, the 
three case studies uncovered how ERM was actually implemented in three 
Singapore-based CCFs, in terms of the influential factors, ERM ownership, 
risk communication, risk-aware culture, and ERM framework or processes. 
Also, cross-case comparisons were performed, and the results implied that 
there was association between ERM implementation and firm size, that the 
parent firms influenced the ERM implementation in their subsidiaries in 
Singapore, and that some practices of these case study firms were consistent 
with the ERM fundamentals, regardless of their ERM implementation status.   
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9 Developing a KBDSS for ERM in CCFs 
9.1 Introduction 
Following the introduction to the background information of KBDSSs, this 
chapter presents the development of the KBDSS for ERM in CCFs. This 
KBDSS intends to assess the ERM maturity, visualize the ERM maturity 
assessment results, provide action plans for improving ERM practices along 
the maturity continuum, and generate a printable ERM maturity assessment 
report. The KBDSS consists of three main components: a knowledge base, a 
graphical user interface (GUI), and a decision support engine (DSE). The 
knowledge base contains the ERM maturity criteria, the ERM best practices 
applicable in CCFs, and the action plans for improving the implementation of 
the ERM best practices, while the DSE computes the maturity scores, 
visualizes the results, selects the appropriate action plans for users, and 
generates a printable assessment report. The action plans for improving ERM 
implementation were acquired from the comprehensive literature review and 
the interviews with practitioners. Microsoft Visual Basic 2010 was used to 
develop the KBDSS. In addition, this chapter uses a hypothetical example to 
demonstrate how the KBDSS works, and validates the KBDSS with the views 
garnered from five industry experts. Thus, the fifth research objective, 
“develop a KBDSS that can assess the ERM maturity level of CCFs and 
provide recommendations to improve ERM implementation along the maturity 
continuum”, was fulfilled. 
9.2 Background of KBDSSs 
9.2.1 Definition of a KBDSS 
A KBDSS can be defined as “a computer information system that provides 
information and methodological knowledge using analytical decision models, 
and providing access to data and knowledge bases to support decision makers 
in making decisions effectively in complex and ill-structured problem domains 
(Zopounidis et al., 1997: p.263).” Technically, KBDSSs originated from an 
integration of an expert system (ES) with a decision support system (DSS).  
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A DSS is an interactive, computer-based information system that utilizes 
decision rules and models, coupled with a comprehensive database (Turban 
and Watkins, 1986). It can be used as a strategic planning tool to evaluate the 
efficiency and performance-based decision-making information. A basic 
objective of a DSS is to provide the necessary information in order to help 
decision makers better understand the complex situations and make good 
decisions (Wang, 2005; Zopounidis et al., 1997).  
Compared with a DSS, an ES is a computer program that includes a 
knowledge base containing experts’ knowledge for a particular problem 
domain, and a reasoning mechanism for generating inferences over the 
knowledge base (Turban and Watkins, 1986). It was viewed as a sub-area of 
artificial intelligence (AI) (Kingsman and de Souza, 1997). As a form of an ES, 
a knowledge-based system (KBS) holds the subject knowledge as a set of facts 
and rules that may be interrogated and manipulated to provide an inferred 
solution or explanation for a given problem (Ülengin and Topcu, 2000). The 
performance of KBSs depends greatly on a knowledge base that stores rules, 
objects, facts, general cases, exceptions and relations that contribute to 
decision-making (Uricchio et al., 2004).  
DSSs derived mainly from management information systems and operations 
research, whereas ESs came from AI. Klein and Methlie (1990) combined the 
frameworks of DSSs and ESs, and produced the frameworks of KBDSSs. 
Uricchio et al. (2004) also considered that a KBDSS was developed by 
incorporating AI or ES technologies into DSS architectures. Hence, KBDSSs 
can overcome the drawbacks of DSSs and ESs without missing their strengths 
(Zopounidis et al., 1997), provide smarter support to decision makers, and 
enable them to improve the decision quality (Bonczek et al., 1981). With the 
development of IT, the division between KBDs, DSSs and KBDSS is no 
longer clear. A great number of papers about applications of KBDSSs have 
been published in international journals, such as Decision Support Systems, 
Knowledge-Based Systems, and Expert Systems with Applications. 
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9.2.2 Applications of KBDSSs in previous studies 
KBDSSs have been applied in various domains. These include cost estimation 
and pricing decisions in versatile manufacturing firms (Kingsman and de 
Souza, 1997), quantitative constructability analysis (Yu and Skibniewski, 
1999), selection of water crossing infrastructure alternatives (Ülengin and 
Topcu, 2000), building project procurement (Kumaraswamy and Dissanayaka, 
2001), management in flexible manufacturing systems (Özbayrak and Bell, 
2003), national defense budget planning (Wen et al., 2005a), enterprise 
mergers and acquisitions (Wen et al., 2005b), measurement of the performance 
of real estate investment (Wang, 2005), variation orders management (Arain 
and Low, 2006), construction equipment selection and cost estimation 
(Eldrandaly and Eldin, 2006), measurement of enterprise performance (Wen et 
al., 2008), tender call evaluation (Alexopoulos et al., 2009), as well as road 
safety analysis (Dell'Acqua et al., 2011; Jo et al., 2011). In addition, SPRING 
Singapore (2010), which is an agency under the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry of Singapore, developed a KBDSS, known as the IMPACT 
(Integrated Management of Productivity Activities) Assessment Tool to help 
businesses identify the strengths and weaknesses in their productivity, measure 
their productivity levels and provide action plans for improving their 
productivity.  
KBDSSs have also been applied in risk management in a variety of fields. 
Ferns (1995) developed a KBDSS called Lifenet in the social service domain 
for the risk assessment of adolescent suicide. Uricchio et al. (2004) presented a 
KBDSS to assess Italian groundwater pollution risks. Padma and 
Balasubramanie (2009) proposed a KBDSS to acquire and quantify the 
work-related risks on musculoskeletal disorder. Baloi and Price (2003) pointed 
out that probability theory, FST, and certainty factor theory had been widely 
used to deal with uncertainties in KBDSSs, and found increasing applications 
of the FST for modeling uncertainties in KBDSSs in the construction industry. 
Despite much attention has been paid to the KBDSSs for risk management, the 
issue of improving ERM practices through a KBDSS has not been much 
explored in the literature. This research presents a KBDSS for assessing ERM 
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maturity and improving ERM practices in CCFs. After the comparison with 
other multi-criteria analysis methods, the FST that can deal with the problems 
of vague and imprecise judgments was used to develop the ERM maturity 
model (see Section 3.7.3). This model was embedded in the proposed KBDSS. 
9.3 Objectives of the KBDSS 
The KBDSS for ERM in CCFs developed in this research serves as an internal 
assessment tool for management staff. The objectives of the KBDSS are to: 
(1) Assess the ERM maturity in a CCF;  
(2) Visualize the ERM maturity assessment results;  
(3) Provide action plans for improving ERM practices along the maturity 
continuum; and  
(4) Generate a printable ERM maturity assessment report. 
A user can input their implementation level of each ERM best practice (see 
Section 7.2.3) under each criterion by comparing similar current practice in his 
or her firm with the best practice. Using the input data and the fuzzy ERM 
maturity model presented in Section 3.7.3, the KBDSS can compute the scores 
of the maturity criteria and the overall maturity score (i.e. ERMMI) in the firm. 
Each criterion score reflects the extent to which this criterion is implemented, 
while the ERMMI describes the overall maturity level of the ERM program in 
the firm. In addition, the criterion scores and the ERMMI are interpreted using 
linguistic terms, and each linguistic term is assigned a color (see Table 9.1). 
Thus, the KBDSS can visualize the assessment results by presenting a 
histogram of the criterion scores with bars in different colors. The bar colors 
represent the linguistic term assigned to the maturity criteria, and the lengths 
are in proportion to the scores. The KBDSS also highlights the criterion scores 
that are below and above the ERMMI in two different colors. Moreover, 
according to the implementation level of each ERM best practice, the KBDSS 
selects a specific action plan for the user to improve the implementation of 
each best practice, which contributes to better informed decisions relating to 
ERM. Furthermore, to make it easy for users to review the assessment results 
and action plans, the KBDSS produces a printable ERM maturity assessment 
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report. The details are presented in the following sections. 
By using the KBDSS, the management staff can gain an overview of the ERM 
maturity as well as the action plans for improving their ERM implementation. 
This allows them to identify the aspects of the ERM implementation that have 
the priority for improvement, according to the information available and the 
real-world circumstances faced by the firm. In addition, when assessing the 
ERM maturity, the management staff would think about the status quo of their 
ERM implementation, and gain more innovative ideas relating to ERM. Thus, 
the ERM maturity assessment conducted can still contribute to the group 
decision-making relating to ERM. Furthermore, it should be noted that the 
assessment results and action plans provided by the KBDSS play a supportive 
rather than a dominative role in the decision-making relating to ERM. The 
KBDSS is not designed to make decisions for users, but rather it provides 
pertinent information in an efficient and easy-to-access format that enables 
users to make more informed decisions (Arain and Low, 2006; Zhao et al., 
2011). 
9.4 Architecture of the KBDSS 
The KBDSS for ERM consists of three main components: a knowledge base, a 
GUI, and a DSE. The architecture is described in Figure 9.1. 
9.4.1 Knowledge base 
The knowledge base is a repository of the knowledge and experience of 
experts. The knowledge base of the KBDSS contains the ERM maturity 
criteria, the ERM best practices applicable in CCFs, and the action plans for 
improving the implementation of the ERM best practices. The ERM maturity 
criteria and best practices were collected from the literature review, as 
described in Section 3.7.3. A total of 16 criteria and 66 best practices were 
found appropriate and retained in the ERM maturity model, according to the 
analysis results of the data collected from Survey I (see Sections 7.2.2 and 
7.2.3). In addition, the action plans for improving ERM practices were 
developed based on the literature review and the interviews that were 
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conducted with the industry practitioners. These action plans are described in 
Section 9.5. 
Knowledge Base
ERM maturity criteria 
Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
Maturity scores of each maturity criteria
Action plans for improving ERM practices 
along the maturity continuum
Input Output
Overall maturity score 
ERM best practices 
Action plans for 
improving ERM practices
Compute maturity scores using the fuzzy 
ERM maturity model
Decision Support Engine (DSE)
Visualize ERM maturity results
Introduction to the KBDSS
Visualized assessment results
Implementation level of ERM best 
practices under the maturity criteria  
ERM definition, KBDSS objectives, 
maturity criteria and the assessment 
method 
Select appropriate action plans
Generate an ERM maturity assessment report
A printable ERM maturity assessment report
 
 
Figure 9.1 Architecture of the KBDSS 
9.4.2 Graphical user interface 
The GUI allows users to interact with the KBDSS using graphical icons and 
visual indicators. The GUI of this KBDSS consists of the entrance interface, 
the introduction interface, the ERM maturity assessment interfaces, the action 
plan interfaces, and the exit interface. Before the user proceeds to the ERM 
maturity assessment, the introduction interface presents a brief introduction to 
the KBDSS. In the assessment process, the interfaces display ERM maturity 
criteria and best practices, and allows the user to input the implementation 
level of the 66 best practices using the five-point scale (1 = very low, 2 = low, 
3 = medium, 4 = high, and 5 = very high). After the ERM maturity assessment 
and action plan selection processes, the GUI displays the maturity criterion 
scores, the ERMMI and the action plans.  
In addition, the criterion scores and the ERMMI are interpreted using the same 
set of linguistic terms (see Table 9.1). The five linguistic terms are represented 
by the colors of red, orange, yellow, blue, and green, respectively. The GUI 
presents a histogram of the assessment results. In the histogram, the color of 
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each bar represents the linguistic term of each maturity criterion, and the 
length is in proportion to the respective criterion score. Moreover, the criterion 
scores can be compared with the ERMMI and the scores below and above the 
ERMMI are highlighted in pink and light green, respectively. Thus, it is easy 
and convenient for users to understand the implementation of the maturity 
criteria and find the weaker aspects that are represented by the shorter bars in 
the histogram. These weaker aspects are worth more attention from the 
management of the firm. Furthermore, a printable ERM maturity assessment 
report can be output, which makes it easy for the users to review the 
assessment results. 
Table 9.1 Criterion scores and linguistic terms 
Scores of maturity criteria Linguistic term Color 
Score < 0.125 Very low Red 
0.125 ≤ Score < 0.375 Low Orange 
0.375 ≤ Score < 0.625 Medium Yellow 
0.625 ≤ Score < 0.875 High Blue 
0.875 ≤ Score Very high Green 
9.4.3 Decision support engine  
The DSE transforms the input implementation levels of ERM best practices 
into TFNs, adopts the centroid method to produce the crisp implementation 
scores ranging from 0 to 1, and calculates the ERM maturity criterion scores 
and the ERMMI. Meanwhile, it sends commands to visualize the maturity 
scores. In addition, based on the assessment results, the DSE selects the action 
plans for the user from the knowledge base. Three rules that are coded in 
If-Then conditional statements are adopted to select the action plans (see Table 
9.2).  
Table 9.2 Rules of selecting action plans in the DSE  
Rules  If (condition) Then (execution) 
Rule 1 Lip < 0.375 Select the action plan for improving the practice to a medium level 
Rule 2 0.375 ≤ Lip < 0.625 Select the action plan for improving the practice to a high level 
Rule 3 Lip > 0.625 Select the action plan for improving the practice to a very high level 
Lip is the score of the best practice p under criterion i.  
The threshold values are set according to Figure 3.9. Specifically, if the score 
of a best practice is below 0.375, indicating that the implementation level of 
this practice is either very low or low, then the DSE selects the action plan that 
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intends to improve the implementation to a medium level; if the score of a best 
practice is between 0.375 and 0.625, implying that the implementation of this 
practice is at a medium level, then the DSE selects the action plan that intends 
to improve the implementation to a high level; and if the score of a best 
practice is above 0.625, implying that the implementation level of this practice 
is high, then the DSE selects the action plan that intends to improve the 
implementation to a very high level. Meanwhile, this action plan could help 
the firm sustain the implementation at a very high level.  
In addition, these action plans are divided into two groups in the KBDSS. One 
group intends to improve the implementation of the best practices scored 
below the ERMMI, and the other is aimed at those scored over the ERMMI. 
The management would prefer to strengthen the implementation of the weak 
aspects, i.e. the practices scored below the ERMMI, or continue focusing on 
the practices scored above the ERMMI, or undertake both sets of practices. 
Both tactics can contribute to a higher ERM maturity.  
Furthermore, an ERM maturity assessment report, which includes the maturity 
scores, the visualization of the scores, and the action plans, can be generated 
and printed, enabling the users to easily review the assessment results.  
9.5 Action plans for improving ERM practices in CCFs 
The action plans were firstly acquired through the comprehensive literature 
review (Barton et al., 2002; Cendrowski and Mair, 2009; Duckert, 2011; 
Fraser and Simkins, 2010; Hopkinson, 2011; Narvaez, 2011; Segal, 2011; Zou 
et al., 2010). These publications also include the statements relating to the best 
practices that were recognized to constitute a successful or advanced ERM 
program. 
Specifically, most of the 66 ERM best practices were provided with three 
categories of action plans, which intended to help a firm improve the 
implementation of each best practice from a very low or low to a medium 
level, from a medium to a high level, and from a high to a very high level, 
respectively. The rationale behind assigning three action plans to a best 
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practice was that it may not be meaningful to provide an action plan to help a 
firm improve from a very low level to a low level. 
The preliminary set of action plans was presented to six industry interviewees, 
who were originally included in the samples of Survey I and II, to solicit 
insightful comments and additional action plans. These interviewees were 
involved in risk management in their firms and had over 10 years’ work 
experience in the construction industry. According to the comments and inputs 
of the interviewees, the action plans were revised and updated. The finalized 
set consisted of 191 action plans for improving the implementation of the 66 
ERM best practices (see Table 5.2).  
It should be noted that not all the best practices had three action plans because 
it was difficult to distinguish between the two adjacent implementation levels 
of some best practices. In this case, two of the three action plans for the best 
practices were duplicated. In addition, an interviewee indicated that some best 
practices did not need to have three action plans in a real-world situation. The 
reason was that it would be meaningless to develop action plans for these best 
practices to improve the implementation from a low to a medium level. Thus, 
these best practices had only two action plans. 
An example is presented in Section 9.7 to illustrate how to select action plans 
based on the assessment results.
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Table 9.3 Action plans for improving ERM implementation in CCFs 
Code 
Action plans for improving ERM implementation 
Low → Medium Medium → High High → Very high 
M01 Commitment of the board and senior management 
B01.1 Prepare a written ERM policy that at least 
covers the aim, principles and process of 
ERM, commitment, and relevant 
responsibilities and accountabilities. 
Ensure that the ERM policy is approved by 
the board and senior management and 
understood by most of the risk owners. 
Include most of the critical aspects of ERM 
implementation (e.g. the aim, principles and 
process of ERM, commitment, responsibilities 
and accountabilities, risk appetite, risk 
communication, timing for monitoring and 
review of policies, etc.) into the written ERM 
policy. 
Ensure that the ERM policy with the top 
approval is understood by all the risk owners 
and made known to all the staff. 
Ensure that the written ERM policy with the top approval 
covers all the critical aspects of ERM implementation 
(e.g. the aim, principles and process of ERM, 
commitment, responsibilities and accountabilities, risk 
appetite, risk communication, timing for monitoring and 
review of policies, etc.). 
Ensure that the written ERM policy is understood by all 
the risk owners and made known to all the staff. 
B01.2 Develop an ERM plan and tailor it to the 
corporate objectives and context. 
Make the ERM plan understood by most of 
the risk owners. 
Ensure that the ERM plan is consistently tailored to the corporate objectives and context. 
Ensure that the ERM plan is understood by all the risk owners and known to all the staff. 
 
B01.3 Try to make decisions and implement ERM 
according to the ERM policy and plan. 
Ensure that most of the decision-making and 
ERM practices are fully consistent with the 
ERM policy and plan. 
Ensure that all the decision-making and ERM practices 
are fully consistent with the ERM policy and plan. 
B01.4 Involve the board and senior management in 
the risk oversight and the development of 
the ERM policy and plan. 
Ensure the active participation of the board and senior management in all the critical aspects of ERM 
implementation. 
 
B01.5 Ensure the visible commitment to ERM 
from the board and senior management, 
making people perceive ERM as a priority 
for the leadership. 
Ensure the visible and continual commitment to ERM from the board and senior management. 
M02 ERM ownership 
B02.1 Appoint a dedicated senior executive, or set 
up a stand-alone department or a board-level 
committee to oversee the risks faced by the 
firm. 
Appoint a dedicated senior executive, or set up 
a stand-alone department or a board-level 
committee to oversee the risks faced by the firm 
and to centralize risk management. 
Make the ERM owner known to all the risk 
owners. 
Appoint a dedicated senior executive, or set up a 
stand-alone department or a board-level committee as the 
ERM owner to take charge of ERM implementation.  
Ensure that the ERM owner is known to all the relevant 
staff. 




Action plans for improving ERM implementation 
Low → Medium Medium → High High → Very high 
B02.2 Appoint risk owners for most risks at the 
department and project levels. 
 
Appoint risk owners for all the risks at the 
department and project levels.  
Ensure that most risk owners fully understand 
the risks falling within their respective 
accountability. 
Appoint risk owners for all the risks that have been 
identified. 
Ensure that all the risk owners fully understand the risks 
falling within their respective accountability. 
 
B02.3 Clearly define the authority and 
responsibility of the risk owners. 
Ensure that most of the risk owners have 
sufficient authority to oversee any risk-related 
action, and accept clearly defined responsibility 
for managing the risks. 
Ensure that all the risk owners have sufficient authority to 
oversee any risk-related action, and accept clearly defined 
responsibility for managing the risks. 
B02.4 Consider ERM implementation when 
assessing owners' performance. 
Set up formal KPIs of all the risk owners.  
Consider ERM implementation in the 
assessment of these KPIs. 
Include specific ERM-related KPIs into the formal set of 
KPIs to assess the performance of all the risk owners. 
M03 Risk appetite and tolerance 
B03.1 Consider the risk appetite when developing 
and executing the corporate strategy. 
Formally and clearly define the risk appetite 
through a written statement that is approved by 
the board of directors. 
Align the risk appetite with the corporate 
strategy. 
Formally and clearly define the risk appetite through a 
written statement that is approved by the board of 
directors. 
Ensure that the risk appetite is aligned with the corporate 
strategy. 
Regularly review and update the risk appetite statement. 
B03.2 Not applicable. Ensure that the risk appetite is understood by 
all the risk owners. 
Ensure that the risk appetite is understood by all the risk 
owners and known to all the relevant staff. 
B03.3 Consider the risk tolerance for most risks 
from the perspective of the achievement of 
the relevant corporate objectives. 
Formally and clearly define the risk tolerance 
for each specific risk according to the corporate 
objectives.  
Ensure that the risk tolerance of a certain risk 
is understood by the risk owner. 
Formally and clearly define the risk tolerance for each 
specific risk according to the corporate objectives.  
Ensure that the risk tolerance of a certain risk is 
understood by the risk owner and made known to the 
relevant staff. 
Regularly review and update the risk tolerance. 
B03.4 Assess the differences between the risk 
tolerance and actual risks on an ad hoc 
basis. 
Assess the differences between the defined risk 
tolerance and actual risks on a sufficiently 
periodic basis. 
Regularly assess the differences between the defined risk 
tolerance and actual risks. 
B03.5 Consider the risk tolerance when developing 
risk response strategies. 
Assess the expected effects of most risk 
response strategies against risk tolerance. 
Ensure that the expected effects of all the risk response 
strategies are assessed against risk tolerance. 
M04 Risk-aware culture 




Action plans for improving ERM implementation 
Low → Medium Medium → High High → Very high 
B04.1 Define the elements of a risk-aware culture 
for the firm.  
Obtain the support from the top management 
to ensure their risk awareness and the 
resource inputs. 
Involve the relevant staff in the creation of the 
risk-aware culture and ensure their buy-in. 
Launch training programs and create 
accountability at all levels to improve the risk 
awareness.  
Encourage open and transparent 
communication, e.g. questioning current 
models and putting forward individual 
comments.  
Ensure the sustained and strong risk-awareness among 
the staff at all levels. 
Consistently encourage open and transparent 
communication, e.g. questioning current models and 
putting forward individual comments.  
Involve the staff at all levels into the creation of the 
risk-aware culture and ensure their buy-in.  
Align the reward and disciplinary systems with the 
creation of the risk-aware culture. 
B04.2 Eliminate the distrust among staff and 
various projects and departments. 
Build up a climate of mutual trust within project 
teams and departments. 
Ensure that a climate of mutual trust is built up and 
enables open and transparent communication of risk 
information throughout the firm. 
B04.3 Envisage the ideal corporate culture with the 
key aspects that support ERM.  
Assess the existing corporate culture against 
the ideal culture.  
Identify the problems exposed in the 
assessment and prioritize them.  
Obtain the visible leadership on cultural 
change from the top management. 
Ensure the visible leadership on cultural 
change from the top management.  
Tackle the problems exposed in the corporate 
culture assessment in a priority order through a 
variety of methods (e.g. getting the staff at all 
levels involved, providing training, and 
aligning the reward and disciplinary systems 
with the risk-aware culture). 
Ensure that all the problems exposed in the corporate 
culture assessment are tackled, and that the corporate 
culture supports ERM. 
Integrate risk thinking into all the decision making and 
strategy planning processes. 
B04.4 Identify the expected behavior according to 
the expected risk-aware culture within the 
firm.  
Explicitly express the expected behavior within 
the firm and make it understood by all the risk 
owners. 
Encourage the expected behavior and correct 
the behavior that is inconsistent with the 
risk-aware culture. 
Explicitly express the expected behavior within the firm 
and make it known by all the relevant staff.  
Adopt a systematic process to encourage the expected 
behavior and correct the behavior that is inconsistent with 
the risk-aware culture.  
M05 Sufficient resources 
B05.1 Allocate resources to the ERM process, 
tools, techniques, personnel skill training on 
an ad hoc basis. 
Allocate sufficient resources and assure the 
availability of the ERM process, tools, 
techniques, personnel skill training, etc. 
Continuously invest in improving the risk management 
process, tools, techniques, personnel skills etc. 
B05.2 Consider the risk significance and priority 
during allocating resources to risk response. 
Ensure that sufficient resources are allocated for the appropriate risk response strategies according to the 
risk significance and priority. 
B05.3 Recruit the staff with knowledge, skills and Employ the sufficient qualified staff with Employ the sufficient qualified staff with knowledge, 




Action plans for improving ERM implementation 
Low → Medium Medium → High High → Very high 
expertise about ERM. knowledge, skills and expertise about ERM. skills and expertise about ERM.  
Ensure that all the risk owners have sufficient knowledge, 
skills and expertise about ERM. 
B05.4 Not applicable. Invite external consultants or experts to train 
the staff on ERM and to provide insights and 
suggestions for the ERM program. 
Build up the long-term collaboration with external 
experts and regularly use their knowledge, skills and 
expertise to strengthen the ERM implementation.  
B05.5 Identify metrics to measure ERM 
performance. 
Ensure that the metrics can comprehensively 
reflect ERM performance. 
Apply these metrics to measure ERM 
performance on a sufficiently periodic basis. 
Ensure that the metrics are comprehensive enough to 
measure ERM performance and are consistently applied 
in ERM performance assessment.  
Review and update the metrics on a sufficient periodic 
basis. 
M06 Risk identification, analysis and response 
B06.1 Adopts a formalized ERM process throughout the firm. Implement ERM according to the formalized and 
standardized ERM process throughout the firm on a 
regular basis. 
B06.2 Collect risk information from internal and 
external sources. 
Ensure that all the risk information collected from various sources is relevant and reliable. 
B06.3 Use at least one risk management tool or 
technique in ERM. 
Use multiple qualitative and quantitative risk 
management tools and techniques in ERM. 
Consistently use the combination of appropriate 
qualitative and quantitative risk management tools and 
techniques. 
B06.4 Use at least one recognized technique to 
identify the risks at the department or project 
level. 
Use multiple techniques to identify risks at all 
levels (including risks related to the corporate 
strategy) and the sources of most risks. 
Ensure that the risks at all levels and their sources and 
potential impacts are comprehensively identified through 
multiple techniques. 
B06.5 Depend on the individual experience and 
subjective judgment to assess the likelihood 
of occurrence and risk impacts and prioritize 
the risks. 
Estimate the likelihood as realistically as 
possible using the information available.  
Assess the direct or immediate risk impacts on 
the relevant objectives. 
Prioritize the risks with the correct application 
of a valid method. 
Realistically estimate the likelihood by evaluating sources 
of uncertainty associated with risk occurrence.  
Assess both the direct and secondary risk impacts on the 
relevant objectives.   
Prioritize the risks with the correct application of a valid 
method. 
B06.6 View risks as inter-related and consider the 
relationship among various risks. 
Assess the relationship among various risks in 
risk analysis. 
Consistently assess the relationship among various risks 
using appropriate methods in risk analysis. 
B06.7 Consider one or two response options for 
each risk as well as the costs of risk response 
Select appropriate risk response strategies by 
considering various response options, risk 
Select appropriate risk response strategies among all the 
relevant response options. 




Action plans for improving ERM implementation 
Low → Medium Medium → High High → Very high 
options during the risk response selection. 
Implement the appropriate risk responses 
without unnecessary delays. 
significance, risk appetite and tolerance, 
resource availability, and the costs versus 
benefits.  
Implement the selected risk response strategies 
without unnecessary delays. 
Ensure that the selected risk response strategies can 
optimize the firm performance.  
Consistently implement the selected risk response 
strategies in a professional and timely manner. 
B06.8 Not applicable. Consider the risk sources and include actions 
that deal with risks at their sources into the risk 
responses. 
Design risk responses to deal with critical risks at their 
sources. 
M07 Iterative and dynamic ERM process steps  
B07.1 Identify new and emerging risks during ad 
hoc reviews. 
Identify new and emerging risks on a 
sufficiently periodic basis. 
Consistently identify new and emerging risks in a timely 
and proactive manner and report them to the appropriate 
persons. 
B07.2 Collect risk information from internal and 
external sources. 
Update the risk information collected from 
various sources when necessary. 
Regularly update the risk information collected from 
various sources. 
B07.3 Monitor and review risk identification, 
analysis, and response activities on an ad hoc 
basis. 
Monitor and review risk identification, analysis, 
and response activities on a sufficiently 
periodic basis in order to assure the quality of 
these activities. 
Regularly monitor and review risk identification, analysis, 
and response activities.  
Improve the quality of risk management activities 
according to the results of the monitoring and reviews. 
B07.4 Clearly record most information related to 
ERM. 
Clearly record most relevant ERM information 
and update it periodically. 
Provide a convenient access to the information 
for the risk owners. 
Clearly record all the relevant ERM information and 
update it regularly.  
Provide a convenient access to the information for all the 
relevant staff.  
B07.5 Identify the residual risks remaining after 
risk response. 
Identify and assess all the residual risks 
remaining after risk response.  
Check whether the risk response is adequate or 
not. 
Assess all the residual risks remaining after risk response 
and check whether the risk response is adequate or not.  
Develop new risk response strategies to tackle the residual 
risks according to the risk appetite and tolerance.  
M08 Leveraging risks as opportunities  
B08.1 Ensure that opportunities are recognized as 
one side of risks by the top management. 
Ensure that opportunities are recognized as one 
side of risks by the top management and risk 
owners. 
Ensure that opportunities are recognized as one side of 
risks by all the relevant staff. 
B08.2 Identify and explore opportunities on an ad 
hoc basis. 
Identify and explore most opportunities, 
including strategic opportunities, during risk 
management planning. 
Ensure that all the opportunities are regularly identified 
and explored during risk management planning. 




Action plans for improving ERM implementation 
Low → Medium Medium → High High → Very high 
B08.3 Assess the expected benefits of 
opportunities and the likelihood of obtaining 
these benefits. 
Assess most of the opportunities by weighing 
their expected benefits and relevant likelihood 
against the potential losses and their likelihood. 
Ensure that all the opportunities are regularly assessed by 
weighing the expected benefits and relevant likelihood 
against the potential losses and their likelihood. 
B08.4 Identify the opportunities for the expected 
improvement of firm performance and 
prioritize them. 
Pursue the opportunities for the expected 
improvement of firm performance in a priority 
order. 
Ensure that all the opportunities for the expected 
improvement of firm performance are actively sought. 
B08.5 Consider the core competencies and risk 
appetite when deciding to take risks.  
Ensure that most risk taking strategies are 
aligned with the core competencies and risk 
appetite. 
Ensure that all the risk taking strategies are consistently 
aligned with the core competencies and risk appetite. 
M09 Risk communication 
B09.1 Communicate and share risk information 
across most projects and departments on an 
ad hoc basis.  
Communicate and share risk information across 
most projects and departments on a sufficiently 
periodic basis. 
Regularly communicate and share all the relevant risk 
information across all the projects and departments in an 
effective and efficient manner.  
B09.2 Report risk information to the board and 
senior management on an ad hoc basis. 
Report relevant and critical risk information to 
the board and senior management in a timely 
manner. 
Report relevant and critical risk information (including the 
KRI data) to the board and senior management in an 
efficient manner according to risk severity or urgency. 
B09.3 Notify line managers, project managers and 
front-line staff of critical information and 
decisions from senior management on an ad 
hoc basis. 
Notify line managers, project managers and 
front-line staff of critical information and 
decisions from senior management in a timely 
manner. 
Establish clear communication lines to ensure that line 
managers, project managers and front-line staff are 
promptly notified of critical information and decisions 
from senior management. 
B09.4 Allow internal staff to provide reasonable 
comments and views on ERM 
implementation. 
Periodically hold workshops or seminars to 
encourage reasonable comments and views on 
ERM implementation of the relevant internal 
staff.  
Invite external consultants or experts to train 
the staff on ERM and to provide insights and 
suggestions for the ERM program. 
Regularly hold workshops or seminars to encourage 
reasonable comments and views on ERM implementation 
of all the relevant internal staff.  
Build up the long-term collaboration with external experts 
and regularly use their knowledge, skills and expertise to 
strengthen the ERM implementation. 
M10 A common risk language  
B10.1 Develop a risk language that explains most 
of the risk management terminologies and 
methodologies used within the firm. 
Ensure that the risk language clearly explains 
most of the risk management terminologies and 
methodologies used within the firm. 
Review and update the risk language on a 
sufficiently periodic basis. 
Ensure that the risk language clearly explains all the risk 
management terminologies and methodologies used 
within the firm. 
Regularly review and update the risk language. 




Action plans for improving ERM implementation 
Low → Medium Medium → High High → Very high 
B10.2 Create a glossary of the risk terms that are 
included in the risk language.  
Make the glossary accessible to all the 
relevant staff. 
Ensure that the risk language is understood by 
the top management and risk owners. 
Use the risk language in most of the risk 
communication within the firm. 
Ensure that the risk language is understood by all the 
relevant staff and consistently used in all the risk 
communication within the firm. 
M11 A risk management information system (RMIS) 
B11.1 Update the existing management 
information system or build up a new RMIS 
in order to facilitate risk communication 
across projects and departments and to 
record relevant risk information. 
Embed the ERM-related functions in to the 
existing management information system or 
build up a new RMIS that can improve risk 
communication across the firm, record ERM 
activities, undertake risk identification and 
analysis, facilitate selecting response strategies, 
and visualize the risk profile.   
Ensure the accuracy, timeliness, consistency, 
comprehensiveness, and applicability of the 
data in the RMIS. 
Ensure that the updated management information system 
or the RMIS can improve risk communication across the 
firm, record ERM activities, undertake risk identification 
and analysis, facilitate selecting response strategies, and 
visualize the risk profile.   
Ensure the accuracy, timeliness, consistency, 
comprehensiveness, and applicability of the data in the 
RMIS. 
Maintain and update the RMIS with the permission on a 
regular basis. 
B11.2 Train the senior management and risk 
owners on the application of the RMIS 
functions. 
Apply the RMIS in risk communication 
across projects and departments. 
Train all the relevant staff in the firm and 
ensure that they clearly understand the 
application of all the RMIS functions. 
Consistently apply the RMIS functions in 
ERM. 
Regularly train all the relevant staff in the firm and 
ensure that they clearly understand the application of all 
the RMIS functions, including the newly-added 
functions. 
Consistently apply all the RMIS functions in ERM. 
M12 Training programs 
B12.1 Formally train the risk owners to assure 
their clear understanding of the ERM policy, 
process and potential benefits, and to 
remove their misunderstanding and anxiety 
about ERM. 
Formally train all the relevant staff to assure their clear understanding of the ERM policy, process and 
potential benefits, and to remove their misunderstanding and anxiety about ERM. 
  
B12.2 Provide ad hoc training on ERM for the staff 
to equip them with knowledge and skills 
relating to ERM. 
Provide periodic training for the staff to update 
their knowledge and skills relating to ERM. 
Provide regular training for the staff to maintain their 
high-level knowledge and skills relating to ERM. 
B12.3 Train the relevant staff to make them learn 
from the business cases available. 
Train all the relevant staff through making 
good use of the recorded ERM information and 
experience.  
Ensure that they learn from the past successes 
Exploit learned experience for ERM using formal and 
informal methods.  
Ensure that all the relevant staff learn from the successes 
and failures from both previous and on-going projects. 




Action plans for improving ERM implementation 
Low → Medium Medium → High High → Very high 
and failures. 
B12.4 Encourage the staff who are professional or 
experienced in ERM to share their 
knowledge and experience with others 
within the firm. 
Ensure that the staff who are professional or experienced in ERM share their knowledge and experience 
with trainees in internal training programs. 
M13 Formalized key risk indicators (KRIs) 
B13.1 Identify quantifiable KRIs and the threshold 
levels for the risks at the department or 
project level. 
 
Identify quantifiable KRIs for most of the 
critical risks (including strategic risks) and 
assure the clarity in what is measured. 
Link the KRIs to the sources or the 
intermediate events of the risks. 
Align the quantitative threshold levels of the 
KRIs with the risk appetite and tolerance. 
Ensure that quantifiable KRIs are clearly identified for all 
the critical risks and that all the KRIs are linked to the 
risk sources. 
Ensure that the quantitative threshold levels of all the 
KRIs are consistently aligned with the risk appetite and 
tolerance. 
Prioritize the KRIs according to their relative importance. 
B13.2 Not applicable. Review and update the KRIs on a sufficiently 
periodic basis. 
Ensure that all the KRIs are consistently reviewed and 
updated. 
B13.3 Ensure that the relevant risk owners are 
clear about how to use the KRIs. 
 
Ensure that all the risk owners are clear about 
how to use the KRIs. 
Make the risk owners to monitor and analyze 
the KRIs on a sufficiently periodic basis. 
Ensure that all the relevant staff understand how to use 
the KRIs, and that all the risk owners regularly monitor 
and analyze the KRIs relating to their respective 
accountability. 
B13.4 Not applicable. Use the KRIs to proactively assess the shifts in 
risk exposures on a sufficiently periodic basis. 
Use the KRIs as the regular early warning signals of 
increasing risk exposures and enable more timely actions 
to address the risks. 
M14 Integration of ERM into business processes 
B14.1 Ensure that at least the top management 
considers risk information, risk tolerance and 
appetite, risk priority and risk response in 
strategic decision-making. 
Ensure that most of the management across the 
firm consistently considers risk information, 
risk tolerance and appetite, risk priority and risk 
response in most of the decision-making 
processes, including strategic decision-making. 
Ensure that all the management across the firm 
consistently considers risk information, risk tolerance and 
appetite, risk priority, and risk response in all the 
decision-making processes. 
B14.2 Ensure that ERM is at least integrated into 
the strategic planning process. 
Review the integration process on a 
sufficiently periodic basis. 
Ensure that ERM is integrated into most of the 
daily management and business processes. 
Regularly review the integration process. 
Ensure that ERM is fully integrated into all daily 
management and business processes. 




Action plans for improving ERM implementation 
Low → Medium Medium → High High → Very high 
B14.3 Assess the implementation of the ERM best 
practices on an ad hoc basis and identify the 
gaps between the status quo and the best 
practices. 
Periodically assess the implementation of the 
ERM best practices and identify the gaps 
between the status quo and the best practices.  
Determine the actions to fill the gaps and fill 
most of the gaps in a priority. 
Regularly and formally assess the implementation of the 
ERM best practices and identify the gaps between the 
status quo and the best practices. 
Take the selected actions to fill all the gaps in a priority 
order and to continuously improve ERM practices. 
M15 Objective setting 
B15.1 Clearly identify and express most of the 
objectives (e.g. strategic, operation, 
reporting and compliance).  
Make the objectives understood by most of 
the risk owners. 
Ensure that most of the objectives (e.g. 
strategic, operation, reporting and compliance) 
are measurable and clearly identified and 
expressed, and that all the risk owners are clear 
about their relevant objectives.  
Ensure that objectives at all levels (e.g. strategic, 
operation, reporting and compliance) are measurable, 
clearly identified and expressed, and readily understood 
by all the relevant staff.    
B15.2 Consider objective achievement when 
developing performance indicators. 
Develop measurable performance indicators for 
most of the objectives. 
Develop measurable performance indicators for all the 
objectives.  
Link all performance indicators with the objectives.  
Regularly review and update the performance indicators. 
B15.3 Review deviations from plans or 
expectations on an ad hoc basis. 
Review and assess most deviations from plans 
or expectations against the corporate objectives 
and project objectives on a sufficiently periodic 
basis. 
Regularly review and assess all the deviations from plans 
or expectations against the corporate objectives and 
project objectives. 
M16 Monitoring, review and improvement of the ERM framework 
B16.1 Monitor the progress of ERM 
implementation against, and deviation from, 
the ERM plan on an ad hoc basis. 
Monitor the progress of ERM implementation 
against, and deviation from, the ERM plan on a 
sufficiently periodic basis. 
Ensure the regular monitoring of the progress of ERM 
implementation against, and deviation from, the ERM 
plan. 
B16.2 Review whether the ERM framework, policy 
and plan are appropriate according to the 
corporate external and internal context on an 
ad hoc basis. 
Review whether the ERM framework, policy 
and plan are appropriate according to the 
corporate external and internal context on a 
sufficiently periodic basis. 
Ensure the regular review of the appropriateness of ERM 
framework, policy and plan according to the corporate 
external and internal context. 
B16.3 Consider how to improve the ERM 
framework, policy and plan, based on results 
of ad hoc monitoring and reviews. 
Consider and select the actions to update and 
improve the ERM framework, policy and plan, 
based on results of monitoring and reviews.  
Take the selected actions when necessary. 
Ensure that the actions are consistently taken to update 
and improve the ERM framework, policy and plan, based 
on results of monitoring and reviews. 
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9.6 Tools for developing the KBDSS 
The KBDSS for ERM was developed using Microsoft Visual Studio 2010. 
Microsoft Visual Studio 2010, developed by Microsoft Corporation, is a type 
of integrated development environment (IDE), which provides services and 
tools that enable a programmer to code, test, and implement a single program, 
or sometimes the series of programs that comprise an application (Shelly and 
Hoisington, 2010).  
Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 can be used to develop GUI applications along 
with Windows Forms applications, web sites, web applications, and web 
services in both native code and managed code. It includes a code editor 
supporting IntelliSense. IntelliSense is the implementation of auto-completion 
and intends to document and disambiguate variable names, functions and 
methods using reflection besides completing the symbol names typed by the 
programmer. In addition, the code editor supports code refactoring. Code 
refactoring is a technique for restructuring an existing body of code. This 
technique improves code readability and reduces complexity, thus improving 
the maintainability of the source code. Furthermore, Microsoft Visual 
Studio 2010 provides the Data Source Configuration Wizard, which enables 
programmers to connect the application to data from different sources, such as 
databases, web services, and objects. Thus, programmers do not need to 
explicitly create a connection object for his or her form or component.  
Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 supports different programming languages, 
including Visual Basic, Visual C/C++, Visual C#, and Visual F#. Visual Basic 
2010 is based on the Visual Basic programming language developed by 
Microsoft Corporation in 1991 to allow easy, visual-oriented development of 
Windows applications (Schneider, 2011). Visual Basic, in turn, was the BASIC 
(Beginner’s All-purpose Symbolic Instructional Code) language, which was 
developed in the 1960s. Visual Basic 2010 allows programmers to easily build 
complex Windows and Web programs, as well as other software tools. Visual 
Basic is the most widely used programming language in the world because it 
is English-like and is considered as one of the easier enterprise-level 
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programming languages to learn. In addition, it is as powerful as the other 
programming languages in Microsoft Visual Studio 2010, such as Visual C++ 
and C# (Shelly and Hoisington, 2010). Therefore, the KBDSS was developed 
using Visual Basic 2010 in this research. 
9.7 Demonstration of the KBDSS 
The KBDSS is in the exe format, and consists of the entrance interface, the 
introduction interface, the ERM maturity assessment interfaces, the action 
plan interfaces, and the exit interface. In this section, a hypothesized example 
is used to demonstrate how the KBDSS works. The data of the example is 
shown in Table 9.4. 
Table 9.4 Data of the hypothesized example 
Code Score Code Score Code Score Code Score Code Score Code Score 
B1.1 4 B3.3 3 B5.5 2 B7.3 3 B9.4 3 B13.3 1 
B1.2 3 B3.4 2 B6.1 5 B7.4 3 B10.1 4 B13.4 2 
B1.3 3 B3.5 1 B6.2 4 B7.5 3 B10.2 3 B14.1 3 
B1.4 5 B4.1 4 B6.3 4 B8.1 4 B11.1 1 B14.2 3 
B1.5 4 B4.2 4 B6.4 3 B8.2 5 B11.2 1 B14.3 2 
B2.1 5 B4.3 3 B6.5 4 B8.3 4 B12.1 3 B15.1 5 
B2.2 3 B4.4 4 B6.6 2 B8.4 3 B12.2 3 B15.2 5 
B2.3 3 B5.1 4 B6.7 3 B8.5 3 B12.3 3 B15.3 5 
B2.4 2 B5.2 3 B6.8 3 B9.1 4 B12.4 2 B16.1 3 
B3.1 4 B5.3 3 B7.1 4 B9.2 5 B13.1 2 B16.2 3 
B3.2 3 B5.4 2 B7.2 4 B9.3 4 B13.2 2 B16.3 2 
Firstly, the user needs to copy the KBDSS to the hard disk of a computer with 
the Windows operating system. The KBDSS is designed to print an ERM 
maturity assessment report. Thus, to print out the report, a printer needs to be 
linked to the computer; alternatively, the Adobe Acrobat Software could be 
installed to the computer to convert the report into a PDF (Portable Document 
Format) file.  
To start the KBDSS, the user has to double click the “KBDSS-ERM” icon, 
and then the entrance interface is presented (see Figure 9.2). To enter the 
KBDSS, the user needs to click “Enter”.  
Then, the introduction interface is presented and provides the user with the 
definition of ERM, the objectives of the KBDSS, the ERM maturity criteria 
and the assessment method (see Figure 9.3). After reading the introduction, the 
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user needs to tick the checkbox, which indicates he or she has already read the 
introduction, and then click the “Proceed to Assessment” button to start the 
ERM maturity assessment. If the checkbox is not ticked, the “Proceed to 
Assessment” button is not enabled. 
 




 Figure 9.3 The introduction interface of the KBDSS 
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The ERM maturity assessment part of the KBDSS includes eight interfaces. 
The first seven interfaces allow the user to input the implementation level of 
each best practice (i.e. the data in Table 9.4) by clicking the radio-button. The 
screenshots of these assessment interfaces are shown in Figures 9.4-9.10. Each 
best practice has five radio-buttons, which use numbers of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 to 
represent very low, low, medium, high and very high, respectively. In addition, 
each of the seven interfaces contains a “Back” button and a “Continue” button. 
If the user clicks the “Back” button, the KBDSS presents the previous 
interface and closes the current interface. If the user clicks the “Continue” 




























Figure 9.10 Assessment interface 7 of the KBDSS 
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If not all the best practices on an interface are assessed by the user, the user 
cannot proceed to the next interface by clicking the “Continue” button and the 
KBDSS presents a message box to remind the user to check whether all the 
best practices on that interface have been assessed (see Figure 9.11).  
 
Figure 9.11 The error message box of the KBDSS 
In addition, the KBDSS provides notes to explain some terminologies. These 
notes are invisible by default. To read the note, the user needs to put the cursor 
over a certain terminology. Figure 9.12 shows a note that explains what a KRI 
is. 
 
Figure 9.12 The note of a terminology in the KBDSS 
The KBDSS presents the results on the eighth interface of the ERM maturity 
assessment part (see Figure 9.13). The user clicks the “See Results” button to 
obtain the criteria scores and the overall score (i.e. ERMMI). Each criteria 
score is in proportion to its respective bar of the histogram, and the bar color 
represents the linguistic term that is corresponded to the score. The rules to 
correspond linguistic terms to scores are also provided on this interface. 
According to Figure 9.13, “a RMIS” and “formalized KRIs” obtain a very low 
and a low implementation level, which are denoted by a red and an orange bar, 
respectively. The implementation of eight criteria is at the medium level and 
represented by bars in yellow while five have high implementation levels with 
blue bars. Only one criterion, i.e. objective setting, has a very high 
implementation level, represented by a green bar. In addition, the ERMMI is 
0.537, which means the ERM maturity is at the medium level. Nine criteria 
obtain scores with the light green backcolor, indicating that these scores are 
above the ERMMI, while seven have score with the pink backcolor, showing 
that these scores are below the ERMMI. After obtaining the assessment results, 
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the user can proceed to see the action plans for improving ERM practices by 
clicking the “Proceed to Action Plans” button. Also, the user can obtain the 
ERM maturity assessment report by clicking the “Print the ERM Maturity 
Assessment Report” button. If no printer is linked to the computer, the report 
is printed as a PDF file. 
The action plan part of the KBDSS consists of seven interfaces. The user can 
return to the previous interface and proceed to the next interface by clicking 
the “Back” button and a “Continue” button, respectively. The screenshots of 
these interfaces are shown in Figures 9.14-9.20. The user can click the “All the 
Action Plans” button to obtain all the action plans on an interface, which are 
selected by the KBDSS according to the assessment results. If an action plan is 
long and cannot be presented in one line in the textbox, the user can use the 
scroll bar to read the whole action plan. The screenshots in the seven figures 
present the action plans for improving the implementation of the 66 best 
practices. In addition to the “All the Action Plans” button, there are another 
two buttons on the top of these interfaces. On each action plan interface, only 
the action plans for the practices scored below the ERMMI are presented if the 
user clicks the “Action Plans for Practices with Scores < Overall Score” 
button, or only the action plans for the practices scored above the ERMMI are 
presented if the user clicks the “Action Plans for Practices with Scores ≥ 
Overall Score” button. Taking the first action plan interface as an example (see 
Figure 9.14), Figure 9.21 and Figure 9.22 show the screenshots of the action 
plans for the practices scored below the ERMMI and those for the practices 








































Figure 9.22 Action plans for best practices scored above the ERMMI 
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After obtaining the action plans for improving ERM practices, the user would 
proceed to the exit interface (see Figure 9.23). The user may return to the 
previous interface by clicking the “Back” button, exit by clicking the “Exit” 
button, or obtain the assessment report by clicking the “Print the ERM 
Maturity Assessment Report” button. The report produced here is the same as 
the one generated on the eighth interface of the ERM maturity assessment 
part. 
 
Figure 9.23 The exit interface of the KBDSS 
The printable ERM maturity assessment report consists of four pages, and 
presents the maturity criterion scores, the overall maturity score, the 






















Figure 9.27 The ERM maturity assessment report sample (page 4)
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9.8 Validation of the KBDSS 
Validation and verification techniques are used to evaluate the quality of 
software systems, such as KBDSSs. Verification is building the system right, 
while validation is building the right system (Boehm, 1984). Thus, verification 
is aimed at eliminating errors in the system, and is typically a software and 
programming task. Validation is more concerned with the quality of the system; 
the extent to which it performs its task, the degree of accuracy, and the 
observed robustness. Verification can be considered as part of validation: a 
system that is not “built right” is unlikely to be “the right system” (O'Keefe 
and Preece, 1996; Preece, 2001). Validation overshadows formal verification, 
and it seems that validation must always be more than verification (O'Keefe 
and Preece, 1996). O'Keefe and O'Leary (1993) listed seven methods to 
validate ESs: 
(1) Case testing 
Cases previously solved by an expert are run through the system, or new 
cases are presented to both expert and system, and the solutions are 
compared. Case testing assumes that the experts against which the system 
is compared are always correct, which means if the system differs from the 
expert then it is wrong. Obviously, it is not always the case.  
(2) Turing tests 
A Turing test refers to a third-party expert comparing the results from an 
ES with those from a human expert. To ensure the objectivity, the process 
should be blinded so that it is not clear which result is the ES’s and which 
is the human’s. There is no assumption that the human expert is correct, 





An analogy to case testing is connecting the system to a simulation model. 
Each simulation run is a “test case” and different scenarios with various 
parameter settings can produce a number of different runs. This validation 
tool is powerful for simple deterministic simulation models, but 
problematic in complex situations. This is because the simulation is not a 
perfect model that performs within an acceptable range.   
(4) Control groups 
A Turing test can be combined with a control group method for systems 
that rely on the combination of the human user and system to solve 
problems. Cases are presented to two separate groups: one with the system, 
and the other without. It is anticipated that the group with the system 
outperforms the control group. However, the two groups may have 
performed differently irrespective of one group with the system, and a 
small number of case studies may not show up this inherent difference. 
(5) Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is performed by systematically changing a system’s 
input variable values over some range of interest and observing the effect 
upon the system. One major pitfall with sensitivity analysis is that starting 
with a few cases and altering them is unlikely to cover a large part of the 
input domain. 
(6) Comparison against other models 
In some cases, there is likely to be a different type of model, such as an 
optimization or statistical model. Comparison of the system against this 
model can provide useful insights.  
(7) Line of reasoning 
Line of reasoning can be used as evidence in a Turing test. However, this 
requires that human experts articulate their reasoning and that it can be 
presented to third-party experts in a form similar to the explanation 
facilities of the shell being used. A more complex approach is to compare 
aspects of the reasoning process, such as the relative time taken to reason, 
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the amount of data used, or the number of hypotheses established and 
rejected. 
Among these methods, case testing has been considered as the most prevalent 
method of validation (O'Keefe and Preece, 1996). Some KBDSSs in the 
construction management area have been validated through case testing (Arain 
and Low, 2006; Imriyas et al., 2007; Liu and Ling, 2005). Although case 
testing assumed that experts are correct, other methods are also dependent on 
the subjective judgment of experts. Even if the Turing test employs a 
third-party expert to compare the results from the system and experts, this 
method still assumes that the third-party expert is correct. Thus, this research 
adopts case testing to validate the KBDSS because it is popular and fits the 
evolutionary development method common to many computerized systems 
(O'Keefe and O'Leary, 1993).   
Five experts from five different CCFs located in different countries were 
contacted for the validation of the KBDSS. It should be noted that these 
experts were not involved in the data collection of Survey I or the 
development of the action plans. They were coded as E1, E2, E3, E4 and E5 
(see Table 9.5). Their work experience in the construction industry ranged 
from 11 to 31 years. Three of them held positions in the senior management 
while two were department managers.  
Table 9.5 Profile of the validation experts 
Expert Experience Designation Location 
E1 20 years President China 
E2 18 years Vice president Sri Lanka 
E3 11 years Manager of Contract Department United Arab Emirates  
E4 12 years Manager of International Marketing Department Uganda 
E5 31 years Director Singapore 
Five experts were adequate for validating the KBDSS, compared with prior 
studies: Arain and Low (2006) validated a KBDSS for managing variation 
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orders by a team of four professionals and one case; Liu and Ling (2005) 
verified a fuzzy system for mark-up estimations by one expert using three 
cases; and Imriyas et al. (2007) validated a KBS for insurance premium rating 
by five experts and one hypothetical case. 
During the validation process, these experts were first asked to rate the 
implementation levels of the 16 ERM maturity criteria as well as the overall 
ERM maturity of their firms according to their experience and judgments (see 
Appendix 4). To improve the accuracy of the rating, the scores were assigned 
in the form of percentage. Thus, there were at least two decimal places in the 
fractional part of the scores. Then, the experts applied the KBDSS to assess 
their ERM maturity and returned the ERM maturity assessment reports. The 
scores assigned by the experts (SE) were compared with those calculated by 
the KBDSS (SK). The comparison intended to test the validity of the fuzzy 
ERM maturity model in the KBDSS. In addition, the experts were requested to 
comment on the KBDSS in terms of usefulness of the action plans to decision 
making, as well as the user-friendliness of the KBDSS. 
Specifically, the validity of the model was determined by calculating the 
percentage error (PE), mean PE (MPE), and mean absolute PE (MAPE). This 
approach has been adopted by Liu and Ling (2005), Lim et al. (2012), and 
Ling et al. (2012). The formulae are shown as below: 
P   (SE   SK   SE     %  (9.1) 
 P  ∑P     (9.2) 
 AP  ∑|P  |   (9.3) 
where n is the number of experts.  
The MPE is used to check whether the model result has a tendency to be over 
(negative sign) or below (positive sign) the respective expert judgment, while 
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the MAPE indicates the magnitude of model errors (Liu and Ling, 2005). A 
lower MAPE indicates a lower magnitude of errors and higher accuracy of the 
model.  




E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 
M01 -16.7% -5.7% 7.1% -20.0% -12.5% -9.6% 12.4% 
M02 -4.2% -11.0% -5.8% -5.8% -4.0% -6.2% 6.2% 
M03 -16.7% 8.5% 14.3% 11.1% 8.5% 5.1% 11.8% 
M04 1.7% 2.8% -13.1% 3.8% 27.0% 4.4% 9.7% 
M05 0.0% 4.3% 10.0% 20.0% 11.0% 9.1% 9.1% 
M06 10.7% 11.5% 10.7% 6.2% -4.3% 7.0% 8.7% 
M07 20.0% -14.3% 20.0% -12.5% 25.0% 7.6% 18.4% 
M08 14.3% 0.0% 14.3% 20.0% 39.0% 17.5% 17.5% 
M09 1.0% 12.4% 8.9% 14.0% 12.4% 9.7% 9.7% 
M10 6.3% 6.3% 0.0% 16.7% -25.0% 0.9% 10.9% 
M11 -25.0% 17.0% 17.0% 17.0% 16.5% 8.5% 18.5% 
M12 -12.6% 16.7% -4.2% 10.7% 9.7% 4.1% 10.8% 
M13 12.4% 17.0% 16.5% -25.0% 9.7% 6.1% 16.1% 
M14 2.8% 16.7% 0.0% -25.0% 7.3% 0.4% 10.4% 
M15 -7.1% 6.3% -0.8% 16.6% 30.5% 9.1% 12.3% 
M16 -4.2% 30.5% 16.8% 2.8% 35.3% 16.2% 17.9% 
ERMMI -9.6% 13.3% 13.0% 10.2% 3.3% 6.0% 9.9% 
The validation results are presented in Table 9.6. The PE values ranged from 
-25.0% to 39.0%, while the MPE values ranged from -9.6% to 17.5%. The 
MPE signs suggested that the model was likely to underestimate the 
implementation levels of 13 maturity criteria and ERMMI, and to overestimate 
the implementation levels of three maturity criteria. Only two maturity criteria 
obtained MPE values over 10%, indicating that the results of the ERM 
maturity model were still consistent with the expert judgments.  
In addition, the MAPE values ranged from 6.2% to 18.5%, suggesting that the 
model had the accuracy ranging from 93.8% to 81.5% in assessing the 
maturity criteria and the ERMMI. Fayek and Oduba (2005) reported that a 
fuzzy system could be seen as successful if the discrepancy between the 
defuzzified and actual values was less than 33% of the actual value. Lee (2007) 
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reported a fuzzy ES that showed the accuracy between 84.68% and 66.50%. 
Ling et al. (2012) developed mathematical models to predict corporate 
competitiveness, with the MAPE values of 14.4% and 22.2%. Compared with 
these previous studies, the fuzzy ERM maturity model in the KBDSS can be 
seen as robust and valid.  
Moreover, the experts commented on the usefulness of the action plans to 
decision making. All the five experts agreed that the action plans presented in 
the KBDSS were useful and helpful for making decisions relating to ERM 
implementation. Specifically, E1 opined that these action plans 
comprehensively described what a company should do to obtain a mature 
ERM program, and included some new ideas about risk management, while 
E4 expressed that the action plans may serve as guidelines for the firm to 
implement ERM in the international market. However, E3 pointed out that the 
parent company should practice ERM according to the action plans, and share 
some resources with its subsidiaries. E3 added that it was impossible to 
implement ERM in subsidiaries without the support from the parent company. 
Also, E5 expressed that the small firms would not need such complicated 
action plans, which substantiated the association between ERM 
implementation and firm size. But E5 admitted that these action plans can help 
the management make decisions relating to risk management. Therefore, the 
usefulness of the action plans to decision making can be seen as valid. 
Furthermore, all the five experts agreed that the KBDSS was user-friendly. 
Specifically, E2, E3 and E5 expressed that the clear interface layout made it 
easy for the user to assess the ERM maturity and understand how to 
effectively conduct risk management, while E4 pointed out that it was 
convenient to print out an assessment report, which allowed the users to take 
away the results and action plans. However, E1 suggested that it was better to 
provide a Chinese version of the assessment report because most of the senior 
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management staff in CCFs had poor English ability.  
9.9 Summary 
This chapter presents the development of the KBDSS for ERM in CCFs. 
Developed using Microsoft Visual Basic 2010, the KBDSS can assess the 
ERM maturity, visualize the assessment results, provide action plans for 
improving ERM practices, and generate a printable ERM maturity assessment 
report. The KBDSS consists of a knowledge base, a GUI, and a DSE. The 
action plans in the knowledge base were acquired from the literature review 
and the interviews with practitioners. An example was used to demonstrate 
how the KBDSS works and five experts from CCFs were invited to validate 
the KBDSS. According to the validation results, the ERM maturity model in 
the KBDSS was seen as robust and valid, the action plans were useful to 
decision making relating to ERM, and the KBDSS was user-friendly. 
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10 Conclusions and Recommendations 
10.1 Research findings and conclusions 
The major research findings and conclusions are presented in the following 
sections. 
10.1.1 A proposed ERM framework for construction firms 
The first objective of this research was to propose an ERM framework for 
construction firms. As Figure 3.6 indicates, this ERM framework includes 12 
components: (1) an ERM process; (2) commitment of the board and senior 
management; (3) training programs; (4) resources; (5) ERM ownership; (6) 
risk-aware culture; (7) objectives; (8) a common risk language; (9) PRM; (10) 
RMIS; (11) risk communication; and (12) monitoring, review and continuous 
improvement of the ERM framework.  
This ERM framework presents an outline of the functional activities that are 
necessary for ERM implementation in construction firms. According to the 
stage of development in ERM implementation and the real-world 
circumstances, construction firms can customize the framework by selecting 
the components that they deem as important and appropriate. Thus, the first 
objective, which intends to propose an ERM framework for construction firms, 
was fulfilled. 
10.1.2 An ERM maturity model for CCFs 
The ERM implementation level can be described by a maturity continuum. 
The second objective of this research was to develop an ERM maturity model 
to assess the ERM maturity levels of CCFs. The keys of an ERM maturity 
model are the criteria or attributes that describe an effective or successful 
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ERM program and that are related to the components of the existing ERM 
frameworks. Through the literature review, a total of 16 maturity criteria were 
identified. In addition, to enable users to easily understand the criteria and 
assess their ERM maturity by considering their current practices, 71 ERM best 
practices were identified from the literature review and the pilot study. These 
practices were related to the 16 criteria and served as the sub-criteria.   
Through Survey I with 89 professionals, the importance of the 16 maturity 
criteria and the applicability of the ERM best practices in CCFs were checked. 
The analysis results indicated that all the 16 criteria were statistically speaking, 
significantly important for a mature ERM program, and included in the model. 
Thus, Hypothesis 1, stating that “ERM maturity level in CCFs depends on a 
set of critical criteria”, was supported. “Commitment of the board and senior 
management”, “risk identification, analysis and response” and “objective 
setting”, “ERM ownership”, “integration of ERM into business processes”, 
“sufficient resources” were the top six important criteria with mean scores 
over 4.00. Using equation 3.9 and 3.10, the weights of the 16 criteria in the 
model were calculated, ranging from 7.21% to 5.40%. In addition, 66 out of 
the 71 ERM best practices were statistically speaking, significantly applicable 
in CCFs and thus included in the model, as the sub-criteria. The five practices 
with p-values over 0.05 were not recognized as significantly applicable in 
CCFs and thus were excluded from the model. The exclusion of these five 
practices was supported by the comments from four practitioners, who 
participated in Survey I.  
Furthermore, the FST was adopted in the model to deal with the problems 
relating to ambiguous, subjective and imprecise judgments, which are 
inevitably involved in the ERM maturity assessment and cannot be handled by 
the classical set theory.  
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The ERM maturity model was embedded into the KBDSS and validated by 
five experts. They were from five different CCFs located in different countries, 
and did not participate in the Survey I. It was found that the assessment results 
from the KBDSS were consistent with the expert judgments, and that the 
accuracy of the model in assessing the maturity criteria and ERMMI ranged 
from 93.8% to 81.5%. Therefore, the fuzzy ERM maturity model was 
considered as robust and valid. The second research objective, “develop an 
ERM maturity model to assess the ERM maturity in CCFs”, was achieved. 
10.1.3 ERM maturity in CCFs based in Singapore 
The third research objective was to investigate the ERM maturity level in 
CCFs based in Singapore. Survey II was performed to collect the data relating 
to the implementation levels of the 66 ERM best practices from 35 CCFs in 
Singapore. By inputting these data into the ERM maturity model, the ERMMI 
values of these firms were obtained.  
It was found that 71.4% of these firms had low-level ERM maturity (i.e. 0.125 
≤ ERMMI < 0.375) while the remaining had medium-level ERM maturity (i.e. 
0.375 ≤ ERMMI < 0.625). Also, this research investigated the relationship 
between ERM maturity and firm size, and found that there appeared to be 
significant association between ERM maturity level and firm size. Thus, the 
larger firms tended to have higher-level ERM maturity. This finding was also 
substantiated by the three case studies. 
Although some CCFs had medium-level ERM maturity, the overall mean 
ERMMI of all the 35 CCFs in Singapore was 0.325, implying that their overall 
ERM maturity level was low (i.e. 0.125 ≤ ERMMI < 0.375). Thus, Hypothesis 
2 that “ERM maturity level in CCFs based in Singapore is low” was accepted, 
and the third research objective was fulfilled.   
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10.1.4 Critical factors driving and hindering ERM implementation in 
CCFs based in Singapore 
The ERM maturity can be influenced by the interactions between the drivers 
for and hindrances to ERM implementation. The fourth research objective was 
to examine the critical factors driving and hindering the implementation of 
ERM in CCFs based in Singapore, and to analyze them in tandem with 
theories of organizational behavior. A total of 17 drivers and 36 hindrances 
were identified through the comprehensive literature review, and the data that 
could assess the significance of these factors in influencing ERM 
implementation were collected in Survey II.  
In terms of the drivers for ERM implementation, the analysis results indicated 
that “improved decision-making”, “reduced costs and losses”, “competitive 
advantages”, “reduced earnings volatility”, and “improved control of an 
enterprise over its projects” were the top five influential drivers. Also, 13 out 
of the 17 drivers significantly drove ERM implementation in CCFs based in 
Singapore. Thus, Hypothesis 3, stating that “ERM implementation in CCFs 
based in Singapore is affected by a set of critical drivers”, was partially 
supported. In addition, the drivers relating to the potential benefits of ERM 
were found to have significant positive influence on ERM implementation. By 
contrast, those relating to compliance and corporate governance requirements, 
i.e. “legal and regulatory compliance requirements”, “non-mandatory reports 
or standards”, and “credit rating agencies’ requirements”, did not have 
significantly positive influence on ERM implementation. However, these three 
drivers were found to have greater influence on ERM implementation in the 
medium-maturity CCFs than the low-maturity firms. In addition to these three 
drivers, “reduced costs and losses” and “improved clients’ satisfaction” had 
different mean scores between the two CCF groups. Despite statistical 
differences in the mean scores of the five drivers, there was statistically 
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significant agreement on the rankings of all the drivers between the low- and 
medium-maturity CCFs.   
As for the hindrances to ERM implementation, “insufficient resources (e.g. 
time, money, people, etc.)”, “lack of perceived value or benefits”, “perception 
that ERM increases costs and administration”, “unsupportive organizational 
culture”, “inadequate training on ERM”, “lack of qualified personnel to 
implement ERM”, “lack of internal knowledge, skills and expertise”, “lack of 
an ERM business case”, “lack of the board or senior management leadership”, 
and “lack of a clear ERM implementation plan” were the top ten influential 
hindrances. Also, the analysis results indicated that 25 out of the 36 hindrances 
significantly hindered ERM implementation in CCFs based in Singapore. Thus, 
Hypothesis 4, stating that “ERM implementation in CCFs based in Singapore 
is affected by a set of critical hindrances”, was partially supported. In addition, 
“lack of risk management techniques and tools”, “lack of an ERM business 
case”, and “lack of a clear ERM implementation plan” had greater negative 
influence on ERM implementation in the low-maturity CCFs, while “inability 
to coordinate with other departments” exerted more negative influence on 
ERM implementation in the medium-maturity CCFs. Despite significant 
differences in the mean scores of the four hindrances, there was strong and 
statistical significant agreement on the rankings of all the hindrances between 
the low- and medium-maturity CCFs.   
In this research, ERM implementation can be seen as an incremental, 
evolutionary and continuous organizational change in construction firms. 
Organizational change requires organizational learning as a medium (Alas and 
Sharifi, 2002), change in organizational culture (Senior and Fleming, 2006), 
appropriate motivation, and the leadership of change agents. Hence, the 
significant drivers and hindrances were interpreted in tandem with the 
organizational behavior theories. From the perspective of organizational 
change theories, some of the drivers for ERM implementation were consistent 
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with Theory E while others were in accordance with Theory O, indicating that 
both theories could be used to implement ERM in the Singapore-based CCFs. 
The 13 significant drivers for ERM implementation were also linked to the 
driving forces of organizational change (see Section 7.3.3.3). In addition, the 
25 significant hindrances were linked to the sources of resistances to 
organizational change, the impediments to organizational learning, the 
three-level organizational culture model, the hygiene factors and the 
expectancy and instrumentality variables in the expectancy theory of 
motivation, as well as the potential errors of leaders, respectively (see Section 
7.3.4.3). Therefore, the fourth research objective, stating that “examine the 
critical factors driving and hindering the implementation of ERM in CCFs 
based in Singapore, and analyze them in tandem with theories of 
organizational behavior”, was achived.  
10.1.5 A KBDSS for ERM 
The last research objective was to develop a KBDSS for ERM in CCFs. This 
KBDSS can assess the ERM maturity, visualize the ERM maturity assessment 
results, provide action plans for improving ERM practices along the maturity 
continuum, and generate a printable ERM maturity assessment report. This 
KBDSS was developed using Microsoft Visual Basic 2010, and consisted of a 
knowledge base, a GUI, and a DSE. The knowledge base contained the 16 
ERM maturity criteria, the 66 ERM best practices applicable in CCFs, and the 
191 action plans for improving the implementation of the best practices that 
were acquired from the comprehensive literature review and the practitioner 
interviewees. The DSE can compute the maturity scores using the fuzzy ERM 
maturity model, visualize the results, select the appropriate action plans for 
users, and generate a report in the printable format. The action plans for 
improving ERM implementation were acquired from the comprehensive 
literature review and the interviews with practitioners. As the validation results 
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indicated, the action plans were useful and helpful for making decisions 
relating to ERM implementation, and the KBDSS was user-friendly. Thus, the 
fifth research objective, involving the development of an ERM KBDSS, was 
fulfilled. 
10.1.6 Conclusions 
This research provided an understanding of how ERM was implemented in 
CCFs based in Singapore by fulfilling five research objectives and testing four 
hypotheses. Hypotheses 1 and 2 were fully supported, while Hypotheses 3 and 
4 were partially supported because some drivers and hindrances were not 
significantly influential to ERM implementation. Some major conclusions can 
be drawn and are presented as follows: 
(1) The fuzzy ERM maturity model, consisting of 16 criteria and 66 
sub-criteria, can effectively assess ERM maturity in CCFs in the global 
market;  
(2) The overall ERM maturity level of CCFs based in Singapore is low while 
larger firms are likely to have higher-level ERM maturity; 
(3) The ERM implementation in CCFs based in Singapore is significantly 
driven by 13 factors and significantly hindered by 25 factors;  
(4) The ERM implementation in CCFs based in Singapore is influenced by the 
parent companies of these CCFs; and  
(5) The computerized KBDSS is user-friendly and helpful for not only 
decision-making, but also ERM maturity assessment and development of 
plans for improvement. 
10.2 Contributions to the literature 
A number of studies have uncovered ERM implementation in various 
industries, such as the banking (Ciorciari and Blattner, 2008; Wu and Olson, 
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2009), insurance (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; Nocco and Stulz, 2006), and 
energy industries (Aabo et al., 2005; Muralidhar, 2010). However, few have 
attempted to focus on ERM implementation status in the construction industry. 
Thus, this research expands the literature through providing an understanding 
of ERM implementation in construction firms.  
The first contribution of this research is a proposed ERM framework to 
facilitate ERM implementation in construction firms (see Figure 3.6). 
Compared with the existing ERM frameworks for various industries, this 
framework considers the project-based nature of construction firms and the 
key issues of ERM, thus clarifying the relationship between ERM and PRM.  
The second contribution is an ERM maturity model for CCFs. Different from 
the existing ERMMMs, the proposed model adopts the FST because this 
theory can tackle the problems relating to ambiguous, subjective and 
imprecise judgments. The FST can quantify the linguistic facets of data 
(Pedrycz et al., 2011; Zimmermann, 2001). Thus, the proposed model is 
quantitative, different from most of the existing models that are qualitative. In 
addition, the proposed model consists of the 16 important maturity criteria and 
66 ERM best practices, which have been validated in Survey I. These criteria 
and best practices are more comprehensive than the existing models, and 
enable users to easily understand the criteria and assess their ERM maturity 
according to their current ERM practices. Using this model, this research 
investigates the degree of ERM maturity in CCFs based in Singapore. 
Thirdly, few studies have identified the drivers for and hindrances to ERM 
implementation in construction firms. Thus, the identification of the critical 
factors driving and hindering the ERM implementation in Singapore-based 
CCFs can contribute to the literature. 
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Lastly, this research elaborates the relationship among the theories of 
organizational behavior, including the theories of organizational change, 
organizational learning, organizational culture, motivation, and leadership (see 
Figure 4.7). Given that few studies have investigated the theoretical rational 
behind ERM implementation, this research interprets ERM implementation in 
construction firms in tandem with the theories of organizational behavior and 
provides the theoretical rational behind the ERM implementation in 
Singapore-based CCFs. Thus, this research expands the literature of ERM and 
contributes to the theories of organizational behavior. 
10.3 Contributions to the practices 
This research significantly contributes to the practices. Specifically, this 
research identifies 16 important ERM maturity criteria and 66 applicable ERM 
best practices, which provide a comprehensive picture of a mature ERM 
program and can comprise a guide for ERM implementation in construction 
firms.  
In addition, the ERM maturity model developed in this research allows users 
to assess its ERM maturity and to obtain a clear view of the status quo, 
strengths and weaknesses of their ERM implementation. Based on the 
assessment results, the management staff of the company can take measures 
and prioritize resources to improve the weak areas of the ERM 
implementation. 
As the ERM maturity model adopts the FST to calculate the maturity scores, 
the application of this model involves perceptibly complicated mathematical 
calculations. Thus, this research develops an ERM KBDSS, which includes 
the model and provides an easy-to-use computerized platform for the users to 
assess ERM maturity, thus ensuring the accuracy of the calculations of TFNs. 
Also, the KBDSS contains a series of action plans for improving ERM 
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implementation. According to the assessment results, the KBDSS can select 
specific action plans for improving the implementation of specific best 
practices, thus effectively supporting the decision-making relating to ERM. In 
addition, the KBDSS can generate a printable ERM maturity assessment 
report, which includes the assessment results and the recommended action 
plans, thus making it easy for the users to keep the results and the action plans. 
Furthermore, the KBDSS serves as a learning tool for the users unfamiliar 
with ERM. When they use the KBDSS, they need to read the ERM best 
practices and think about the current practices in their firms. This thinking 
process is likely to contribute to their knowledge and practices relating to 
ERM. 
Moreover, the identification of the critical drivers for and hindrances to ERM 
implementation allows practitioners to take measures to strengthen the 
positive influence of drivers and diminish the negative influence of hindrances. 
The management would refer to the action plans provided by the KBDSS to 
develop the specific measures, and determine the priority of the measures.  
Lastly, case studies were performed to uncover how ERM was implemented in 
CCFs in Singapore, and present managerial implications through cross-case 
comparisons. These implications allow practitioners to understand ERM 
implementation in reality and learn from the past experiences of other firms, 
thus contributing to the ERM practices.   
10.4 Limitations 
Despite the achievement of the research objectives, there are limitations to the 
conclusions drawn from this research.  
Although the ERM maturity criteria, ERM best practices, and the factors 
driving and hindering ERM implementation were identified from the 
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comprehensive literature review, they may not be exhaustive with the passage 
of time.  
In addition, because of the difficulty in constructing a sampling frame in 
Survey I, this study used the non-probability sample, which has inherent 
limitations. Despite the inherent limitations, it can still be used to obtain a 
representative sample (Patton, 2001), and has been recognized as being 
appropriate when the respondents were not randomly selected from the entire 
population, but were rather selected based on whether they were willing to 
participate in the study (Wilkins, 2011). 
10.5 Recommendations for future research 
This research sets a foundation for future research on ERM implementation in 
the construction industry. Future research is recommended in the following 
areas. 
Firstly, this research found that the potential benefits significantly drove ERM 
implementation. The management staff should be convinced that these 
benefits can outweigh the cost related to ERM implementation. Thus, future 
research would develop a set of metrics that can measure ERM performance, 
which could demonstrate the tangible ERM benefits to the management staff.  
In addition, future research can examine the impact of implementing ERM on 
project performance, and the differences in project performance between 
construction firms with different ERM maturity levels. As construction firms 
are project-based, the positive impact on project performance can be a tangible 
benefit of ERM. If the improvement in project performance resulting from 
implementing ERM could be confirmed, more construction firms would be 
motivated to implement ERM. 
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Moreover, as ERM implementation can be seen as an organizational change, 
future research would investigate the appropriate organizational learning styles, 
motivation measures, and leadership styles for ERM implementation in 
construction firms, which can expand the literature relating to theories of 
organizational behavior. 
Lastly, further research would develop a benchmarking system for ERM and 
establish a database containing the maturity scores collected from a large 
number of construction firms with various characteristics. The benchmarking 
system could be embedded into the KBDSS, which allows the users to 
compare their ERM implementation with the average implementation level of 
all the firms and those with certain firm characteristics, respectively. Such an 
updated KBDSS therefore allows the users to make better informed decisions 
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Appendix 1 Questionnaire in Survey I 
Survey on Enterprise Risk Management Maturity Criteria and 
the Best Practices of Chinese Construction Firms 
Part I: Introduction  
Risk management in construction firms should cover not just the project risks, 
but also the risks at the enterprise level. Hence, enterprise risk management 
(ERM), which has been widely used in financial and energy industries, is also 
necessary for construction firms, though few studies about ERM in 
construction firms have been conducted. The Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) in the US defined ERM 
as “a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and 
other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, 
designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage 
risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding 
the achievement of entity objectives”. The State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) of the State Council of China issued a 
Guide to Enterprise Risk Management for Central Enterprises in 2006 to 
encourage ERM implementation in the Chinese central enterprises.  
This research aims to gain an understanding of ERM implementation in 
Chinese construction firms (CCFs) in Singapore. As part of the research, this 
survey is to identify the importance weightings of the criteria in an ERM 
maturity assessment model, and the applicability of the ERM best practices 
in CCFs.   
You are invited to rate the importance of the 16 criteria, the applicability of the 
71 ERM best practices according to your experience and knowledge, and the 
significance of factors. In addition, you are welcome to provide other best 
practice that you deem as important and rational for ERM in CCFs. The 
findings of this study will be used to establish an ERM maturity assessment 
model for CCFs. We assure you that the information provided by you will be 





person will be identified in the research.   
Thank you for your kind assistance. 
Yours sincerely, 
Zhao Xianbo, Ph.D Candidate 
Department of Building 
National University of Singapore 
Part II: General Information  
1. Your institution type:  
  (a) Chinese construction firm; (b) Academic or research institution 
2. Designation: _________ 
3. Years of your work or research experience in the construction industry: 
  (a) 5-10; (b) 11-15; (c) 16-20; (d) 21-25; (e) >25 
4. If you are from a firm, where is the firm?  
  (a) China; (b) Asia (without China); (c) Africa; (d) Europe;  
  (e) Latin America; (f) North America; (g) Oceania. 
Part III: ERM Best Practices  
Please rate the APPLICABILITY in applying the following best practices in 
Chinese construction firms using a five-point scale: 1=very inapplicable, 
2=inapplicable, 3=medium, 4= applicable, 5=very applicable 
 




Criterion 1 Commitment of the board and senior 
management 
1 2 3 4 5 
B1.1 A written ERM policy is approved by the board 
and senior management and is made known to 
all the staff. 
     
B1.2 An ERM plan is developed and tailored to the 
corporate objectives and context. 
     
B1.3 All the risk-related decision-making and ERM 
practices are fully consistent with the ERM 
policy and plan. 
     









takes part in ERM. 
B1.5 The commitment is continual and is not 
interrupted by changes in the board or senior 
management. 
     
Criterion 2 ERM ownership 1 2 3 4 5 
B2.1 A dedicated senior executive, or a stand-alone 
department, or a board-level committee takes 
charge of risk oversight and centralizes risk 
management. 
     
B2.2 All the staff actively participate in the ERM 
process. 
     
B2.3 Each category of critical risk has a risk owner, 
who fully understands the risks falling within 
the limit of his or her accountability. 
     
B2.4 All risk owners have sufficient authority to 
oversee any risk-related action, and accept 
clear defined responsibility for managing the 
risks. 
     
B2.5 The authority and responsibility of risk owners 
is understood by staff at all levels of a firm. 
     
B2.6 ERM is incorporated into the performance 
review and assessment of risk owners. 
     
Criterion 3 Risk appetite and tolerance
1
 1 2 3 4 5 
B3.1 Risk appetite is formally and clearly defined 
according to the corporate strategy. 
     
B3.2 Risk appetite is made known to all the staff in 
the firm. 
     
B3.3 Risk tolerance for each specific risk is formally 
and clearly defined according to the corporate 
objectives. 
     
B3.4 Differences between risk tolerance defined and 
actual risks are regularly assessed. 
     
B3.5 Expected effects of risk response strategies are 
assessed against risk tolerance. 
     
Criterion 4 Risk-aware culture 1 2 3 4 5 
                                                             
1 Risk appetite is the amount and type of risk that an organization is willing to 
pursue and retain, while risk tolerance is an organization's or stakeholder's 
readiness to bear the risk after risk response in order to achieve its objectives. 
Risk appetite relates primarily to the business model and is strategic, while 









B4.1 A risk-aware culture is created throughout a 
firm and makes staff at all levels have risk 
awareness. 
     
B4.2 A climate of trust is built up within a firm and 
project teams. 
     
B4.3 Risk-aware culture is incorporated into the 
corporate culture. 
     
B4.4 There is neither a blame-culture nor defensive 
routines
2
 in a firm. 
     
B4.5 The expected behavior within the organization 
is explicitly expressed to sustain a strong 
risk-aware culture. 
     
Criterion 5 Resources 1 2 3 4 5 
B5.1 Resources are continuously invested in 
improving the risk management process, tools, 
techniques, personnel skills etc. 
     
B5.2 Resources are allocated for risk response based 
on the results of risk analysis and risk priority. 
     
B5.3 A firm has sufficient qualified staff and internal 
knowledge, skills and expertise to implement 
ERM. 
     
B5.4 External consultants or experts are used to 
reinforce and complement existing internal 
knowledge and skills about ERM. 
     
B5.5 A comprehensive set of metrics is consistently 
applied to measure ERM performance. 
     
Criterion 6 Risk identification, analysis and 
response 
1 2 3 4 5 
B6.1 A firm adopts a formalized and standardized 
ERM process at project and firm levels. 
     
B6.2 The risk information collected is ensured to be 
relevant and reliable. 
     
B6.3 Qualitative and quantitative risk management 
tools and techniques are consistently used. 
     
B6.4 A firm comprehensively identifies sources of 
risk, areas of impacts and their causes and 
     
                                                             
2  Defensive routines are action, policy, or practice that prevents 
organizational participants from experiencing embarrassment or threat and, at 
the same time, prevents them from discovering the causes of the 










B6.5 The likelihood of occurrence and impact 
magnitude of all the risks identified are 
analyzed in order to identify the risk rank and 
management priority. 
     
B6.6 The relationship of different risks is considered 
and assessed. 
     
B6.7 The appropriate risk response strategy is 
identified through considering the risk 
significance, risk appetite and tolerance, 
resource availability, cost versus benefit 
comparisons, as well as the enterprise 
objectives. 
     
B6.8 Risk response is designed to deal with critical 
risks at their sources. 
     
Criterion 7 Iterative and dynamic ERM process steps 1 2 3 4 5 
B7.1 New and emerging risks are consistently 
identified in a timely and proactive manner. 
     
B7.2 Risk information is collected from various 
sources and updated regularly. 
     
B7.3 Risk identification, analysis, and response 
activities are continuously monitored, 
reviewed and improved. 
     
B7.4 The ERM process is clearly recorded to make it 
convenient to review and improve. 
     
B7.5 Residual risks that still remain after the 
response measures have been fully 
implemented are assessed. 
     
Criterion 8 Leveraging risks as opportunities 1 2 3 4 5 
B8.1 It is enterprise-widely recognized that 
opportunities are an aspect of risks. 
     
B8.2 Opportunities are regularly identified and 
explored during risk management planning. 
     
B8.3 Opportunities are regularly assessed by 
weighing the expected benefits and relevant 
likelihood against the potential losses and their 
likelihood. 
     
B8.4 Opportunities for the expected improvement of 
firm performance are actively pursued through 
ERM. 
     









competencies and risk appetite. 
Criterion 9 Risk communication  1 2 3 4 5 
B9.1 Risk information is consistently communicated 
and shared across projects and departments 
within the firm. 
     
B9.2 Critical risk information is reported to the 
board and senior management in a periodic or 
immediate manner according to risk severity or 
urgency. 
     
B9.3 Clear communication lines are established to 
ensure line managers, project managers and 
front-line staff are promptly notified of critical 
information and decisions from senior 
management. 
     
B9.4 Individual comments and views of internal or 
external experts are encouraged during the 
ERM process. 
     
Criterion 10 A common risk language
3
 1 2 3 4 5 
B10.1 The risk language clearly explains the risk 
management terminologies and methodologies 
used within a firm. 
     
B10.2 The risk language is understood and 
maintained by all the staff within a firm. 
     
B10.3 The risk language is used consistently in all the 
communication within a firm. 
     
Criterion 11 A risk management information system 
(RMIS) 
1 2 3 4 5 
B11.1 The firm has a RMIS that serves as a platform 
for risk communication and reporting, records 
ERM activities, undertakes risk identification 
and analysis, and facilitates selecting response 
strategies.   
     
B11.2 Staff at all levels clearly understand how to 
apply the RMIS in ERM practices. 
     
B11.3 The functions of the RMIS are fully used in 
ERM practices. 
     
Criterion 12 Training programs 1 2 3 4 5 
                                                             
3 A common risk language explains the terminologies and methodologies and 
contributes to a common understanding of their meanings and context 









B12.1 Formalized training programs ensure all the 
relevant staff clearly understand the ERM 
policy, the ERM process and potential benefits, 
thus reducing misunderstanding and anxiety 
about ERM. 
     
B12.2 Regular training is provided for staff to 
maintain their high-level knowledge and skills 
relating to ERM. 
     
B12.3 Training programs make the relevant staff 
learn from successes and failures from both 
previous and on-going projects. 
     
B12.4 The staff who are professional or experienced 
in ERM share their knowledge relating to ERM 
with trainees in training programs. 
     
Criterion 13 Formalized key risk indicators (KRIs)
4
 1 2 3 4 5 
B13.1 KRIs are identified for all the critical risks that 
a firm faces. 
     
B13.2 KRIs are consistently reviewed and updated.      
B13.3 KRIs are regularly monitored and analyzed by 
the risk owners. 
     
B13.4 KRIs act as early warning signals of increasing 
risk exposures in a firm. 
     
Criterion 14 Integration of ERM into business 
processes 
1 2 3 4 5 
B14.1 Management across a firm consistently 
considers risk information, risk tolerance and 
appetite, risk priority and risk response 
strategies in all decision-making activities, 
especially in strategic decision-making. 
     
B14.2 ERM is fully integrated into all daily 
management and business processes. 
     
B14.3 The implementation levels of the ERM best 
practices are regularly assessed to identify gaps 
and improve ERM practices. 
     
Criterion 15 Objective setting  1 2 3 4 5 
B15.1 Objectives of the firm are clearly identified and 
understood by staff at all levels.   
     
                                                             
4 A key risk indicator (KRI) is a measure to indicate the potential, presence, 
level, or trend of a risk. KRIs can predict whether a risk occurred or is 









B15.2 All objectives have performance measures and 
all performance measures are linked with 
objectives. 
     
B15.3 Deviations from plans or expectations are 
regularly reviewed and assessed against the 
corporate objectives and project objectives. 
     
Criterion 16 Monitoring, review and improvement of 
ERM framework 
1 2 3 4 5 
B16.1 A firm regularly monitors the progress of ERM 
implementation against, and deviation from, 
the ERM plan. 
     
B16.2 A firm regularly reviews whether the ERM 
framework, policy and plan are still appropriate 
according to the corporate external and internal 
context. 
     
B16.3 Actions are taken to improve the ERM 
framework, policy and plan, based on results of 
monitoring and reviews.  
     
 
If there are other ERM best practices that you deem as important and 
rational, please list them below: 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Part IV: ERM Maturity Criteria  
There are 16 criteria identified from the literature review. Please rate the 
IMPORTANCE of each criterion towards ERM maturity assessment using a 
five-point scale: 1=very low, 2=low, 3=medium, 4=high, 5=very high.  
No. ERM maturity criteria 
Rating Importance 
1 2 3 4 5 
M01 Commitment of the board and senior 
management 
     
M02 ERM ownership      
M03 Risk appetite and tolerance      
M04 Risk-aware culture      
M05 Sufficient resources      
M06 Risk identification, analysis and prioritization      
M07 Iterative and dynamic ERM process steps      





No. ERM maturity criteria 
Rating Importance 
1 2 3 4 5 
M09 Risk communication      
M10 A common risk language      
M11 A risk management information system      
M12 Training programs      
M13 Formalized key risk indicators       
M14 Integration of ERM into business processes      
M15 Objective setting      
M16 Monitoring, review and improvement of ERM 
framework 
     
  
Thank you for your kind assistance! 
If you have any questions about the survey, please feel free to contact 
Zhao Xianbo. 






Appendix 2 Questionnaire in Survey II 
Survey on Enterprise Risk Management Implementation in 
Chinese Construction Firms based in Singapore 
Part I: Introduction  
The research being conducted at the Department of Building, National 
University of Singapore aims to gain an understanding of Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM) implementation in Chinese construction firms (CCFs) 
based in Singapore. As part of the research, this survey is to identify the 
critical factors driving and hindering the ERM implementation, and the 
implementation level of ERM in CCFs based in Singapore.  
You are invited to rate the extent to which the factors listed in this 
questionnaire drive or hinder ERM practice and the implementation level of 
several criteria in your firm according to your experience and knowledge. The 
findings of this study will be used to identify the critical drivers for and 
hindrances to ERM implementation as well as the ERM maturity level in 
CCFs based in Singapore. We assure you that the information provided by you 
will be kept strictly confidential and will be used for academic purpose only. 
Any reports resulting from this survey will make no identifiable reference to 
the specific sources of data. We reiterate that no individual company or person 
will be identified in this research.  
Thank you for your kind assistance. 
Yours sincerely  
 
ZHAO Xianbo, PhD candidate 
Department of Building 






Part II: General Information  
1. Your designation: ______ 
2. Your firm’s financial grade under BCA: ______ 
3. Your firm has been in Singapore for ___ years. 
4. Your total working experience: ___ years.  
5. You have been working in Singapore for ____ years. 
Part III: Drivers and Hindrances for Enterprise Risk Management  
Please rate the SIGNIFICANCE of the following factors in driving and 
hindering Enterprise Risk Management implementation in your firm using a 
five-point scale: 1=very insignificant, 2=insignificant, 3=neutral, 
4=significant, 5=very significant.  
 
No. Drivers for ERM implementation 
Rate Significance 
1 2 3 4 5 
D01 Legal and regulatory compliance requirements      
D02 Non-mandatory reports or standards      
D03 Credit rating agencies’ requirements      
D04 Reduced earnings volatility      
D05 Reduced costs and losses      
D06 Increased profitability and earnings      
D07 Improved decision-making      
D08 Better risk reporting and communication      
D09 Increased management accountability       
D10 Greater management consensus      
D11 Competitive advantages      
D12 Better resource allocation      
D13 Improved clients’ satisfaction      
D14 Improved control of an enterprise over its 
projects 
     
D15 A broader scope of risks      
D16 Advances in information technology       
D17 Request and encouragement from the board and 
senior management 






No. Hindrances to ERM implementation 
Rate Significance 
1 2 3 4 5 
H01 Low data quality      
H02 Lack of data      
H03 Insufficient resources (e.g. time, money, 
people, etc.) 
     
H04 Lack of a formalized ERM process      
H05 Lack of risk management techniques and tools      
H06 Lack of internal knowledge, skills and expertise       
H07 Lack of qualified personnel to implement ERM      
H08 Lack of a risk management information system      
H09 Unsupportive organizational structure      
H10 Unsupportive organizational culture      
H11 Lack of a common risk language      
H12 Lack of risk awareness within the organization      
H13 Confidence in the existing risk management 
practices 
     




     
H15 Lack of shared understanding and approach to 
risk management across departments 
     
H16 Lack of understanding relating to effective 
ERM process 
     
H17 Perception that ERM adds to bureaucracy       
H18 Perception that ERM increases costs and 
administration  
     
H19 Perception that ERM interferes with business 
activities 
     
H20 Inadequate training on ERM      
H21 Lack of an ERM business case      
H22 Lack of perceived value or benefits of ERM      
H23 Lack of commitment of the board and senior 
management 
     
H24 Not perceived as a priority by senior 
management 
     
H25 Lack of board or senior management leadership      
H26 The movement of the ERM champion from 
senior management into other areas without a 
successor  
     
H27 Lack of consensus on benefits of ERM among      
                                                             
1 Silo mentality means that persons in one department or unit do not care 





board members and senior management 
H28 Other management priorities      
H29 Lack of a clear ERM implementation plan      
H30 Inability to coordinate with other departments      
H31 Lack of a set of metrics for measuring 
performance of ERM 
     
H32 Unclear ownership and responsibility for ERM 
implementation 
     
H33 Organizational turf
2
      
H34 Employees’ reluctance to give up power      
H35 People's reluctance to share risk information      
H36 Recession and business downturn      
 
Part IV: Enterprise Risk Management maturity assessment  
Please rate the IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL of each practice by 
comparing similar current practices in your firm with the best practices listed 
below using a five-point scale: 1=very low, 2=low, 3=medium, 4=high, 
5=very high 
 
No. Criteria and best practices 
Implementation 
(1=Very Low; 5=Very 
High) 
Criterion 1 Commitment of the board and senior 
management 
1 2 3 4 5 
B1.1 A written ERM policy is approved by the board 
and senior management and is made known to 
all the staff. 
     
B1.2 An ERM plan is developed and tailored to the 
corporate objectives and context. 
     
B1.3 All the risk-related decision-making and ERM 
practices are fully consistent with the ERM 
policy and plan. 
     
                                                             
2 Organizational turf means that each organization has its “domain” or field 
of operation. It also has human and material resources, goals and tasks related 
to the goals. The basic factor in triggering a “turf battle” is the degree of 
power surrendered or gained by the organizations involved. “Power” as used 
here is the ability to control or manage resources to accomplish a goal. If both 
organizations feel they will gain by working together or having access to an 
equal degree of power, cooperation continues. But if one organization feels it 





No. Criteria and best practices 
Implementation 
(1=Very Low; 5=Very 
High) 
B1.4 The board and senior management actively 
takes part in ERM. 
     
B1.5 The commitment is continual and is not 
interrupted by changes in the board or senior 
management. 
     
Criterion 2 ERM ownership 1 2 3 4 5 
B2.1 A dedicated senior executive, or a stand-alone 
department, or a board-level committee takes 
charge of risk oversight and centralizes risk 
management. 
     
B2.2 Each category of critical risk has a risk owner, 
who fully understands the risks falling within 
the limit of his or her accountability. 
     
B2.3 All risk owners have sufficient authority to 
oversee any risk-related action, and accept clear 
defined responsibility for managing the risks. 
     
B2.4 ERM is incorporated into the performance 
review and assessment of risk owners. 
     
Criterion 3 Risk appetite and tolerance
3
 1 2 3 4 5 
B3.1 Risk appetite is formally and clearly defined 
according to the corporate strategy. 
     
B3.2 Risk appetite is made known to all the staff in 
the firm. 
     
B3.3 Risk tolerance for each specific risk is formally 
and clearly defined according to the corporate 
objectives. 
     
B3.4 Differences between risk tolerance defined and 
actual risks are regularly assessed. 
     
B3.5 Expected effects of risk response strategies are 
assessed against risk tolerance. 
     
Criterion 4 Risk-aware culture 1 2 3 4 5 
B4.1 A risk-aware culture is created throughout a 
firm and makes staff at all levels have risk 
awareness. 
     
B4.2 A climate of trust is built up within a firm and      
                                                             
3 Risk appetite is the amount and type of risk that an organization is willing to 
pursue and retain, while risk tolerance is an organization's or stakeholder's 
readiness to bear the risk after risk response in order to achieve its objectives. 
Risk appetite relates primarily to the business model and is strategic, while 





No. Criteria and best practices 
Implementation 
(1=Very Low; 5=Very 
High) 
project teams. 
B4.3 Risk-aware culture is incorporated into the 
corporate culture. 
     
B4.4 The expected behavior within the organization 
is explicitly expressed to sustain a strong 
risk-aware culture. 
     
Criterion 5 Resources 1 2 3 4 5 
B5.1 Resources are continuously invested in 
improving the risk management process, tools, 
techniques, personnel skills etc. 
     
B5.2 Resources are allocated for risk response based 
on the results of risk analysis and risk priority. 
     
B5.3 A firm has sufficient qualified staff and internal 
knowledge, skills and expertise to implement 
ERM. 
     
B5.4 External consultants or experts are used to 
reinforce and complement existing internal 
knowledge and skills about ERM. 
     
B5.5 A comprehensive set of metrics is consistently 
applied to measure ERM performance. 
     
Criterion 6 Risk identification, analysis and response 1 2 3 4 5 
B6.1 A firm adopts a formalized and standardized 
ERM process at project and firm levels. 
     
B6.2 The risk information collected is ensured to be 
relevant and reliable. 
     
B6.3 Qualitative and quantitative risk management 
tools and techniques are consistently used. 
     
B6.4 A firm comprehensively identifies sources of 
risk, areas of impacts and their causes and 
potential impacts. 
     
B6.5 The likelihood of occurrence and impact 
magnitude of all the risks identified are 
analyzed in order to identify the risk rank and 
management priority. 
     
B6.6 The relationship of different risks is considered 
and assessed. 
     
B6.7 The appropriate risk response strategy is 
identified through considering the risk 
significance, risk appetite and tolerance, 
resource availability, cost versus benefit 
comparisons, as well as the enterprise 





No. Criteria and best practices 
Implementation 
(1=Very Low; 5=Very 
High) 
objectives. 
B6.8 Risk response is designed to deal with critical 
risks at their sources. 
     
Criterion 7 Iterative and dynamic ERM process steps 1 2 3 4 5 
B7.1 New and emerging risks are consistently 
identified in a timely and proactive manner. 
     
B7.2 Risk information is collected from various 
sources and updated regularly. 
     
B7.3 Risk identification, analysis, and response 
activities are continuously monitored, reviewed 
and improved. 
     
B7.4 The ERM process is clearly recorded to make it 
convenient to review and improve. 
     
B7.5 Residual risks that still remain after the 
response measures have been fully 
implemented are assessed. 
     
Criterion 8 Leveraging risks as opportunities 1 2 3 4 5 
B8.1 It is enterprise-widely recognized that 
opportunities are an aspect of risks. 
     
B8.2 Opportunities are regularly identified and 
explored during risk management planning. 
     
B8.3 Opportunities are regularly assessed by 
weighing the expected benefits and relevant 
likelihood against the potential losses and their 
likelihood. 
     
B8.4 Opportunities for the expected improvement of 
firm performance are actively pursued through 
ERM. 
     
B8.5 Risk taking of a firm is aligned with its core 
competencies and risk appetite. 
     
Criterion 9 Risk communication  1 2 3 4 5 
B9.1 Risk information is consistently communicated 
and shared across projects and departments 
within the firm. 
     
B9.2 Critical risk information is reported to the board 
and senior management in a periodic or 
immediate manner according to risk severity or 
urgency. 
     
B9.3 Clear communication lines are established to 
ensure line managers, project managers and 
front-line staff are promptly notified of critical 





No. Criteria and best practices 
Implementation 
(1=Very Low; 5=Very 
High) 
information and decisions from senior 
management. 
B9.4 Individual comments and views of internal or 
external experts are encouraged during the 
ERM process. 
     
Criterion 10 A common risk language
4
 1 2 3 4 5 
B10.1 The risk language clearly explains the risk 
management terminologies and methodologies 
used within a firm. 
     
B10.2 The risk language is used consistently in all the 
communication within a firm. 
     
Criterion 11 A risk management information system 
(RMIS) 
1 2 3 4 5 
B11.1 The firm has a RMIS that serves as a platform 
for risk communication and reporting, records 
ERM activities, undertakes risk identification 
and analysis, and facilitates selecting response 
strategies.   
     
B11.2 The functions of the RMIS are fully used in 
ERM practices. 
     
Criterion 12 Training programs 1 2 3 4 5 
B12.1 Formalized training programs ensure all the 
relevant staff clearly understand the ERM 
policy, the ERM process and potential benefits, 
and thus reducing misunderstanding and 
anxiety about ERM. 
     
B12.2 Regular training is provided for staff to 
maintain their high-level knowledge and skills 
relating to ERM. 
     
B12.3 Training programs make the relevant staff learn 
from successes and failures from both previous 
and on-going projects. 
     
B12.4 The staff who are professional or experienced 
in ERM share their knowledge relating to ERM 
with trainees in training programs. 
     
Criterion 13 Formalized key risk indicators (KRIs)
5
 1 2 3 4 5 
                                                             
4 A common risk language explains the terminologies and methodologies and 
contributes to a common understanding of their meanings and context 





No. Criteria and best practices 
Implementation 
(1=Very Low; 5=Very 
High) 
B13.1 KRIs are identified for all the critical risks that a 
firm faces. 
     
B13.2 KRIs are consistently reviewed and updated.      
B13.3 KRIs are regularly monitored and analyzed by 
the risk owners. 
     
B13.4 KRIs act as early warning signals of increasing 
risk exposures in a firm. 
     
Criterion 14 Integration of ERM into business 
processes 
1 2 3 4 5 
B14.1 Management across a firm consistently 
considers risk information, risk tolerance and 
appetite, risk priority and risk response 
strategies in all decision-making activities, 
especially in strategic decision-making. 
     
B14.2 ERM is fully integrated into all daily 
management and business processes. 
     
B14.3 The implementation levels of the ERM best 
practices are regularly assessed to identify gaps 
and improve ERM practices. 
     
Criterion 15 Objective setting  1 2 3 4 5 
B15.1 Objectives of the firm are clearly identified and 
understood by staff at all levels.   
     
B15.2 All objectives have performance measures and 
all performance measures are linked with 
objectives. 
     
B15.3 Deviations from plans or expectations are 
regularly reviewed and assessed against the 
corporate objectives and project objectives. 
     
Criterion 16 Monitoring, review and improvement of 
ERM framework 
1 2 3 4 5 
B16.1 A firm regularly monitors the progress of ERM 
implementation against, and deviation from, the 
ERM plan. 
     
B16.2 A firm regularly reviews whether the ERM 
framework, policy and plan are still appropriate 
according to the corporate external and internal 
context. 
     
                                                                                                                                                               
5 A key risk indicator (KRI) is a measure to indicate the potential, presence, 
level, or trend of a risk. KRIs can predict whether a risk occurred or is 





No. Criteria and best practices 
Implementation 
(1=Very Low; 5=Very 
High) 
B16.3 Actions are taken to improve the ERM 
framework, policy and plan, based on results of 
monitoring and reviews.  
     
 
Thank you for your kind assistance! 
If you have any questions about the survey, please feel free to contact 
Zhao Xianbo. 




Appendix 3 Interview guide 
Interview Questions about Enterprise Risk Management  
1. Basic information 
1.1 Designation: _______ 
1.2 Working experience:    years; and    years in Singapore. 
1.3 Grade of the firm according to BCA:   
1.4 No. of the completed projects in Singapore:____    
1.5 Annual revenue in Singapore: _________SGD 
1.6 Private, State-owned, or Joint Venture ? 
2 Factors affecting enterprise risk management (ERM) implementation 
2.1 What are the drivers for ERM implementation in your firm?  
2.2 What are the hindrances to ERM implementation in your firm? 
3 ERM ownership 
3.1 Who is ultimately responsible for risk management in your firm? 
3.2 Is there any independent RM department or RM committee of the board in 
your firm? How does it operate? 
3.3 Who is in charge of the independent RM department or committee? 
4 Risk communication  
4.1 How do you communicate risk information in your firm?  
4.2 Is there a common risk language in your firm? If no, what are the common 
terms in your firm to communicate about risks? If yes, how does your firm 
create the risk language? 
4.3 How do you report the operation status and ERM implementation to your 
parent firm?  
4.4 How and in what aspects does the parent firm affect your firm in Singapore?  
4.5 Do you have risk management information systems (RMIS) or intranets 
facilitating risk communication? 
5 Risk-aware culture 
5.1 How does the top management cultivate an ERM culture in your firm? 
5.2 How does your firm establish risk management accountability in your firm? 
5.3 Please introduce the training or organizational learning programs relating to 
ERM in your firm. Do the training programs employ external consultants? 
6 ERM framework or process 
6.1 Have you heard of the COSO (the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of 
the Treadway Commission) ERM framework, SASAC (China’s State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council) 
ERM framework, or ISO 31000:2009 risk management frameworks? And 
how much do you know about them? 
6.2 What ERM framework do you use and does this framework refer to the above 
COSO, SASAC, ISO frameworks?  
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6.3 Does your firm have risk appetite and tolerance? Please state the risk appetite 
and tolerance. 
6.4 How do you identify risks? Do you have a risk checklist or inventory of risk 
indicators in place to help identify risks at the enterprise level? Do you review 
and update the risk checklist or inventory periodically? 
6.5 How do you analyze risks? Do you use experience, techniques or software 
(information system)?  
6.6 How are the risk response measures decided in your firm? Who decides it? 
6.7 How does ERM contribute to the decision making in your firm? 
6.8 How do you review and monitor risks? Do you use a set of key risk indicators 
for the critical risks to monitor risks?  
 420 
 
Appendix 4 Questionnaire for the validation of the KBDSS 
Validation of the Knowledge-Based Decision Support System for 
Enterprise Risk Management in Chinese Construction Firms 
You are invited to evaluate the knowledge-based decision support system 
(KBDSS) for enterprise risk management (ERM) in Chinese construction firms 
(CCFs). The KBDSS for ERM in CCFs serves as an internal assessment tool for 
management staff. The objectives of the KBDSS are to: assess the ERM maturity 
in a CCF; visualize the ERM maturity assessment results; provide action plans for 
improving the ERM practices along the maturity continuum; and generate a 
printable ERM maturity assessment report.  
The information which you provide will be kept strictly confidential and will be 
used solely for academic purposes only. Your name and your firm name will not 
appear in the report. Thank you for your kind assistance. 
Yours sincerely, 
ZHAO Xianbo, PhD candidate 
Department of Building 
National University of Singapore 
Part I: General Information  
1. Your designation:   
2. Your total working experience in the construction industry:   years.  
3. Your firm name:   
4. Your email address:   
Part I: Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) Maturity Assessment  
ERM is defined as “a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, 
management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the 
enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and 
manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of entity objectives.” ERM maturity reflects the 
sophistication of ERM implementation.  
1. In the table, please rate the implementation level (1%-100%) of each criterion 




2. Please use the KBDSS software to assess the ERM maturity of your firm. 
Please click the “Print the ERM Maturity Assessment Report” button on the 
page of “ERM maturity assessment 8” in the software, and return a copy of 
the report to Mr. Zhao Xianbo. 
Code ERM maturity criteria 
The implementation level (%) of 














M01 Commitment of the board and senior 
management 
      
M02 ERM ownership       
M03 Risk appetite and tolerance       
M04 Risk-aware culture       
M05 Sufficient resources       
M06 Risk identification, analysis and 
prioritization 
      
M07 Iterative and dynamic ERM process 
steps 
      
M08 Leveraging risks as opportunities       
M09 Risk communication       
M10 A common risk language       
M11 A risk management information 
system 
      
M12 Training programs       
M13 Formalized key risk indicators        
M14 Integration of ERM into business 
processes 
      
M15 Objective setting       
M16 Monitoring, review and improvement 
of ERM framework 
      
Overall ERM maturity score       
3. Do you think the action plans provided by the KBDSS is useful to the decision 
making relating to improving the ERM practice in your firm?  
4. What do you think of the user-friendliness of the KBDSS for ERM?  
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Appendix 5 A calculation example of the ERM maturity model 
The ERM maturity model in Section 3.7.3 is adopted to assess the ERM maturity 
level in a CCF based in Singapore to illustrate the calculation process. The 
relative importance scores of the maturity criteria were collected from Survey I. 
Using equation 3.9, the mean scores of these criteria (MSi) were calculated and 
presented in Table 7.2. Then, using equation 3.10, criterion weights (Wi) can be 
calculated. For instance, the weight of criterion M01 was calculated as follows: 
𝑊         ∑      
  
   ⁄ = 4.55 / (4.55 + 4.16 + 3.51 + 3.82 + 4.01 + 4.28 + 3.97 + 
3.61 + 3.90 + 3.40 + 3.76 + 3.92 + 3.89 + 4.08 + 4.26 + 3.97) = 7.21% 
In this example, three professionals participate in the ERM maturity assessment 
the rate the implementation levels of the 66 best practices using the five-point 
scale (1 = very low, 2 = low, 3 = medium, 4 = high, and 5 = very high). The input 
data ( ̃   ) assigned by the three professionals are presented in Table A.1.  
Using equation 3.11, the TFN of the implementation level of each best practice 
( ̃  ) can be calculated, as shown in column  ̃   of Table A.1. In this example, 
there are three participants in ERM maturity assessment, i.e. k = 3. As shown in 
Table A.1, the best practice B01.4 (The board and senior management actively 
takes part in ERM) obtained the linguistic values of “very high”, “high”, and 
“very high” from the three professionals. According to Table 3.3, the TFNs of 
“high” and “very high” are (0.50, 0.75, 1.00) and (0.75, 1.00, 1.00), respectively. 
Following the addition and scalar multiplication operation rules of TFNs 
(euqations 3.3 and 3.7),  ̃   is calculated as follows:  
 ̃   = (             3    ⁄   ∑  ̃   
3
    = 1/3 × [(0.75, 1.00, 1.00) + (0.50, 
0.75, 1.00) + (0.75, 1.00, 1.00)] = 1/3 × (0.75 + 0.50 + 0.75, 1.00 + 0.75 + 1.00, 
1.00 + 1.00 + 1.00) = (0.67, 0.92, 1.00) 
 423 
 
Table A.1 The calculation of the ERMMI of a CCF 
Code  ̃     ̃     ̃  3  ̃    ̃  Wi  ̃  × Wi 
M01 B01.1 H (0.5, 0.75, 1) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) (0.42, 0.67, 0.92) (0.33, 0.57, 0.78) 7.21% (0.024, 0.041, 0.056) 
B01.2 L (0, 0.25, 0.5) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.00, 0.17, 0.42)   
B01.3 H (0.5, 0.75, 1) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.17, 0.42, 0.67)   
B01.4 VH (0.75, 1, 1) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) VH (0.75, 1, 1) (0.67, 0.92, 1.00)   
B01.5 H (0.5, 0.75, 1) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) (0.42, 0.67, 0.92)   
M02 B02.1 M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.08, 0.17, 0.42) (0.02, 0.10, 0.35) 6.59% (0.001, 0.007, 0.023) 
B02.2 L (0, 0.25, 0.5) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.00, 0.08, 0.33)   
B02.3 L (0, 0.25, 0.5) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.00, 0.08, 0.33)   
B02.4 L (0, 0.25, 0.5) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.00, 0.08, 0.33)   
M03 B03.1 L (0, 0.25, 0.5) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.08, 0.33, 0.58) (0.13, 0.37, 0.62) 5.56% (0.007, 0.020, 0.034) 
B03.2 L (0, 0.25, 0.5) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.08, 0.33, 0.58)   
B03.3 M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.25, 0.50, 0.75)   
B03.4 L (0, 0.25, 0.5) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.08, 0.25, 0.50)   
B03.5 L (0, 0.25, 0.5) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.17, 0.42, 0.67)   
M04 B04.1 H (0.5, 0.75, 1) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.33, 0.58, 0.83) (0.40, 0.65, 0.88) 6.06% (0.024, 0.039, 0.053) 
B04.2 H (0.5, 0.75, 1) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) VH (0.75, 1, 1) (0.58, 0.83, 1.00)   
B04.3 H (0.5, 0.75, 1) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.33, 0.58, 0.83)   
B04.4 M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) (0.33, 0.58, 0.83)   
M05 B05.1 H (0.5, 0.75, 1) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) (0.42, 0.67, 0.92) (0.27, 0.48, 0.73) 6.36% (0.017, 0.031, 0.047) 
B05.2 H (0.5, 0.75, 1) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.33, 0.58, 0.83)   
B05.3 M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.17, 0.42, 0.67)   
B05.4 H (0.5, 0.75, 1) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.42, 0.67, 0.92)   
B05.5 VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.00, 0.08, 0.33)   
M06 B06.1 H (0.5, 0.75, 1) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) (0.42, 0.67, 0.92) (0.26, 0.50, 0.74) 6.79% (0.018, 0.034, 0.050) 
B06.2 H (0.5, 0.75, 1) VH (0.75, 1, 1) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) (0.58, 0.83, 1.00)   
B06.3 H (0.5, 0.75, 1) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) (0.42, 0.67, 0.92)   
B06.4 M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.17, 0.42, 0.67)   
B06.5 M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.17, 0.42, 0.67)   
B06.6 VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.08, 0.25, 0.50)   
B06.7 L (0, 0.25, 0.5) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.17, 0.42, 0.67)   
B06.8 M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.08, 0.33, 0.58)   
M07 B07.1 M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.08, 0.33, 0.58) (0.15, 0.38, 0.63) 6.29% (0.009, 0.024, 0.040) 
B07.2 H (0.5, 0.75, 1) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.33, 0.58, 0.83)   
B07.3 M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.17, 0.42, 0.67)   
B07.4 M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.17, 0.42, 0.67)   
Table A.1 (Continued) 
424 
 
Code  ̃     ̃     ̃  3  ̃    ̃  Wi  ̃  × Wi 
B07.5 L (0, 0.25, 0.5) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.00, 0.17, 0.42)   
M08 B08.1 L (0, 0.25, 0.5) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.17, 0.42, 0.67) (0.33, 0.58, 0.83) 5.72% (0.019, 0.033, 0.048) 
B08.2 H (0.5, 0.75, 1) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) (0.42, 0.67, 0.92)   
B08.3 H (0.5, 0.75, 1) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) (0.42, 0.67, 0.92)   
B08.4 M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) (0.25, 0.50, 0.75)   
B08.5 M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) (0.42, 0.67, 0.92)   
M09 B09.1 M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) (0.42, 0.67, 0.92) (0.52, 0.77, 0.96) 6.18% (0.032, 0.048, 0.059) 
B09.2 VH (0.75, 1, 1) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) VH (0.75, 1, 1) (0.67, 0.92, 1.00)   
B09.3 H (0.5, 0.75, 1) VH (0.75, 1, 1) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) (0.58, 0.83, 1.00)   
B09.4 M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) (0.42, 0.67, 0.92)   
M10 B10.1 H (0.5, 0.75, 1) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.17, 0.42, 0.67) (0.08, 0.33, 0.58) 5.40% (0.005, 0.018, 0.032) 
B10.2 L (0, 0.25, 0.5) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.00, 0.25, 0.50)   
M11 B11.1 VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.00, 0.08, 0.33) (0.00, 0.04, 0.29) 5.97% (0.000, 0.002, 0.017) 
B11.2 VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25)   
M12 B12.1 M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.17, 0.42, 0.67) (0.17, 0.40, 0.65) 6.22% (0.010, 0.025, 0.040) 
B12.2 L (0, 0.25, 0.5) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.17, 0.42, 0.67)   
B12.3 M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.25, 0.50, 0.75)   
B12.4 L (0, 0.25, 0.5) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.08, 0.25, 0.50)   
M13 B13.1 L (0, 0.25, 0.5) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.00, 0.17, 0.42) (0.04, 0.13, 0.38) 6.16% (0.003, 0.008, 0.023) 
B13.2 VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25)   
B13.3 VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.00, 0.00, 0.25)   
B13.4 M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.17, 0.33, 0.58)   
M14 B14.1 M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) (0.42, 0.67, 0.92) (0.17, 0.39, 0.64) 6.47% (0.011, 0.025, 0.041) 
B14.2 L (0, 0.25, 0.5) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.08, 0.33, 0.58)   
B14.3 VL (0, 0.25, 0.5) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.00, 0.17, 0.42)   
M15 B15.1 H (0.5, 0.75, 1) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) (0.33, 0.58, 0.83) (0.36, 0.61, 0.86) 6.75% (0.024, 0.041, 0.058) 
B15.2 M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) (0.33, 0.58, 0.83)   
B15.3 H (0.5, 0.75, 1) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) H (0.5, 0.75, 1) (0.42, 0.67, 0.92)   
M16 B16.1 L (0, 0.25, 0.5) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.08, 0.33, 0.58) (0.06, 0.31, 0.56) 6.29% (0.003, 0.019, 0.035) 
B16.2 L (0, 0.25, 0.5) M (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.08, 0.33, 0.58)   
B16.3 L (0, 0.25, 0.5) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) L (0, 0.25, 0.5) (0.00, 0.25, 0.50)     
Sum           100% (0.21, 0.42, 0.66) 





Then, using equation 3.12, and the TFN of the implementation level of each 
criterion ( ̃ ) can be calculated. For example, the TFNs of the implementation 
levels of the five best practices (u = 5) under the criterion M01 are indicated in 
Table A.1. Thus,  ̃  is calculated as follows: 
 ̃   (          3   5⁄  ∑  ̃  
5
    = 1/5 × [(0.42, 0.67, 0.92) + (0.00, 0.17, 
0.42) + (0.17, 0.42, 0.67) + (0.67, 0.92, 1.00) + (0.42, 0.67, 0.92)] = 1/5 × 
(0.42 + 0.00 + 0.17 + 0.67 +0.42, 0.67 + 0.17 + 0.42 + 0.92 + 0.67, 0.92 + 
0.42 + 0.67 + 1.00 + 0.92) = (0.33, 0.57, 0.78) 
Using equation 3.13, The TFN of the ERM maturity level of Firm A can be 
calculated as follows:  
 ̃    (       3   ∑ (𝑊     ̃ 
  
      = 7.21% × (0.33, 0.57, 0.78) + 6.59% 
× (0.02, 0.10, 0.35) + 5.56% × (0.13, 0.37, 0.62) + 6.06% × (0.40, 0.65, 0.88) 
+ 6.36% × (0.27, 0.48, 0.73) + 6.79% × (0.26, 0.50, 0.74) + 6.29% × (0.15, 
0.38, 0.63) + 5.72% × (0.33, 0.58, 0.83) + 6.18% × (0.52, 0.77, 0.96) + 5.40% 
× (0.08, 0.33, 0.58) + 5.97% × (0.00, 0.04, 0.29) + 6.22% × (0.17, 0.40, 0.65) 
+ 6.16% × (0.04, 0.13, 0.38) + 6.47% × (0.17, 0.39, 0.64) + 6.75% × (0.36, 
0.61, 0.86) + 6.29% × (0.06, 0.31, 0.56) = (0.21, 0.42, 0.66) 
Thus,        3 are 0.21, 0.42, and 0.66, respectively, and the crisp ERMMI 
value of this CCF can be calculated using equation 3.16:  
        ⁄  (       3  = 1/3 × (0.21 + 0.42 + 0.66) = 0.43 
The ERMMI value falls into the regions of “low” and “medium”, and 
“medium” has a higher membership value than “low” when the X value is 0.43. 
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